Rolf Martin Piehler

Following a default judgment granted on January 5, 2026, the plaintiff's counsel advised by letter that the failure to seek costs in the original endorsement was inadvertent.

The plaintiff subsequently sought costs on a partial indemnity scale of approximately $6,000 inclusive of HST, plus disbursements of $832.10 and HST of $93.35.

The court found the Bill of Costs to be poorly prepared, as it failed to provide totals for time or disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and costs.

A motion to review an assessment officer's decision regarding costs awarded to a self-represented litigant in a solicitor assessment proceeding.

The applicant, an architectural designer, sought compensation for lost opportunity costs incurred while preparing for and attending a 42-day assessment hearing.

The assessment officer awarded $90,000 for the applicant's time, despite the applicant providing no corroborating evidence of specific lost contracts or delayed projects.

The respondent law firm challenged the award on the ground that there was insufficient evidentiary foundation demonstrating actual lost opportunity.

The court found that while the assessment officer was entitled to infer lost opportunity costs, the award failed to properly apply the legal test requiring a "modest" or "reasonable" fee for self-represented litigants.

The court reduced the award to $40,000.

The court awarded the Applicants partial indemnity costs in the amount of $88,743.94 after finding that the Respondent developer was not entitled to charge certain adjustment amounts on closing under the agreements of purchase and sale.

The court found the Developer's conduct increased costs but did not rise to the level warranting substantial indemnity.

The decision reviews the appropriate scale and quantum of costs, referencing the Developer's failure to provide information and the resulting bifurcation of the proceeding.

The applicants, purchasers of units in a townhouse complex, sought a declaration that the developer was not entitled to charge them certain adjustment amounts on closing under their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court found that the developer was not entitled to pass on utility infrastructure costs paid to contractors, trades, and other third parties, but only those paid to the municipality or utility service providers, and for meter installation.

The court also found the developer was not entitled to charge $800 for an extension of the closing date.

The application was granted, and a reference on damages was directed.

The respondent, Niman Mamo LLP, brought a motion on consent for a sealing order over all materials filed in the court file, citing solicitor-client privilege and ongoing litigation.

The court found that the materials filed did not meet the requirements for a sealing order as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25.

The court emphasized the presumption of openness in court proceedings and the need for strong, evidence-based grounds to override this principle.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a mortgagee, sought judgment against the mortgagor for default and vacant possession of the mortgaged property.

While the mortgagor did not oppose the judgment and had vacated, a second respondent, Thomas Mullen, opposed the vacant possession order, asserting he was a residential tenant of a portion of the property under a "lease with option to purchase" agreement.

The court found that the agreement constituted a lease, as the condition for purchase (severance of the lot) was never met.

The court further determined that Mullen's occupation of the property, including a trailer and a Quonset hut used as a permanent residence for most of the year, qualified as a "residential complex" and "rental unit" under the Residential Tenancies Act.

Consequently, the applicant, as a mortgagee in possession, was deemed a landlord and was required to seek possession through the Landlord and Tenant Board, not the Superior Court.

The court granted judgment against the mortgagor for the outstanding debt but dismissed the application for vacant possession against Mullen due to lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached during a pre-trial conference, where the defendants agreed to pay $200,000.

The defendants argued the motion was premature, citing difficulties in refinancing their home to secure the funds.

The court found that a reasonable time for payment had passed, regardless of whether the payment was conditional on refinancing, as the defendants controlled the timing of the event.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

The plaintiff and defendants were in a partnership to buy, renovate, and sell houses.

The plaintiff claims she lent the defendants approximately $1 million and seeks repayment and an equitable mortgage.

The defendants counterclaim for partnership profits and an accounting.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not an appropriate case for summary judgment due to the partial nature of the motion, the lack of documentary evidence, and the significant credibility issues requiring oral evidence at trial.

This decision addresses the costs of a dismissed application where the applicants, Victor Vetro and Linda Montanari, sought to remove Marilyn Gail Barbour as trustee of a property and transfer it to Ms. Montanari.

The application was dismissed by consent after Mr. Vetro's bankruptcy trustee intervened and settled a related application.

Ms. Barbour sought substantial indemnity costs, while the applicants argued for no costs.

The court awarded Ms. Barbour partial indemnity costs of $16,500, finding her to be the successful party on the costs issue, but not entitled to substantial indemnity based on the record before the court.

The defendant, Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), moved to dismiss the plaintiff David Smith's action for delay and breaches of a trial timetable order in a construction lien reference.

The court found that a motion to dismiss for delay under Rule 27.01(1)(c) was inconsistent with the Construction Lien Act's statutory timelines.

It also determined that the trial timetable order was not peremptory, and Smith's breaches, while not condoned, did not amount to intentional or contumelious conduct warranting dismissal.

The court had already imposed sanctions by barring certain evidence.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the trial was rescheduled with further directions regarding evidence admissibility.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the defendant Frank Fiorini for alleged breaches of court orders dated October 19 and November 10, 2010, related to the disclosure and non-removal of construction equipment.

The motion was initially brought in 2010, adjourned, struck in 2011, and resurrected in 2018.

The court dismissed the motion due to the plaintiff's seven-year delay, the plaintiff's prior indication that contempt had been purged, and the failure to prove the breach beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized that contempt motions are a last resort and should not be used merely to enforce judgments when other means have failed.

The applicant, Muhammad Watto, and two corporations he controlled, brought two applications.

The first sought a declaration of oppression against the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council for revoking approval of continuing professional development programs.

The second sought the appointment of an inspector to investigate the Regulatory Council's affairs.

The court dismissed both applications, finding no proven oppression and no demonstrated need for an inspector, as the applicant lacked standing for the oppression claim regarding the corporations and failed to establish a prima facie case for an investigation.

The City of Hamilton commenced an action against Daimler Trucks North America LLC and Wajax Industries Limited for damages arising from a truck fire.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred due to the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The court found that the City of Hamilton knew or ought to have known of its claim by November 12, 2010, at the latest, and failed to exercise reasonable diligence in acquiring material facts.

Consequently, the claim, commenced on February 19, 2013, was statute-barred.

The defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claim.

The appellant sought to enforce a mortgage registered against residential property owned by the respondent.

The respondent's spouse had borrowed money from the appellant and signed a promissory note agreeing to register a mortgage as security.

The respondent contended the mortgage was unenforceable because she received no consideration and understood it was to replace an existing second mortgage, not to secure her spouse's debts.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondent received no consideration and that the mortgage's purpose was to discharge the existing second mortgage, not to secure new loans.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff and defendants, partners in an informal real estate joint venture, brought cross-motions concerning Certificates of Pending Litigation (CPLs) on three properties.

The plaintiff sought discharge of a CPL on one property and payment of funds, while the defendants sought discharge of a CPL on another and leave to issue a CPL on a third.

The court applied the Interrent test for CPLs, finding triable issues for all claims due to the parties' poor record-keeping.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendants were granted leave to issue a CPL on one property, preserving the status quo pending trial.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a default judgment in an action concerning an alleged default under a second mortgage.

The defendants had served a notice of intention to defend but did not deliver a statement of defence and were subsequently noted in default and subjected to default judgment.

The court considered Rules 19.03 and 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the circumstances surrounding communications between counsel.

The court found that plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide notice of the intention to note the defendants in default and failed to respond to correspondence from new defence counsel.

In the interests of justice, the court set aside the noting in default and the default judgment and ordered the defendants to deliver a statement of defence within 20 days.

A former lawyer sought declarations that payments from Legal Aid Ontario to his solicitor account constituted “wages” under the Wages Act and were therefore largely exempt from garnishment to satisfy a judgment debt.

He also requested an accounting of funds remitted pursuant to a notice of garnishment and access to Legal Aid’s billing system.

The court held that payments made to a self‑employed lawyer for Legal Aid work are not “wages” within the meaning of the Wages Act, drawing an analogy to prior authority holding that physician payments from OHIP are not wages.

The applicant had not properly brought a motion to vary the garnishment and the statutory framework did not support the requested retroactive relief.

The court also found that Legal Aid Ontario had already provided a full and adequate accounting of payments applied toward the garnishment.