John Peter Zarudny

The applicant, John Bradley Atkinson, sought a conditional stay of his sentencing and long-term offender (LTO) proceeding until the Attorney General funded his legal representation, pursuant to a Rowbotham application.

The court applied the three-part Rowbotham test, finding that the applicant had exhausted Legal Aid appeals and that his right to a fair hearing would be compromised without counsel.

However, the court found that the applicant failed to establish indigency, as he had access to a $10,000 inheritance that he had not disclosed to Legal Aid Ontario and had not demonstrated was insufficient to retain private counsel for the estimated four-day LTO hearing.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The defendant, a Service Ontario customer service representative, was charged with four counts of fraud-related offences, including making false documents, possessing identification with intent to commit fraud, using forged documents, and breach of trust.

It was alleged he participated in a scheme to provide false identification for obtaining genuine Ontario Driver’s Licences and Health Cards.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a co-accused, which the court found unreliable.

The defendant testified he was unaware of the fraudulent nature of the documents, believing he was merely helping a friend's driving students bypass wait times.

The court found the Crown failed to prove actual knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The defendant, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (representing the Family Responsibility Office), moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The plaintiff alleged that the FRO negligently authorized the return of her ex-husband's suspended passport, allowing him to flee the country and evade over $200,000 in support arrears.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the FRO owed a prima facie duty of care to the support recipient and that genuine issues regarding the standard of care and damages required a trial.

The applicant, an unrepresented accused charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and uttering threats, sought the appointment of amicus curiae to represent his interests at a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant's Legal Aid certificate was denied after his previous counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae and whether such an appointment was necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

The court found that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae in limited circumstances where necessary to prevent a failure of justice, and that the imminent preliminary inquiry with one co-accused in custody for eight months necessitated the appointment.

The court appointed counsel as amicus curiae at a rate of $180 per hour.

The respondents brought motions to quash the appellant's appeal from an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions and quashed the appeal, finding that the appellant had appealed to the wrong court.

The proper appeal route was to a panel of the Divisional Court on a motion under section 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Chief Coroner for Ontario brought a motion to set aside an order requiring him to file a record of proceedings for a judicial review application concerning his refusal to order an inquest into a death.

The Divisional Court held that the Chief Coroner was not exercising a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act when deciding whether to hold an inquest, as he was determining the public interest rather than legal rights or eligibility for benefits.

Consequently, the Chief Coroner was not required to file a record of proceedings, and the motion was granted.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the police and Crown attorneys for malicious prosecution, Charter breaches, and other torts following his acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The motion judge struck most of his fresh amended statement of claim under Rules 21 and 25.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by effectively conducting a summary judgment motion rather than accepting the pleaded facts as true, and by applying too narrow a test for malice at the pleadings stage.

The action was permitted to proceed against all defendants except the Police Services Board (save for vicarious liability).

The applicant brought a motion to compel the respondent Chief Coroner to file a record of proceedings in a pending application for judicial review.

The underlying application sought to review the Chief Coroner's decision not to order an inquest into the death of the applicant's child.

The respondent argued that the decision was not the exercise of a statutory power of decision and generated no record of proceedings.

The court granted the motion, holding that as long as there is a pending application for judicial review, a record of proceedings must be filed, leaving the determination of reviewability to the reviewing panel.

The self-represented appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his claim for malicious prosecution against an assistant crown attorney.

The motion judge had found no genuine issue for trial regarding the absence of reasonable and probable grounds or malice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's decision and noting the appellant failed to address any purported errors.

The appellant, a lawyer, was acquitted of sexual assault charges and subsequently sued the Crown, police, and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

The motion judge struck the statements of claim and refused leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against Her Majesty the Queen due to failure to provide the required 60 days' notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

However, the Court set aside the order striking the claim against the Crown Attorney and Police defendants, finding that while the pleading was deficient, the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend, as the allegations, if properly pleaded with material facts, could support valid causes of action.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim alleged conspiracy to injure and abuse of process by the police and government defendants in relation to an investigation targeting the adult entertainment industry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge took an overly technical approach and that the material facts pleaded were reasonably capable of supporting the causes of action.

The Minister of Health and Genpharm appealed a decision granting judicial review that quashed the extension of a cut-off date for generic drug submissions to the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary.

The application judge had found the process procedurally unfair and ordered a new cut-off date, resulting in all five competing generic drug companies having their products listed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals as moot, finding that the new Formulary had already been published, the legal landscape had changed, and Genpharm's proposed future action for damages did not justify hearing the appeal on the merits.

The appellant Ministry appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal's supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation of its previous orders.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry acted in bad faith in attempting to comply with an order mandating a human rights training program to address a poisoned work environment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal retained jurisdiction under s. 41 to recast its orders and impose system-wide remedies.

The Court also rejected the Ministry's argument that it was denied procedural fairness, concluding it had sufficient notice of the allegations of bad faith.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed a decision of the Human Rights Board of Inquiry finding that the Ministry failed to comply with a 1998 remedial order regarding a racially poisoned work environment.

The Board had ordered a human rights training program, which was not implemented within the required timeframe or in the approved manner.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board had the supervisory jurisdiction to remain seized of the matter, hear evidence of continuing discrimination, and recast its original orders to ensure an effective remedy.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.

The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to strike an affidavit from the appeal book in an appeal from a human rights tribunal decision.

The affidavit contained notes and subjective observations regarding the tribunal's conduct during the hearing, which the Commission argued went beyond permissible gap-filling evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the affidavit was not fresh evidence but was relevant to the issues of bias and partiality raised on appeal.

The applicant, a non-profit charity providing services to developmentally disabled individuals, sought judicial review of a Ministry decision terminating its funding and directing another agency to take over its operations and property.

The Ministry made the decision without notice, citing a loss of confidence following a series of serious occurrences.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding the decision was the exercise of a statutory power and thus amenable to judicial review.

The court held the decision was illegal and made without jurisdiction because the Ministry failed to obtain the required order in council under the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act.

Furthermore, the decision was patently unreasonable and breached the duty of fairness owed to the applicant.

The applicant, a non-profit organization providing services to developmentally disabled individuals, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to terminate its funding without notice and direct another agency to take over its operations and property.

The Ministry cited a loss of confidence following several 'serious occurrences'.

The Divisional Court held that the Ministry's actions constituted the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.

The Court found the decision to be illegal, patently unreasonable, and a breach of the duty of fairness, as the Ministry failed to obtain the required Order in Council to seize the property and failed to provide the applicant with fair warning or an opportunity to respond.

The application was granted, and the Ministry was ordered to restore funding and return management to the applicant.

The moving parties (respondents on the appeal) brought a motion to lift the statutory stay of several orders made by a Board of Inquiry regarding a racially poisoned workplace at a detention centre.

The Board had ordered the Ministry to publicize its decision, implement organizational reforms, and conduct anti-racism training.

The court applied the RJR-Macdonald test and lifted the stay of the order requiring publication of the decision, finding irreparable harm to the complainant if he was kept out of the workplace.

However, the court declined to lift the stays on the orders requiring organizational reforms and training, finding that the balance of convenience favoured leaving them in place until the appeal was decided, given the substantial public funds involved and the Ministry's pending appeal.

The Minister of Health appealed a Divisional Court decision that allowed Apotex Inc.'s application for judicial review.

Apotex sought to increase the listed prices of three of its drug products in the Formulary after a generic competitor failed to bring its lower-priced products to market.

The Minister refused to recommend the price increase, citing a cost neutrality policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for the Minister's highly discretionary decision was patent unreasonableness.

The Court found that the Minister's refusal was rational and not patently unreasonable, as the Formulary was already in effect and the cost neutrality policy was applicable.

The appeal was allowed and the application for judicial review was dismissed.