Christian Moreno

This decision concerns the theft of a culturally and historically significant original silver gelatin print of Winston Churchill, known as "The Roaring Lion," taken by Canadian photographer Yousuf Karsh.

The accused, Jeffrey Wood, an art dealer, stole the portrait from the Chateau Laurier hotel in Ottawa, replaced it with a forged copy, and trafficked the original internationally through Sotheby’s auction house.

The court emphasized the unique cultural value of the artwork, the aggravating factors of forgery and trafficking, and the international scope of the crime.

After considering sentencing principles, including restraint for a first offender, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, concurrent on all counts, reflecting the seriousness of the offence and the mitigating factors.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a double murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused in recorded intercepts and threatening text messages sent weeks after the murders.

The court reviewed the legal principles governing the admissibility of similar fact and propensity evidence, ultimately finding that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The court considered a mid-trial application by the Crown under section 652 of the Criminal Code for a jury view of the scene of a double homicide.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the Crown had not established a "very real and demonstrable advantage" to the jury’s understanding of the evidence that would result from a view, and that the risk of confusion and logistical hurdles outweighed any potential benefit.

The court relied on leading authorities, including R. v. Johnson and R. v. Golov, and noted that photographs and video evidence already provided the jury with sufficient information.

The Crown brought a second application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, during re-examination, following material inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior recorded statements.

The defence opposed, arguing the Crown was improperly expanding its application and that the issues should have been anticipated in chief.

The court held that the inconsistencies arose only during cross-examination and permitted the Crown to cross-examine on these points in re-examination, finding it was within the scope of proper re-examination and in the interests of justice.

This decision concerns the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by a key Crown witness, Justina Murray, in the trial of Gregory Anthony Beasley for two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit Ms. Murray’s video-recorded out-of-court statements for their truth, as her trial evidence was inconsistent and she did not adopt material aspects of her prior statements.

The court analyzes the necessity and reliability requirements for admitting such hearsay under the principled exception, referencing leading authorities including R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The court finds the statements admissible, concluding that the procedural safeguards (including video recording, opportunity for cross-examination, and, in one case, an oath) were sufficient to ensure reliability, and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a Crown application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, in a double murder trial.

The court found that Ms. Murray’s trial evidence was inconsistent with her prior recorded statements and permitted the Crown to cross-examine her.

The ruling addresses the legal principles governing such applications, the existence of inconsistencies, the Crown’s purpose in calling the witness, and the probative value of the prior statements.

The decision concerns a defence motion to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin and Nico Soubliere, to James Brooks, suggesting an intention to rob another drug dealer for Percocets.

The court found the statements admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the statements were substantively reliable and relevant to the issue of the identity of the shooter.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, and that the circumstances in which the statements were made supported their reliability.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin, to his girlfriend, Ruth Anne Villeneuve, in a double homicide prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as evidence of Delphin’s intention to act as “backup” for Nico Soubliere, who was meeting with the accused.

The court reviewed the state of mind exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, ultimately finding that the statements were not sufficiently reliable and were made under circumstances of suspicion.

The application to admit the statements was denied.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of a police statement by the accused, Gregory Beasley, in a double homicide prosecution.

The court considered whether the police's provision of alcohol to the accused during a custodial interview rendered the statement involuntary or created oppressive circumstances.

After reviewing the evidence and legal principles, the court found that the statement was voluntary and admissible, as the accused had an operating mind, was not subject to threats or inducements, and the provision of alcohol did not amount to oppression or police trickery under the law.

The accused, Vinod Vasavan, sought a bail variation under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to permit contact with his wife, who had recanted her initial allegations of domestic violence.

The Crown opposed the variation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review an undertaking given to a peace officer under s. 498(1)(c).

The court held that s. 520 only applies to orders made by a justice under s. 515, and that the proper recourse for varying such an undertaking, in the absence of consent, is an application to a justice under s. 502(2) to replace the undertaking with a release order.

The defendant, M.W., was charged with seven offences including assault, sexual assault, choking, forcible confinement, threatening, and breaching a court order against his common-law partner, K.L. The trial judge found K.L.'s testimony to be unreliable due to numerous material inconsistencies across her various statements and during trial.

The court also determined that an eight-second video clip, while appearing to show a sexual assault, was insufficient on its own to prove non-consensual interaction without reliable contextual evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove any of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to M.W.'s acquittal on all counts.

Emmanuel Pinard was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors, including a significant criminal record with prior firearm and violence convictions, and mitigating factors such as family support and respect for the court.

The Crown sought a 6-year sentence, while the offender sought time served (approximately 1 year 1 month).

The court determined the appropriate range for this standalone offence was akin to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (3-6 years).

A sentence of 3 years and 4 months incarceration was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 2 years 2.5 months remaining.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, a lifetime firearm prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The accused was charged with escaping lawful custody, various firearm offences, and possession of cocaine.

The court excluded evidence of the accused's identity and the cocaine found, due to Charter breaches by police, specifically the failure to provide s. 10(a) and (b) rights immediately upon detention and the unreliable basis for arrest (purported "odour of marijuana").

However, evidence of discarded earbuds, which contained the accused's DNA and linked him to a loaded handgun found nearby, was admitted.

The court reasoned that the accused's flight and abandonment of the earbuds broke the chain of causation between the initial Charter breaches and the discovery of this evidence, and that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned items.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted of escaping lawful custody and cocaine possession but found guilty of the firearm-related charges.

The judge also emphasized the critical need for updated police training on detention powers and Charter rights.

The accused was charged with driving with over .80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a motor vehicle collision on October 28, 2018.

The defence raised multiple Charter challenges including allegations of lost evidence (911 calls and cell video), breaches of the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, breaches of the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 254(3), and violations of the right to counsel.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty on both counts based on breath test results showing readings of .225 and .215, expert toxicology evidence, and the circumstances of the collision.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder and other offenses, sought production of records from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) related to the complainant, Morvin George, and disclosure from the Crown regarding Mr. George and witness Lynecia Blugh.

The application for CBSA records was dismissed as the applicant failed to demonstrate likely relevance under the O'Connor test.

The application for Crown disclosure was allowed in part, with the court ordering the production of three specific missing person occurrence reports related to Ms. Blugh that referenced the applicant, while dismissing the request for other Crown records deemed clearly irrelevant.

The accused, R.S., charged with sexual assault, brought an application to introduce text messages and an email between himself and the complainant, L.H., under ss. 278.92 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court partially granted the application, admitting the text messages.

These messages, exchanged proximate to and after the alleged assaults, were deemed relevant to L.H.'s credibility regarding consent and the narrative of events, possessing significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice, and crucial for the defence's right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized a holistic consideration of factors under s. 278.92(3) and rejected stereotypical interpretations of victim behaviour.

However, the email, which described an erotic dream of L.H. involving R.S. and was sexual in nature, was found to fall under s. 276(4) as sexual activity.

As no s. 276 application was brought for its admission, and it would have been dismissed on the merits for relying on a proscribed inference about consent, the email was deemed inadmissible.

During a trial for sexual assault, the accused brought a renewed application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant.

The application was renewed after the complainant testified in-chief.

The court partially granted the application, finding that the evidence was necessary to provide context to specific text messages and statements made by the complainant regarding their platonic relationship.

The court held that admitting the evidence for this limited purpose did not rely on twin-myth reasoning and its probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice.

R.S., charged with sexual assault and choking, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of three prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant, L.H. The defence argued this evidence was relevant to establish an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and/or to challenge L.H.'s credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that R.S.'s belief was based on a mistake of law ("No" means "No") and not a mistake of fact.

The court emphasized that prior sexual activities, especially those where consent was vitiated by an expressed lack of agreement, could not form the basis of a defence of honest but mistaken belief, nor could they be used to infer consent or attack credibility without engaging in prohibited "twin myths." The evidence lacked significant probative value and was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice and the complainant's dignity and privacy.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged breach of their Section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated trial date was 571 days (approximately 18 months and 22 days).

After deducting defence delay of 40-41 days, the net delay was approximately 530 days (17.5 months), which fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the accused failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case did not take markedly longer than it should have.

The Crown was ready to proceed throughout, and the only non-defence delay was attributable to court unavailability.

The application for a stay was dismissed.