Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-25-00034721 Date: 2025-10-01 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

TITAN TOOL & DIE LIMITED – Applicant

– and –

UNIFOR AND ITS LOCAL 195, EMILE NABBOUT, SARKIS GASPAR, JOHN DOE 1 and JOHN DOE 2 – Respondents

Counsel:

• Dante Gatti and Jeffrey A. Patterson, for the Applicant
• Adrienne Lei and Megan Phyper, for the Respondents

Heard: September 23, 2025

Reasons for Decision

Justice Kalajdzic:

Overview

[1] On April 4, 2025, I granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain a blockade at the entrance of the premises owned by the applicant, Titan Tool & Die Limited, located at 2801 Howard Avenue (the "April Order"). In reasons released on April 7, 2025, I explained that the respondents did not have the right to obstruct the removal of dies owned by third parties when protesting the loss of work caused by U.S. tariffs.

[2] More than four months later, after bargaining for a new collective agreement between the applicant and the respondent union failed, Titan locked out its unionized workers. Immediately thereafter, workers commenced picketing. According to Titan, workers are again obstructing the main entrance to its premises as well as other entrances not listed in the April Order. Titan seeks to vary the injunction to include multiple municipal addresses and a public street, all without the need to revisit the test for an injunction.

[3] The respondents submit that they are engaged in peaceful picketing in accordance with their constitutional right to protest. They argue the amendments Titan seeks are significant, and that Titan, therefore, must meet the test for a civil injunction anew, including the stringent requirements for an injunction in a labour dispute set out in s. 102 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ["CJA"]. The respondents submit that Titan does not meet two of the preconditions under s. 102 or the common law test for a civil injunction.

[4] I agree with the respondents that Titan's request for a variation of the April Order requires them to establish entitlement to an injunction. The absence of several other addresses in the original injunction was not a mere oversight at the time; there was no unlawful activity to enjoin at those locations in April. More importantly, the context of the protests has fundamentally changed. The parties are now in a labour dispute, and the workers' quarrel is not with U.S. tariff policy but with the employer who has locked them out after failed collective bargaining.

[5] I do not agree with the respondents, however, that Titan has failed to meet the preconditions for an injunction under s. 102 of the CJA. I find that the respondents have unlawfully obstructed two entrances for unreasonably lengthy periods of time. I do not agree with Titan that the respondents' picketing is otherwise unlawful, or that there is a risk of physical harm.

[6] Accordingly, the applicant's motion is granted in part. The respondents are restrained from obstructing the entrances at 2801 Howard Avenue and at 305 Charles Street. This order does not prohibit picketing that leads to reasonable inconvenience and delay caused by the respondents communicating information at the Howard Avenue and Charles Street entrances.

Facts

[7] The applicant, Titan Tool & Die Limited, is a unionized employer that specializes in producing components that are used in vehicles and other assemblies. Its primary location is located at 2801 Howard Avenue in Windsor, Ontario, but it also has a manufacturing facility in Warren, Michigan.

[8] The respondent, Unifor, is a trade union as defined in the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A. It has many chartered local unions, including Local 195 in Windsor. Together, Unifor and Local 195 (collectively "the Union") are the exclusive bargaining agent for employees at Titan.

[9] On the morning of March 31, 2025, members of the Union who were not Titan employees blocked the driveway facing Howard Avenue so that a truck loaded with dies that belonged to a Titan customer could not leave. Over the course of the day, more protestors arrived and prevented the driver of the truck, an American citizen, from leaving. A protestor threatened to slash the truck's tires.

[10] The Windsor Police Service ("WPS") arrived at the request of Titan's CEO, Dominic Chimienti. Although the WPS kept the peace, they were unsuccessful in removing the blockade.

[11] At 4:50 p.m. that day, Titan made the decision to unload the dies so that the truck driver could leave the premises and return to the United States. The dies were moved the following night to avoid another blockade.

[12] Titan's motion for an interlocutory injunction was argued on April 3, 2025. The following day, I granted an order enjoining the respondents or anyone with notice of the order from obstructing any person or vehicle from entering into, or exiting from, the premises municipally located at 2801 Howard Avenue.

[13] There were no protests, picketing, or demonstrations between April 1 and August 11, 2025.

[14] On July 17, 2025, Mr. Chimienti advised the Union that the company intended to move original equipment and both manufacturer-owned and customer-owned tools, parts and equipment off-site. By mid-July, Titan had effectively ceased operations in the Howard Avenue facility.

[15] The parties began collective bargaining on July 21, 2025. The collective agreement expired on July 31, 2025. Negotiations stalled on August 8, 2025. Three days later, Titan locked out its unionized employees. The same day, the Union's members and its supporters began picketing the employer on the sidewalk along Howard Avenue.

[16] On August 21, 2025, Union members blocked a truck attempting to enter the driveway at 2801 Howard Avenue, resulting in traffic being blocked on Howard Avenue for approximately 30 minutes.

[17] On August 26, 2025, Union members blocked a truck carrying Titan's machinery from leaving the premises. WPS was called and attended, but did not remove the picketers. The truck's driver ultimately elected to drop the trailer in order to leave after midnight on August 27, 2025.

[18] Futura Tool Inc. is a manufacturer located at 305 Charles Street just south of the Titan facility. It is a subsidiary of Titan. On September 10, 2025, the Union's members and supporters began picketing on Charles Street outside the Futura facility. Between September 10-12, 2025, some members blocked two trucks carrying parts owned by Martinrea. Titan alleges fires were set as part of the obstruction, but the respondents dispute this claim, and Titan filed no photographic evidence supporting these reports.

[19] On September 12, 2025, Titan brought an urgent motion to vary the April Order to include five other entrances to Titan's facility. Justice Horvat granted a limited order restraining the respondents, their agents, and anyone with notice from obstructing or blocking the Martinrea trucks. Her Honour declined to expand the April Order to include abutting properties and adjourned the balance of Titan's motion to be argued before me.

[20] Both at the hearing before Justice Horvat and before me, the respondents agreed that the April Order remains in place and is operative and enforceable.

Issues

[21] The main issues to be decided on the motion are:

a. Does Titan need to meet the test for a civil injunction to expand the scope of the April Order?

b. If yes, has Titan met the preconditions for an injunction under ss. 102(3) and (4) of the "CJA"?

c. If the preconditions under s. 102 have been met, has Titan satisfied the test for a civil injunction according to RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311?

Law and Analysis

Issue A: Does Titan need to meet the test for a civil injunction to expand the scope of the April Order?

[22] Section 9 of the April Order provides that either party may move to amend the Order on seven days' notice. Titan's initial argument at the hearing was that it was entitled to vary the April Order pursuant to s. 9 to encompass all points of entry to Titan's property as a mere housekeeping matter. Titan sought to add five municipal addresses and the entirety of Charles Street to the Order. Mr. Gatti characterized the amendment as a minor variance to correct an omission. He stated that it was through an oversight that only 2801 Howard Avenue was listed in the Order.

[23] I do not agree that the changes requested are a mere housekeeping matter. In April, no one argued that any protest activity was taking place at any of the addresses now sought to be added to the April Order. There would have been no evidentiary basis on which to make such an order.

[24] Moreover, the present context is very different from the one in which I made the April Order. To accept Mr. Gatti's argument would be to ignore that his client has locked out unionized employees after negotiations failed to lead to a new collective agreement.

[25] Mr. Gatti also argued that the current context is irrelevant because I granted the April Order on the basis that it was a labour dispute.

[26] At para. 42 of my reasons for decision, I found that the April protests were political in nature, aimed not at Titan but at American tariff policy. As a result, I concluded that the proceeding did not involve a labour dispute for the purposes of s. 102 of the CJA. In the alternative, however, I concluded that even if it had been a labour dispute, Titan had established ineffective police assistance (s. 102(3)) and adequate notice (s. 102(7)).

[27] The central finding in my reasons for judgment was that the parties were not engaged in a labour dispute. My comments about s. 102 were obiter – they were not necessary to make my decision. Accordingly, I am not bound to conclude that if the circumstances in April met the preconditions for a labour dispute and the test for an injunction, then the current circumstances do, as well.

[28] More importantly, Titan's argument ignores that I am now faced with a different evidentiary record and different objections by the Union. The April Order is in force until the underlying litigation concludes or other order of this court, but this does not mean that changes in circumstances are irrelevant. Indeed, the existence of s. 9 in the Order confirms that altered circumstances may dictate a variation of the injunction.

[29] The only principled basis on which to expand the injunction is because there is activity that the law dictates must be enjoined. To rule otherwise would be to permit incremental encroachments on the respondents' freedom of expression after an initial order is made, under the guise of 'housekeeping.' Any incursions on the right to picket must be made carefully, and only when the moving party meets its burden of proof.

[30] Accordingly, Titan must satisfy the test for a civil injunction to expand the scope of the April Order.

Issue B: Has Titan met the preconditions for an injunction under ss. 102(3) and (4) of the CJA?

[31] Under s. 102(1) of the CJA, a "labour dispute" includes a dispute about the "terms, tenure or conditions of employment." There is no question that the parties have been engaged in a labour dispute since the lockout occurred on August 11, 2025.

[32] In a proceeding for an injunction to restrain a person in connection with a labour dispute, s. 102 imposes several preconditions. At the hearing, the respondents argued that Titan did not meet two of the preconditions: s. 102(3) (the police assistance requirement) and s. 102(4) (the no hearsay requirement).

(i) Section 102(3) – police assistance

[33] Section 102(3) requires the court be satisfied "that reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance, protection and action to prevent or remove any alleged danger of damage to property, injury to persons, obstruction of or interference with lawful entry or exit from the premises in question" were unsuccessful (emphasis added).

[34] The policy foundation of s. 102(3) is to ensure that injunctions in labour disputes are not granted too freely, but only as a last resort: Industrial Hardwood Products (1996) Ltd. v. International Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 2693 (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 694 (C.A.), at para. 16.

[35] Titan submits that police assistance has been ineffective since August 11, 2025. Although officers are keeping the peace, they did not prevent picketers from blocking trucks on three occasions: August 21, August 26, and September 10-12, 2025.

[36] The respondents argue that the WPS has been effective at keeping the peace and have not had to make any arrests. Moreover, just because the police will not follow Titan's orders does not mean police assistance has been ineffective.

[37] The uncontroverted evidence is that two Martinrea trucks were blocked from leaving the Charles Street entrance of the Futura site for almost two days in September. The picketers dispersed only as a result of the order of Horvat J. on September 12, 2025. Another truck was prevented from leaving for six hours on August 26, 2025, and a fourth truck was blocked on Howard Avenue for 30 minutes on August 21, 2025.

[38] The precondition in s. 102(3) places the onus on Titan to satisfy the court that it made reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance and that those efforts did not result in the removal of an "obstruction of or interference with lawful entry or exit from the premises." The degree of the obstruction and its duration are relevant considerations in determining whether police assistance was successful: Industrial Hardwood, at para. 23.

[39] I am satisfied that Titan has met its onus under s. 102(3) because it called the WPS promptly and, for more than 37 hours on one occasion, and six hours on another, the WPS was unable to remove the blockade.

(ii) Section 102(4) – inadmissible hearsay

[40] The respondents also submitted that Titan's evidence on the motion is inadequate because much of it constitutes inadmissible hearsay under s. 102(4) of the CJA.

[41] Section 102(4) provides that "affidavit evidence in support of a motion for an injunction to restrain a person from an act in connection with a labour dispute shall be confined to statements of facts within the knowledge of the deponent." The purpose of this provision is to safeguard employees' freedom of expression. "As a safeguard to that freedom, injunctions can only be made on the basis of first hand information being provided to the court. Clearly, the legislature believed it to be important that the court rely only on what persons deposed they had personally seen, heard or otherwise perceived": Vale v. USWA Local 6500 et al., 2010 ONSC 1774, at para. 11.

[42] Titan argued that I should accept attributed hearsay in Mr. Chimienti's affidavit because the Union could have challenged the third-party evidence by compelling the attendance of Lauren Szecsei or individual police officers pursuant to r. 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. I disagree. Rule 39.03 does not displace Titan's onus under s. 102(4) to adduce only the evidence that is in the personal knowledge of the deponent.

[43] Accordingly, I will not be considering as evidence on this motion, the contents of any affidavit which are not known personally by the deponent. This includes paragraphs in Mr. Chimienti's affidavit where he repeats threatening statements allegedly made to Ms. Szecsei (para. 48), concerns allegedly expressed to Ms. Szecsei by a truck driver (para. 35), and unattributed hearsay of Futura employees (para. 52).

Issue C: Has Titan met the RJR test for a civil injunction?

[44] An injunction may be sought in a labour dispute under s. 102 of the CJA and in all other disputes under s. 101 of the CJA. Section 101 provides that the court may grant an injunction where it appears just or convenient to do so. Under both provisions, the same test for an interlocutory injunction is used, and this was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald, as follows:

i. Is there a serious issue to be tried?

ii. Has the moving party established irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted?

iii. Does the balance of convenience favour the moving party, in the sense that the harm to the moving party if the injunction is not granted must exceed the harm to the respondent if the injunction is granted?

[45] This list of three factors is not to be applied in an inflexible, mechanical manner. The ultimate focus of the court is on the justice and equity of the situation in issue: Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. v. Mosaic Potash Esterhazy Limited Partnership, 2011 SKCA 120, 341 D.L.R. (4th) 407, at para. 26; Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. Moyse, 2014 ONSC 6442, 122 O.R. (3d) 741, at para. 2. The factors should be used to assess the relative risks of harm to the parties from granting or withholding interlocutory relief.

(i) Serious issue to be tried

[46] Ms. Lei made no submissions on this part of the test. The respondents devoted two paragraphs to this issue in their factum, stating that Titan has adduced inadmissible hearsay and no serious issue is apparent.

[47] As I found in my reasons on April 7, 2025, obstruction of entry to private property constitutes a serious issue to be tried: Fleming Door Products Ltd. v. Hazell, [2008] O.J. No. 3039 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 15; Long Lake Forest Products Inc. v. United Steelworkers Local 1-2693, at para. 32.

[48] There is direct evidence of obstruction at paras. 50-53 of Mr. Chimienti's affidavit. In her endorsement dated September 12, 2025, Horvat J. found that two Martinrea trucks were blocked from leaving and ordered the removal of the obstruction.

[49] I therefore find that there is a serious issue to be tried with respect to the respondents' allegedly tortious behaviour.

(ii) Irreparable harm if injunction not granted

[50] The Supreme Court of Canada indicated in RJR that the issue to be decided at this stage of the analysis is whether a refusal to grant relief "could so adversely affect the applicants' own interests that the harm could not be remedied if the eventual decision on the merits does not accord with the result of the interlocutory application": RJR, at p. 341.

[51] Irreparable harm refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude. "It is harm which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other": RJR, at p. 341.

[52] Titan argued that it will suffer three types of irreparable harm if relief is not obtained: business or reputational harm; physical injury or property damage; and unlawful obstruction of ingress and egress.

[53] First, irreparable harm may be established where "one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its business reputation": RJR, at p. 341.

[54] On the admissible evidence before me, I find that Titan would suffer irreparable harm in the form of damage to its business reputation or market loss if trucks with customer tools and dies are blockaded. Under the bailment agreement with Martinrea, Titan was obligated to return Martinrea's property on demand. Consistent with my finding at para. 62 of my April 7 reasons, a failure by Titan to comply with its obligations under such an agreement would expose it to reputational and business harm that is difficult to calculate in monetary terms: General Motors Corp. v. BBI Enterprises Group, Inc., at paras. 50-53.

[55] Second, a risk of physical injury or serious property damage is also sufficient to establish irreparable harm, particularly where there is a risk that incidents of unlawful conduct will escalate in both degree and number: Ivaco Rolling Mills (2004) LP v. United Steel Workers of America, Local 8794, at paras. 22-25.

[56] I find that Titan's evidence does not establish a risk of physical injury or serious property damage. There is no photographic evidence of any fires and Ms. Grainger deposes in her affidavit that she has not observed any members of the Union starting fires. There is no specific direct evidence of threats or intimidation; Mr. Venter's vague reference to threats and cursing in his affidavit is insufficient. The sign calling Mr. Chimienti a "traitor to Canada" does not go "well beyond lawful and peaceful picketing", as alleged in Mr. Chimienti's affidavit. The facts are distinguishable from cases relied on by Titan, such as Photo Engravers & Electrotypers Ltd. v. Fell, [1989] O.J. No. 1442 (H.C.), where there was evidence union members had assaulted and damaged the personal property of management personnel.

[57] Finally, deprivation of access to property can give rise to irreparable harm: Sobeys Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Canada, Local 175, 2013 ONSC 1207, at para. 38. Where conduct is criminal in nature, for example when there is obstruction, interruption, or interference with a person in the lawful enjoyment of property as prohibited by s. 430(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, or there is tortious conduct, damages may not be adequate and irreparable harm is inferable: Interforest Ltd. v. Weber, [1999] O.J. No. 3637 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 27.

[58] Ms. Lei relied on Trailmobile Canada Ltd. v. Merrill, [1983] O.J. No. 1123 (H.C.). In that case, the court declined to order an injunction on facts far more egregious than in the case before me, on the ground that the employer had not shown financial loss.

[59] If Trailmobile stands for the proposition that economic loss is a prerequisite for an injunction, I decline to follow it. See also Sobeys, at para. 29-30. Economic loss is not required to establish irreparable harm; indeed, by its very nature, economic loss is a harm that can most easily be compensated.

[60] Picketing that does not cause irreparable economic harm may still justify the imposition of an injunction. In Falconbridge Ltd. v. Sudbury Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers Union Local 598, [2000] O.J. No. 4168 (Ont. S.C.), Hennessy J. stated at para. 25 that the "complete blockading of the property, [and] the restriction on the free movement, liberty and security of individuals who have been held in vehicles for unconscionably long periods" are violations that cause irreparable harm.

[61] Although there have been only three instances of "unconscionably long" restrictions of movement caused by the respondents' picketing, I conclude that it is likely there will be further obstruction of this nature if no relief is granted. Damages are an inadequate remedy when drivers are blocked from entering or leaving for hours or days. Moreover, while delays for the purpose of communicating are lawful exercises of workers' right to picket, Titan does not lose its right to enter or leave its own property for unconscionably long periods of time: Falconbridge, para. 27.

(iii) Balance of convenience

[62] The third RJR factor considers which of the parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusing of an interlocutory injunction pending a decision on the merits.

[63] In assessing the balance of convenience, the constitutionally protected right of employees to picket for lawful purposes must be weighed against the employer's rights: Sobeys, at paras. 20-26.

[64] Picketing involves expressive conduct and, as such, engages one of the highest constitutional values: freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is the foundation of a democratic society: see R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, at para. 32.

[65] The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that free expression is particularly critical in the context of labour relations. It is through picketing that "employees are able to define and articulate their common interests and, in the event of a labour dispute, elicit the support of the general public in the furtherance of their cause": Pepsi-Cola, at para. 34.

[66] That said, freedom of expression is not absolute. "When the harm of expression outweighs its benefit, the expression may legitimately be curtailed": Pepsi-Cola, at para. 36. Thus, picketing amounting to tortious or criminal conduct is not permitted: Pepsi-Cola, at para. 66.

[67] Numerous cases have made clear that picketers are not permitted to obstruct entry or exit from the property of their own employers, let alone that of third parties: Fleming Door, at para. 15; Purolator Inc. v. John Doe et al., 2024 ONSC 6812, at para. 50, aff'd 2025 ONCA 565.

[68] On the record before me, the only unlawful picketing that has taken place since August 11, 2025, has been the blockades of trucks on August 11, August 25, and September 10, 2025. The respondents have the right to delay vehicles entering and leaving Titan's premises for the purposes of conveying information to those wishing to receive it. Some inconvenience to the employer is permissible: Industrial Hardwoods, at para. 21. Moreover, the Union "has a legitimate interest in applying pressure, deprivation and harm to the employer's economic interests in an effort to achieve its bargaining objectives": Aramark Canada Ltd. v. Keating, 2002 CarswellOnt 6031, [2002] O.J. No. 3505, at para. 29. However, the respondents do not have the legal right to block or impede the entry and exit of vehicles or people on Titan's premises for periods of time greater than necessary to communicate information.

[69] I conclude, therefore, that the balance of convenience favours the applicant. The evidentiary record shows that the respondents engaged in unlawful obstruction of Titan's premises at 2801 Howard Avenue, and Futura's premises at 305 Charles Street. In his reply submissions, Mr. Gatti confirmed that Titan only seeks injunctive relief for those two addresses, notwithstanding Titan's original claim to add four other addresses and the entirety of Charles Street to the April Order.

[70] The April Order shall be varied to include ingress and egress at 305 Charles Street. Because Charles Street itself is a public road, the WPS will continue to ensure pedestrian safety, as they have done to date.

[71] The April Order will also be amended to include a picketing protocol. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Patterson suggested that counsel for the parties could negotiate a picketing protocol. I encourage them to do so, with the assistance of the WPS if deemed necessary. If they are unable to reach an agreement, counsel may request a short attendance with me through the Trial Coordinator's Office.

Conclusion

[72] For the foregoing reasons, I grant a narrower version of the injunction sought by Titan in its notice of motion returnable on September 12, 2025:

a. The respondents and everyone with notice of this order are restrained from obstructing or impeding the entry or exit of people and vehicles at the entrance to Titan's premises immediately north of its building at 2801 Howard Avenue.

b. The respondents and everyone with notice of this order are restrained from obstructing or impeding the entry or exit of people and vehicles at the entrance to Futura's premises located at 305 Charles Street.

c. This order does not prohibit reasonable inconvenience and delay caused by the Union and its members in communicating information.

[73] If the parties cannot agree on the costs of the motion, the applicant may file written submissions of not more than five double-spaced pages as well as a Bill of Costs by October 17, 2025. The respondents may file their submissions in reply of not more than five double-spaced pages by October 24, 2025.

Jasminka Kalajdzic Justice

Released: October 1, 2025