Larry J. Levine

The plaintiffs brought a motion to find the defendant, the mother of one of the plaintiffs, in civil contempt of two prior court orders regarding a disputed family home.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims of constructive trust, resulting trust, and abuse.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding the defendant lacked actual knowledge of the specific terms of the first order due to illiteracy in English and her former counsel's failure to inform her, and declined to exercise its discretion to find contempt on the second order.

The court also dismissed the summary judgment motion, concluding that the intertwined issues of property ownership, alleged gifts, and historical abuse presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

Following a judgment in the applicant's favour, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $75,163.75, arguing the respondent raised unproven allegations of forgery and fraud.

The court found the respondent's conduct did not rise to the egregious level required for substantial indemnity costs, noting the respondent attacked the integrity of non-parties rather than the applicant.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought to enforce an assignment agreement for a pre-construction condominium unit in downtown Toronto.

The respondent seller claimed she never accepted the final counteroffer and that the agreement contained fundamental mistakes.

The court found the respondent's evidence lacked credibility and that a binding contract was formed.

The court rectified minor mathematical errors in the agreement and ordered specific performance, finding the property was unique to the applicant's family needs and damages would be inadequate in a rising real estate market.

The defendant, Yaw Jung Lee, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, K. Lee & Associates Ltd., a corporation with no assets.

The court applied the two-step inquiry under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the plaintiff's lack of assets satisfied the initial requirement.

Despite the plaintiff's assertion of being "not impecunious," the court determined that this did not alter the defendant's entitlement to security, as there was no enforceable claim against potential lenders.

The court also considered the defendant's counterclaim and the principle of proportionality.

The motion was granted, ordering the plaintiff to pay $61,250 into court as security for costs within 60 days, failing which the action would be stayed.

The defendant was also awarded $7,500 plus HST and disbursements for the costs of the motion.

The plaintiff, a General Foreman, sued for wrongful dismissal.

The court found he was hired under a fixed-term oral contract for the project's duration.

The defendant argued that the collective agreement, which provided for only four hours' notice, applied by custom, despite the General Foreman position not being covered by the agreement.

The court held that the burden was on the defendant to prove the termination clause was an implied term, which it failed to do.

Consequently, common law principles applied, entitling the plaintiff to damages for the unexpired term of the contract, mitigated by new employment.

The plaintiff invested $5 million in preferred shares of a financially troubled credit union pursuant to an offering statement.

The credit union was subsequently placed into administration and liquidation following the discovery of a complex mortgage fraud and the issuance of large, improper loans.

The plaintiff sued the credit union's directors and external auditors, alleging a material misrepresentation in the offering statement regarding the use of 'appraised values' for mortgage approvals.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding no material misrepresentation, no causation, and that the defendants had established a statutory defence.

The court also denied the plaintiff's mid-trial motion to amend the pleadings, ruling the new allegation was statute-barred.

The applicant sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The respondent repudiated the agreement, citing a family tragedy and the inability of beneficial owners (his mother and brother) to approve the terms, as per a "Seller's Solicitor's Approval Condition." The court found that the respondent failed to exercise the solicitor's approval clause reasonably, honestly, and in good faith, as no legal advice was sought regarding the terms of the agreement or the beneficial ownership issue.

The court emphasized that moral blameworthiness or family dynamics do not factor into the test for exercising such a clause and that contractual terms cannot be expanded by surrounding circumstances.

Specific performance was awarded to the applicant, and the agreement was deemed valid.

The plaintiff purchaser in a real estate transaction brought an ex parte motion seeking an order to pay $210,000 of the $1.5 million purchase price into court upon closing, pending a determination of his entitlement to an abatement due to an alleged misrepresentation about the property's size.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested relief amounted to execution before judgment and was akin to a Mareva injunction without meeting the criteria.

The court held there was no precedent for such an interlocutory remedy and that an abatement is a subsidiary remedy to specific performance, which cannot be ordered on an interlocutory basis.

The defendant owners (Ikram) brought a motion under section 47 of the Construction Lien Act to discharge a construction lien registered by the plaintiff (Diamond Drywall Contracting Inc.) for $201,253.00.

The Master clarified that motions under section 47 are akin to summary judgment motions, allowing the Master to exercise expanded powers to weigh evidence and make findings of fact, consistent with the principles from Hryniak v Mauldin.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding $193,569.00 of the lien, as the original contract work was deemed completed by June 15, 2015, and lien rights for that work had expired.

However, genuine issues of credibility and fact remained concerning whether Diamond performed work on specific dates in May 2016, amounting to $7,684.00, which required a trial.

Consequently, the lien was partially discharged, reduced to $7,684.00, and security of $9,605 (including costs) was ordered to be posted.

The larger claim was allowed to proceed as a contract claim, and costs of $10,000 were awarded to the defendant.

A dispute arose after the defendant purchased a winning $2 million scratch lottery ticket while in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff and living with her parents.

The plaintiff claimed the parties had agreed to share lottery winnings, while the parents argued they owned the winnings because the ticket was purchased using their company's debit card.

The court held that the evidence did not establish any express or implied agreement between the romantic partners to share the winnings and rejected claims of constructive trust or unjust enrichment.

The court further found that the parents had implicitly permitted the debit card use and had no entitlement to the proceeds.

The winnings belonged solely to the defendant, subject only to a small damages award relating to a lost deposit caused by a freezing order obtained by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff advanced funds to a partnership operated by relatives pursuant to promissory notes and personal guarantees, including a $1,000,000 loan with an option to convert to equity.

The defendants asserted that the plaintiff elected to convert the loan to equity through a signed authorization, while the plaintiff alleged the document was forged.

The court found the authorization document to be a forgery and held that the plaintiff remained a lender entitled to repayment under the promissory note and guarantees.

The plaintiff also sued a bank for releasing funds from his account without authorization.

The court held that the plaintiff was bound by verification provisions in the bank’s Financial Services Agreement, which relieved the bank of liability due to the plaintiff’s failure to review and report account discrepancies.

Minority shareholders sought relief under ss. 207 and 248 of the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) to restrain a majority shareholder from convening a meeting to remove a director and potentially distribute corporate assets following the sale of the company’s principal property.

The dispute concerned three contested liabilities, including a claimed success fee, an assigned commission agreement, and disputed legal accounts.

The court found that allowing the majority shareholder to control the board and distribute funds without maintaining adequate reserves could constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct toward minority shareholders and potential creditors.

The court enjoined the shareholders’ meeting and ordered that corporate funds be preserved through specific holdbacks pending determination of the disputed claims.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs approaching $100,000, arguing that the plaintiffs had advanced unproven allegations of fraud.

The court reaffirmed that substantial indemnity costs may be warranted where serious allegations of fraud or dishonesty are made but not proven.

While agreeing that such elevated costs were justified, the court held the amount claimed was excessive and instead fixed a fair and reasonable amount based on the Rule 57.01 factors.

The court also declined to pierce the corporate veil to impose personal costs liability on a non‑party principal of the plaintiff corporations.

The plaintiff tax consulting firm sued a corporate client, its president, and its investors for unpaid fees relating to successful SR&ED tax credit applications.

The plaintiff alleged that the investors gave oral assurances to the president that they would pay the plaintiff's fees, which the president relayed to the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation against the investors, finding the president's evidence regarding the oral assurances to be not credible.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding no benefit was received by the investors and that the corporate veil provided a juristic reason for any benefit retained.

Default judgment was granted against the corporate client.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs totalling $143,891.09.

The plaintiff did not dispute liability for costs, the hours spent, the disbursements, or the hourly rates, but argued that proportionality required a reduction of professional fees to $75,000.

The court applied the governing principles of reasonableness and proportionality in assessing costs under rule 57.01(1).

Considering the five‑day trial, the complexity of the litigation, the parties’ settlement offers, and reasonable expectations, the court found the defendants’ claimed fees excessive.

Costs were fixed at $80,000 in fees plus $40,533.09 in disbursements.

The plaintiff alleged unjust enrichment after the defendants adopted a name she proposed in a response to a request for proposals for retail space at a casino complex.

The plaintiff asserted that she created the phrase used for the retail area and that the defendants later adopted it after rejecting her proposal.

The court found that the phrase originated from the historical and cultural terminology of the First Nation and was not an original creation of the plaintiff.

It also held that the name provided no financial or commercial benefit to the defendants and was offered gratuitously during the proposal process.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish enrichment, deprivation, or absence of juristic reason as required for unjust enrichment.