Tina Kaye

The applicant purchased a property in 2018 with title held 99% in his name and 1% in the names of the respondents (the parents of his fiancée).

The applicant paid the entire down payment of $430,000 and deposit of $20,000.

The respondents co-signed the mortgage and paid the monthly mortgage payments, while the applicant paid property taxes, utilities, and insurance.

After the relationship between the applicant and the respondent's daughter ended in 2020, the property was sold in 2022.

The respondents claimed either an agreement existed for a 50/50 split of proceeds or that unjust enrichment applied.

The court found no agreement existed and that unjust enrichment did not apply, ordering the proceeds to be distributed according to title (99% to the applicant, 1% to the respondents).

The Applicants sought the appointment of a receiver over several respondent companies, including those jointly owned and those solely controlled by one of the individual respondents, due to alleged misappropriation of funds, mortgage defaults, and corporate oppression.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory bases for appointing a receiver (Courts of Justice Act, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Business Corporations Act) were not met.

The court determined there was no underlying action for interlocutory relief, no irreparable harm shown given the sufficient value of the secured property, and the request for relief against solely-owned companies was brought too late.

The applicant developer brought a motion under Rule 49.09 to enforce a purported settlement agreement regarding a land dispute that was blocking a subdivision development.

The applicant argued that the parties had agreed on the essential terms of a land sale in exchange for the withdrawal of the respondents' objection.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was no mutual intention to be bound because several terms proposed by the respondents in a counteroffer, including the closing date, right of assignment, and registration of the agreement, were never accepted by the applicant.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a motion brought by the defendants, Paul Kennedy and Leanne Kennedy, to set aside a prior judgment.

The court found the defendants' motion to be vexatious, based on manipulation of facts, regurgitation of previously rejected issues, and defiance of court orders.

Citing a long history of such litigation conduct, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, emphasizing that such costs serve as a chastisement and deterrent for improper and unnecessary litigation.

The court ordered the Kennedys to pay $70,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

The Kennedys (Defendants) brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside a default judgment rendered nearly 11 years prior, arguing that their former representative, Trent Bridger, sabotaged their defense through misrepresentation and that the damages calculation was faulty due to the Plaintiffs' incomplete disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Kennedys were aware of Bridger's communications, that Justice Frank had already rejected the "stolen records" excuse, and that the significant delay in bringing the motion was unjustified.

The court also held that the Kennedys could not now demand a full accounting given their persistent failure to comply with prior disclosure orders.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for defamation and misfeasance in public office, the successful defendants sought their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court applied the principles from Apotex and Rule 57.01, noting the serious allegations made, the complexity of the 10-year litigation, and the plaintiff's reasonable expectations.

The court found the defendants' reduced costs requests to be fair and reasonable, ordering the plaintiff to pay $280,000 to one defendant and $250,000 to the remaining defendants.

The plaintiff, a general surgeon, sued the hospital, its chief executive officer, and its chief of staff for defamation and misfeasance in public office after losing his hospital privileges.

The plaintiff alleged that the chief of staff defamed him in a letter and in oral statements, and that the defendants acted in bad faith to oust him from the hospital.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the oral defamatory statements were not proven and that the letter was protected by qualified privilege.

The court held it had jurisdiction to hear the misfeasance claim but dismissed it, finding no evidence of unlawful acts, malice, or improper purpose by the defendants.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

A case conference was held after a scheduled 10-day trial was adjourned due to a lack of judicial resources.

The defendant hospital sought leave to bring motions for partial summary judgment and security for costs.

The court denied leave for the summary judgment motion, noting it should have been brought before the action was set down for trial, and directed that any motion for security for costs proceed through regular channels rather than on an urgent basis.

The court also ordered further discovery on the plaintiff's loss of income claim and directed counsel to select a trial date in 2022, emphasizing the unacceptability of further delaying a 10-year-old case.

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to extend the deadline for setting the action down for trial.

The action, commenced in 2014 to enforce a 2013 default judgment, had seen no steps taken by the plaintiffs for 30 months between 2016 and 2019.

Applying the conjunctive test for delay, the Master found that while the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice, the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay.

The action was dismissed for delay.

Hasibullah Sakhiyar, charged with firearm offences, applied for a review of a bail decision that detained him in custody.

The application was a reverse onus bail hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the bail justice did not err in law by failing to apply the "ladder principle" (which is inapplicable to reverse onus hearings), that the original decision was not clearly inappropriate in its weighting of detention grounds, and that the proposed new release plan did not constitute a material and relevant change in circumstances.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess alcohol and driving impaired on December 12, 2014, with the information sworn on December 30, 2014.

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to trial was 24.5 months.

After deducting defence delay totalling 12.5 months, the net delay was 12 months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the net delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a breath demand and obstructing a peace officer by falsely identifying himself.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding no breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly attributed significant portions of the delay to defence conduct, including a late disclosure motion and shifting defence strategy, and reasonably concluded that the overall delay did not violate the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, as police attempted to contact counsel of choice and the accused was permitted to consult duty counsel while awaiting a potential return call.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

The defendant sought Charter relief following his arrest for care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs, possession of Ketamine, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under s. 9 of the Charter, the delay in informing him of the reasons for arrest under s. 10(a), and the legality of a Level 3 strip search conducted at the police station under s. 8.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the s. 10(a) delay was brief and non-prejudicial, the strip search violated s. 8 rights as it lacked the requisite justification under the Golden test.

However, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, finding that no remedy was appropriate in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 90 days intermittent custody imposed following convictions for driving with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit and driving while suspended.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing deterrence and denunciation, failing to give adequate consideration to rehabilitation, and improperly rejecting a conditional sentence.

The court held that appellate intervention requires the sentence to be clearly unreasonable or demonstrably unfit and found that the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant principles and factors.

Given the appellant’s significant record for impaired driving and driving while suspended, the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying an impaired driving charge for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had calculated institutional delay at just over 10 months and found prejudice to the accused arising from employment consequences, travel issues, and personal stress.

On appeal, the court held that the correct method for calculating institutional delay reduced the period to approximately 8½ months, which fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court further found that the alleged prejudice was not causally connected to the delay but rather to the laying of the charge itself, and that the trial judge failed to balance the societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The stay was set aside and a new trial was ordered.