Rolf Martin Piehler

The deceased designated one of her two sons as the sole beneficiary of two segregated fund policies.

Following her intestate death, the other son claimed entitlement to half the proceeds, arguing the designated beneficiary promised to share them and held them on a resulting trust for the estate.

The court found insufficient corroborated evidence of a binding promise to share the proceeds.

Applying Mak (Estate) v. Mak, the court held that the presumption of resulting trust does not apply to beneficiary designations under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The proceeds were ordered paid out of court to the designated beneficiary.

Following a default judgment granted on January 5, 2026, the plaintiff's counsel advised by letter that the failure to seek costs in the original endorsement was inadvertent.

The plaintiff subsequently sought costs on a partial indemnity scale of approximately $6,000 inclusive of HST, plus disbursements of $832.10 and HST of $93.35.

The court found the Bill of Costs to be poorly prepared, as it failed to provide totals for time or disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendants.

The court granted the motion, finding the facts supported judgment in the amounts set out in the draft judgment.

The court also declared that the judgment debts arose from fraudulent misrepresentations under section 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and would survive any present or future bankruptcy proceedings by the defendants.

No costs were sought or ordered.

A motion to review an assessment officer's decision regarding costs awarded to a self-represented litigant in a solicitor assessment proceeding.

The applicant, an architectural designer, sought compensation for lost opportunity costs incurred while preparing for and attending a 42-day assessment hearing.

The assessment officer awarded $90,000 for the applicant's time, despite the applicant providing no corroborating evidence of specific lost contracts or delayed projects.

The respondent law firm challenged the award on the ground that there was insufficient evidentiary foundation demonstrating actual lost opportunity.

The court found that while the assessment officer was entitled to infer lost opportunity costs, the award failed to properly apply the legal test requiring a "modest" or "reasonable" fee for self-represented litigants.

The court reduced the award to $40,000.

The court awarded the Applicants partial indemnity costs in the amount of $88,743.94 after finding that the Respondent developer was not entitled to charge certain adjustment amounts on closing under the agreements of purchase and sale.

The court found the Developer's conduct increased costs but did not rise to the level warranting substantial indemnity.

The decision reviews the appropriate scale and quantum of costs, referencing the Developer's failure to provide information and the resulting bifurcation of the proceeding.

The applicants, purchasers of units in a townhouse complex, sought a declaration that the developer was not entitled to charge them certain adjustment amounts on closing under their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court found that the developer was not entitled to pass on utility infrastructure costs paid to contractors, trades, and other third parties, but only those paid to the municipality or utility service providers, and for meter installation.

The court also found the developer was not entitled to charge $800 for an extension of the closing date.

The application was granted, and a reference on damages was directed.

The respondent, Niman Mamo LLP, brought a motion on consent for a sealing order over all materials filed in the court file, citing solicitor-client privilege and ongoing litigation.

The court found that the materials filed did not meet the requirements for a sealing order as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25.

The court emphasized the presumption of openness in court proceedings and the need for strong, evidence-based grounds to override this principle.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a mortgagee, sought judgment against the mortgagor for default and vacant possession of the mortgaged property.

While the mortgagor did not oppose the judgment and had vacated, a second respondent, Thomas Mullen, opposed the vacant possession order, asserting he was a residential tenant of a portion of the property under a "lease with option to purchase" agreement.

The court found that the agreement constituted a lease, as the condition for purchase (severance of the lot) was never met.

The court further determined that Mullen's occupation of the property, including a trailer and a Quonset hut used as a permanent residence for most of the year, qualified as a "residential complex" and "rental unit" under the Residential Tenancies Act.

Consequently, the applicant, as a mortgagee in possession, was deemed a landlord and was required to seek possession through the Landlord and Tenant Board, not the Superior Court.

The court granted judgment against the mortgagor for the outstanding debt but dismissed the application for vacant possession against Mullen due to lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff mortgage syndicate brought a motion for summary judgment and to strike the defendants' statement of defence and counterclaim regarding a defaulted second mortgage.

The defendants, who had not made any payments, alleged unparticularized fraudulent behaviour by the plaintiffs' agents.

The court struck the statement of defence and counterclaim as they disclosed no reasonable defence or cause of action.

Finding no genuine issue for trial, the court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs and awarded full indemnity costs.

The plaintiff sued her mortgagee, its realtors, the purchasers, and the mortgagee's lawyer, alleging an improvident sale of her property under a power of sale.

The defendant lawyer moved to strike the claim against him under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead the elements of unlawful act conspiracy, specifically failing to plead an unlawful act or that the lawyer's conduct was directed at her rather than simply advancing his client's interests.

The claim against the lawyer was struck without leave to amend.

The claimant and the bankrupt appealed two decisions of the Registrar in Bankruptcy that refused to extend the time for the claimant to appeal the Trustee's Notice of Disallowance of her claim to a beneficial interest in a property, and subsequently granted the Trustee's motion to sell the property.

The Superior Court found that the bankrupt had standing to appeal.

The Court held that the Registrar made palpable and overriding errors of fact in applying the test for an extension of time, specifically by ignoring evidence that the claimant formed an intention to appeal within the prescribed time and had a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The appeals were allowed, the Registrar's decisions were set aside, and the time to appeal the disallowance was extended.

The appellant appealed a summary trial decision that allowed the respondent repair shop to recover $30,358.06 for repairs to a vehicle from funds paid into court.

The trial judge had found that although the respondent's non-possessory lien was invalid and unenforceable under the Repair and Storage Liens Act due to a lack of signed acknowledgment, the appellant's payment of the disputed funds into court under s. 24 converted the invalid lien into a valid charge on the funds.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 24(13) cannot be used to turn an invalid, improperly registered lien into a valid one.

The respondent's claim was dismissed and the funds were ordered to be paid out to the appellant.

The plaintiff moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached during a pre-trial conference, where the defendants agreed to pay $200,000.

The defendants argued the motion was premature, citing difficulties in refinancing their home to secure the funds.

The court found that a reasonable time for payment had passed, regardless of whether the payment was conditional on refinancing, as the defendants controlled the timing of the event.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the plaintiff was awarded costs.

The plaintiff repair shop brought an action to recover amounts paid into court by the defendant vehicle owner under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The plaintiff had repaired and stored a Ferrari leased to a third party that later went into receivership.

The court found that the plaintiff had valid non-possessory liens that became charges on the funds paid into court.

The court awarded the plaintiff $30,358.06 for the fair value of the repairs but dismissed the claim for storage charges due to insufficient evidence of fair value.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was previously dismissed.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $38,152.77 for the motion, while the defendants argued for partial indemnity costs of $12,430.00.

The court found that the defendants acted unreasonably in bringing a motion for partial summary judgment that relied on competing affidavits where credibility was at issue.

Pursuant to Rule 20.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the plaintiff costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $29,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff and defendants were in a partnership to buy, renovate, and sell houses.

The plaintiff claims she lent the defendants approximately $1 million and seeks repayment and an equitable mortgage.

The defendants counterclaim for partnership profits and an accounting.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not an appropriate case for summary judgment due to the partial nature of the motion, the lack of documentary evidence, and the significant credibility issues requiring oral evidence at trial.

This decision addresses the costs of a dismissed application where the applicants, Victor Vetro and Linda Montanari, sought to remove Marilyn Gail Barbour as trustee of a property and transfer it to Ms. Montanari.

The application was dismissed by consent after Mr. Vetro's bankruptcy trustee intervened and settled a related application.

Ms. Barbour sought substantial indemnity costs, while the applicants argued for no costs.

The court awarded Ms. Barbour partial indemnity costs of $16,500, finding her to be the successful party on the costs issue, but not entitled to substantial indemnity based on the record before the court.

The defendant, Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), moved to dismiss the plaintiff David Smith's action for delay and breaches of a trial timetable order in a construction lien reference.

The court found that a motion to dismiss for delay under Rule 27.01(1)(c) was inconsistent with the Construction Lien Act's statutory timelines.

It also determined that the trial timetable order was not peremptory, and Smith's breaches, while not condoned, did not amount to intentional or contumelious conduct warranting dismissal.

The court had already imposed sanctions by barring certain evidence.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the trial was rescheduled with further directions regarding evidence admissibility.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the defendant Frank Fiorini for alleged breaches of court orders dated October 19 and November 10, 2010, related to the disclosure and non-removal of construction equipment.

The motion was initially brought in 2010, adjourned, struck in 2011, and resurrected in 2018.

The court dismissed the motion due to the plaintiff's seven-year delay, the plaintiff's prior indication that contempt had been purged, and the failure to prove the breach beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized that contempt motions are a last resort and should not be used merely to enforce judgments when other means have failed.

The applicant, Muhammad Watto, and two corporations he controlled, brought two applications.

The first sought a declaration of oppression against the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council for revoking approval of continuing professional development programs.

The second sought the appointment of an inspector to investigate the Regulatory Council's affairs.

The court dismissed both applications, finding no proven oppression and no demonstrated need for an inspector, as the applicant lacked standing for the oppression claim regarding the corporations and failed to establish a prima facie case for an investigation.