Kim A. Mullin

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

The appellants brought a second motion for reconsideration of a prior Court of Appeal decision that had dismissed their appeal and affirmed a judgment against them.

The appellants sought to set aside or vary the prior decision on grounds of fraud, mistake, and significant new material facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants were recycling arguments already considered and rejected, mischaracterizing the basis of their first motion to reconsider, and presenting arguments without merit regarding the respondent's standing and the credibility of witnesses.

The court further ordered that the appellants could not initiate further proceedings without paying outstanding costs and obtaining leave of the panel.

On appeal from a Divisional Court decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had jurisdiction to impose a 25 percent cap on the alternative parkland dedication requirement under section 42 of the Planning Act.

The Town of Richmond Hill had adopted an Official Plan policy allowing for parkland dedication at a rate of one hectare per 300 dwelling units.

Developers challenged this policy, and the OMB imposed a 25 percent cap on the amount of land required to be conveyed.

The Divisional Court set aside the cap, finding the OMB lacked authority to impose it.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the legislature has given municipalities exclusive authority to determine the rate under section 42(3), subject only to the requirement that an Official Plan contain specific policies dealing with parkland provision and the use of the alternative requirement.

The OMB's role is limited to reviewing whether such policies are appropriate and accord with provincial policies, not to set or cap the rate itself.

The appellants moved under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision maintaining awards of damages against them.

The appellants contended that the trial judge miscalculated damages as of a specific date by failing to consider post-date gains from a transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants were attempting to reargue an issue that had been decided against them at trial and on appeal, and that the theory of damages was not raised in the original appeal.

The applicant sought declarations that the City of Hamilton was deemed to have consented to a demolition application under the Ontario Heritage Act due to insufficient notice, and orders for the Chief Building Official to process a demolition permit application.

The core issue was whether the City's notice of refusal, sent to a director's residence rather than the corporation's registered office or the address on the second application, constituted sufficient notice.

The court, relying on Supreme Court of Canada precedent, found that Section 67 of the OHA does not provide an exhaustive list of notice methods and that the City had taken a "positive step" to give notice, which was actually received and acted upon by the applicant's sole director.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

Shareholders of two successive corporate ventures to develop oil and gas fields in Russia sued defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, and conspiracy.

The defendants had induced the plaintiffs to invest US$50 million in a sham public company (Magellan) by falsely representing that another investor (BDW) had committed to investing US$70 million.

When the fraud was discovered, the parties reorganized under a new company (Koll), but the defendants continued to deceive the plaintiffs about asset values and IPO prospects to induce further investment.

The trial judge awarded full compensatory damages to the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the court upheld liability for pre-June 2006 conduct but set aside liability for post-June 2006 conduct based on unpleaded fraudulent misrepresentation claims regarding IPO-related statements, while maintaining liability for wrongful garnishment of remaining Magellan funds.