Christopher Kent Leafloor

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Colin Patrick Murphy, finding that the motion judge erred by compelling Murphy to testify during his own civil contempt proceedings, in violation of section 11(c) of the Charter.

The compelled testimony was improperly used to support a finding of contempt and to justify a sentence of incarceration.

The Court held that section 11(c) applies to civil contempt proceedings, including sentencing, and prohibits testimonial compulsion once contempt is alleged.

The finding of contempt for failing to produce deleted data and the sentence were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new sentencing hearing on the admitted acts of contempt.

The defendants, Frank Lee and Jason Cooney, brought a Charter application to exclude two kilograms of crystal methamphetamine found in their car, arguing violations of their s. 9 (unreasonable arrest) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thus no s. 9 violation.

However, it found s. 10(b) violations for both defendants due to delays in advising and facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct (carelessness, not systemic) and the impact on the accused's Charter interests (no evidence flowed from the breach) were outweighed by society's strong interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, given the reliable and significant evidence.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Oliver Kwafo was tried on charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue was whether Mr. Kwafo had knowledge of the drugs found hidden in his vehicle.

Despite suspicious circumstances, the Crown failed to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to a key police witness's inability to recall crucial details about the discovery of the drugs.

Consequently, Mr. Kwafo was found not guilty on all three counts.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in carfentanil, possession of proceeds of crime, failing to comply with a recognizance, and assault resisting arrest.

The accused brought a Charter application under section 24(2) seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless search incident to arrest.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful as the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was in breach of a recognizance or in contravention of the Trespass to Property Act.

The officer's testimony was found to be unreliable and evasive, with significant inconsistencies regarding the basis for the arrest.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant and found that the seriousness of the Charter breach and its impact on the accused's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The applicant was arrested on August 28, 2018, and his trial was scheduled to conclude on February 24, 2020, just four days before the Jordan 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The applicant was in custody awaiting trial.

The court found that while the applicant demonstrated no defence delay and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, the applicant failed to establish that he took meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

Specifically, the applicant did not bring a severance application after learning that co-counsel scheduling issues would delay trial by almost one year, and took no proactive steps after trial dates were set.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Letrae Paul Shallow, was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 15-month jail sentence, while the defence requested a suspended sentence with three years' probation, citing exceptional circumstances and a Charter breach.

The court considered mitigating factors, including the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, rehabilitative efforts, strong family and community support, and significant personal growth since the offence.

Aggravating factors included the quantity of cocaine (21.79 grams) and the commercial nature of the trafficking.

The court found some exceptional circumstances but determined they did not warrant a sentence entirely outside the usual range for this offence.

Balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence, less two days pre-sentence custody, followed by three years' probation with specific conditions, and a ten-year weapons prohibition order.

The accused applied under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained via a search warrant, arguing the warrant was improperly issued due to insufficient grounds and improper use of the telewarrant procedure.

The court dismissed the application, finding the warrant was properly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds, the confidential informant's tip was sufficiently corroborated under the Debot test, and the telewarrant procedure was appropriately used as "impracticable" does not require urgency.

Even if there was a Charter breach regarding the telewarrant, the evidence would be admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

A 20-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in MDMA involving small quantities (3.09 and 13 grams).

The Crown sought a nine-month custodial sentence.

The court suspended the passing of sentence and imposed probation, finding that incarceration would not serve the sentencing objectives and would be disproportionate given the offender's youth, early guilty plea, positive pre-sentence report, demonstrated remorse, rehabilitation efforts, strong family support, and excellent academic performance.

The court emphasized individualized proportionality and the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment.

The defendant was charged with production of marijuana and related offences.

He applied under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to quash search warrants that led to the discovery of marijuana plants.

The defendant held a production license allowing him to produce marijuana for personal medical purposes.

Four search warrants were issued for different units in a warehouse plaza—two licensed units (17 and 18) and two unlicensed units (15 and 16).

The licensed units were authorized for a combined total of 294 plants.

The defendant challenged whether the warrants had sufficient reasonable grounds to believe there was an "overgrow" in the licensed units and whether the unlicensed units were operating as a grow operation.

The court found that after excision and amplification of the Information to Obtain, the warrants were supported by reasonable grounds and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence pursuant to a telewarrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of the search warrant, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO), as redacted to protect a confidential informant, fell short of constitutional standards.

The ITO relied on information from an untested confidential source whose tip lacked sufficient detail and compelling information.

Police corroboration was limited to confirmation of innocent facts.

The court applied the "three Cs" test (compelling, credible, corroborated) and found significant deficiencies in all three areas.

Additionally, the court found the ITO lacked evidence of currency regarding the alleged ongoing drug trafficking.

The court also found the affiant's conduct in preparing the ITO fell toward the serious end of the misconduct spectrum due to selective disclosure of the confidential informant's criminal record, misleading characterization of the applicant's prior charges as "offences," failure to determine the status of prior drug charges, and lack of diligence in corroborating key claims.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the seized evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused faced charges including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following an encounter with police that began with a purported Highway Traffic Act bicycle infraction.

The court found the police stop was a pretext to investigate possible gang or drug involvement and that the accused was subjected to an unlawful and humiliating public strip search.

The court rejected key portions of the arresting officer’s testimony, finding the officer unreliable and concluding that the detention and search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Given the seriousness of the Charter breaches and the strong temporal connection between those breaches and the discovery of the cocaine in a police cruiser, the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

With no remaining evidence, the charge was dismissed.

The accused was tried on five criminal charges arising from an incident on July 10, 2011, in a Toronto Community Housing Complex known for drug and gang activity.

Police officers, responding to community complaints about drug trafficking, encountered the accused in the complex.

When approached, the accused fled, and during the chase, officers observed him reaching into his waistband and discarding a substance.

Officers apprehended him and found crack cocaine in his possession.

The accused was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine and marijuana, wilfully obstructing a police officer by falsely identifying himself, failing to comply with a recognizance condition regarding drug abstinence, and failing to comply with a probation order to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The court found the accused guilty of cocaine possession, obstructing police, and failing to comply with probation, but dismissed the marijuana possession charge and the breach of recognizance charge.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of heroin, and dangerous driving.

The overall delay from charge to trial was approximately 40½ months, with almost 16 months of institutional delay following committal to trial in the Superior Court.

Applying the framework from Morin and related authorities, the court considered the length of delay, reasons for delay, lack of defence waiver, and inferred prejudice.

The court found that the institutional delay significantly exceeded the constitutional guidelines and that the Crown failed to prioritize the matter after an earlier trial date was not reached.

Balancing the interests of the accused and society, the court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and infringed s. 11(b).