Joseph Stanley Wilkinson

The appellant sought leave to challenge a three-year sentence for breaching a long-term supervision order, arguing enhanced pre-sentence credit should have been granted.

Leave was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and crystal methamphetamine) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of failing to comply with a release order.

He received a global sentence of two years imprisonment after credit for pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of alleged Charter violations relating to searches and access to counsel, and challenged the sentence on grounds of inadequate consideration of systemic discrimination and a procedurally unfair forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches.

The Court admitted fresh evidence on the sentence appeal but dismissed it on the merits, except for setting aside the forfeiture order for the funds seized.

The appellant appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed following convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The offences arose from the appellant's actions at the American consulate in Toronto, where she forced her way into the building and slashed a security guard with a box cutter.

The appellant argued the sentence was disproportionate given that she had never caused more than minor bodily harm and her violent offences were few and far between.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied section 753.01(5) of the Criminal Code and that there was no reasonable expectation a determinate sentence would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Norma Walton’s appeal from her convictions for theft over $5,000, finding that the trial judge’s repeated and intrusive questioning of the accused during her testimony, both in chief and in cross-examination, undermined the fairness of the trial.

The court held that the trial judge’s interventions usurped the role of counsel, created the impression of alignment with the Crown, and prevented the defence from presenting its case in an orderly fashion.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant, Liam Stinson, convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself from sentencing.

The application was based on an email sent by the investigating officer to the judge's judicial assistant, which the applicant argued created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge noted that the email contained no sentencing submissions or requests for a particular outcome, and that the judge had acted ethically by consulting the Judicial Ethics Committee and disclosing the email to counsel.

The court emphasized the trial judge's unique advantage in sentencing due to having presided over the trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.

Liam Stinson, charged with three counts of first-degree murder and one count of arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charges at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown argued Stinson was a principal perpetrator through the use of innocent agents (Jared Herrick and Phillippe Jeannotte) in the firebombing that resulted in three deaths.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude Stinson intended to commit murder and used the agents to achieve this, having misled them into believing the residence was unoccupied.

The jury subsequently found Stinson guilty of first-degree murder.

The accused, Liam Stinson, is charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased victim, Jamie Lynn Rose.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the *res gestae* exception or the principled approach to hearsay, arguing their relevance to the deceased's state of mind, the accused's animus, motive, and identity.

The court applied the tests of necessity, reliability (procedural and substantive), and the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

Many statements were excluded due to lack of contemporaneousness, suspicious circumstances, contradictory evidence, or the declarant's motive to lie.

Other statements, particularly those made closer to the time of death and without reliability concerns, were admitted.

The court emphasized avoiding "trials within a trial" and undue prejudice from cumulative evidence.

The appellants, Shawn Cargioli, Kendell Kamal, and Famien Morrisson, appealed their murder convictions stemming from the stabbing death of Shadi Taleb during a planned robbery.

Cargioli was convicted of first-degree murder, while Kamal and Morrisson were convicted of second-degree murder.

The appeals raised various grounds, including the admissibility of expert evidence, trial judge's rulings on witness testimony, admissibility of police statements, jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, misapprehension of evidence, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, and jury instructions on liability for manslaughter, murder, and first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Morrisson and Kamal, affirming their convictions and sentences.

For Cargioli, the court found a reversible error in the first-degree murder instruction regarding the contemporaneity of mens rea and actus reus for active participation.

Given the Crown's concession, the court substituted a conviction for second-degree murder for Cargioli and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The applicant, Mohamad El-Zahawi, sought to re-open a Garofoli application to exclude intercepted communications, an order for additional disclosure, and a stay of proceedings.

The original Garofoli application, heard in the Ontario Court of Justice, was dismissed.

However, new information (Exhibit F) came to light in a related case (Askari Group) that led to a stay of charges for other accused due to the Crown's inability to disclose relevant material without compromising informant privilege.

The court found that Exhibit F was relevant fresh evidence, constituting a material change in circumstances, and that the Superior Court of Justice had inherent jurisdiction to re-open the Garofoli application despite the applicant's prior undertakings.

The court ruled that the undertakings were not intended to bind the applicant in perpetuity against new evidence.

Consequently, the application to re-open was allowed.

Following this decision, the Crown conceded a violation of the applicant's s. 7 Charter rights due to the inability to disclose Exhibit F and requested a stay of charges, which was granted.

The appellant, Nigel Jordan, appealed a three-year sentence for three breaches of a long-term supervision order.

He argued the sentence was too long, given the non-violent nature of the offences, and that the sentencing judge erred by considering a four-year sentence without allowing submissions and by overemphasizing the need for an exemplary sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the sentencing judge's decision, noting that the imposed sentence was within the Crown's proposed range and that the judge properly considered all circumstances, including aggravating factors related to the purpose of the supervision order.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses the admissibility of antemortem statements made by the deceased, C.C., in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce these statements under various hearsay exceptions, including present intention, physical condition, narrative, and the principled exception.

The court ruled on the admissibility of specific statements made to different witnesses, admitting those that demonstrated present intention, physical condition, or narrative, as well as those admissible under the principled exception or as circumstantial evidence.

Statements tendered to prove a fact contrary to their content were deemed inadmissible.

The accused was convicted of drug trafficking and possession.

He appealed, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling from *R. v. Jordan*, dismissing the stay application.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the 30-month ceiling instead of the 18-month ceiling, as the accused was tried in the Ontario Court of Justice without a preliminary inquiry.

The Court determined that the Crown failed to justify the excessive delay, as the case was not complex enough and the Crown's reliance on the prior *Morin* framework was unreasonable given its dilatory conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant, Manuel Fernandes-Desa, appealed his conviction for impaired driving, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons from the trial judge regarding an officer's inconsistent statement, misapprehension of evidence leading to a reversed burden of proof, and an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the officer's credibility despite the inconsistency, that there was no misapprehension of evidence or reversal of the burden of proof, and that the verdict was reasonable based on the constellation of factors presented at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped interview without a Prosper warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant had not asserted his right to counsel, thereby negating the requirement for a Prosper warning.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, witnesses, and police officers documenting injuries to the complainant's eye and other abrasions.

The defence argued self-defence.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and reliable in his testimony, noting his emotional demeanor and consistency with observations by police.

The defendant's testimony was found less credible and appeared rehearsed.

However, the judge identified a critical contradiction: the defendant's post-incident statement that "no one talks about our family like that" suggested provocative words were spoken in the bedroom, contradicting the complainant's denial.

This contradiction created reasonable doubt as to what occurred in the bedroom.

The accused was acquitted.

Michael Durant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, applied for a change of venue for his new separate trials following a successful appeal.

The application was based on extensive and prejudicial pre-trial and post-conviction publicity in the Welland area, including media speculation about a serial killer, the Ryczak case sentencing controversy, and the fact of his previous convictions.

The Crown opposed, arguing that jury selection safeguards were sufficient.

The court granted the change of venue, finding a fair and reasonable likelihood of partiality or prejudice that could not be overcome by traditional safeguards, particularly given the difficulty in formulating effective challenge-for-cause questions without contaminating the jury pool.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions on incapacity and consent, and the trial judge's response to jury questions regarding bodily harm and consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding admissibility of prior sexual assault evidence and counselling records, the exclusion of a prior consistent statement, the instruction on incapacity as part of the Crown's case, and the response to jury questions regarding the relationship between bodily harm and consent.

The appellant, Grant Zilney, appealed convictions for an indecent act (December 19, 2016) and for an indecent act and criminal harassment (May 1, 2017), as well as the sentence for the latter and the finding that his right to a trial without delay was not breached.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding the December 19, 2016 conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of defence evidence or corroboration.

However, the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias in the trial judge's comments during sentencing that "guilt was obvious" regarding the May 1, 2017 convictions.

Consequently, a new trial was ordered for the indecent act and criminal harassment charges related to Mary Smith.

The appeal on the s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial without delay was dismissed, with the court affirming that judicial reserve time does not count towards the Jordan ceiling for unreasonable delay, as it constitutes an exceptional circumstance.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after his motorcycle collided with a southbound SUV at an intersection in Toronto, resulting in serious injuries to a pedestrian.

The trial judge sentenced him to 12 months in custody followed by two years' probation, with a five-year prohibition on driving motorcycles.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending the driving prohibition could not be limited to motorcycles and that the driving lessons requirement was improper.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, dismissed the appellant's sentence appeal with modifications, and allowed the Crown's sentence appeal.