Bethanie Pascutto

Two proposed class actions were brought against consumer loan companies for allegedly engaging in unlawful business practices that misled consumers into signing loan agreements in breach of consumer protection legislation.

The plaintiffs sought interim motions for temporary stays of hundreds of related proceedings (primarily in Small Claims Court) pending final disposition of the class actions.

At a case conference, the court determined the sequencing of motions and set a litigation timetable.

The court ordered that the interim stay motions be heard before certification, finding that fairness and efficiency dictated this sequencing to prevent the defendants' enforcement actions from effectively mooting the class proceedings.

The appellant, Dov Markowich, appealed the dismissal of his motion for leave to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin Mining Corporation under the Securities Act for alleged failure to disclose a material change, and for certification of a class action.

The motion judge dismissed both.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "change in the business, operations or capital" and by resolving evidentiary conflicts prematurely.

The Court clarified that "change" should be interpreted broadly, and its magnitude is relevant to materiality, not to whether a change occurred.

The appeal was allowed, leave was granted for the statutory cause of action, and the issue of class certification was remitted to the Superior Court.

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a single-purpose real estate holding company, brought a third oppression application against the majority shareholders, seeking to force the sale of the company's property and its winding-up.

He alleged that the respondents oppressively withheld distributions and paid themselves unjustified salaries and special fees.

The respondents brought a cross-application to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed the oppression application, finding that the respondents' actions were justified and did not breach the applicant's reasonable expectations.

The court also dismissed the vexatious litigant cross-application but ordered that the applicant must seek leave before commencing any further proceedings against the company or its shareholders.

The moving parties, Park Lawn Corporation and J. Bradley Green, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation counterclaim, which was denied.

The responding party, Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., sought costs for the motion.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act to award partial indemnity costs to the responding party, finding that the moving parties engaged in unnecessary provocative litigating in the public domain and opportunist cost-mongering.

Park Lawn Corporation and its CEO, J. Bradley Green, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation counterclaim filed by Kahu Capital Partners Ltd. The counterclaim arose after Green made allegedly defamatory statements about Kahu Capital in a trade newsletter, accusing the firm of complicity in the alleged wrongdoings of Park Lawn's former CEO.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the statements related to a matter of public interest, there were grounds to believe the counterclaim had substantial merit and that the moving parties had no valid defence.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by Kahu Capital outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The appellant, Detour Gold Corporation, appealed a summary judgment declaring that the respondent, Prism Resources Inc., held a valid and enforceable royalty interest in Detour's mining claims as an interest in land.

The appeal concerned the interpretation of a 2004 letter agreement between Prism and Conquest Resources Inc., Detour's predecessor, and the application of principles from Bank of Montreal v. Dynex Petroleum Ltd. and Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge correctly found Prism's royalty to be an interest in land, based on the parties' intention inferred from the agreement, surrounding circumstances, and admissible subsequent conduct.

This decision concerns the costs arising from the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for leave to commence a secondary market securities class action and to certify the action.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for partial indemnity and a discount due to the alleged novel and public interest nature of the litigation.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $693,805.39, finding no basis for substantial indemnity as there was no reprehensible conduct or unproven fraud allegations.

The court also rejected the argument for a discount under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, concluding that the issues were not novel or of broad public interest, particularly as they had been previously litigated.

A minor deduction was made for online research disbursements.

The plaintiff sought leave to bring a statutory secondary market misrepresentation claim under the Securities Act and to certify a class action for both statutory and common law negligent misrepresentation claims.

The claims arose from the defendant mining company's alleged failure to immediately disclose a pit wall instability and subsequent rock slide at its Chilean copper mine.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no reasonable possibility of success that the events constituted a 'change' to the company's business, operations, or capital, as they were inherent mining risks managed in the ordinary course.

The court also dismissed the certification motion for the common law claim, holding that individual issues of reliance made a class proceeding unmanageable and not the preferable procedure.

The appellant, Detour Gold Corporation, brought an unopposed motion for leave to file a five-page reply factum.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, using the opportunity to critique the current appellate rules that necessitate such motions.

The judge advocated for an automatic right to file brief reply factums to enhance written advocacy, improve judicial preparation, and reduce unnecessary litigation costs, highlighting a procedural gap in both civil and criminal appellate rules.

This appeal addresses the role of "public correction" in secondary market misrepresentation class actions under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act.

The appellant sought leave to pursue a statutory remedy, which the motion judge denied by requiring a discrete and identifiable public correction that explicitly revealed the misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal, following its own decision in *Barrick OCA*, found that the motion judge applied an unduly onerous standard for public correction.

The Court clarified that public correction does not require "facial symmetry" with the misrepresentation and must be understood in context by the secondary market.

The appeal was allowed, and the leave motion remitted for redetermination.

The appellant was jogging on an indoor track at McMaster University when struck from behind by a member of the Flying Angels Running Club, suffering a serious shoulder injury requiring surgery.

At trial, no negligence was found against McMaster University or the runner who struck the appellant.

However, the Flying Angels Running Club and its coach were found negligent.

The jury determined the appellant was 40 percent contributorily negligent for failing to move to a different lane when asked to do so.

The appellant received approximately $80,000 net in damages including prejudgment interest.

On appeal, the appellant challenged four evidentiary rulings by the trial judge: the characterization of lane one as the "default lane" in the jury charge, the exclusion of an email from a track employee, the exclusion of a letter to the Ontario Ministry of Labour, and the exclusion of insurance reimbursement charts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.