Michael Coristine

The court considered whether Dexter Peters was a party to a violent gunpoint robbery committed by his younger half-brother, J.M., in Toronto.

The Crown alleged Peters conspired with J.M. or aided and abetted the robbery, relying on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance, the presence of a GPS tracker on the victim’s car, and Peters’ conduct before, during, and after the offence.

The defence argued there were reasonable inferences consistent with innocence, including that Peters was unaware of J.M.’s plan and did not assist in the robbery.

The court found the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peters was a party to the offence, emphasizing the need for more than mere presence at the scene.

Peters was acquitted of all charges.

The offender, Matthew Galbraith, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography.

The prosecution sought a two-year jail sentence, while the defence advocated for a 15-24 month conditional sentence.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Pike, 2024 ONCA 608, determined that a conditional sentence was proportionate given the offender's mitigating factors, including his first-time offender status, troubled childhood, active engagement in rehabilitation, and genuine remorse, balanced against the gravity of the offence and the nature of the collected material.

A 22-month conditional sentence with house arrest and electronic monitoring was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

Nick Cvetas pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000, having stolen $317,000 from his 81-year-old godmother, Nevenka Cemas, between 2015 and 2016.

The theft involved a significant breach of trust, as Cvetas was her joint account holder, Power of Attorney, and executor.

The Crown sought 12 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a 6-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors (breach of trust, vulnerability of victim, planned nature of offence, repeated lies) and mitigating factors (guilty plea, prior good character, community support, full restitution).

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, rejecting a conditional sentence despite restitution.

Cvetas was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, followed by two years probation with a no-contact condition, and a five-year prohibition from having authority over others' money/property, with exceptions for supervised employment or immediate family.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of two pre-trial motions brought by the accused, Barrington Brooks: one alleging abuse of process under the Charter and the other alleging infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court, exercising its case management powers, summarily dismissed both motions.

For the abuse of process motion, the court found no reasonable prospect of success as the allegations were not capable of constituting abuse in the current proceeding and lacked evidentiary support.

For the s. 11(b) motion, the court calculated the net delay, attributing significant periods to defence delay (due to discharging counsel) and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), concluding that the total delay fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling and was not otherwise unreasonable.

This is a judicial interim release (bail) hearing where the Crown sought the detention of the accused on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court considered the accused's lengthy and violent criminal record, including previous convictions for assault and probation breaches, and current allegations of attempted murder and criminal harassment.

The proposed release plan, involving the Toronto Bail Program and electronic monitoring, was deemed insufficient to mitigate public safety concerns given the gravity of the alleged offences and the accused's history.

The court also considered the accused's status as a member of a vulnerable population under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code but found that the Crown had met its onus for detention on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The defence alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand and arrest.

The court found that while the officer had a subjective belief of impairment, it was not objectively reasonable, thus constituting a breach of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

However, applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the Charter-infringing conduct was less serious, the impact on the accused was low (due to discoverability), and society's interest in adjudicating on the merits was high.

Consequently, the breath sample evidence was admitted.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge, while the impaired operation charge was dismissed.

This is a sentencing decision for Gioacchino Jack Ricchio, who was convicted of sexual assault.

The 16-year-old victim was intoxicated and drugged with flubromazolam, rendering her incapable of consent.

The assault involved intimate touching and possibly digital penetration.

Aggravating factors included the victim's vulnerability, the accused's knowledge of her incapacitation, his prior youth criminal record (including a violent offence), and his callous abandonment of the victim while she was incapacitated.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth (20 years old), intellectual deficits, and family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding the assault highly intrusive and harmful despite the absence of proven penile penetration, citing R. v. Friesen.

Considering the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 26 months, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, along with various ancillary orders.

The offenders, two brothers, were convicted of second degree murder for the planned and deliberate killing of an innocent 17-year-old victim, whom they mistakenly believed was associated with a group that had previously robbed one of the offenders.

The Crown sought a 22-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 13-17 years, citing systemic anti-Black racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court found the murder to be exceptionally egregious, bordering on first degree murder, and sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with a 20-year period of parole ineligibility, alongside mandatory weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a motor vehicle collision.

The central issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court considered various indicia of impairment, including the collision circumstances, the defendant's unsteadiness, physical observations, and an utterance about alcohol consumption.

The judge found that the evidence, even when considered cumulatively, allowed for competing reasonable explanations and did not meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after he and a co-accused provided alcohol and drugs to two underage girls and took them to a hotel.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and incapacitated.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that the complainant was fine and consented.

Applying the test for capacity to consent, the court found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication.

The court also found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, as the accused took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendants were convicted of multiple counts of robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and wearing a disguise, arising from a series of ATM robberies.

The defendants brought a Charter challenge arguing that the mandatory consecutive minimum sentences under s. 85(4) of the Criminal Code violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding it was bound by appellate authority and that the sentences were not grossly disproportionate for the offenders or a reasonable hypothetical offender.

The court also rejected a request to artificially allocate the sentences to avoid collateral immigration consequences for one of the defendants.

Both defendants were sentenced to a global term of 7 years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit.

This decision from a Gardiner hearing addresses factual determinations for sentencing after Curtis Murray and Corey Murray were convicted of second-degree murder.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, motivated by revenge against a specific group, and that the victim was killed under the mistaken belief he was part of that group.

While the judge's legal view was that these facts would typically constitute first-degree murder, the jury's verdict of second-degree murder was respected.

The court also determined that Curtis Murray was the leader and instigator, with Corey Murray being a willing but more of a follower, which was considered a mitigating factor for Corey.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder and other offenses, sought production of records from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) related to the complainant, Morvin George, and disclosure from the Crown regarding Mr. George and witness Lynecia Blugh.

The application for CBSA records was dismissed as the applicant failed to demonstrate likely relevance under the O'Connor test.

The application for Crown disclosure was allowed in part, with the court ordering the production of three specific missing person occurrence reports related to Ms. Blugh that referenced the applicant, while dismissing the request for other Crown records deemed clearly irrelevant.

Following a guilty verdict for first-degree murder, the applicants sought a factual inquiry and a mistrial after discovering that a juror had cycled past the murder scene and posted about it on a fitness app during deliberations.

The court declined to conduct the inquiry, finding that the evidence was sufficiently preserved for an appeal and that questioning the juror about the impact of the visit would violate the secrecy of jury deliberations.

The court also dismissed the mistrial application, concluding that the physical layout of the scene was not central to the main issue of identity, was already well-documented in evidence, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application seeking a remedy for lost telecommunications records from Freedom Mobile Inc. The police failed to preserve these potentially exculpatory records due to unacceptable negligence, specifically an erroneous belief about Freedom Mobile's affiliation with Rogers and its data retention policy.

The court found a breach of the applicants' s. 7 Charter rights but determined that a stay of proceedings was not appropriate.

Instead, the court ordered a strong jury instruction (Bero instruction) as a sufficient remedy, acknowledging the high relevance of the lost evidence but its indeterminate utility.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a mistrial during their jury trial.

The application was based on two incidents: an altercation in the courthouse foyer where the deceased's mother verbally accosted the accused's mother in the jury's presence, and a prior CTV interview given by the deceased's mother.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither incident created a "real danger of prejudice or a risk of a miscarriage of justice." The judge determined that the jury was intelligent and capable of impartiality, and that a strong judicial instruction would suffice to mitigate any potential impact.

Practical considerations regarding the difficulty and delay of selecting a new jury also factored into the decision.

The applicant, Shakiyl Shaw, on trial for first-degree murder, sought a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charge at the close of the Crown's case, requesting the jury only deliberate on manslaughter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer that the applicant knew his co-accused were armed and intended to shoot someone, and that the murder was planned and deliberate, thereby making him liable as a secondary party to murder.

During a trial for first degree murder, the applicant sought to preclude the Crown from asking the principal witness to identify him in the dock.

The applicant argued the identification had trifling probative value and was dangerously prejudicial because the witness was intoxicated and the prior photo identification was flawed.

The court dismissed the application, holding that in-dock identifications are presumptively admissible and that any frailties in the evidence are matters of weight for the jury to assess following cross-examination and proper jury instructions.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial applications alleging abuse of process and seeking to adduce hearsay and alternate suspect evidence.

They argued the Crown preferred a direct indictment for an oblique purpose to shield a key witness from discovery, and sought disclosure of the materials provided to the Attorney General.

The court dismissed the abuse of process application, finding no evidence of bad faith or improper motive to displace the presumption that prosecutorial discretion was exercised properly.

The court also dismissed the hearsay application and provisionally dismissed the alternate suspect application, finding the proposed evidence lacked a sufficient connection to the crime and its prejudicial effect vastly outweighed any probative value.

The applicant, Lenneil Shaw, sought to redact entries from a phone download report, arguing they constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked sufficient authentication to link certain phone calls to him.

The report associated a phone number with the contact name "Dozey," a nickname for Lenneil Shaw, and showed calls to a Crown witness's phone near the time of a homicide.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the report contained no implied assertion of who made the calls, but rather presented circumstantial facts relevant to linking the accused to the witness.

The court held that the evidence was admissible for the fact that calls were made, not their substance, and that it met the threshold for relevance, even if it admitted competing inferences.