Peter H. Smiley

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction to freeze approximately $6.1 million in settlement funds held in the defendant's solicitor's trust account.

The funds were allegedly derived from a fraudulent investment scheme involving the defendant corporation, which was controlled by individuals connected to a Ponzi scheme operated by Arash Missaghi.

The plaintiffs alleged they were induced to invest substantial sums through misrepresentation and fraud.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case of fraud, that assets were in the jurisdiction, that there was a risk of dissipation, and that irreparable harm would result if the funds were distributed.

The court also allowed the defendant to withdraw $250,000 from the frozen funds for legal expenses.

The court voided six promissory notes and struck out related mortgages registered by the plaintiffs against the defendants' properties, finding that the notes were materially altered without consent, contrary to the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court also declined to grant equitable mortgages or certificates of pending litigation, citing the plaintiffs' inequitable conduct and failure to meet statutory tests.

The decision addresses issues of forged notes, after-acquired property, corporate personality, and the application of the Family Law Act to matrimonial homes.

The court considered motions by the plaintiff to amend its statement of claim and by the defendants to strike the statement of claim.

The court found that, except for the claim of unlawful interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff’s amended claim disclosed the material elements of the causes of action pleaded, including breach of confidence, fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, and piercing the corporate veil.

The court dismissed the defendants’ motion to strike, allowed the plaintiff’s motion to amend (except for the unlawful interference claim), and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, an executive search firm, sued the defendant for breach of contract and breach of the duty of honesty and good faith related to a search for a Chief Financial Officer.

The defendant, a defunct company, did not take a position at the summary trial.

The court found the defendant breached the contract by failing to make a required payment and breached the duty of honesty and good faith by misleading the plaintiff and not allowing the search to conclude.

Damages of $67,000 plus interest and costs of $17,832.74 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant, Money Gate Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its motion seeking distribution of proceeds from a property sale, asserting an unregistered assignment of a second mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the source of funds for the alleged assignment, concluding no enforceable assignment was acquired.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision to dismiss the motion or in the discretionary costs order, noting the appellant's failure to file a cost outline.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The moving parties sought reconsideration of a prior decision by the Court of Appeal dismissing their appeal, presenting new evidence.

The court dismissed the motion for reconsideration, affirming that such requests are granted only in very exceptional cases and that the new evidence did not undermine the basis for the original appeal dismissal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party.

The plaintiff, Tripsetter Inc., brought a motion seeking leave to add Tweed Inc. and Jurgen Schreiber as defendants, alleging they are "franchisor's associates" under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The proposed defendants objected, arguing the claim was out of time due to a lack of notice of rescission and that the proposed pleading failed to establish the necessary control for a franchisor's associate.

The court found that the Act does not require notice of rescission to be given to an alleged franchisor's associate for a claim for damages to proceed.

It also determined that the limitation period argument was not clear-cut and could be argued at trial, as the plaintiff's knowledge of Tweed's full involvement only came to light during discovery.

The court found the proposed pleading, including the "de facto franchisor" concept, to be sufficient for the purpose of a pleadings amendment motion, noting that amendments are to be read generously.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff's representative to reattend discovery and answer numerous refused questions across four categories.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the questions were irrelevant or privileged.

The court largely upheld the plaintiff's refusals, finding most questions irrelevant to the core issues of the case, such as the nature of the business relationship (franchise vs. license) or the plaintiff's subjective understanding of legal requirements.

Only one minor question regarding inventory was ordered to be answered.

The plaintiff, Tripsetter Inc., brought a motion seeking a further and better affidavit of documents from the defendants, 2161907 Alberta Ltd., Canopy Growth Corporation, and Justin Farbstein, and answers to undertakings and a refusal.

The core dispute concerned whether the parties' relationship was a franchise or a license, impacting disclosure obligations under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The court ordered the production of a Franchise Disclosure Document and a Financial Projections Document, finding them relevant to the nature of the relationship and the defendants' disclosure exemption arguments.

However, the plaintiff's general request for a further affidavit of documents and its requests regarding the undertakings and refusal were dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in declining to pierce the corporate veil to hold a personal defendant liable for a corporation's breaches of contract.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that piercing the corporate veil is an exception, particularly in commercial settings where parties understood they were contracting with a corporation.

The court found that the corporate defendant's "unreasonable" and "capricious" breaches of contract did not amount to "improper conduct" sufficient to justify piercing the veil, as doing so for every breach by a one-person company would undermine corporate separateness.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

The defendants moved to set aside a noting in default, which the plaintiff did not substantively oppose but contested on costs.

The court granted the motion, finding the defendants' delay in defending was adequately explained and they had arguable defences.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' partial indemnity costs of the motion, deeming the plaintiff's refusal to consent to setting aside default without substantial indemnity costs for a prior ex parte substituted service motion unreasonable and an abuse of process.

The appellants, a web development business and its principal, appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action against a financing company and granted judgment against them for $82,250.

The appellants alleged procedural unfairness, unsuitability for summary judgment, an incorrect outstanding loan amount, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the appellants had proper notice and their absence from the motion was tactical.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision on the merits, finding the action in debt well-suited for summary judgment, and refused to admit the proposed fresh evidence, deeming it available with reasonable diligence or not credible.

The moving parties sought to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that denied them an extension of time to appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion to remove opposing counsel from the record, which had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to set aside, confirming that the underlying order was interlocutory and therefore the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The defendants, Morteza Katebian and Payam Katebian, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with three prior costs orders, including an order for additional security for costs.

The plaintiff argued the action had considerable merit, they were impecunious, and funds were frozen due to ongoing litigation.

The court found the plaintiff's claim of considerable merit unconvincing and their impecuniosity argument belated.

While acknowledging the severity of dismissal, the court granted the plaintiff a final opportunity until April 1, 2021, to comply with the outstanding costs orders, failing which the defendants could move for dismissal without notice.

The Hordos (plaintiffs/appellants) appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion for various relief, including removal of the defendant's counsel, discovery-related orders, and striking pleadings.

They also brought a Rule 59.06 motion to set aside the Master's order based on alleged fraud and fresh facts, and a motion for extraordinary relief such as interim costs, declaring LawPro and LSO vexatious litigants, and appointing a receiver for the LSO.

The court dismissed all of the Hordos' appeals and motions, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision, no evidence of fraud or material fresh facts to set aside the order, and no legal basis for the extraordinary relief sought.

The court affirmed the Master's finding that the Hordos' conspiracy theory was baseless.

ICapital Financial Services Corp. brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the main action by Alireza Ghasempoor and judgment on its counterclaim against Ghasempoor and third-party claim against Atciti Corp. The court dismissed Ghasempoor's action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding his claims of damaged credit rating and unreasonable payment demand.

The court granted summary judgment to ICapital on its counterclaim and third-party claim, finding Atciti Corp. defaulted on a loan agreement, triggering Ghasempoor's personal guarantee.

Judgment was awarded for $82,250.00 plus pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs were fixed.

Hazelton Homes Corporation (Plaintiff) claimed beneficial ownership of two properties registered to Morteza Katebian, who had defaulted on mortgages held by Home Trust Company and Ivan Terziev and Elena Mechtcheriakova (Second Mortgagees).

Following the conversion of applications into an action, the defendants (Katebian, Payam, Home Trust, and Second Mortgagees) moved for security for costs against Hazelton.

The court found good reason to believe Hazelton's claim against Home Trust and the Second Mortgagees was frivolous and vexatious, and that Hazelton, a shell corporation, had insufficient assets.

The motion for security for costs was granted for Home Trust and the Second Mortgagees, with specific amounts ordered to be paid into court or credited from existing holdbacks.

Katebian and Payam's motion for security for costs was adjourned pending their delivery of a Statement of Defence.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by the self-represented plaintiffs, Diana Hordo and Michael J. Hordo, against the defendant, Arnold H. Zweig, and non-parties LawPro, the Law Society of Ontario (LSO), Lynda Ciaschini, and Charles Sinclair.

The plaintiffs' motion, which sought various forms of relief including the removal of the defendant's counsel and production of documents, was largely dismissed, with only a minor order granted for additional written discovery questions for the defendant.

The court found that the plaintiffs made serious, unproven allegations of misconduct, including criminal behaviour and dishonesty, against the defendant, his counsel, and LSO.

Consequently, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the defendant ($8,000.00) and LSO ($4,500.00), to be paid by the plaintiffs, citing the reprehensible nature of the unproven allegations.

The applicant, Hazelton Homes Corporation, initiated two applications seeking declarations of trust over two properties held by Morteza Katebian, among other relief.

Katebian and other respondents opposed, with Katebian also seeking consolidation and conversion of the applications into an action.

The court consolidated the applications but found significant material facts in dispute, including allegations of criminal activity and conflicting handwriting expert evidence regarding trust agreements.

Consequently, the court ordered the consolidated applications to proceed to trial, converting them into an action, and scheduled a case management conference.