Gwendolyn Lily Adrian

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the plaintiff regarding a default judgment arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The plaintiff sought to enforce the default judgment through garnishment and sheriff's sale.

The court found that a binding settlement agreement existed on essential terms, that the defendants had not breached or resiled from the agreement, and that the timing of collateral mortgage registration was not an essential term.

The court granted the motion to enforce the settlement, cancelled the scheduled property sale, and ordered specific performance of the settlement terms with deadlines for mortgage registration and final payment.

This is a costs ruling following a complex fourteen-day combined family and civil trial.

The trial involved equalization payment disputes between spouses exceeding $10.5 million, unequal division claims, post-valuation date adjustments, fraud and oppression allegations, and a civil action for fraudulent conveyancing.

The husband was ordered to pay the wife an equalization payment of $1,054,267 and the wife was ordered to pay the husband $1,000,000 for oppression and punitive damages.

The court addressed costs claims from the wife and a third-party defendant, finding the civil action unnecessary and awarding limited costs to the wife for a specific pre-trial motion, while awarding substantial costs to the third-party defendant who successfully defended against fraud allegations.

This is a ruling on a motion to disqualify a witness, Gabrielle St. George, in ongoing matrimonial and civil litigation.

Vito Ierullo sought to call Ms. St. George, the estranged sister of Rae Marie Ierullo (referred to as Ms. Adragone), to provide evidence concerning a loan assignment, the transfer of a family home, and allegations of forgery and fraudulent documents.

Rae Marie Ierullo objected, arguing the proposed evidence was largely hearsay, lacked direct knowledge, and was motivated by ill-will.

The court found the evidence to be speculative, based on animus, and largely hearsay, concluding that its admission would unnecessarily expand the scope of the trial into collateral family and estate issues.

The motion to permit Ms. St. George to testify was dismissed.

The appellant, Robert Lepp, sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from an August 17, 2023 order that dismissed his summary judgment motion and granted the respondent, Mandie Eddie's, cross-motion for defamation, awarding her $550,000 in damages and injunctive relief.

Lepp had failed to file sworn evidence in the original motions.

The Court of Appeal applied the four-factor test for extending time to appeal, considering bona fide intention, length and explanation for delay, prejudice, and merits of the proposed appeal.

The court found Lepp's explanation for delay (prioritizing a "Second Action" to gather evidence for an appeal) unacceptable, noted the lack of merit in his proposed appeal (challenging factual findings without competing evidence), and emphasized the significant prejudice and harm to the administration of justice, including the potential for a mistrial in the ongoing "Second Action." The motion for an extension of time was dismissed with costs.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the qualification of an expert witness, D.J. Myles Martin, proposed by the applicant (Rae Marie Ierullo) in a combined family and civil trial concerning business valuations.

The respondent (Vito Ierullo) challenged the expert's qualifications.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess tests for expert admissibility, considering factors such as formal education, professional qualifications, experience, and independence.

The court declined to qualify the expert, citing his lack of formal CBV accreditation, limited litigation support experience, and an undisclosed social relationship with the applicant, which raised concerns about his objectivity and non-partisanship.

The Applicants, beneficiaries of an estate, challenged the compensation claimed by the Estate Trustees (Respondents) and the legal fees paid to the Respondents' law firm.

The court found that the Respondents could not rely on a compensation agreement incorporated into the will because it was not properly executed by the alternative trustee.

The court also found that the Respondents breached their fiduciary duty by requiring the Applicants to sign releases without proper explanation or advice, and by holding distributions hostage.

Applying the "five factors" for compensation, the court significantly reduced the executors' compensation from $300,000 to $194,933.84 plus HST, and disallowed a substantial portion of the legal fees claimed by the Respondents' firm, finding double-counting and unjustified charges.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment that enforced Minutes of Settlement and granted summary judgment for $90,000 to the respondents.

The Minutes of Settlement required the appellants to pay $40,000 in instalments and deliver consents, including a consent to judgment for $120,000.

The appellants failed to deliver consents and stopped the final $10,000 payment.

The motion judge rejected arguments that the pandemic or respondents' separate arrangements with other settling parties altered obligations, and found no error in converting the motion to summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the process or the conclusions, including that the $90,000 award was not a penalty.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, Country Garden Academy Inc., appealed a Superior Court judgment that determined the minimum rent for a lease renewal.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting "comparable premises," failing to consider zoning limitations, and overlooking alleged bad faith by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's holistic consideration of factors, including property use and zoning, and no evidence to support the bad faith claim.

The respondent's cross-appeal for leave to appeal costs was also denied.

The defendants brought a motion seeking leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim.

The plaintiffs opposed certain amendments, arguing they constituted a withdrawal of admissions regarding Mr. Cui's employment by the plaintiff corporations.

The court found that the original pleading, drafted by a self-represented litigant, did not contain unambiguous, deliberate, and intentional admissions.

Even if admissions were withdrawn, the court determined that the three-part test for withdrawal was met, particularly given the reasonable explanation provided (self-representation and lack of legal training).

The motion to amend was granted, with the plaintiffs awarded $3,500 in costs thrown away on a substantial indemnity basis.

This motion concerned a plaintiff's application to find a defendant in contempt of court for breaching a prior permanent injunction against defamation.

The defendant, who had previously engaged in a relentless and malicious online campaign against the plaintiff, continued to publish defamatory statements despite a court order.

The court found the defendant guilty of contempt, emphasizing that the prior order was clear and unequivocal, and the defendant had actual knowledge and intentionally breached it.

The court also provided directions for the defendant to purge his contempt, including apologizing and removing all offending online content.

Additionally, the decision addressed issues related to the defendant's examination in aid of execution, providing clear instructions for compliance and adjourning the request to examine the defendant's spouse.

The plaintiff moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached during a pre-trial conference, where the defendants agreed to pay $200,000.

The defendants argued the motion was premature, citing difficulties in refinancing their home to secure the funds.

The court found that a reasonable time for payment had passed, regardless of whether the payment was conditional on refinancing, as the defendants controlled the timing of the event.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

The plaintiff, Tina Jayne Duncan, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, Robert Lepp, for defamation.

Lepp had published numerous defamatory statements about Duncan on his blog, emails, and YouTube videos, stemming from a neighbourly dispute over a fence.

Despite a libel notice and the commencement of the action, Lepp continued his campaign and was noted in default.

The court found that Duncan established defamation, awarding her $50,000 in general damages, $10,000 in aggravated damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages.

A permanent injunction was granted, requiring Lepp to remove all defamatory content and refrain from future publications.

The court also ordered Lepp to attend an examination in aid of execution for an unpaid costs order from a previous motion.

The applicant, Maryam Rezaee, brought a motion for a mandatory injunction to restore her as manager of a hospitality business, alleging that a corporate restructuring which transferred control to her son, Raymond Zar, was unenforceable due to *non est factum* and constituted oppression.

She also sought alternative prohibitory injunctions.

The respondent, Raymond Zar, brought a cross-motion to remove an existing interim order preventing property encumbrance, arguing non-disclosure of independent legal advice during the *ex parte* application for that order.

The court dismissed Maryam's motion for both mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, finding she did not meet the "strong prima facie case" standard for mandatory relief or the "irreparable harm" standard for either.

The court also dismissed Zar's cross-motion, thereby maintaining the interim order pending the resolution of the Certificates of Pending Litigation motion.

The defendants moved for security for costs against the plaintiff, Forvest Financial Services Corporation, an assignee of a claim from a Swiss corporation.

The motion was brought under Rule 56.01(1)(d), alleging Forvest had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The court applied the two-stage test from Hallum and Yaiguaje, considering all evidence, including the plaintiff's own financial disclosures.

The Master found that Forvest's assets, primarily "advances to related parties," were sheltered from execution and insufficient.

While the plaintiff demonstrated a good case on the merits regarding misappropriation of funds, a critical credibility issue concerning a limitation period argument prevented a finding of "good chance of success." No unreasonable delay was found on the defendants' part.

The court ordered Forvest to post security for costs, reducing the quantum to exclude mediation costs due to the defendants' bad faith participation and costs related to their counterclaim.

The plaintiff and defendants were in a partnership to buy, renovate, and sell houses.

The plaintiff claims she lent the defendants approximately $1 million and seeks repayment and an equitable mortgage.

The defendants counterclaim for partnership profits and an accounting.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not an appropriate case for summary judgment due to the partial nature of the motion, the lack of documentary evidence, and the significant credibility issues requiring oral evidence at trial.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant appealed a decision by Justice Douglas K. Gray dated April 14, 2016.

The Court of Appeal determined that this was not a case warranting substantial indemnity costs, as both parties had pursued and defended their positions vigorously.

The respondents claimed partial indemnity costs of $17,354.08, but the court awarded costs to the respondents in the reduced amount of $13,000, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal reviewed additional material filed by counsel at the court's request and determined that the appellant's submissions did not raise an issue on which leave to appeal the costs order should be granted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment concerning the scope and use of a right-of-way to access her garage.

The appellant raised three arguments: (1) that the application judge erred in interpreting the right-of-way as providing access only along the existing laneway; (2) that fence posts erected by the respondents interfered with the right-of-way; and (3) that the form of the order was deficient because undertakings were not included in the formal order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings on all grounds, finding no legal error or misapprehension of evidence regarding the scope of the right-of-way, noting the fence post issue was moot as the posts had been removed, and finding no significant difference between including undertakings in the formal order versus the recitals.

The main appeal was dismissed, with the costs question deferred pending receipt of written submissions.