Rolf Martin Piehler

The City of Hamilton commenced an action against Daimler Trucks North America LLC and Wajax Industries Limited for damages arising from a truck fire.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred due to the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The court found that the City of Hamilton knew or ought to have known of its claim by November 12, 2010, at the latest, and failed to exercise reasonable diligence in acquiring material facts.

Consequently, the claim, commenced on February 19, 2013, was statute-barred.

The defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claim.

The appellant sought to enforce a mortgage registered against residential property owned by the respondent.

The respondent's spouse had borrowed money from the appellant and signed a promissory note agreeing to register a mortgage as security.

The respondent contended the mortgage was unenforceable because she received no consideration and understood it was to replace an existing second mortgage, not to secure her spouse's debts.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondent received no consideration and that the mortgage's purpose was to discharge the existing second mortgage, not to secure new loans.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of a property and sought damages for unauthorized renovations by the defendants.

The defendant real estate agent claimed a 50% equitable interest based on an oral joint venture agreement and financial contributions to the deposit and closing costs.

The court found the defendant had an equitable interest despite the lack of a formal written agreement, applying the doctrine of part performance.

However, because the defendant repudiated the agreement after the plaintiff's son gutted the property, she was entitled to restitution of her financial contributions totaling $154,615.55, while the plaintiff's claims for damages and loss of rent were dismissed.

The plaintiff and defendants, partners in an informal real estate joint venture, brought cross-motions concerning Certificates of Pending Litigation (CPLs) on three properties.

The plaintiff sought discharge of a CPL on one property and payment of funds, while the defendants sought discharge of a CPL on another and leave to issue a CPL on a third.

The court applied the Interrent test for CPLs, finding triable issues for all claims due to the parties' poor record-keeping.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendants were granted leave to issue a CPL on one property, preserving the status quo pending trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to quash the defendant's appeal of a judgment and costs order under the Construction Lien Act, arguing the notice of appeal was not served within the required 15-day period.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to extend the time for service.

The court found inadequate evidence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit and no real explanation for the delay, concluding the appeal was primarily directed at the costs endorsement.

The plaintiff's motion to quash was granted and the defendant's motion for an extension was dismissed, without prejudice to the defendant seeking leave to appeal the costs decision.

The plaintiff brought a motion to quash the defendant's appeal of a judgment for failing to serve the notice of appeal within the 15-day period required by the Construction Lien Act.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for an extension of time, arguing he was waiting for a costs endorsement to clarify an alleged error in the judgment.

The court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the motion for an extension, finding inadequate evidence of a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period and noting that a costs judgment is a separate determination that does not extend the time to appeal the merits.

A construction lien action where a foundation contractor sought payment of an outstanding balance for work performed on a residential construction project.

The homeowner disputed the amount owed and advanced a set-off and counterclaim alleging deficient workmanship and breach of contract.

The court found the contractor had completed approximately 90 percent of the contracted work before being ordered off the job site following a design issue unrelated to the contractor.

The homeowner’s claims for remediation and damages were unsupported by reliable evidence and the contractor had not been given an opportunity to remedy alleged minor deficiencies.

Judgment was granted to the contractor for the invoiced amount, the lien was confirmed, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a third mortgage against the defendant's property, claiming it secured loans previously made to the defendant's spouse.

The defendant argued she never consented to securing her spouse's debts and believed the mortgage was intended to replace an existing second mortgage.

The court found the mortgage was intended to replace the second mortgage and that no funds were advanced to the defendant.

The court also applied the defence of non est factum, finding the defendant did not consent to the mortgage's purported purpose.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the mortgage was ordered discharged.

The defendant's counterclaim for slander of title was dismissed.

Following settlement of a mortgage enforcement action, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the mortgagor to the mortgagee.

The mortgage contained a contractual provision requiring the mortgagor to pay the lender’s legal costs on a solicitor-and-client basis.

The court held that such provisions do not displace the court’s discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Concerns about an inaccurate discharge statement under the Mortgages Act, block-billed legal accounts, and proportionality justified refusing full indemnity costs.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court reduced the claimed $65,831.32 in costs to $25,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The respondents sought costs following a motion in which they obtained part of the alternative relief requested, although the applicant’s pleadings were not struck.

The court considered written costs submissions from the respondents, while the applicant declined to provide submissions due to an inability to obtain instructions from the client residing abroad.

The court found that the respondents achieved substantial and significant relief that advanced the proceeding.

In the circumstances, the court fixed reasonable costs in a modest lump sum.

Costs were ordered payable by the applicant to the respondents.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for $67,408.88 owing on two equipment leases for vending machines.

The defendant, an unsophisticated retired nurse, argued the leases were unconscionable, she lacked mental capacity due to a brain tumor, and she was induced by misrepresentations from third-party vendors involved in a scam.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the complex issues of unconscionability, capacity, and due diligence required a full trial with viva voce evidence to achieve a fair and just determination.

Following a three‑day trial in which the plaintiff’s claim for $68,506.25 was dismissed, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because there was no Rule 49 offer triggering such consequences and no reprehensible conduct by the opposing party.

The court also adjusted the claimed partial indemnity rate, finding that a 67% recovery of actual counsel rates was excessive and that a rate approximating 60% of substantial indemnity was more typical.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors, including a refused settlement offer, the court awarded a global costs amount reflecting fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

The applicant commenced an application seeking possession of a property, forfeiture of a $30,000 deposit under an agreement of purchase and sale, and damages arising from alleged vandalism and breach of the agreement.

The respondents argued the property was unsafe and sought to strike the applicant’s affidavit for failure to answer undertakings and refusals from cross-examination, while also seeking return of the deposit.

The court held that credibility disputes and conflicting evidence made the issues unsuitable for determination on the application record.

Pursuant to Rule 38.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the remaining issues of damages and entitlement to the deposit were ordered to proceed to trial and the application was converted into an action.

The deposit was ordered paid into court pending determination by the trial judge.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sued the defendant for a commission of $68,506.25 under a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA) after the defendant purchased a home using another brokerage.

The court found that the BRA had been repudiated by the defendant and that the plaintiff accepted the repudiation by its conduct in failing to provide further services.

Alternatively, the plaintiff repudiated the agreement by failing to assist the defendant in locating a home, which the defendant accepted.

The claim was dismissed.

Following a six‑day civil fraud trial in which the plaintiff recovered damages exceeding $150,000, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on findings that the defendants engaged in deceitful and exploitative conduct and pointing to litigation conduct during trial.

Applying Rules 1.04 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant appellate guidance, the court held that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for rare and exceptional cases involving reprehensible conduct.

The court found that the conduct of one individual defendant and the corporate defendant warranted substantial indemnity costs, while another defendant’s lesser culpability justified only partial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 on a substantial indemnity scale and $32,500 on a partial indemnity scale, with joint and several responsibility apportioned among the defendants.

A vulnerable elderly homeowner brought an action alleging fraud, deceit, breach of contract, and negligence after contractors performing renovation work obtained over $138,000 through numerous consumer purchase contracts within approximately forty days.

The court found that a salesperson for the construction company exploited the plaintiff’s trust and vulnerability, repeatedly persuading her to approve unnecessary work and sign cheques.

The court concluded that the salesperson’s conduct constituted fraudulent misrepresentation and the tort of deceit, rendering most contracts void.

The construction company was held vicariously liable for its agent’s misconduct, and the company’s principal bore partial personal liability for failing to intervene despite warning signs.

Compensatory and aggravated damages were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a default judgment in an action concerning an alleged default under a second mortgage.

The defendants had served a notice of intention to defend but did not deliver a statement of defence and were subsequently noted in default and subjected to default judgment.

The court considered Rules 19.03 and 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the circumstances surrounding communications between counsel.

The court found that plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide notice of the intention to note the defendants in default and failed to respond to correspondence from new defence counsel.

In the interests of justice, the court set aside the noting in default and the default judgment and ordered the defendants to deliver a statement of defence within 20 days.

The plaintiffs brought an action seeking a declaration that their mortgage debt to the defendants had been fully paid through a 'savings' agreement whereby the plaintiff worked off the debt on construction projects.

The defendant mortgagee counterclaimed for enforcement of the mortgages and a writ of possession.

The court found that the purported 'savings' agreement was a forgery and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.

The court granted judgment to the defendant on the mortgages and authorized a writ of possession, but postponed its execution pending the outcome of a related proceeding concerning a recent power of sale transaction.

A former lawyer sought declarations that payments from Legal Aid Ontario to his solicitor account constituted “wages” under the Wages Act and were therefore largely exempt from garnishment to satisfy a judgment debt.

He also requested an accounting of funds remitted pursuant to a notice of garnishment and access to Legal Aid’s billing system.

The court held that payments made to a self‑employed lawyer for Legal Aid work are not “wages” within the meaning of the Wages Act, drawing an analogy to prior authority holding that physician payments from OHIP are not wages.

The applicant had not properly brought a motion to vary the garnishment and the statutory framework did not support the requested retroactive relief.

The court also found that Legal Aid Ontario had already provided a full and adequate accounting of payments applied toward the garnishment.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interim order to recover an aircraft engine owned by the Government of Taiwan, which had been sent for overhaul.

The defendants, who acted as middlemen, had the engine shipped to Canada and detained it, claiming a repairer's lien and demanding security.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to possession, the defendants had unlawfully detained the engine, and the defendants were not entitled to a lien as they did not perform any repairs.

The court ordered the immediate return of the engine without requiring the plaintiff to post security.