Leslie Karen Monique Paine

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence and in excluding evidence of the respondent's prior disreputable conduct and criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary rulings on the evidentiary issues, notably confirming for the first time that Gladue principles are relevant to a Corbett application when assessing the probative value and prejudicial effect of an Indigenous accused's prior convictions.

The English-speaking appellants, having obtained orders under s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code for trials before English-speaking judges and juries, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) on the ground of insufficient English language proficiency.

The trial judges dismissed these applications, concluding that a s. 530 order alone did not automatically entitle an accused to such a challenge without an "air of reality" or "realistic potential" for language competency issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judges' decisions, finding that the s. 530 orders were not necessary in these cases as the trials were already in English, and the purpose of s. 530 is to assist official language minorities, not to enforce minimum fair trial conditions for majority language speakers.

The court affirmed that a threshold showing of realistic potential is required for challenges for cause under s. 638(1)(f), similar to s. 638(1)(b), and that existing jury selection processes (Juries Act qualifications, pre-vetting) adequately address language competency.

The appeals were dismissed, and convictions affirmed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his mother in a fire.

Following conviction, he raised a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR).

The jury rejected the NCR defence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's answer to a jury question regarding whether the appellant would be eligible for insurance proceeds if found NCR.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider the financial consequences of an NCR verdict.

The court held that the error was not harmless and that the curative proviso was unavailable.

The conviction was set aside and a new second-stage trial on the NCR issue was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault by a judge sitting alone.

The complainant alleged that on October 16, 1992, after a night of drinking, she awoke to find the appellant having intercourse with her.

DNA evidence established that the appellant was the father of the complainant's child, confirming intercourse had occurred.

The central issue at trial was whether the complainant had consented.

The appellant argued the trial judge relied on a Crown misstatement of evidence regarding similar language used by both parties about the sexual act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years, finding the trial judge had improperly treated the appellant's absence of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The appellant appealed a Review Board disposition continuing his detention following a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for first degree murder.

Before the appeal was heard, the appellant died while detained.

Applying the governing discretion on abatement after death, the court held there were no special circumstances warranting continuation of the appeal.

The issues were narrow, the proposed remedy was case-specific, and no systemic or public-importance issue arose.

The appeal therefore abated and was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for receiving a financial benefit from sexual services contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

Duty counsel argued that the trial judge erred in applying the presumption under subsection (3) when other findings suggested uncertainty about whether the complainant gave all earnings to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption and noting that the trial judge's findings regarding control for a second charge did not undermine the presumption's application.

The appellant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault (twice), assault with a weapon, threatening death, assault causing bodily harm, and assault.

He knew he was HIV-positive but did not disclose this status to the complainant, a vulnerable victim whom he brutally assaulted on multiple occasions, including putting a drill to her head while threatening to kill her.

The trial judge imposed a nine-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, primarily challenging the denial of his Rowbotham applications for state-funded counsel.

The trial judge had instead expanded the role of an amicus curiae to assist the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing the Rowbotham order based on the appellant's history of unreasonably discharging counsel, and that the expanded amicus role ensured trial fairness without constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person and occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm present.

He did not testify at trial.

On appeal to the SCC, the appellant argued unreasonable verdict based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court held that the strong circumstantial case permitted the Court of Appeal to consider the appellant's silence when assessing his unreasonable verdict argument, and affirmed that the trial judge's clear jury instructions against using silence as a makeweight for the Crown preserved the accused's right to silence.

Appeal dismissed and convictions upheld.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

Appeal from convictions for first degree murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a prohibited firearm with intent to wound.

The sole ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's W.(D.) instructions to the jury, specifically the use of expanded language referring to "other defence evidence" or "evidence relied on by the defence" in the first and second stages of the instruction.

The appellant argued this formulation erroneously directed the jury to consider supporting evidence when assessing the appellant's credibility and deflected the jury from considering all evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the expanded instruction was not ideal, it did not constitute reversible error when read in the context of the entire charge, which repeatedly emphasized the Crown's burden of proof and the jury's obligation to consider all evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of his neighbor and sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on multiple grounds, including that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to a mistaken belief in consent defense, that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's demeanor and mental health history, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the trial judge improperly used prior consistent statements.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable, the defense arguments were properly addressed, and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on December 21, 2017.

The sentencing judge had refused to grant credit for pre-sentence custody on more than a one-for-one basis due to the appellant's breaches of no contact provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of R. v. Plante and fresh evidence showing good behaviour in custody.

The court granted an additional 1.5:1 credit of 43 days for pre-sentence custody based on parity of treatment principles.

The appellant appealed a sentence of concurrent 12-month sentences followed by three years probation imposed for two counts of breaching court orders forbidding contact with the complainant.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by misapprehending evidence regarding threats.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence and upheld the sentence, noting the appellant's history of five previous breach convictions, his failure to be deterred by earlier sentences, and the devastating impact on the victim.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence of a loaded handgun and drugs found in his vehicle, alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The police had observed the accused engage in a suspected hand-to-hand drug transaction in a parking lot and subsequently blocked his vehicle to investigate.

The court found that the detention was based on reasonable suspicion and not arbitrary, but the police violated ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to promptly advise the accused of the reasons for his detention and his right to counsel.

The subsequent search of the vehicle was found to be a lawful search incident to arrest.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court admitted the physical evidence (firearm and drugs) due to its high reliability and importance to the truth-seeking function, but excluded a brief statement made by the accused prior to being advised of his rights.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against two five-year-old girls for whom he occasionally babysat.

He appealed his convictions on the grounds of unreasonable verdict, prejudicial interruption of closing submissions, and failure to give a propensity warning to the jury.

He also appealed his sentence of two years consecutive on each count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable, no prejudice from the trial judge's intervention, and that the jury instructions adequately warned against cross-pollinating evidence between counts despite the lack of a specific propensity warning.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting that occurred after they were robbed at a flea market.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the jury selection process, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the periods of parole ineligibility and the sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as the trial judge had erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's sentencing position without notice and failing to give adequate weight to the appellants' youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful confinement and sentenced to 32 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the strong Crown case, which included a 911 call recording.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the 32-month sentence was lenient given the premeditated nature of the abduction and confinement.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 6 years and 7.5 months for multiple offences including break and enter, robbery, and assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in attributing presentence custody and sought a reduction of the global sentence to 5 years.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misunderstood the Crown's position regarding presentence custody.

The Court maintained the 6-year global sentence due to the seriousness of the crimes but reduced it by the 7.5 months of presentence custody to make the credit meaningful.

The applicant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his sentence appeal by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

He had been sentenced to 45 days of intermittent jail for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 192 mg/100 ml, marking his fourth drinking and driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no arguable error of law, noting that the lower courts properly applied sentencing principles and that a conditional sentence was manifestly inappropriate.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual offences against multiple young complainants on the basis that the trial reasons were inadequate, the evidence of the child witnesses was inconsistent, and one complainant's account may have been tainted by social worker involvement before a second video statement.

Applying the appellate framework governing sufficiency of reasons and deference on credibility findings, the court held that the reasons, read in the context of the record and the trial process, adequately explained why the trial judge rejected the defence and accepted the complainants' evidence.

The court found no material misapprehension of the evidence and no reversible error in the treatment of similar fact evidence or the impugned complainant's testimony.

The child pornography convictions were not argued and were left undisturbed.

The sexual interference convictions were stayed under the Kineapple principle, the remainder of the conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.