Bradley Oran Demone

The defendant, D.J., was charged with sexually assaulting B.B., his sister-in-law.

The trial involved a s. 276 application to admit prior sexual conduct evidence (an alleged consensual affair between D.J. and B.B. two years prior).

The judge, sitting alone, applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

The court found significant inconsistencies and implausibilities in the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding the timing of reporting the assault, the behaviour of her protective dogs during the alleged assault, and her interactions with police.

The evidence of the complainant's sister, R.B., who testified for the defence, was found to be truthful and contradicted key aspects of the complainant's account regarding when the assault was first reported.

The judge concluded that the Crown failed to prove the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code for conduct occurring on November 27, 2015, in Toronto.

The complainant attended what she believed to be a film audition and participated in two filmed scenes involving sexual activity.

The Crown alleged the accused committed sexual assault by touching the complainant without consent during Scene 1 and by penetrating her vagina without consent during Scene 2.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge concluded the complainant consented to the filmed audition, that any penetrations in Scene 2 were accidental, and that the accused held a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of breach of probation following the trial judge’s granting of a directed verdict motion at the close of the Crown’s case.

The trial judge held that the Crown was required to adduce evidence negating a potential Family Court order permitting contact, treating that exception as an essential element of the offence.

The appeal court held this was an error in law, finding that such exceptions operate as potential defences that must only be negatived by the Crown once raised to the level of an air of reality.

Because the Crown had nonetheless pleaded the exception and led evidence addressing it, the directed verdict should have been denied as there was a prima facie case.

The acquittal was set aside and the matter ordered to resume before the trial judge at the point where the directed verdict had been granted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued the trial judge erred by providing insufficient reasons, misapprehending evidence, and reversing the burden of proof regarding his explanation that illness and cold conditions prevented him from providing a sample.

The appeal court held the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and demonstrated proper credibility analysis.

The court further found no material misapprehension of evidence and concluded the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof when assessing both the elements of the offence and the defence of reasonable excuse.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for a stay based on breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from charge to completion of trial was approximately 26 months.

The court reviewed the characterization of various periods of delay and concluded that institutional and Crown delay totalled approximately 12 months and 9 days, close to the trial judge’s calculation.

The court held that the trial judge properly characterized the delays and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated prejudice caused by delay.

Balancing the societal interest in adjudicating serious impaired driving charges with the appellant’s Charter rights, the court found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder following a guilty plea to assault.

He argued the NCR verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient, and there was inadequate evidence supporting the NCR finding.

The court reviewed the evidence, including psychiatric testimony, eyewitness evidence, and the legal test under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

It held that a reasonable trier of fact could have reached the NCR finding on the balance of probabilities and that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient to permit appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying an impaired driving charge for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had calculated institutional delay at just over 10 months and found prejudice to the accused arising from employment consequences, travel issues, and personal stress.

On appeal, the court held that the correct method for calculating institutional delay reduced the period to approximately 8½ months, which fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court further found that the alleged prejudice was not causally connected to the delay but rather to the laying of the charge itself, and that the trial judge failed to balance the societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The stay was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand under the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the trial judge improperly relied on a roadside utterance captured on video in violation of jurisprudence limiting the use of compelled roadside statements while the right to counsel is suspended.

The court reviewed the governing principles from the Elias line of cases and the actus reus exception recognized in appellate authority.

It held that statements made during the testing process may be admissible where they form part of the actus reus of the refusal offence or help determine whether the accused genuinely attempted to comply.

The impugned statement was admissible because it demonstrated the accused’s linguistic understanding and was relevant to whether the repeated failed attempts constituted a constructive refusal.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to appear under s. 145 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that he mistakenly attended the wrong courthouse and then attempted to travel to the correct location.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by assessing the appellant’s evidence in isolation and by failing to consider corroborating evidence from the appellant’s mother, whose credibility was acknowledged by the Crown.

This omission constituted both a misapprehension of evidence and a failure to consider relevant evidence on a material issue.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for breach of a probation order under s. 137 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act involving a prohibition on contact with a co‑accused subject to limited exceptions for vocational, educational, employment, or counseling purposes.

The trial judge acquitted after concluding the Crown bore the burden of proving the accused was not within the counseling exception and had failed to investigate whether counseling was occurring.

The appeal court held the trial judge erred in law by treating the exception as an element of the offence despite no evidentiary foundation giving it an “air of reality.” The evidence established the accused and the co‑accused were simply sitting and walking together outside a building, which could not fall within the counseling exception.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered, with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The applicant, having been acquitted of criminal harassment, initiated a private prosecution against the complainant for perjury and other offences.

After a justice of the peace issued process, the Crown intervened and entered a stay of proceedings, citing no reasonable prospect of conviction and public interest.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the stay, alleging abuse of process and flagrant impropriety by the Crown.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's decision to stay proceedings is a core prosecutorial discretion immune from judicial review absent flagrant impropriety, which the applicant failed to establish.