Michael Coristine

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and causing a disturbance.

The appeal raised grounds of abuse of process due to alleged trial delay and failure to consider a Charter s. 11(b) application.

The court dismissed the abuse of process claim, finding no evidence of malicious delay by the Crown.

The s. 11(b) argument was deemed abandoned at trial.

The court also addressed a potential error in the trial judge's application of the "only reasonable inference" standard for circumstantial evidence, concluding that while the phrasing was imperfect, it did not affect the burden of proof or the outcome given the trial judge's rejection of alternative explanations.

The appellant, Alex Beseiso, appealed his convictions for Causing a Disturbance and Assault Peace Officer, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no violation of his s. 9 Charter rights (arbitrary detention) and failed to adequately address his self-defence argument.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the trial judge's factual findings regarding psychological detention were entitled to deference and were properly founded on the evidence.

It also concluded that the trial judge adequately addressed and rejected the appellant's self-defence claim, finding his gesture to police was aggressive, not defensive.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence seized during a police search of a motel room where he was arrested.

The accused was a casual visitor in the room, which was occupied by an acquaintance.

The court held that the accused lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room and therefore had no standing to challenge the search under s. 8 of the Charter.

In the alternative, the court found no breach of s. 8, as there were no material misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain, the seizure of clothing was authorized, and an 18-day delay in reporting the seizure to a justice did not violate the Criminal Code.

The court further held that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was found guilty of fraud over $5,000, false pretences, and possession of property obtained by crime after depositing over $141,000 in fraudulent cheques into a commercial bank account.

The court found the accused acted with wilful blindness and dissipated the funds rapidly.

After weighing mitigating factors, including the accused's lack of a prior record, against aggravating factors such as the sophistication of the scheme and the amount of loss, the court sentenced the accused to 15 months' imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, and issued a DNA order.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, sought to introduce evidence of two alternate sets of suspects at trial: a man known as 'Ammo' with an alleged jealousy motive, and associates of a man with a grudge against one of the accused who allegedly framed them.

The court applied the 'air of reality' test and found no evidential foundation for either theory.

The evidence regarding the alternate suspects lacked sufficient connection to the crime, including motive, opportunity, and propensity, and was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, including cutting his hair, removing identification from his apartment, and asking his girlfriend to change her police statement, as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the evidence lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial.

The court held that the evidence was highly probative, not inherently prejudicial, and admissible, leaving it to the jury to determine what reasonable inferences could be drawn.

Sentencing of four offenders convicted of multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, money laundering, and committing offences for a criminal organization.

The offenders orchestrated a sophisticated, multi-million dollar fraud scheme targeting the Canada Small Business Financing Program and several major banks using sham construction companies.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from 14 months to 8 years, along with significant restitution orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture.

The accused was charged after opening a business account in the name of a legitimate investment company and depositing two misdirected cheques totalling more than $141,000.

He claimed he believed the funds were repayment of a debt orchestrated by another individual, but the court rejected that evidence as inconsistent with the bank records, his representations to bank employees, and his rapid dissipation of the funds through multiple branch transactions.

Applying the law of fraud and the doctrine of wilful blindness, the court found that the accused intentionally misled the bank to gain access to stolen funds, or alternatively deliberately avoided confirming what he strongly suspected.

The court entered convictions on all counts.

The defendants were charged with multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, laundering proceeds of crime, and committing offences for a criminal organization in relation to a scheme to fraudulently obtain Canada Small Business Financing Program loans from various banks.

The Crown alleged that the defendants used sham corporations, forged financial documents, and inflated or fabricated invoices for leasehold improvements and equipment to deceive the banks into advancing loan funds, which were then laundered among the defendants.

The court found that Marshall Kazman and Gad Levy orchestrated the scheme and were guilty of fraud, money laundering, and the criminal organization offence.

Ali Vaez Tehrani and Madjid Vaez Tehrani were found guilty of fraud on specific counts but acquitted of the criminal organization charge.

Armand Levy, Ekaterina Chapkina, and Kamyar Ghatan were acquitted of all charges.

The accused, Mark Ahye, was tried without a jury on two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a collision on September 6, 2014.

Mr. Ahye was driving a black Acura at approximately 90 kph in a 50 kph zone when he struck a Toyota Prius, injuring its occupants.

The Crown alleged dangerous driving, including competitive driving with another vehicle.

The defense argued that the evidence of aggressive driving was conflicting and that the collision was unavoidable due to the other driver's unsafe entry onto the road.

The court found conflicting witness accounts regarding whether Mr. Ahye was racing or driving aggressively.

Preferring the evidence of a witness who had a better and more continuous vantage point, the court found a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ahye was driving in a manner dangerous to the public.

Consequently, Mr. Ahye was found not guilty on both counts.

The defendant, a Service Ontario customer service representative, was charged with four counts of fraud-related offences, including making false documents, possessing identification with intent to commit fraud, using forged documents, and breach of trust.

It was alleged he participated in a scheme to provide false identification for obtaining genuine Ontario Driver’s Licences and Health Cards.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a co-accused, which the court found unreliable.

The defendant testified he was unaware of the fraudulent nature of the documents, believing he was merely helping a friend's driving students bypass wait times.

The court found the Crown failed to prove actual knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been breached.

The case involved charges of kidnapping, extortion, and assault arising from a violent abduction.

The court conducted a detailed Morin analysis of delay, allocating periods to inherent requirements, defence delay, institutional delay, and Crown delay, including delay caused by a mistrial following disclosure failures.

The court determined that total Crown and institutional delay amounted to approximately 14 months and 27 days, falling within the Morin guidelines.

Although some prejudice was established, it did not reach the level required to justify a constitutional remedy, and the seriousness of the offences weighed strongly in favour of a trial on the merits.