Adam J. Wygodny

The applicant sought fourteen substantive heads of relief including declarations of trust, fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, production of records, and claims for general, punitive, aggravated and exemplary damages under the Business Corporations Act and Substitute Decisions Act.

The court found the application was improperly prepared with excessive materials, non-compliant factums, missing compendium, and unrealistic time estimates.

The court granted limited relief: an order requiring the respondent to account for her time as power of attorney for property, production of corporate books and records by both parties, and monthly disclosure obligations.

The court declined to remove the respondent as director and declined to declare a purchase money resulting trust, finding credibility issues could not be resolved on the paper record.

The remaining relief was adjourned and the court noted a trial may be required.

The plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion seeking a Mareva injunction, an interim order for the recovery of personal property, an order freezing assets, and leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendants.

The motion alleged extensive fraud, conversion, and other torts by the primary defendant, Yueh-Tang Yang, involving millions of dollars and real estate, and a serious risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted most of the requested relief, finding a prima facie case of fraud and a demonstrated risk of asset dissipation, satisfying the criteria for the extraordinary remedies sought.

The applicants brought a motion to declare Ronald Hitti a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and, alternatively, to prohibit him from making further motions without leave under Rule 37.16.

The court reviewed Hitti's persistent and acrimonious conduct, including repeated unsuccessful motions, failure to pay multiple costs awards, and abusive correspondence.

The court found that Hitti's conduct met the criteria for vexatious litigation, granted the relief sought, declared him a vexatious litigant, and prohibited him from bringing further motions without leave.

Costs were awarded against Hitti.

The appellant, Robert Glegg, appealed judgments declaring him a vexatious litigant and associated costs orders.

The underlying litigation stemmed from his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, with Glegg initiating numerous proceedings, including tort claims against the respondents (family friends and a legal aid clinic with its lawyers), alleging they conspired to assist his daughter's mother in "brainwashing" her.

The application judge declared Glegg a vexatious litigant, stayed his existing proceedings, and barred him from commencing further related proceedings without leave, also ordering full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glegg's appeal, affirming that his claims were an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previously determined facts, specifically that his daughter acted of her own free will.

The court upheld the vexatious litigant declaration, the permanent stay of actions, the prohibition on future litigation without leave, and the full indemnity costs award.

The moving parties, Park Lawn Corporation and J. Bradley Green, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation counterclaim, which was denied.

The responding party, Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., sought costs for the motion.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act to award partial indemnity costs to the responding party, finding that the moving parties engaged in unnecessary provocative litigating in the public domain and opportunist cost-mongering.

Park Lawn Corporation and its CEO, J. Bradley Green, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation counterclaim filed by Kahu Capital Partners Ltd. The counterclaim arose after Green made allegedly defamatory statements about Kahu Capital in a trade newsletter, accusing the firm of complicity in the alleged wrongdoings of Park Lawn's former CEO.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the statements related to a matter of public interest, there were grounds to believe the counterclaim had substantial merit and that the moving parties had no valid defence.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by Kahu Capital outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

Following a decision declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant and staying his underlying civil claims as an abuse of process, the court determined the scale and quantum of costs.

The court awarded full indemnity costs to both groups of applicants for both the applications and the underlying civil actions, citing the respondent's extreme, baseless claims and his well-funded, obsessive litigation campaign.

Costs were fixed at $53,175.37 for the Flores applicants and $195,970.46 for the JFCY applicants.

The bankrupt, his father, and a creditor (his former partner) brought overlapping motions in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The court ordered equitable set-off of multiple costs awards made in family and bankruptcy proceedings between the bankrupt and the creditor, effective September 28, 2018.

The court dismissed the father's claim for a charge over the balance of the costs award, finding that solicitor's liens and charging orders do not apply to non-lawyers who fund litigation.

The balance of the costs award was ordered payable to the bankruptcy trustee.

The court also dismissed the creditor's request for a stay of enforcement and declined to dismiss the creditor's civil action for delay at this stage.

The applicants, including a legal clinic and family friends, brought applications under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had engaged in years of relentless litigation across multiple jurisdictions following his teenage daughter's decision to withdraw from his custody, repeatedly alleging abduction, fraud, and conspiracy against anyone involved.

The court found that the respondent persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted them in a vexatious manner, continually attempting to re-litigate issues already decided against him.

The applications were granted, the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant, and he was prohibited from instituting or continuing related proceedings without leave of the court.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A trial was ordered within a receivership application to determine the ownership of three corporations that held interests in real property.

The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the corporations, while the principal of the Laila Group of Companies claimed the corporations were subsidiaries of her company, World Corp. The court found both parties lacked credibility and had fabricated documents.

Ultimately, the court determined that the plaintiff was the legal owner of one corporation but held it on a resulting trust for World Corp., and that World Corp. was the legal and beneficial owner of the other two corporations.

The defendant property manager brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff condominium corporation's action as a nullity.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements under s. 23(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 before commencing the action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the action against the property manager for breach of contract and negligence was not the type of action caught by s. 23(1) of the Act, and therefore the notice requirements did not apply.

Furthermore, the court held that the action commenced with the filing of the Statement of Claim, not the Notice of Action, and that the plaintiff had provided sufficient notice to the owners prior to filing the Statement of Claim.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL).

The Master had discharged the CPL on the basis of the appellant's material non-disclosure of a "no registration" clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) when obtaining the CPL ex parte.

The appellate court upheld the Master's decision, finding no reversible error in the Master's application of the law regarding the duty of full and frank disclosure on ex parte motions.

The court affirmed that failure to make full and frank disclosure of a material fact is sufficient grounds to set aside an ex parte order.

The defendants brought a motion for the production of a report prepared by the plaintiff's Barbadian counsel (the CGF Report) and a list of documents reviewed by that counsel.

The plaintiff claimed solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the report and the list of documents.

The court held that the CGF Report was protected by solicitor-client privilege as it contained legal advice, and the plaintiff had not waived this privilege.

However, the court found that the list of documents reviewed by counsel was not privileged, as it merely constituted facts, and ordered its production.

A cross-motion by the plaintiff to strike portions of an affidavit was resolved by the court placing no weight on the hearsay paragraphs.

The applicants brought a contempt motion against the respondents for failing to produce financial records as ordered by a prior court order.

Although the records were eventually produced, leading to no formal finding of contempt, the court found that the respondents' lengthy delay and non-compliance necessitated the motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the applicants, finding the respondents' conduct in delaying disclosure and forcing the contempt motion to be reprehensible and to constitute special circumstances justifying a higher scale of costs.

The Regional Municipality of York (the "Region") brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim of 2149629 Ontario Inc. ("214"). 214 sought damages for negligence and breach of contract, alleging that the Region's actions caused it to miss a deadline for registering a plan of subdivision, thereby incurring higher development charges.

The court found that 214 knew or ought to have known about the dewatering condition required for registration.

The court determined that the Region was not negligent, there was no principal/agency relationship between the Region and the Township of King, and the Region did not breach its contractual duty of good faith.

Furthermore, the court denied relief from forfeiture, concluding that 214 was not penalized but rather failed to receive a benefit by not meeting the agreement's conditions.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and 214's claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment alleging breach of the Copyright Act regarding marketing materials for a residential development.

During argument, the plaintiff realized its legal position was flawed and abandoned the motion.

The defendant sought costs of $34,719 on a substantial indemnity basis, while the plaintiff suggested $6,000.

The court found the motion was peripheral to the main action, unnecessary, and caused significant delay, bordering on an abuse of process.

Applying Rule 20.06, the court awarded the defendant costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $29,719.12.

At a contested status hearing, the plaintiff was required to show cause why its commercial lease dispute action should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, finding the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The action was allowed to continue, and the registrar was ordered not to dismiss the action without further order of the court.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim alleging malicious prosecution, unlawful interference with economic relations, and various claims for damages arising from an earlier injunction and the termination of a referral relationship.

The court held that the defendants failed to establish the elements required for malicious prosecution, particularly malice, and that the inclusion of parties in civil litigation was insufficient to ground such a claim.

Claims for intentional or unlawful interference with economic relations also failed because the evidence did not demonstrate an intention by the plaintiffs to cause economic harm.

The court further found that damages related to the interim injunction should be pursued through enforcement of the undertaking for damages rather than by counterclaim.

Partial summary judgment was granted dismissing most of the counterclaim, with leave granted to amend the counterclaim to seek damages tied specifically to the injunction period.

The applicant purchaser sought a declaration that a vendor take-back mortgage was paid in full, arguing that a price adjustment for non-developable land reduced the balance to zero.

The agreement of purchase and sale required the calculation of non-developable land to occur at the five-year anniversary of the mortgage, but the applicant missed this deadline, claiming it was impossible to determine due to ongoing environmental studies regarding an endangered minnow species.

The court dismissed the application, holding that time was of the essence and the unpredictable nature of the development approval process did not excuse the failure to adhere to the contractually stipulated timeline.

The respondent vendors' cross-application for payment of the outstanding mortgage balance was granted.