Ontario Land Tribunal

Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire

ISSUE DATE: March 14, 2025 CASE NO(S).: OLT-23-001315

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 38(4.1) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, as amended.

Appellant: CBM Aggregates Subject: Interim Control By-law 2022-75 Description: Interim Control By-law 2022-75 restricts the use of land for the establishment of new gravel pits of quarries, while a study is completed Reference Number: By-law 2022-075 and Extension By-law 2023-084 Property Address: All lands within the Caledon High Potential Mineral Aggregates Area Municipality/UT: Caledon/Peel OLT Case No: OLT-23-001315 OLT Lead Case No: OLT-23-001315 OLT Case Name: CBM Aggregates v. Caledon (Town)

Heard: September 4-6 and October 2, 2024 by Video Hearing

APPEARANCES:

Parties	Counsel/Representative*
CBM Aggregates, a Division of St Marys Cement Inc. (Canada)	Kim Mullin Mithea Murugesu
Town of Caledon	Chris Barnett Ben Kitching* (Student-at-Law)
Forks of the Credit Preservation Group Inc.	David Donnelly

DECISION DELIVERED BY BITA M. RAJAEE AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL

Link to Order

INTRODUCTION

1The Town of Caledon (“Town”) enacted Interim Control By-law No. 2022-75 (“ICBL”) on October 18, 2022, which prohibited the use of any land, building, or structure for a gravel pit or quarry on certain lands not already zoned MX (Extractive Industrial). On September 26, 2023, the Town enacted By-law No. 2023-084 (“Extension By-law”), which extended the application of the ICBL for the period of one year. CBM Aggregates, a Division of St Marys Cement Inc. (Canada) (“Appellant”) seeks to develop an aggregate operation on lands within the affected area. The Appellant appealed the Extension By-law pursuant to s. 38 of the Planning Act (“Act”).

2A Case Management Conference took place on March 11, 2024, wherein it was confirmed that adequate notice for this proceeding had been provided. Moreover, the Forks of the Credit Preservation Group Inc. (“Forks”) was added as a Party.

DECISION

3The Tribunal dismisses the appeal, maintaining the ICBL and Extension By-law.

SUBJECT PROPERTY AND BACKGROUND

4The Appellant owns or controls 261 hectares in the Town, located between Mississauga Road and Main Street/Regional Road 136, both north and south of Charleston Sideroad (“Subject Lands”). The Appellant’s Pit/Quarry proposal was submitted for these Subject Lands. The Subject Lands contain about 78 million tonnes of high-quality bedrock and roughly 4 million tonnes of sand and gravel. They are located within the Greater Toronto Area (“GTA”) close to a major market.

5The Subject Lands are identified in Schedule L of the Town’s Official Plan (“Town’s OP”) as Caledon High Potential Mineral Aggregate Resource Area (“CHPMARA”). They are mapped specifically as a CHPMARA Bedrock Resource and Aggregate Resource Lands, but are not yet zoned MX for extractive industrial use. They are also the only designated Bedrock Resource and Aggregate Resource Lands in the Town. After the Town’s aggregate resources policies were enacted in the Town’s OPA 161 in 2003, the Appellant began to assemble the Subject Lands and, over a 19-year process, acquired parcels where the Town’s OP directs pits and quarries to be located.

6With respect to its proposal, the Appellant first discussed the project with Town officials in 2019, and engaged with the public at that time. In April 2022, the Appellant received a checklist for submission, with a deadline of December 2022 to complete the pre-application process.

7On October 18, 2022, approximately two months before the deadline for the submission of the application, the Town passed the ICBL, which temporarily froze land use for aggregate extraction until October 18, 2023 to allow time for policy review and updates. This ICBL was then extended for one year until October 18, 2024, pursuant to the Extension By-law. These by-laws apply to all CHPMARA lands that are not already zoned MX (Extractive Industrial), such as the Subject Lands.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

8The Appellant requested that the Tribunal repeal the Extension By-law (and ICBL) on the basis that they do not meet the requirements of the test for an ICBL. The ICBL did not conform with the Town or Region’s OP and was not consistent with provincial policies. Moreover, the ICBL was not necessary for the Town to update its mineral aggregate policies. The Town was already engaged in reviewing its policies and had been so engaged for years. It was not necessary to enact the ICBL to do this, and the Town could have updated its policies at any time. The Appellant submitted that the purpose of the ICBL and Extension By-law were to thwart the Appellant’s proposal. The Appellant further submitted that the Town was required to act expeditiously and fairly in carrying out the required review and updates, but did not do so. The Appellant requested, in the alternative, that if the Tribunal maintains the ICBL and Extension By-law, they be modified to not apply to the Subject Lands.

9The Town requested that the Tribunal dismiss the appeal, on the basis that it was entitled under the Act to enact an ICBL. Moreover, the Town had met the sole statutory pre-condition of s. 38(1) of the Act, which was to complete a study, by directing that the Caledon Supplementary Aggregate Resources Policy Study (“Study”) be undertaken. Moreover, the ICBL and Extension By-law met the requirements of the test for such by-laws, in that they met the requirements of the Act, there was a planning rationale behind authorising them (namely, reviewing the Town’s OP policies to ensure they are up to date), they conform with the Town’s OP, and the Study was carried out fairly and expeditiously within the timelines mandated by the Act.

10Forks agreed with the Town and also requested that the appeal be dismissed for reasons similar to those identified by the Town.

ISSUES AND WITNESSES

11All Parties agreed that the ICBL was not subject to appeal, as at the time that it was passed, it could not be appealed by anyone other than the Minister, but that the Extension By-law was. Furthermore, all Parties agreed that if the Tribunal allowed the appeal, then the same finding would apply to the ICBL. The Appellant’s Counsel provided the Tribunal with the case of Tweed Farms Inc. & 2470689 Ontario Inc. v. Niagara-on-the-Lake (Town), 2020 CanLII 24865 (ON LPAT) (“Tweed Farms Case”) in support of that position. The other Parties did not provide evidence to the contrary and the Tribunal was persuaded by the findings in the Tweed Farms Case. Thus, if the Extension By-law was repealed by the Tribunal, so would the underlying ICBL.

12The Parties agreed that there is an established test when evaluating an ICBL and the Extension By-law. The test has been expressed in Wyeridge McKellar Developments Inc. v. McKellar (Township), 2009 CarswellOnt 3297 (“Wyeridge Case”) at paragraph 75, and outlines the following principles when evaluating such by-laws:

1. That Section 38 (then Section 37) of the Planning Act must be interpreted strictly in view of the fact that it permits a municipality to negate development rights;
2. That the municipality must substantiate the planning rationale behind the authorizing resolution and the interim control by-law;
3. That the by-law must conform with the Official Plan; and
4. That the authorized review must be carried out fairly and expeditiously.

13The Parties provided submissions on, and the witnesses opined about, the above factors. This is the test the Tribunal used in evaluating the ICBL and Extension By-law.

14The following witnesses testified at the Hearing:

Appellant Karen Bennett, Planner, a RPP and a Member of OPPI Qualified by the Tribunal, without objection, to provide expert opinion evidence in the field of Land Use Planning

Town Steven Burke, Planner, a RPP and a Member of MCIP Qualified by the Tribunal, without objection, to provide expert opinion evidence in the field of Land Use Planning

Forks Allan Ramsay, Planner, a RPP and a Member of MCIP Qualified by the Tribunal, without objection, to provide expert opinion evidence in the field of Land Use Planning

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Part 1 of the Test: Section 38 is to be Interpreted Strictly

15The first branch of the test to assess the ICBL and Extension By-law is to interpret s. 38 of the Act strictly, as it permits a municipality to negate development rights. Section 38 of the Act states as follows:

“Interim control by-law

38 (1) Where the council of a local municipality has, by by-law or resolution, directed that a review or study be undertaken in respect of land use planning policies in the municipality or in any defined area or areas thereof, the council of the municipality may pass a by-law (hereinafter referred to as an interim control by-law) to be in effect for a period of time specified in the by-law, which period shall not exceed one year from the date of the passing thereof, prohibiting the use of land, buildings or structures within the municipality or within the defined area or areas thereof for, or except for, such purposes as are set out in the by-law. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, s. 38 (1).

Extension of period by-law in effect

(2) The council of the municipality may amend an interim control by-law to extend the period of time during which it will be in effect, provided the total period of time does not exceed two years from the date of the passing of the interim control by-law. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, s. 38 (2).

Notice of passing of by-law

(3) No notice or hearing is required prior to the passing of a by-law under subsection (1) or (2) but the clerk of the municipality shall, in the manner and to the persons and public bodies and containing the information prescribed, give notice of a by-law passed under subsection (1) or (2) within 20 days of the passing thereof. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, s. 38 (3); 1994, c. 23, s. 23 (1); 2023, c. 10, Sched. 6, s. 8 (1).”

[Emphasis added by Tribunal.]

16The Town asserts that it lawfully enacted the ICBL by fulfilling the only statutory requirement under s. 38 of the Act, namely authorizing the Study (identified at paragraph [9] of this Decision) on aggregate resources policies in the Town. Moreover, the ICBL provides the municipality with “breathing space” to reconsider and update its land use policies without the need for a prior planning report (which was found to be appropriate at paragraph 54 of Equity Waste Management of Canada Corp. v. Halton Hills (Town), 1997 CanLII 2742 (ON CA), 1997 CarswellOnt 3270 (“Equity Waste Management Case”)). The ICBL was enacted to allow the Town to authorize a study, with a period of one year subsequently extended to a total of two years. No notice was given, which was not required, but notice of the decision was ultimately given, as required. The Town’s Counsel submitted that since the first branch of the test is to interpret s. 38 of the Act strictly, and since the Town has complied with those requirements exactly, the Town therefore meets this branch of the test in enacting the ICBL. The Tribunal agrees with this and finds that the Town did indeed comply with the strict requirements of s. 38.

17The Appellant acknowledged that the Town has the right to update its policies but argued that ICBLs are extraordinary legislative tools with significant impacts on landowners. Given their potentially draconian effects on property rights, ICBLs require careful justification and transparency, as indicated in the case of London (City) v. RSJ Holdings Inc., 2007 SCC 29 at paragraphs 4 and 27. Moreover, the Appellant emphasized that under s. 38 of the Act, ICBLs face strict limitations in that they can only last for a maximum of two years (s. 38(2)) and, once expired, no new ICBL can be applied to the same lands for three years (s. 38(7)). The Appellant argued that these limitations underscore that such tools should be used sparingly, in response to unforeseen issues, and with full transparency. Thus, contrary to claims by Forks that ICBLs are routine, they are exceptional tools that should only be used when necessary. The limitations outlined in the legislation reinforce their intended rarity. In short, the Appellant argued that while ICBLs are legally permitted, their significant consequences demand careful scrutiny and cautious application.

18The Tribunal, however, is persuaded by the submissions of the Town and Forks, rather than those of the Appellant. The Tribunal is convinced by the evidence provided by the Town and Forks that, in this case, the Town did indeed act strictly in accordance with the requirements of s. 38 of the Act. Specifically:

a. The Tribunal was persuaded by the Town and Forks that the ICBL did not negate development rights as it did not prevent aggregate extraction, and no less aggregate was extracted during the term of the ICBL. The ICBL only prevented aggregate approvals on lands that were not already zoned for this activity, and did not prevent the aggregate operations of those already engaged in this activity.

b. As found in the Equity Waste Management Case, the purpose of an ICBL is to provide a municipality with the ability to pause development while reviewing or updating its policies. In this case, the ICBL was enacted in response to public concerns, which is a legitimate part of the democratic process, as found in the Equity Waste Management Case at paragraph 69. Moreover, the ICBL was enacted to address the Town’s need to update its policies, which aligns with the intended purpose of s. 38. In fact, the Court of Appeal in the Equity Waste Management Case has recognized ICBLs as essential planning tools to prevent overdevelopment against the public interest. The Superior Court agreed in 715113 Ontario Inc. v. Ottawa (City), 1987 CanLII 4101 (ON SC), a case provided by Forks. Courts in those two cases have recognized ICBLs as essential for protecting the public interest by temporarily freezing development to allow for zoning review.

c. The Town followed proper legal procedures, acted within its authority, and appropriately applied s. 38 of the Act to enact the ICBL. Of note, s. 38 does not require evidence of planning deficiencies before allowing an ICBL.

d. How rarely ICBLs are used is not a relevant factor in considering whether this particular one was appropriate. While the Tribunal agrees with the Appellant that s. 38 imposes strict limits on the use of an ICBL, the Tribunal does not agree that this is a consideration in determining whether the Town complied with its requirements under s. 38. In other words, the Town’s compliance was complete when it authorized the required Study. How often an ICBL is used is not part of that test.

19In short, the Tribunal finds that the Town complied with the statutory requirements for enacting an ICBL. Specifically, the Town met the only pre-condition by directing that the required land-use Study be conducted and by issuing the proper notice afterward. Thus, the Tribunal finds that this branch of the test is met.

Part 2 of the Test: Municipality Must Substantiate Planning Rationale

20The second branch of the test is that the municipality must substantiate the planning rationale behind the authorizing resolution and the ICBL.

21In this case, both the Town and Forks submitted that the ICBL was enacted for legitimate planning purposes to allow for a necessary review of the Town’s aggregate policies in response to development pressures, outdated regulations, and evolving environmental and public health concerns. The ICBL was enacted to allow for a Study to assess whether current policies adequately manage aggregate extraction impacts.

22The Tribunal is persuaded that reviewing and updating Caledon’s aggregate policies is a justified and necessary planning objective, because the existing policies are based on studies from 1999 and an approved OP from 2003. These are outdated and require modernization to reflect changes in provincial policies and regulations, such as updates to the Provincial Policy Statement, the Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (“Growth Plan”), and the Aggregate Resources Act. Moreover, changes in modern environmental and public health standards also provide a rationale for updating Caledon’s aggregate policies.

23The Appellant argued that the ICBL was unnecessary and improperly motivated, primarily aimed at obstructing the Appellant’s quarry proposal rather than addressing legitimate planning concerns. Ms. Bennett, the Appellant’s planner, disagreed with using an ICBL as the vehicle for policy review. The Appellant submitted:

a. There was no urgent need for policy changes. The Region (since 2013) and the Town (since 2019) had been reviewing aggregate policies for years without urgency. The Town only acted when the Appellant’s application submission was imminent, suggesting a reactive rather than proactive approach. The proposed quarry was not an unforeseen issue that justified an ICBL or an immediate policy change, as the lands were designated for aggregate use under long-standing regional policies and the Town was aware of the Appellant’s intentions as early as April 2022. In support of this, the Appellant argued that:

1. The Town justified the ICBL by citing policy “gaps,” but existing policies were already comprehensive, as demonstrated by decades of established and approved planning processes, such as the Caledon Community Resources Study commissioned in 1996, “arguably the most comprehensive aggregate study undertaken in Ontario” as stated in the Peel Region and Town of Caledon Joint Aggregate Policy Review dated May 2023 (“Joint Aggregate Review”), as well as subsequent reviews.
2. The Joint Aggregate Review and other reports found no critical deficiencies requiring immediate action.
3. The reports and staff analyses cited by the Town to justify the ICBL were subjective and not shared with the Appellant in advance of ICBL’s passing, failing to demonstrate an urgent need for the ICBL.

b. The timing of the ICBL was suspect as it was passed on October 18, 2022, just six days before a municipal election, at a hastily called meeting, and two months before the Appellant’s submission deadline. Moreover, there were procedural fairness issues surrounding the passing of the ICBL. For example, the Appellant had not received notice of the impending ICBL while Forks was aware of it. In fact, prior to enacting the ICBL, the Mayor and Council members met with Forks and received subjective reports criticizing Caledon’s aggregate policies but did not engage the Appellant similarly. The report received from Forks was the “Official Plan Aggregate Policy Assessment For The Top Ten Aggregate Producing Municipalities In Ontario In Relation To The Town Of Caledon, September 12, 2022” (“TAPMO Policy Report”), a copy of which was not provided to the Appellant. This report informed the passing of the ICBL, according to the Appellant.

24All of the above leads to the crux of the Appellant’s concern with the ICBL, which is that it shifts the regulatory framework in order to undermine the Appellant’s application. The ICBL and Extension By-law have proposed a Study to determine whether the OP policies need to be updated. The proposed updates are stricter than those that were previously in force. If those updates are enacted, the Appellant’s application will be subject to those new policies. The ICBL forces the application to be assessed under future, undeveloped policies rather than the policies in force at the time of submission. This contradicts the “Clergy Principle,” which holds that applications should be evaluated based on the existing policies in place at the time of submission. This effectively changes the rules mid-process. The Appellant submits that the ICBL and the Extension By-law, therefore, were not based on legitimate planning grounds, but specifically in order to prevent the application from being assessed under prior policies. The Appellant further submits that the ICBL was a political response to public opposition rather than a necessary planning measure, and was a strategic and political maneuver designed to undermine its application. By forcing the Appellant to comply with new, still-developing policies, the ICBL unfairly shifts regulatory requirements and disregards the Clergy Principle, creating uncertainty in the planning process.

25With respect to whether the review was necessary, the Town and Forks submitted that the ICBL was indeed necessary, as testified to by Mr. Burke, to address aggregate development pressures, reconcile discrepancies between regional and town policies, and incorporate findings from recent studies and reviews (such as the TAPMO Policy Report). The Tribunal was persuaded that it is reasonable for development pressures (such as an increasing number of aggregate applications) to necessitate a policy review. The Tribunal was also persuaded that there are indeed ongoing and significant aggregate development pressures from major industry players, such as the Appellant and from another developer who planned to submit an application to extend its quarry operation, as well as 22 existing aggregate operations in the Town. Thus, a review of and updates to regulations was reasonable. It is further reasonable that these development pressures may lead to quickened or urgent responses to address those pressures.

26Moreover, the Tribunal was persuaded that studies, including the TAPMO Policy Report, raised concerns about Caledon’s policies being among the weakest in Ontario, highlighting a need for reform. The Appellant submitted that those concerns were unfounded. However, the Tribunal’s task at this Hearing was not to evaluate the validity of the concerns raised by the reports, but rather to simply determine whether they raised a question. It was in fact the ICBL’s purpose to determine the validity of the concerns. In other words, the questions raised by the TAPMO Policy Report were to be answered by the Study conducted during the period the ICBL was in force. It was not this Tribunal’s purview to answer those questions. In this finding, the Tribunal was persuaded by the Wyeridge Case, which clarifies that the legal test for an ICBL does not require proving “necessity,” as only a valid planning rationale is required. In this case, therefore, the Tribunal does not need to assess whether the existing policies were indeed deficient, only whether the reports provided to support the ICBL raised questions about the existing policies. The Tribunal finds that the reports raised questions and the ICBL was an appropriate response in the circumstances.

27In response to concerns raised about the timing of the ICBL – especially in relation to pending applications – the evidence shows that the Town’s longstanding need to update its policies provided sufficient justification for this measure. Specifically, a number of factors supported the need for the ICBL, including that:

a. The Rehabilitation Master Plan (November 2021) needed to be integrated into the Town’s new Official Plan. b. The Town Staff Report (2022-048) supported the need for a comprehensive review of aggregate policies. c. Changes in environmental regulations, public health knowledge, and climate change considerations require modernized policies.

28With respect to the Appellant’s arguments about the “Clergy Principle,” the Tribunal agrees with the Town that the debate over whether the ICBL was the appropriate instrument or whether it improperly shifted the timing of policy application is secondary. The key issue is whether the Study was undertaken for legitimate planning purposes, not that the chosen process was the only possible method to achieve this end. The Tribunal finds that the Clergy principle is not relevant to this case as it is a legal principle, not a planning policy or planning rationale to be considered.

29Furthermore, only the ICBL was before the Tribunal and not the Appellant’s application. At a future hearing, when the application is considered, the Tribunal can consider the question of whether the Clergy principle applies. At this subject hearing, the Tribunal cannot make that determination and must simply assess whether there is a planning rationale for passing the ICBL. The Tribunal finds that studying and updating the policies is a valid planning objective. The Appellant’s planner disagreed that an ICBL was the appropriate means to achieving that end but did not disagree, in cross-examination, that updating policies was a valid planning rationale. In this branch of the test, the Tribunal is not required to consider whether there were alternative ways to achieve the relevant planning rationale, only whether there is one. The Tribunal finds that there is, namely for the Town to review and update its aggregate resource policies.

30Of note, while discussions of bad faith were raised, the Tribunal was not required to make that determination and cannot do so, as the Tribunal is bound by the statute and legal test that is before it when assessing the ICBL. Regardless, the evidence presented did not demonstrate that the Appellant was unfairly targeted by the Town or that the ICBL was improperly motivated. The evidence supported the Tribunal’s finding that the Town, in response to various development pressures and information regarding gaps in policy, enacted the ICBL to study whether that was the case and update its policies if necessary. This is a legitimate planning rationale for an ICBL.

Part 3 of the Test: By-law Must Conform with the Official Plan

31The third branch of the test in assessing an ICBL and Extension By-law is that it must conform with the Town’s OP.

32In this case, the Tribunal finds that the ICBL aligns with the Town’s OP, which supports the availability and extraction of aggregate resources. The Tribunal was persuaded by Messrs. Burke and Ramsay, who testified that the ICBL conforms not only with the Town’s OP but also is consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement 2020 and the Provincial Planning Statement 2024 (both referred to as “PPS”), conforms with the Growth Plan, and conforms with the Regional Official Plan. The ICBL does not reduce resource availability or obstruct application processing. Rather, it ensures aggregate resources remain available while also allowing for policy updates that will ultimately ensure that resources remain viable. In fact, during the period that the ICBL has been in force, the Town has processed and deemed complete the Appellant’s application, in accordance with the Town’s OP. Thus, the Town has not prohibited new applications or removed resources from availability.

33The Appellant argued that the ICBL and Extension By-law fail to align with, and in fact contradict, multiple planning instruments at the provincial, regional, and municipal levels, thereby undermining effective aggregate resource management. This is based on the following:

a. By prohibiting the use of aggregate lands for two years, the ICBL disrupts proper resource management rather than supporting it. Moreover, the evidence before the Tribunal indicates that the policies resulting from the ICBL will likely impose stricter rules on pits and quarries, which would complicate future approvals. b. The PPS (both 2020 and 2024) requires that mineral aggregates be protected and remain available (s. 2.5.1 and s. 2.5.2.1) as close to market as possible. The ICBL’s prohibition on new pits and quarries enforces stricter mapping and policy tests that could ultimately reduce long-term access to these resources. Moreover, past aggregate policies have been consistent with provincial policies, and the ICBL’s restrictions are redundant and unjustified. c. The ICBL, by preventing new approvals and delaying resource use, interferes with proper mapping and long-term protection of High Potential Mineral Aggregate Resource Areas, contradicting the Regional Official Plan and the Town’s OP. d. The Town’s OP’s intent is to make aggregate resources available while protecting CHPMARA lands for future extraction. The ICBL contradicts this aim by prohibiting new approvals in CHPMARA lands. Since the ICBL only applies to CHPMARA lands, a new pit or quarry could be proposed outside these designated areas, where extraction is not encouraged under the Town’s OP.

34In short, the Appellant contends that the ICBL and Extension By-law impose unnecessary restrictions on aggregate resource development in contradiction to established provincial, regional, and municipal policies. This misalignment ultimately undermines long-term aggregate resource planning rather than supporting it. Moreover, it risks pushing development into areas not planned for this use, thereby disrupting a balanced and forward-looking approach to aggregate resource management.

35The Tribunal, however, finds that this is an incorrect interpretation of the ICBL, which does not prohibit new applications, nor does it remove aggregate resources from availability and future extraction. The ICBL only applies to lands that do not have the right to extract aggregate resources anyways (not zoned for it), so no extractions are prohibited. To clarify, the ICBL prohibits the approval of applications on lands that are not already zoned for this activity, but does not prevent continued aggregate extractions or approvals on lands zoned for it. Moreover, the ICBL merely prohibits extraction for two years – it does not permanently remove the resource from future extraction. The Tribunal is persuaded that the ICBL has not impacted existing aggregate production or approvals, and licensed sites continue to operate.

36The Appellant also raised the concern that new policies arising from the ICBL will be more restrictive and will limit extraction, which will not conform with the OP. However, the Tribunal finds that these concerns are speculative. A discussion of future policies was not before the Tribunal. Rather, the Tribunal was tasked with assessing only the ICBL and finds that the ICBL does conform with the OP. Additionally, even if the new policies are more restrictive, the Town can amend its policies at any time (if appropriate) to allow specific applications.

37Moreover, the Tribunal was persuaded by the Town’s submissions that, if new policies are approved, they will reflect the province’s updated stance on aggregate extraction and will be consistent with the PPS. Therefore, the updated policies of the OP would align with provincial policies. Even if new, more restrictive policies are later approved by the Minister, they will reflect up-to-date provincial standards. The Tribunal agreed with the Town that updating its policies is in the public interest and outweighs the Appellant’s private interest in having its application assessed under older policies.

38The Appellant argued that the ICBL limits the economic well-being of the province and the GTA, because, as the Appellant’s planner testified, aggregate reserves that are “close to market” are critically low. However, the Tribunal was not persuaded by this. Rather, the Tribunal was persuaded by Forks’ submissions and evidence, including data provided, that there appears to be an ample supply of aggregate resources, with at least 13.44 million tonnes available annually, contradicting the Appellant’s concerns about economic harm and aggregate shortages. The Appellant did not demonstrate a negative impact by the ICBL on the province’s GDP or the GTA’s economic figures. Moreover, no intervention from regulatory bodies (such as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forests) has been necessary.

39The Tribunal was also persuaded by Forks Counsel’s submissions that the ICBL supports the Town’s goal, as outlined in the Town’s OP, to preserve its unique character while managing aggregate resources responsibly. The ICBL’s purpose, to study the Town’s aggregate policies, supports this goal and the position that planning decisions should balance growth with environmental and community considerations. The Town’s policies aim to balance extraction with community and ecological interests, and the ICBL supports that aim.

40With respect to this branch of the test, the Tribunal finds that the ICBL conforms with the Town’s OP by not impeding resource extraction or application processing and by allowing necessary policy updates that serve the broader public interest in ensuring that future policies are robust and up to date. Additionally, the Tribunal finds that the ICBL is consistent with and conforms with the PPS 2020 or PPS 2024, the Growth Plan, and the Regional OP. It provides a necessary pause for updated policy consideration without restricting long-term resource availability. The Appellant’s concerns about aggregate shortages, economic harm, and restrictive policies are speculative and unsupported by evidence. The ICBL does not undermine aggregate production, and Caledon’s planning approach remains consistent with broader municipal and provincial goals. The Tribunal finds that the ICBL was lawfully enacted to provide breathing space for policy review (ensuring that future aggregate management decisions are made in the public interest), does not hinder aggregate operations, and is a legitimate planning tool consistent with official plans and provincial policy.

Part 4 of the Test: Review Must be Carried Out Fairly and Expeditiously

41The fourth branch of the test requires the Tribunal to determine whether the review mandated by the ICBL was carried out fairly and expeditiously. In this case, the Tribunal must assess whether the Town conducted its Study on aggregate policies expeditiously and fairly within the two-year timeframe allowed under the Act.

42The Appellant contends that the Town’s process for conducting its Study was both slow and unfair for the following reasons:

a. Despite draft policies being available as early as January 2024, they were not publicly released until August 2024, 22 months into the 24-month period of the ICBL and Extension By-law, and only two months before the deadline. b. There were significant delays in providing updates to the Council and the public (no updates for five months until March 2023, with further updates only in June 2023 and January 2024). c. A Working Group was created to work on these policies. However, the Working Group process was problematic. Initially, an aggregate industry representative, a member of Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association (OSSGA), was included. This person was the sole industry representative. However, he was suddenly removed from the Working Group, without adequate reasons provided, and never replaced. This left only opposition groups like Forks represented. The significant influence of Forks and others opposed to pits and quarries over that of the aggregate industry shows the unfairness of the process. d. These delays and exclusions left the aggregate industry with insufficient time to respond to proposed, more restrictive policies (including new mapping and site design rules that could remove some of the Subject Lands from CHPMARA-designated resource areas). Moreover, since the Town released these policies so close to the deadline, it is now under pressure to implement the new policies by the deadline. This leaves the public, including the aggregate industry, with limited time to respond to the proposed policies.

43Overall, the Appellant argued that these issues suggest that the Town’s Study was rushed and the process lacked fairness and balanced consultation. Given the urgency of the ICBL, the Study should have been conducted more efficiently.

44Upon review of the evidence and the submissions of Counsels to the Town and Forks, however, the Tribunal finds that the Town proceeded expeditiously and fairly. Specifically, the Tribunal finds it justified for the Town to take the time period allotted in the Act for conducting the Study, given the complex nature of aggregate policies. The Act allows a period of two years for the Study to be completed. The Town has met that timeline. Thus, contrary to the Appellant’s assertions, it cannot be said to have incurred unnecessary delays. There is no delay, in other words, if the Town has met the timeline and completed the Study within the two-year limit. Of note, while the Appellant would have liked draft policies to have been presented earlier than the deadline, “urgency” is not a legal requirement in assessing the validity of an ICBL (Vaughan (City) Interim Control By-law 412-99, 2000 CarswellOnt 6046 at paragraph 35).

45With respect to the Appellant’s argument regarding lack of fairness during the Study period, the Tribunal was persuaded that the Town followed all required procedures as outlined in the Act. The Town was required to hold a statutory public meeting and an open house, and it did so. The Act requires that 20 days of notice be provided before the review meeting, and this requirement was met. Moreover, the Town conducted a lengthy consultation process, allowing for public engagement, including delegations from various groups. The Tribunal was persuaded by Mr. Burke’s evidence that the aggregate industry was consulted throughout the process. Additionally, as the Town’s Counsel submitted, the Appellant did not engage in the process the way that others, such as Forks, did. The Appellant did not raise concerns about fairness during the process, only raising these concerns now at the Hearing. The Tribunal agrees that the process seems to have been conducted fairly, in accordance with legislation, and allowing all who wanted to participate to do so.

46The crux of the Appellant’s concern with lack of fairness seems to be that the new policies arising from the policy review are significantly more restrictive. The Tribunal, however, is not assessing the new policies themselves, but rather the process to allow for the development of new policies. The process before the Tribunal in this case appears to have followed the guidelines required by the Act.

47In summary, the Tribunal finds that the Town satisfied all statutory requirements, including completing its Study, consultations, holding an open house and a statutory public meeting, and determining whether to adopt the new policies in advance of the expiry of the ICBL. Furthermore, the Town complied with the Act’s review process, namely providing 20 days of notice. Section 38 of the Act allows a full two years to complete the required ICBL Study, after which the ICBL expires without policy changes. There is no legal requirement to complete the Study sooner; two years is deemed a reasonable timeframe for complex aggregate policy reviews (for example in the case of ClubLink Corporation ULC v. Oakville (Town), 2017 CanLII 29557 (ON LPAT), at paragraphs 89 and 90). Having met the time limits in the Act, the Town cannot be said to have not proceeded expeditiously.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

48The Tribunal finds that the ICBL and the Extension By-law are appropriate, supported by a planning rationale, consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement 2020 and the Provincial Planning Statement 2024, and conform with the Town’s Official Plan, Regional Official Plan, and the Growth Plan. Furthermore, the ICBL is justified and based on a legitimate planning rationale. It does not unfairly target the Appellant’s proposal in comparison with others and there is no evidence that it has been enacted for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the proper assessment of the merits of a development application. Moreover, the ICBL does not restrict aggregate resources but instead protects them.

49In making its determination, the Tribunal reviewed s. 38 of the Act, which provides the Town with the power, right, and jurisdiction to freeze land use while a planning study is being completed. In passing the ICBL, the Town met the sole statutory pre-condition required by the Act (s. 38(1)) for passing such a by-law when it directed that the Study be undertaken.

APPELLANT’S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST

50The Appellant’s primary request was for the Tribunal to repeal the ICBL and the Extension By-law. As an alternative, the Appellant’s Counsel suggested that the ICBL and the Extension By-law could be amended so that they do not apply to the Appellant’s lands. The Appellant’s Counsel argued that the Tribunal has discretion in such matters, and precedent shows that policies can be modified in appropriate cases, especially when there is a significant change anticipated such as in this case (Messrs. Burke and Ramsay testified that the new policies represent an emerging policy direction). This would allow the Appellant’s application to be assessed under the prior policy regime, rather than the new policies arising from the ICBL review.

51However, the Tribunal was not persuaded that this would be appropriate. For the reasons indicated above, the ICBL and Extension By-law are valid. Sufficient evidence was not provided to demonstrate that the Appellant’s lands should be excluded. In fact, part of why the ICBL was enacted was development pressure resulting from the Appellant’s application. As development pressure was found to be a valid basis for an ICBL, it would not be appropriate to exclude those lands from the effects of the ICBL.

52Moreover, the Tribunal was tasked only with assessing the validity of the ICBL and Extension By-law. The Tribunal was not in the position of determining the best policy regime to use in assessing the Appellant’s application. Those legal questions are left to the adjudicator who may determine the outcome of this application.

ORDER

53THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the appeal by CBM Aggregates, a Division of St Marys Cement Inc. (Canada) against the Town of Caledon, pursuant to s. 38 of the Planning Act, is dismissed.

“Bita M. Rajaee”

BITA M. RAJAEE MEMBER

Ontario Land Tribunal Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248

The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.