Edward H. Royle

The Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit hearsay evidence from a co-accused, Jerome Bent, who refused to testify.

The accused, Shakeil Wheatle, was charged with first-degree murder.

The motion relied on the principled exception to the hearsay rule, requiring assessment of necessity and reliability.

The court found necessity was met due to Bent's refusal.

For reliability, the court distinguished between parts of Bent's statement that incriminated himself and were corroborated, which were deemed inherently trustworthy and admissible, and parts that incriminated Wheatle, which lacked sufficient trustworthiness and corroboration, and were therefore inadmissible.

The court emphasized the lack of opportunity for cross-examination and the circumstances of the statement (jailhouse discussion) as undermining procedural reliability for the parts incriminating Wheatle.

The applicant, Shakeil Wheatle, charged with two separate murders, brought a pre-trial motion seeking severance of the two murder counts.

The court granted the severance, finding no factual nexus between the two homicides, differing strengths in the Crown's case for each, and a significant risk of prejudice to the accused if the counts were tried together.

The decision emphasized the importance of avoiding impermissible inferences and the complexity of jury instructions in such circumstances.

The accused, Kamil Filli and Liban Douale, faced charges of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Both brought applications to exclude evidence under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Filli argued his warrantless arrest and subsequent search were unlawful.

The court dismissed Filli's application, finding his arrest and search lawful, or at worst a low-level Charter breach that would not warrant exclusion of evidence under the R. v. Grant test.

Douale argued the search warrant for his residence was based on information obtained through an unlawful warrantless search by police in the common hallway of his multi-unit residential building.

The court granted Douale's application, finding that the police conducted an unlawful warrantless search by entering the building and overhearing a conversation, which was the sole basis for subsequent incriminating observations.

This serious breach of privacy, coupled with the affiant's omission of these facts from the Information to Obtain, led to the exclusion of evidence against Douale under section 24(2) of the Charter, effectively ending the prosecution's case against him.

The applicant sought to compel the Crown to disclose the identity of a confidential source, or alternatively, to present the source's physical description of the occupant of a storage locker to the trier of fact.

The applicant argued that the confidential source's description of the occupant as "heavy set" was inconsistent with his own physical appearance, and this information was critical to raising a reasonable doubt about his guilt as the possessor of firearms found in the locker.

The court applied the "innocence at stake" exception to informer privilege, finding that the information was not available from any other source and was likely to raise a reasonable doubt.

The court ruled that the confidential informant privilege must be pierced, allowing the confidential source to be called as a witness on the identification information, or an alternative method to present the description to the trier of fact.

The applicants challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at an apartment where firearms and drugs were found, arguing inadequate disclosure and failure to comply with the Criminal Code requirements for a nighttime search.

The court found the warrant presumptively invalid due to the failure to request a nighttime search under s. 488 of the Criminal Code.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the evidence, concluding the breach was technical, had no practical impact on the applicants' rights, and excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The applicant sought a bail review to set aside a detention order following charges involving firearms and narcotics discovered in a storage locker and apartment rented in the applicant’s name.

The reviewing court found that the lower court erred in relying on secondary grounds based on an alleged breach of a residence condition, as there was no charge for the alleged breach and the evidence did not establish that the applicant lived at the apartment.

However, the detention order was upheld on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code due to the apparent strength of the circumstantial case, the seriousness of the alleged offences, and the impact that release could have on public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant’s lengthy pre‑trial custody and anticipated trial date were considered but were insufficient to undermine the basis for continued detention.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The appellant sought to appeal summary conviction findings for forcible confinement, mischief under, intimidation, and two counts of assault after being tried and convicted in absentia.

The appellant had not appeared at trial, had not surrendered to serve his sentence, and had not communicated with counsel since before trial.

Counsel nonetheless advanced the appeal without instructions as a matter of principle.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal where counsel lacked instructions and the appellant remained unlawfully at large.

The court held that counsel without instructions had no standing to bring the appeal and that individuals who have not surrendered to custody should not be permitted to invoke the appellate process.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant seeking an extension of time if he later wished to pursue the appeal.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and uttering threats arising from allegations involving a child complainant, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), improperly rejected the accused’s evidence, and wrongly treated a letter written by the complainant as a prior consistent statement.

The court held that the trial judge applied the proper W.(D.) analysis and fairly assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the accused.

The court further found that the letter was not relied upon for the truth of its contents but was used only as part of the narrative context.

No reversible error was identified in the trial judge’s reasoning or evidentiary treatment.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.