Rohan Michael Robinson

Howard Burke and Devon Dinall were convicted by a jury of drug-related offences (cocaine trafficking) and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court determined the factual basis for sentencing, rejecting the defence's argument that marihuana trafficking was also involved.

Howard Burke, a repeat offender, was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for trafficking 2.320 kg of cocaine and concurrent three years for possession of $76,880 in proceeds.

Devon Dinall, a mid-level trafficker, was sentenced to three and a half years imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic 306g of cocaine, concurrent three and a half years for trafficking, and concurrent one year for possession of $15,560 in proceeds.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, considering aggravating factors like the volume of drugs and prior records, and mitigating factors like employment and personal challenges.

Kimo David was convicted by a jury of five firearm-related offenses and subsequently found guilty of five additional firearm and breach of order offenses.

The court considered aggravating factors including his extensive criminal record, prior firearm convictions, the public nature of the offense, and his post-arrest conduct.

Mitigating factors were limited to his relative youth.

The court rejected the "jump principle" given his limited prospects for rehabilitation.

Sentences for the main firearm offenses were concurrent, while breaches of separate prohibition orders were consecutive.

A global sentence of 8 years was imposed, with credit for presentence custody.

The court addressed whether a mandatory minimum sentence of three years imprisonment for trafficking a firearm remained operative following Superior Court decisions declaring the provision unconstitutional.

The court held that a declaration of invalidity made by the Superior Court of Justice binds the Ontario Court of Justice and that the Crown must either appeal such a declaration or accept its effect.

The court concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to traffic a firearm no longer applies.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence of a loaded handgun and drugs found in his vehicle, alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The police had observed the accused engage in a suspected hand-to-hand drug transaction in a parking lot and subsequently blocked his vehicle to investigate.

The court found that the detention was based on reasonable suspicion and not arbitrary, but the police violated ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to promptly advise the accused of the reasons for his detention and his right to counsel.

The subsequent search of the vehicle was found to be a lawful search incident to arrest.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court admitted the physical evidence (firearm and drugs) due to its high reliability and importance to the truth-seeking function, but excluded a brief statement made by the accused prior to being advised of his rights.

The accused was convicted after trial on 16 counts of fraud arising from his involvement in billing practices at his employer, Attersley Tire, which fraudulently invoiced Highland Trucking for promotional gifts totaling $17,353.00.

The court found that while the accused participated in the scheme, the fraud was orchestrated and encouraged by Attersley Tire and its management.

The accused received only indirect benefits through job retention.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, the court imposed a conditional discharge with 18 months of probation, finding that general deterrence carried less weight than the accused's personal circumstances, positive pre-sentence report, and rehabilitation prospects.

The court rejected restitution as a probation term given that the victim company showed no interest in recovery and the funds remained with Attersley Tire.

The defendant was charged with seven counts relating to possession of a restricted firearm and ammunition found in a speaker box during a search warrant execution at his Toronto residence on October 27, 2013.

The Crown alleged the defendant had knowledge, custody, and control of the firearm.

The defendant raised an alternate suspect defense, arguing his younger brother M.E. had placed the gun in the speaker without his knowledge or consent.

The trial judge found that while the Crown's circumstantial evidence was substantial, the defense evidence established an air of reality to the third-party suspect theory.

The judge concluded that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on all counts.

The accused was convicted of internet luring of a virtual 15-year-old boy contrary to s. 172 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or 90 days imprisonment.

The court found the accused to be a first offender on the lower end of the sentencing continuum.

However, the court identified a serious Charter violation: the police unlawfully disseminated the accused's HIV status in a media release without statutory authority or consideration of constitutional rights.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day followed by three years of probation as a remedy for the Charter breach while maintaining denunciation and deterrence of the underlying offence.

The accused was charged with inviting sexual touching by means of telecommunication with a person believed to be under sixteen, contrary to section 172.1(b) of the Criminal Code, and attempt aggravated sexual assault.

The Crown alleged the accused solicited sexual contact with a minor through an online advertisement and subsequent communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings on grounds of entrapment and Charter breach.

The court found no entrapment, as the police investigation was based on reasonable suspicion and the accused initiated all suggestions to meet.

However, the court found a Charter breach under section 7 when police unlawfully disclosed the accused's HIV status in a media release without proper authorization under provincial privacy legislation.

Despite the breach, the court declined to grant a stay, finding alternative remedies sufficient to preserve the integrity of the justice system.

The accused was convicted on the luring charge.

Two accused were charged with sexual assault and gang sexual assault following allegations that the complainant was sexually assaulted by multiple men in an apartment over approximately thirty-one hours.

The trial judge found the complainant’s evidence unreliable regarding how she arrived at the apartment but accepted core aspects of her testimony concerning non-consensual sexual activity, supported by DNA evidence and contemporaneous reporting.

The court concluded that one accused engaged in multiple acts of non-consensual sexual intercourse and other sexual activity with the complainant and rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The second accused was found to have touched the complainant’s breast in a sexual manner without consent based on DNA evidence and credibility findings.

However, the Crown failed to prove that the accused were parties to each other’s assaults for the purpose of the gang sexual assault charges.

The applicant, an unrepresented accused charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and uttering threats, sought the appointment of amicus curiae to represent his interests at a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant's Legal Aid certificate was denied after his previous counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae and whether such an appointment was necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

The court found that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae in limited circumstances where necessary to prevent a failure of justice, and that the imminent preliminary inquiry with one co-accused in custody for eight months necessitated the appointment.

The court appointed counsel as amicus curiae at a rate of $180 per hour.