John Philpott

The plaintiff sought access to documents seized pursuant to an Anton Piller Order executed six months prior.

The defendants opposed, arguing the Order did not explicitly permit access and that review was premature.

The court found that the terms of the Order contemplated access by the Independent Supervising Solicitor (ISS) to identify and inspect records.

Given the passage of time and the discovery stage of the proceeding, the court directed the ISS to inspect the seized material and produce relevant records to the parties, noting the ISS provides protection against disclosure of irrelevant or privileged material.

The plaintiff sought a direction allowing the Independent Supervising Solicitor (ISS) to commence reviewing evidence seized pursuant to an Anton Piller Order.

The defendants objected, noting the order did not permit review and seeking to schedule a motion to set aside the order.

The court declined the plaintiff's request, finding the purpose of the order—preservation of evidence—had been achieved and noting concerns that the standard clause preventing review was inexplicably omitted from the draft order.

The court also declined to schedule the motion to set aside the order, finding no urgency since the original materials were returned to the defendants and the ISS was not reviewing the copies.

An expedited schedule for documentary production was ordered instead.

The applicants, who rent water heaters and HVAC equipment to consumers, brought an application for a declaration that they were entitled to the end-of-term lease payments when a customer exercised their right to an early buyout.

The respondent had previously purchased a 10-year stream of future payments under the lease agreements.

The court interpreted the assignment agreement and found that the respondent purchased the assigned payments, which explicitly included income derived from early buyouts.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought an urgent order for the partition and sale of a property held as tenants in common with the respondent, citing terminal illness.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing it would cause him severe personal, emotional, and financial hardship amounting to oppression, and would prejudice his ongoing family law claims for resulting or constructive trust over the property.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for partition and sale, finding that the respondent had demonstrated sufficient hardship and that his trust claims were not frivolous and required a full trial.

The court also declined to grant declaratory relief regarding a second property, deeming the issue hypothetical and subject to alternative dispute resolution or the family law proceeding.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after successfully defending a motion to extend an interim injunction.

The court declined to award costs immediately, exercising its discretion to defer costs to the cause.

The court reasoned that the defendants might ultimately be found liable at trial for serious breaches of fiduciary duty and unfair competition, making an immediate costs award inappropriate.

The court also noted the defendants violated formatting rules by submitting single-spaced materials to circumvent page limits.

The plaintiffs moved to continue an interim injunction granted a year prior, which prohibited the defendants (former fiduciary employees) from soliciting the plaintiffs' customers and employees.

The court dismissed the motion to extend the injunction, finding that the one-year period had already provided the plaintiffs with a reasonable amount of time to solidify their customer relationships and protect their goodwill from the defendants' unfair 'springboard' competition.

The court also directed the proceedings into case management.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two orders of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and fixed costs payable to the responding party at $2,500.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Carpenter-Gunn J. dated June 25, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding defendants in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The moving parties sought interim injunctive relief arising from the alleged secret creation and operation of a competing business by insiders and key employees within a longstanding family-run sign business.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court found at least a strong prima facie case of breaches of fiduciary duties, solicitation of employees and customers, and misuse or threatened misuse of confidential information.

The court held that irreparable harm was established through likely loss of clients, employees, market share, and reputation, and that the balance of convenience favoured limited restraints.

An interim order issued barring solicitation of specified customers, general contractors, and current employees, and prohibiting possession, disclosure, or use of confidential information, but the court declined to impose a complete interim non-competition ban.

The applicants, judgment creditors of the respondents for over $26 million USD arising from a fraudulent lending scheme, moved to discontinue the payment of living expenses and legal fees to the respondents and their related trusts from the receivership estate.

The trusts brought a cross-motion to strike the Receiver's Eleventh Report, arguing the Receiver exceeded its mandate by tracing funds and making observations about badges of a sham trust.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the Receiver acted within its court-ordered investigatory powers and did not usurp the court's role.

The court granted the applicants' motion to terminate funding, holding that the respondents had exhausted their appeals, were now judgment debtors, and failed to meet the test for funding from frozen assets, as they had not provided full disclosure and the funds belonged to their creditors.

This motion concerned a plaintiff's application to find a defendant in contempt of court for breaching a prior permanent injunction against defamation.

The defendant, who had previously engaged in a relentless and malicious online campaign against the plaintiff, continued to publish defamatory statements despite a court order.

The court found the defendant guilty of contempt, emphasizing that the prior order was clear and unequivocal, and the defendant had actual knowledge and intentionally breached it.

The court also provided directions for the defendant to purge his contempt, including apologizing and removing all offending online content.

Additionally, the decision addressed issues related to the defendant's examination in aid of execution, providing clear instructions for compliance and adjourning the request to examine the defendant's spouse.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a prior decision of the Superior Court of Justice dated September 30, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs fixed at $4,000 to the responding parties.

The wife was largely successful on a motion for interim disbursements under the OBCA, temporary spousal support, and further financial disclosure.

Both parties sought costs of the motion.

The court found the wife was the successful party and that the husband's behavior regarding disclosure was unreasonable.

After considering the parties' offers to settle and the proportionality of the fees, the court awarded the wife costs of $97,523.88, representing 65% of her actual costs.

The costs were ordered to be paid equally by the husband personally and the corporations he controls.

The defendants (plaintiffs by counterclaim) brought an urgent motion for interim injunctive relief to stop the plaintiffs and their principals from engaging in a relentless campaign of online harassment and defamation via Instagram.

The dispute originated from a failed transaction involving luxury handbags and watches, which previously led to ex parte Mareva and Anton Piller orders against the defendants.

The court found that the principals of the plaintiff corporation had posted highly defamatory statements, threats, and images obtained from the execution of the court orders.

Applying the stringent test for defamation injunctions, the court granted the requested relief, ordering the removal of the posts and restraining further contact and publication.

The moving party wife sought interim costs and disbursements of $500,000 to fund her family law and oppression remedy claims against the responding party husband, who controlled the family's closely-held corporations.

She also sought temporary spousal support and an order compelling the husband to answer undertakings and refusals from his questioning.

The court awarded $250,000 in interim costs under the OBCA as an advance against her shareholdings, finding her oppression claim had sufficient merit and she lacked liquid resources.

The court also ordered the husband to pay $3,000 per month in temporary spousal support to equalize the parties' net disposable incomes, and compelled him to answer the majority of the outstanding undertakings and refusals.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in 2019 to enforce a judgment obtained in 1997, seeking a further accounting from the judgment debtor and leave to examine third parties in aid of execution.

The court found that the plaintiffs' extreme delay constituted laches and that any potential claims against the third parties were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the request to examine third parties but ordered the self-represented judgment debtor to re-attend an examination to answer specific questions on a best efforts basis.

The defendants sought to transfer a civil action from Toronto to Newmarket, arguing common issues with a related family law proceeding.

The plaintiff opposed, asserting the civil action involved discrete transactions and that the family law matter was overly complex and largely irrelevant to his claims.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding the moving parties failed to demonstrate that the proposed venue was significantly better, particularly given the limited overlap of issues and the potential for undue complication of the civil claim within the broader family law litigation.

The appellant, Deltro Electric Ltd., appealed a decision of the Electrical Safety Authority Review Panel confirming the application of a 'Wattage Based' inspection fee to its solar farm installations.

The appellant argued that the fee was invalidly enacted due to procedural defects, that certain projects were exempt from the Electrical Safety Code, and that the use of MC4 connectors did not constitute an electrical installation requiring inspection.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the ESA had cured any initial procedural defects by the time the fees were applied, that the projects required ESA connection authorizations under the Distribution System Code, and that connecting PV panels with MC4 connectors constituted work on an electrical installation subject to inspection.

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.1 order dismissing his claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claim arose from an incident at the respondent's café where the respondent allegedly refused to provide ice in a drink for the appellant's disabled friend.

The appellant sought damages for isolation and negative emotional impact allegedly resulting from this incident and subsequent events.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the claim had no hope of success and that Rule 2.1 was properly invoked.

The appellant also sought to note the respondent in default for failing to file a proper statement of defence, but this request was dismissed as moot following the action's dismissal.

This is a costs judgment following an interim proceeding where an injunction was granted.

The court received costs submissions from all parties.

However, due to allegations of subsequent events that may impact the appropriate costs award, the judge exercised discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to reserve the costs of the interim proceeding to the trial judge or, with consent, to the judge disposing of an oppression application.

The court emphasized that costs are not appropriately awarded on the interim proceeding until an assessment of evidence and findings of fact considering these subsequent events can be made.