Bernie Romano

The applicant sought interim spousal and child support from the respondent in a common law relationship that lasted approximately 16 years.

The respondent's parents and brother brought a summary judgment motion for possession of the matrimonial home.

The court granted the summary judgment motion for possession, finding that the applicant had no possessory rights as a common law spouse and no valid constructive trust claim.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on gifts and housing benefits provided by his parents and ordered that interim spousal support commence upon the applicant's vacation of the property.

The court deferred determination of the quantum of support and child support pending further submissions.

This costs endorsement follows a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claims and largely granting the defendant's counterclaim regarding property ownership and accounting.

The court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that costs should be capped under simplified procedure rules, rejecting it because the action predated the rule change.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle.

The court, however, awarded partial indemnity costs, finding that substantial indemnity generally requires reprehensible conduct, which was absent in this case.

The court assessed the quantum of costs based on proportionality, reasonableness, and the parties' expectations, making adjustments to the defendant's claimed amount.

The plaintiffs, a mother and son, brought an action against the defendant, the mother's separated spouse, regarding the ownership of an investment property.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendant held his registered 33 percent interest in trust for the son, who allegedly contributed to the purchase and renovations.

The defendant relied on a marriage contract that stipulated ownership governed property division and counterclaimed for partition and sale, an accounting of rental income, and the return of personal belongings.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' trust claims, finding the marriage contract binding and the son's contributions unproven.

The court granted the defendant's counterclaim for partition and sale, an accounting of rental income from 2017 onwards, and the return of his personal belongings.

This appeal concerned a property zoned agricultural, where the Estate Trustees sought a declaration for legal non-conforming use for commercial purposes, including outdoor storage of vehicles and equipment.

The application judge dismissed the declaration, finding the uses were not lawful under the relevant zoning by-law.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the application judge's refusal to award them costs for a successful contempt motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the declaration, affirming that the commercial activities were not lawful non-conforming uses.

It also granted leave to appeal the costs issue but dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's discretionary decision on costs.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision terminating her tenancy for the landlord's son's occupation.

The tenant challenged the LTB's findings on good faith, monetary calculations, the adjudicator's failure to question the landlord, and the adjudicators' credentials.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the tenant's challenges to the good faith finding did not raise an error of law.

The court also found no legal error in the monetary calculations or the adjudicator's conduct, and held that the tenant failed to rebut the presumption of the adjudicators' competence and impartiality.

The eviction was postponed to September 30, 2023.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that their current use of lands was a legal non-conforming use under the Planning Act.

The application judge found that the use had changed significantly from the prior legal non-conforming use and that the appellants had abandoned the prior use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's factual findings and her conclusion that the appellants failed to establish a continuing legal non-conforming use.

The court also confirmed the admissibility of property complaints as factual matters from records kept in the ordinary course of business.

The applicant son brought a motion within a guardianship application to determine his 91-year-old father's capacity to instruct counsel, and to enforce previous orders regarding financial disclosure and access visits.

The father, who suffers from aphasia, had been assessed by multiple capacity assessors.

The court found the father had capacity to instruct counsel regarding his personal care and residence, but lacked capacity to instruct on property matters due to his inability to understand a disputed $280,000 mortgage.

The court directed the Public Guardian and Trustee to arrange section 3 counsel for the father, ordered the respondent siblings to provide the long-overdue accounting, and enforced the applicant's access visits, awarding substantial indemnity costs against the respondent siblings for their reprehensible conduct in delaying the proceedings.

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking a declaration that he was a director of a not-for-profit corporation and that a respondent director was in a conflict of interest for purchasing adjacent property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was not a director under the Letters Patent and lacked standing to bring a derivative action without leave.

The court also upheld the finding that the respondent director was not in a conflict of interest, as the purchase was transparent and approved by the corporation.

The applicants sought a declaration that their property's current use (outside storage of vehicles, machinery, equipment, commercial/business operation, storage of trucks/trailers, shipping containers) constituted a legal non-conforming use under s. 34(9) of the Planning Act, which would set aside municipal Orders to Comply.

The respondent sought dismissal, or a declaration limiting the non-conforming use to 4 trucks and 7 trailers.

The court found that while the property had a prior legal non-conforming use as a trucking business with ancillary parking and storage, the applicants' current use had significantly changed in nature and intensity, including storage of derelict vehicles, a fuelling station, and a junk yard, which were too remote from the original use and caused undue neighbourhood impact.

Consequently, the applicants lost the protection of s. 34(9) of the Planning Act, and their application was dismissed, making the Orders to Comply enforceable.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order requiring it to vacate a gas bar premises.

The application judge had found a month-to-month commercial tenancy existed and ordered vacant possession.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the application judge erred by resolving disputed material facts regarding whether the appellant had an ownership interest in the property rather than a tenancy.

The appeal was allowed and the application was converted to an action to proceed to trial.

Following an application regarding the continuation of a legal non-conforming use, the applicant sought costs of $60,186.30 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued for each party to bear their own costs due to divided success, or alternatively $20,000.

The court found there was genuinely divided success as the applicant was successful on the declaration but overreached on the injunction, which the respondent successfully resisted.

Applying Rule 57.01, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $38,000 all-inclusive.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision which found the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the tenants' application for rent abatement.

The landlord had previously commenced a Superior Court application for unpaid occupancy fees, and the tenants subsequently applied to the Board for rent abatement due to alleged lack of heat.

The Divisional Court held that the Board erred in law by concluding it could not decline jurisdiction and by failing to consider whether the tenants' application was an abuse of process.

The Court found that allowing the Board application to proceed would lead to duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings, as the tenants were raising the exact same issues as a set-off defense in the Superior Court action.

The appeal was allowed and the tenants' Board application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant sought declarations regarding the continuation of legal non-conforming uses on his property, affirmation of an existing injunction against the Town, and an order to register court judgments on title.

The court granted declarations affirming that the property's uses, including a motor vehicle compound, were a continuation of previously recognized legal non-conforming uses.

The court dismissed the requests for an affirmation of the injunction, finding no contravention by the Town, and for an order to register judgments, deeming it a matter for the Land Titles system.

The plaintiff municipality brought a motion to hold the defendants in contempt of a 2019 court order requiring them to remove an encroaching fence and cease illegal business operations and storage on specific properties.

The defendants admitted non-compliance but argued that the COVID-19 pandemic and financial hardship prevented them from obeying the order.

The court rejected this defence, finding that financial hardship does not excuse deliberate disobedience of a court order.

The court found the defendants in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt regarding two of the properties and the fence, and directed the parties to schedule a sentencing hearing.

The moving party insurer brought a motion under section 128(5) of the Insurance Act for the appointment of an umpire after the parties' appraisers failed to agree on a candidate to value a water loss claim.

The court reviewed the candidates proposed by both the insurer and the insureds, considering their experience in valuation, impartiality, and prior experience as an umpire.

The court appointed George R. Milnes, finding his 30-year career representing both insurers and insureds demonstrated the necessary expertise and impartiality.

The moving party, Stefano Carella, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Dietrich J. dated February 20, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No order was made as to costs due to an outstanding issue regarding whether the moving party was capable of instructing counsel.

A case management conference was held to schedule a motion for leave to appeal an order regarding capacity and representation issues.

The court noted delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the self-represented status of two respondents.

The court set a timetable for the filing of materials and directed that the motion for leave to appeal proceed in writing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed its jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order granting vacant possession.

Despite arguments from the parties, the court determined that the order fell under s. 78(1) of the Commercial Tenancies Act, which directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal transferred the appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, declining to hear the merits.

No costs were ordered.

Following a successful motion to enforce zoning bylaws and property rights, the plaintiff municipality sought costs.

The defendants argued the motion was unnecessary and sought their own costs.

The court found the plaintiff acted properly in bringing the motion in the public interest and was entitled to costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs and costs thrown away, totalling $71,220.90.