Leslie Karen Monique Paine

The English-speaking appellants, having obtained orders under s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code for trials before English-speaking judges and juries, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) on the ground of insufficient English language proficiency.

The trial judges dismissed these applications, concluding that a s. 530 order alone did not automatically entitle an accused to such a challenge without an "air of reality" or "realistic potential" for language competency issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judges' decisions, finding that the s. 530 orders were not necessary in these cases as the trials were already in English, and the purpose of s. 530 is to assist official language minorities, not to enforce minimum fair trial conditions for majority language speakers.

The court affirmed that a threshold showing of realistic potential is required for challenges for cause under s. 638(1)(f), similar to s. 638(1)(b), and that existing jury selection processes (Juries Act qualifications, pre-vetting) adequately address language competency.

The appeals were dismissed, and convictions affirmed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his mother in a fire.

Following conviction, he raised a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR).

The jury rejected the NCR defence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's answer to a jury question regarding whether the appellant would be eligible for insurance proceeds if found NCR.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider the financial consequences of an NCR verdict.

The court held that the error was not harmless and that the curative proviso was unavailable.

The conviction was set aside and a new second-stage trial on the NCR issue was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault by a judge sitting alone.

The complainant alleged that on October 16, 1992, after a night of drinking, she awoke to find the appellant having intercourse with her.

DNA evidence established that the appellant was the father of the complainant's child, confirming intercourse had occurred.

The central issue at trial was whether the complainant had consented.

The appellant argued the trial judge relied on a Crown misstatement of evidence regarding similar language used by both parties about the sexual act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years, finding the trial judge had improperly treated the appellant's absence of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The appellant appealed his conviction for receiving a financial benefit from sexual services contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

Duty counsel argued that the trial judge erred in applying the presumption under subsection (3) when other findings suggested uncertainty about whether the complainant gave all earnings to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption and noting that the trial judge's findings regarding control for a second charge did not undermine the presumption's application.

The appellant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault (twice), assault with a weapon, threatening death, assault causing bodily harm, and assault.

He knew he was HIV-positive but did not disclose this status to the complainant, a vulnerable victim whom he brutally assaulted on multiple occasions, including putting a drill to her head while threatening to kill her.

The trial judge imposed a nine-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, primarily challenging the denial of his Rowbotham applications for state-funded counsel.

The trial judge had instead expanded the role of an amicus curiae to assist the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing the Rowbotham order based on the appellant's history of unreasonably discharging counsel, and that the expanded amicus role ensured trial fairness without constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person and occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm present.

He did not testify at trial.

On appeal to the SCC, the appellant argued unreasonable verdict based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court held that the strong circumstantial case permitted the Court of Appeal to consider the appellant's silence when assessing his unreasonable verdict argument, and affirmed that the trial judge's clear jury instructions against using silence as a makeweight for the Crown preserved the accused's right to silence.

Appeal dismissed and convictions upheld.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

Appeal from convictions for first degree murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a prohibited firearm with intent to wound.

The sole ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's W.(D.) instructions to the jury, specifically the use of expanded language referring to "other defence evidence" or "evidence relied on by the defence" in the first and second stages of the instruction.

The appellant argued this formulation erroneously directed the jury to consider supporting evidence when assessing the appellant's credibility and deflected the jury from considering all evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the expanded instruction was not ideal, it did not constitute reversible error when read in the context of the entire charge, which repeatedly emphasized the Crown's burden of proof and the jury's obligation to consider all evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of his neighbor and sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on multiple grounds, including that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to a mistaken belief in consent defense, that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's demeanor and mental health history, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable, the defense arguments were properly addressed, and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on December 21, 2017.

The sentencing judge had refused to grant credit for pre-sentence custody on more than a one-for-one basis due to the appellant's breaches of no contact provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of R. v. Plante and fresh evidence showing good behaviour in custody.

The court granted an additional 1.5:1 credit of 43 days for pre-sentence custody based on parity of treatment principles.

The appellant appealed a sentence of concurrent 12-month sentences followed by three years probation imposed for two counts of breaching court orders forbidding contact with the complainant.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by misapprehending evidence regarding threats.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence and upheld the sentence, noting the appellant's history of five previous breach convictions, his failure to be deterred by earlier sentences, and the devastating impact on the victim.