Dr. Rosenbloom

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving, failing to comply with a breath demand, and dangerous driving.

At trial, she argued that her drink had been spiked, leading to involuntary intoxication.

The trial judge rejected this defence and convicted her.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof, erroneously requiring the defence to establish a 'likelihood' of involuntary intoxication rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address conflicting expert evidence on the effects of crack cocaine and the complainant's capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was alive to the dispute between the experts and that it was open to him to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's account.

The court further held that, even if the treatment of the expert evidence was inadequate, the conviction remained supported by the accepted evidence that the complainant was unable to move, speak, or think clearly and did not consent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his wife.

At trial, he admitted causing her death but claimed he did not mean to kill her, raising defences of self-defence, necessity, and accident.

He alleged his wife had tried to poison him and set a fire in their home, and that she died from traumatic asphyxia during a struggle when he accidentally kneeled on her chest.

The trial judge instructed the jury on accident as to unintended consequences but refused to leave accident as to the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to leave the defence of an accidental act with the jury, as there was an air of reality to the appellant's claim that he kneeled on his wife accidentally.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences, and sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended his defence by stating he conceded participation in the robberies and only relied on an intoxication defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly understood the defence's position that, absent intoxication, the appellant would be guilty as a party.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge failed to provide reasons for denying two-for-one pre-trial custody credit, the global sentence remained fit.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application for a judge-alone trial without Crown consent, and that the jury instructions regarding extreme intoxication and the standard of proof were flawed.

He also argued the trial judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on the Charter application, jury instructions, or the application of Gladue principles to the parole ineligibility period.