William F. Pentney

The complainant, a Seventh Day Adventist, was terminated from her employment as a laboratory technician because her religious beliefs prevented her from working a scheduled Saturday shift.

The Board of Inquiry found that both the employer and the union engaged in adverse effect discrimination on the basis of creed.

The employer failed to reasonably accommodate the complainant by not specifically offering to allow her to work on Sunday at straight time or to arrange a shift swap, and did not establish that such accommodations would cause undue hardship.

The union also failed to reasonably accommodate the complainant by refusing to agree to an exemption from the collective agreement's overtime provisions.

The respondents were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages for lost wages and interest, and to review their work rules to prevent future discrimination.

The respondents brought a motion to quash summonses issued by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the complainant requiring the production of documents by the respondent employer.

The Board of Inquiry held that the Commission's investigative powers under the Human Rights Code do not preclude it from requesting a summons under the Statutory Powers Procedures Act.

The Board further found that the descriptions of the documents in the summonses met the test of reasonable distinctiveness and were relevant to the inquiry.

The motion to quash was dismissed, though one duplicate summons was quashed to avoid redundancy.

The respondents, Domtar Inc. and the union, brought preliminary motions to limit the participation of the complainant's independent counsel at the human rights hearing, arguing that the Human Rights Commission already had carriage of the complaint.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motions, holding that under section 38(2) of the Human Rights Code, the complainant is a full party to the proceedings.

Consequently, under section 10 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the complainant has the right to be represented by independent counsel, call and examine witnesses, and make submissions, provided the participation is not abusive or duplicative.

The respondents brought preliminary motions to dismiss human rights complaints filed in 1981 due to unreasonable delay, primarily caused by the Commission holding the complaints in abeyance pending a Supreme Court decision.

The Board of Inquiry held that it had jurisdiction to dismiss for delay only if proceeding would be impossible or an abuse of process.

Finding neither condition met, the Board refused to dismiss the complaints at the preliminary stage.

The Board also set aside an amendment to the complaint that added a fresh incident of discrimination outside the limitation period, but allowed an amendment adding a new respondent.