Gwendolyn Lily Adrian

The plaintiff, a former municipal by-law enforcement officer, sued the defendant for defamation arising from blog posts and emails following an incident where the plaintiff ticketed the defendant for having his dog off-leash.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant's communications, which focused on the plaintiff's honesty, integrity, and mental health, were primarily personal attacks and did not relate to a matter of public interest.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiff sought costs following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to set aside his noting in default and his cross-motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant had flouted the Rules of Civil Procedure, attempted to bully his way out, and rejected early offers to set aside the noting in default for a nominal payment.

The defendant's conduct warranted an elevated award of costs.

The court ordered the defendant to pay costs of $18,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, which was slightly above partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation, trespass, and nuisance against two neighbours arising from a dispute over a fence.

One defendant was noted in default and brought a motion to set aside the noting in default over a year later.

The other defendant brought a motion to amend her pleadings and withdraw admissions.

The court dismissed the first defendant's motion, finding no credible explanation for his extraordinary delay and noting his abusive behaviour.

The court granted the second defendant's motion to amend her pleadings and withdraw admissions, provided the amendments did not attempt to relitigate issues already decided in a related Small Claims Court action.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was previously dismissed.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $38,152.77 for the motion, while the defendants argued for partial indemnity costs of $12,430.00.

The court found that the defendants acted unreasonably in bringing a motion for partial summary judgment that relied on competing affidavits where credibility was at issue.

Pursuant to Rule 20.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the plaintiff costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $29,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff and defendants were in a partnership to buy, renovate, and sell houses.

The plaintiff claims she lent the defendants approximately $1 million and seeks repayment and an equitable mortgage.

The defendants counterclaim for partnership profits and an accounting.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not an appropriate case for summary judgment due to the partial nature of the motion, the lack of documentary evidence, and the significant credibility issues requiring oral evidence at trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim in an action for lost profits arising from the defendant's refusal to allow the plaintiff to bid on or be awarded two electrical contracting projects.

The defendant opposed certain amendments, arguing they asserted a new cause of action after the expiry of a limitation period.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments merely provided additional facts and particulars arising out of the same factual matrix originally pleaded, and did not assert a new cause of action.

The applicant brought an application seeking damages for wrongful dismissal and unpaid RRSP contributions, arguing he was terminated without cause and entitled to three months' severance under his employment contract.

The respondent employer argued the termination was for just cause due to the applicant's abusive behaviour towards subordinates, and sought to have the application converted to an action and dismissed via summary judgment.

The court found that material facts regarding the alleged misconduct were in dispute and required credibility assessments that could not be resolved on a paper record.

Consequently, the court ordered the entire application to proceed to trial.

The applicant son sought to be appointed sole Guardian of Property and Guardian of Personal Care for his 87-year-old mother, who suffers from advanced dementia.

He also sought to remove his brother as a joint attorney for property.

The respondent brother sought to be appointed Guardian of Personal Care.

The court found no strong and compelling evidence of misconduct or neglect to justify removing the respondent brother as an attorney for property.

The court appointed both brothers as joint guardians of personal care and directed that the mother's emergency care plan remain consistent with the choice previously made by her late husband.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant appealed a decision by Justice Douglas K. Gray dated April 14, 2016.

The Court of Appeal determined that this was not a case warranting substantial indemnity costs, as both parties had pursued and defended their positions vigorously.

The respondents claimed partial indemnity costs of $17,354.08, but the court awarded costs to the respondents in the reduced amount of $13,000, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal reviewed additional material filed by counsel at the court's request and determined that the appellant's submissions did not raise an issue on which leave to appeal the costs order should be granted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment concerning the scope and use of a right-of-way to access her garage.

The appellant raised three arguments: (1) that the application judge erred in interpreting the right-of-way as providing access only along the existing laneway; (2) that fence posts erected by the respondents interfered with the right-of-way; and (3) that the form of the order was deficient because undertakings were not included in the formal order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings on all grounds, finding no legal error or misapprehension of evidence regarding the scope of the right-of-way, noting the fence post issue was moot as the posts had been removed, and finding no significant difference between including undertakings in the formal order versus the recitals.

The main appeal was dismissed, with the costs question deferred pending receipt of written submissions.

The Estate Trustees applied to pass their accounts for the Estate of Ingrid Loveman.

A beneficiary objected, alleging the Trustees breached their fiduciary duties by delaying the sale of the estate's primary asset (a house) to one of the Trustees, failing to account for rental income, and improperly charging the estate for litigation and carrying costs.

The court found that the purchasing Trustee preferred his own interests by delaying the house purchase, which caused unnecessary carrying costs and exposed the estate to a dependant's relief claim.

The court ordered the Trustees to personally bear the litigation costs and the carrying costs incurred after a reasonable closing date.

The Trustees were also ordered to account for uncollected rental income.

Trustee compensation was reduced to 1.75% due to these administrative failures.