Robb Mark MacDonald

The court considered the Crown's application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a double murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused in recorded intercepts and threatening text messages sent weeks after the murders.

The court reviewed the legal principles governing the admissibility of similar fact and propensity evidence, ultimately finding that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The court considered a mid-trial application by the Crown under section 652 of the Criminal Code for a jury view of the scene of a double homicide.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the Crown had not established a "very real and demonstrable advantage" to the jury’s understanding of the evidence that would result from a view, and that the risk of confusion and logistical hurdles outweighed any potential benefit.

The court relied on leading authorities, including R. v. Johnson and R. v. Golov, and noted that photographs and video evidence already provided the jury with sufficient information.

The Crown brought a second application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, during re-examination, following material inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior recorded statements.

The defence opposed, arguing the Crown was improperly expanding its application and that the issues should have been anticipated in chief.

The court held that the inconsistencies arose only during cross-examination and permitted the Crown to cross-examine on these points in re-examination, finding it was within the scope of proper re-examination and in the interests of justice.

This decision concerns the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by a key Crown witness, Justina Murray, in the trial of Gregory Anthony Beasley for two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit Ms. Murray’s video-recorded out-of-court statements for their truth, as her trial evidence was inconsistent and she did not adopt material aspects of her prior statements.

The court analyzes the necessity and reliability requirements for admitting such hearsay under the principled exception, referencing leading authorities including R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The court finds the statements admissible, concluding that the procedural safeguards (including video recording, opportunity for cross-examination, and, in one case, an oath) were sufficient to ensure reliability, and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a Crown application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, in a double murder trial.

The court found that Ms. Murray’s trial evidence was inconsistent with her prior recorded statements and permitted the Crown to cross-examine her.

The ruling addresses the legal principles governing such applications, the existence of inconsistencies, the Crown’s purpose in calling the witness, and the probative value of the prior statements.

The decision concerns a defence motion to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin and Nico Soubliere, to James Brooks, suggesting an intention to rob another drug dealer for Percocets.

The court found the statements admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the statements were substantively reliable and relevant to the issue of the identity of the shooter.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, and that the circumstances in which the statements were made supported their reliability.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin, to his girlfriend, Ruth Anne Villeneuve, in a double homicide prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as evidence of Delphin’s intention to act as “backup” for Nico Soubliere, who was meeting with the accused.

The court reviewed the state of mind exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, ultimately finding that the statements were not sufficiently reliable and were made under circumstances of suspicion.

The application to admit the statements was denied.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of a police statement by the accused, Gregory Beasley, in a double homicide prosecution.

The court considered whether the police's provision of alcohol to the accused during a custodial interview rendered the statement involuntary or created oppressive circumstances.

After reviewing the evidence and legal principles, the court found that the statement was voluntary and admissible, as the accused had an operating mind, was not subject to threats or inducements, and the provision of alcohol did not amount to oppression or police trickery under the law.

This is a sentencing decision for Jerzy Bogacz, who pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The incident involved high-speed, erratic driving on a busy highway, resulting in serious injuries to a taxi driver and passenger.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, probation, and a driving prohibition, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing factors, noting the egregious nature of the driving and the multiple victims.

Despite mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea and remorse, the court found a custodial sentence necessary.

Bogacz was sentenced to 9 months incarceration and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The court declined to impose a probation term or a restitution order, deeming civil court more appropriate for financial damages.

The defendants, Frank Lee and Jason Cooney, brought a Charter application to exclude two kilograms of crystal methamphetamine found in their car, arguing violations of their s. 9 (unreasonable arrest) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thus no s. 9 violation.

However, it found s. 10(b) violations for both defendants due to delays in advising and facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct (carelessness, not systemic) and the impact on the accused's Charter interests (no evidence flowed from the breach) were outweighed by society's strong interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, given the reliable and significant evidence.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

N.N. pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, while K.H. and Y.N. pleaded guilty to manslaughter, all related to the killing of Hashim Kinani.

The court determined the appropriate youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, focusing on the length of the custodial portion and credit for pre-sentence detention.

The decision balanced accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration, considering the serious nature of the offences, the young persons' backgrounds, and the impact of COVID-19 on their detention conditions.

The accused, P.H., was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The defence argued the sexual activity was consensual, while the complainant alleged force.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable and lacking credibility due to inconsistencies, evasiveness, and confusing answers, which persisted despite the provision of interpreters.

The judge noted that while stereotypical assumptions about sexual assault victims' behaviour are prohibited, the complainant's explanations for her actions and statements were often implausible and untruthful.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found not guilty.

The accused, Marko Tubic and Kenneth Clifford, were charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a Vetrovec witness, Abdul-Aziz Ahmed, corroborated by forensic and surveillance evidence.

The court found the Vetrovec witness's testimony required extreme caution due to inconsistencies and motives to lie.

However, independent confirmatory evidence supported material aspects of his testimony regarding a physical altercation and the disposal of the victim's body.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the victim was alive when thrown over the bridge, thus precluding a first-degree murder conviction based on that specific act.

However, considering Tubic's extensive post-offence conduct (cleaning, disposing of body, hiding evidence, attempting to use victim's bank card), the court inferred intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, finding Marko Tubic guilty of second-degree murder.

Kenneth Clifford was found not guilty, as there was reasonable doubt regarding his involvement in the death or the plan to dispose of the body, and his post-offence conduct indicated distress rather than complicity.

The defence brought an application seeking directions regarding the timing of a section 276 application to question the complainant regarding previous sexual activity.

The defence sought to bring the application during trial after the complainant testified, arguing that advance notice would allow the complainant to tailor her evidence.

The Crown sought a pre-trial hearing.

The court directed that the section 276 application be brought before trial commenced, finding that the complainant already possessed knowledge of the text messages at issue and the potential contradictions with her police statement, thereby minimizing any prejudicial effect of pre-trial disclosure.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in cocaine contrary to s 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Over a period of months, the accused sold cocaine to undercover officers on ten occasions, progressing from small amounts to a final transaction involving half a kilogram for $28,000.

A search of the accused's residence yielded approximately 193 grams of cocaine, scales, packaging material, and cash.

A Gladue report was prepared and a sentencing circle was held to consider the accused's personal circumstances as an Indigenous person and systemic factors contributing to the offences.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence proposed a restorative justice approach with three to six months custody followed by probation, or alternatively, the minimum federal term of two years.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years and six months, reflecting the serious nature of commercial-level cocaine trafficking while considering the accused's rehabilitation efforts, guilty plea, and Indigenous heritage.

The accused Ashley Perry and Christian Walters were charged with unlawful possession of a loaded restricted firearm, two over-capacity magazines, and cocaine following a police search warrant executed at their apartment.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The court found that while the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Perry had knowledge and control of the contraband items, it could establish that Walters had such knowledge, either because he placed the items himself or was informed of their location by his brother or an associate.

Perry was acquitted on all counts; Walters was convicted.

The Crown charged two defendants with aggravated assault of a family member who sustained extensive facial bruising, stitches, and two significant fractures to her orbital bone on December 2, 2017.

The complainant gave two irreconcilable accounts: initially reporting a violent attack by both defendants to medical staff and police, then recanting at trial and claiming she had tripped and fallen down the stairs.

The court admitted the complainant's prior police statement under the KGB doctrine and found it more credible than her trial testimony.

However, the court concluded that while the evidence was highly suspicious of guilt and probably showed the assault occurred, the absence of independent corroborating evidence combined with the complainant's demonstrated willingness to fabricate evidence and her motive to do so created a reasonable doubt.

Both defendants were acquitted.

During a jury trial for possession of a firearm, trafficking, and proceeds of crime, the Crown sought to have a key witness, the defendant's common-law spouse, declared an adverse witness under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The witness's testimony contradicted prior statements and other evidence regarding consent to search, the defendant's movements, vehicle contents, and the source of seized cash.

The court found the witness adverse, citing inconsistencies and a motive to assist the defendant.

Leave was granted for the Crown to cross-examine her on specific points, with limiting instructions to the jury to ensure trial fairness.

A 20-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in MDMA involving small quantities (3.09 and 13 grams).

The Crown sought a nine-month custodial sentence.

The court suspended the passing of sentence and imposed probation, finding that incarceration would not serve the sentencing objectives and would be disproportionate given the offender's youth, early guilty plea, positive pre-sentence report, demonstrated remorse, rehabilitation efforts, strong family support, and excellent academic performance.

The court emphasized individualized proportionality and the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment.