Robb Mark MacDonald

The offender pleaded guilty to facilitating terrorist activity, instructing terrorist activity, and promoting hatred.

Over a decade, he was a leader in a neo-Nazi militant accelerationist group, creating propaganda videos and manifestos that incited violence against identifiable groups and inspired several real-world attacks.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the gravity of terrorism offences designed to result in indiscriminate killing.

The offender was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, less 48 months of pre-sentence credit.

The court declined to order delayed parole eligibility, finding the offender's prospects for rehabilitation in the penitentiary system warranted standard parole rules.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a double murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused in recorded intercepts and threatening text messages sent weeks after the murders.

The court reviewed the legal principles governing the admissibility of similar fact and propensity evidence, ultimately finding that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The court considered a mid-trial application by the Crown under section 652 of the Criminal Code for a jury view of the scene of a double homicide.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the Crown had not established a "very real and demonstrable advantage" to the jury’s understanding of the evidence that would result from a view, and that the risk of confusion and logistical hurdles outweighed any potential benefit.

The court relied on leading authorities, including R. v. Johnson and R. v. Golov, and noted that photographs and video evidence already provided the jury with sufficient information.

The Crown brought a second application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, during re-examination, following material inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior recorded statements.

The defence opposed, arguing the Crown was improperly expanding its application and that the issues should have been anticipated in chief.

The court held that the inconsistencies arose only during cross-examination and permitted the Crown to cross-examine on these points in re-examination, finding it was within the scope of proper re-examination and in the interests of justice.

This decision concerns the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by a key Crown witness, Justina Murray, in the trial of Gregory Anthony Beasley for two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit Ms. Murray’s video-recorded out-of-court statements for their truth, as her trial evidence was inconsistent and she did not adopt material aspects of her prior statements.

The court analyzes the necessity and reliability requirements for admitting such hearsay under the principled exception, referencing leading authorities including R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The court finds the statements admissible, concluding that the procedural safeguards (including video recording, opportunity for cross-examination, and, in one case, an oath) were sufficient to ensure reliability, and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a Crown application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, in a double murder trial.

The court found that Ms. Murray’s trial evidence was inconsistent with her prior recorded statements and permitted the Crown to cross-examine her.

The ruling addresses the legal principles governing such applications, the existence of inconsistencies, the Crown’s purpose in calling the witness, and the probative value of the prior statements.

The decision concerns a defence motion to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin and Nico Soubliere, to James Brooks, suggesting an intention to rob another drug dealer for Percocets.

The court found the statements admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the statements were substantively reliable and relevant to the issue of the identity of the shooter.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, and that the circumstances in which the statements were made supported their reliability.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin, to his girlfriend, Ruth Anne Villeneuve, in a double homicide prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as evidence of Delphin’s intention to act as “backup” for Nico Soubliere, who was meeting with the accused.

The court reviewed the state of mind exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, ultimately finding that the statements were not sufficiently reliable and were made under circumstances of suspicion.

The application to admit the statements was denied.

The accused, Gregory Beasley, was charged with two counts of first-degree murder.

The defence brought a motion seeking direction to cross-examine the officer-in-charge regarding investigative hearsay about other individuals and organized crime figures who may have had motives to harm the victims.

The defence conceded that this evidence did not meet the strict test for third-party suspect admissibility due to a lack of evidence regarding opportunity.

Justice Lacelle dismissed the motion, holding that the proposed evidence was irrelevant and that its potential prejudice, including distracting the jury and opening the door to the accused's own organized crime links, far outweighed its probative value.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of a police statement by the accused, Gregory Beasley, in a double homicide prosecution.

The court considered whether the police's provision of alcohol to the accused during a custodial interview rendered the statement involuntary or created oppressive circumstances.

After reviewing the evidence and legal principles, the court found that the statement was voluntary and admissible, as the accused had an operating mind, was not subject to threats or inducements, and the provision of alcohol did not amount to oppression or police trickery under the law.

This is a sentencing decision for Jerzy Bogacz, who pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The incident involved high-speed, erratic driving on a busy highway, resulting in serious injuries to a taxi driver and passenger.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, probation, and a driving prohibition, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing factors, noting the egregious nature of the driving and the multiple victims.

Despite mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea and remorse, the court found a custodial sentence necessary.

Bogacz was sentenced to 9 months incarceration and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The court declined to impose a probation term or a restitution order, deeming civil court more appropriate for financial damages.

The defendants, Frank Lee and Jason Cooney, brought a Charter application to exclude two kilograms of crystal methamphetamine found in their car, arguing violations of their s. 9 (unreasonable arrest) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thus no s. 9 violation.

However, it found s. 10(b) violations for both defendants due to delays in advising and facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct (carelessness, not systemic) and the impact on the accused's Charter interests (no evidence flowed from the breach) were outweighed by society's strong interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, given the reliable and significant evidence.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a text message sent by the accused to a police officer inquiring about his mother's life insurance policy.

The Crown opposed, arguing it was self-serving hearsay.

The court found that while the text was presumptively inadmissible hearsay, it should be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement's substantive reliability was corroborated by other evidence and that fairness to the accused required its admission to provide a complete picture of his statements regarding the insurance policy.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied to re-open a pre-trial statement voir dire under section 551.3(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that fresh evidence showing he received pre-interview advice from a disbarred lawyer acting as a paralegal, rather than a licensed lawyer, undermined the original finding that his statement to police was voluntary and compliant with the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the fresh evidence could not have affected the original ruling, as the accused was not detained at the time and had explicitly declined to exercise his right to counsel even if he had been detained.

The offender, a youthful first offender, was found guilty of receiving a material benefit from the sexual services of three women over a ten-month period.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court found that while the offence was serious and inherently exploitative, it did not involve violence, coercion, or underage complainants.

Emphasizing the principles of individual deterrence and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, to be served under house arrest, followed by 18 months of probation.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to add Wynn's Property Maintenance Ltd. as a defendant in a slip and fall action, and initially sought to add two other corporate entities but abandoned that request.

Wynn's opposed the motion, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The court found that the claim against Wynn's was discovered on February 4, 2019, when the plaintiff's counsel was informed of Wynn's identity.

Due to the suspension of limitation periods under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, the motion was brought within time, and leave to add Wynn's was granted.

The court also awarded $3,500 in costs to the two corporate entities that the plaintiff abandoned its motion against, finding the plaintiff failed to conduct proper due diligence before seeking to add them.

N.N. pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, while K.H. and Y.N. pleaded guilty to manslaughter, all related to the killing of Hashim Kinani.

The court determined the appropriate youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, focusing on the length of the custodial portion and credit for pre-sentence detention.

The decision balanced accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration, considering the serious nature of the offences, the young persons' backgrounds, and the impact of COVID-19 on their detention conditions.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after killing the victim and disposing of his body by throwing him off a bridge.

The Crown sought a 16-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court considered the egregious circumstances, including the offender's attempts to rob the victim and conceal the body, balanced against his community support and tentative rehabilitation steps.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 13.5-year period of parole ineligibility.

The accused, P.H., was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The defence argued the sexual activity was consensual, while the complainant alleged force.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable and lacking credibility due to inconsistencies, evasiveness, and confusing answers, which persisted despite the provision of interpreters.

The judge noted that while stereotypical assumptions about sexual assault victims' behaviour are prohibited, the complainant's explanations for her actions and statements were often implausible and untruthful.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found not guilty.

The accused, Marko Tubic and Kenneth Clifford, were charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a Vetrovec witness, Abdul-Aziz Ahmed, corroborated by forensic and surveillance evidence.

The court found the Vetrovec witness's testimony required extreme caution due to inconsistencies and motives to lie.

However, independent confirmatory evidence supported material aspects of his testimony regarding a physical altercation and the disposal of the victim's body.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the victim was alive when thrown over the bridge, thus precluding a first-degree murder conviction based on that specific act.

However, considering Tubic's extensive post-offence conduct (cleaning, disposing of body, hiding evidence, attempting to use victim's bank card), the court inferred intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, finding Marko Tubic guilty of second-degree murder.

Kenneth Clifford was found not guilty, as there was reasonable doubt regarding his involvement in the death or the plan to dispose of the body, and his post-offence conduct indicated distress rather than complicity.