Keith Juriansz

The applicant association applied under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001 to quash the Township of Wainfleet's Short-Term Rental By-law.

The applicant argued the by-law was illegal, enacted in bad faith, and conflicted with the Municipal Act and the Planning Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law was enacted after extensive public consultation, did not prohibit short-term rentals, and did not conflict with provincial legislation.

The administrative penalties were found to be coercive rather than punitive, and the by-law regulated business operations rather than land use.

The applicant association applied under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001 to quash the Township of Wainfleet's Short-Term Rental By-law.

The applicant argued the by-law was illegal, enacted in bad faith, and conflicted with the Municipal Act and Planning Act.

The court found the by-law was enacted after extensive public consultation, did not prohibit short-term rentals, and did not conflict with provincial legislation.

The administrative penalties were deemed coercive rather than punitive, and the by-law was found not to be discriminatory.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the Township on a partial indemnity basis.

This endorsement consolidates three applications concerning the guardianship and estate administration of Teresa Opalinski and Alexander Opalinski Sr. The disputes involved allegations of elder abuse, undue influence, and breaches of fiduciary duty among family members.

The court addressed motions for dismissal of a guardianship application (rendered moot by death), a motion for access to Alexander Sr., and an application for the removal of Joanna Opalinski as estate trustee of Teresa's estate.

The court dismissed the guardianship application and the access motion, and granted the application to remove Joanna as estate trustee, directing the appointment of an independent trustee.

The parties sought approval of a settlement involving a defendant under disability.

The plaintiff had commenced an action seeking a declaration of constructive trust over a property and resisting eviction.

Following a related proceeding, the plaintiff agreed to provide vacant possession and abandon his claims, with this action to be dismissed without costs.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the party under disability, as it avoided litigation risks and unrecoverable costs.

The applicant brought a motion to compel arbitration of a dispute arising from a real estate development project governed by a Co-Ownership Agreement.

The parties agreed the dispute should be arbitrated but disagreed on whether the corporate mortgagees and individual guarantors were bound by the arbitration clause.

The court applied the competence-competence principle, holding that the arbitrator must determine their own jurisdiction and decide which parties are subject to the arbitration, as the issue involved mixed fact and law requiring contractual interpretation.

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment enforcing a mortgage against its property.

The appellant argued the mortgage was a 'fraudulent instrument' under the Land Titles Act because the individual who executed it had fraudulently assumed control of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the mortgage was not a forgery, the corporation was not a 'fictitious person', and the individual did not falsely hold herself out as the registered owner.

The doctrine of deferred indefeasibility did not invalidate the mortgage, and partial summary judgment was appropriate.

The applicant estate trustee brought a motion for an order appointing section 3 counsel under the Substitute Decisions Act for her father.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the underlying proceeding was not brought under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the motion, holding that the plain wording of section 3(1) and relevant case law require the underlying proceeding to be under the Substitute Decisions Act for the court to have jurisdiction to appoint such counsel.

The moving parties sought interim injunctive relief arising from the alleged secret creation and operation of a competing business by insiders and key employees within a longstanding family-run sign business.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court found at least a strong prima facie case of breaches of fiduciary duties, solicitation of employees and customers, and misuse or threatened misuse of confidential information.

The court held that irreparable harm was established through likely loss of clients, employees, market share, and reputation, and that the balance of convenience favoured limited restraints.

An interim order issued barring solicitation of specified customers, general contractors, and current employees, and prohibiting possession, disclosure, or use of confidential information, but the court declined to impose a complete interim non-competition ban.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay spousal support despite a waiver in the parties' separation agreement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the Miglin test by failing to consider whether the agreement as a whole substantially complied with the Divorce Act and whether there had been a significant change in circumstances.

The court set aside the spousal and child support orders and increased the appellant's trial costs award to $60,000 due to his complete success and the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

The court issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs for a motion and partial indemnity costs for the action.

The plaintiff argued the costs were unreasonable and disproportional.

The court fixed costs for the motion at $2,500 (substantial indemnity) and for the action at $24,104.36 (partial indemnity).

Substantial indemnity was awarded for the motion due to the plaintiff's sanctionable conduct, including failure to comply with previous costs orders and engaging in pointless delay.

The court emphasized that proportionality should not override other considerations, especially when a litigant's conduct prolongs or complicates proceedings, and that costs can exceed the amount recovered in judgment in appropriate circumstances.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim and release funds paid into court, citing the plaintiff's repeated failure to comply with multiple costs orders.

The plaintiff had accumulated significant outstanding costs and had engaged in delaying tactics, including unverified claims of imminent funds and questionable travel expenses.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action due to her contumelious breaches of costs orders and ordered the funds in court to be paid to the defendant, emphasizing the necessity of enforcing court orders despite the draconian nature of dismissal.

The complainant, a Seventh Day Adventist, was terminated from her employment as a laboratory technician because her religious beliefs prevented her from working a scheduled Saturday shift.

The Board of Inquiry found that both the employer and the union engaged in adverse effect discrimination on the basis of creed.

The employer failed to reasonably accommodate the complainant by not specifically offering to allow her to work on Sunday at straight time or to arrange a shift swap, and did not establish that such accommodations would cause undue hardship.

The union also failed to reasonably accommodate the complainant by refusing to agree to an exemption from the collective agreement's overtime provisions.

The respondents were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages for lost wages and interest, and to review their work rules to prevent future discrimination.

The respondents brought a motion to quash summonses issued by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the complainant requiring the production of documents by the respondent employer.

The Board of Inquiry held that the Commission's investigative powers under the Human Rights Code do not preclude it from requesting a summons under the Statutory Powers Procedures Act.

The Board further found that the descriptions of the documents in the summonses met the test of reasonable distinctiveness and were relevant to the inquiry.

The motion to quash was dismissed, though one duplicate summons was quashed to avoid redundancy.