Joseph Stanley Wilkinson

The appellant sought leave to challenge a three-year sentence for breaching a long-term supervision order, arguing enhanced pre-sentence credit should have been granted.

Leave was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and crystal methamphetamine) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of failing to comply with a release order.

He received a global sentence of two years imprisonment after credit for pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of alleged Charter violations relating to searches and access to counsel, and challenged the sentence on grounds of inadequate consideration of systemic discrimination and a procedurally unfair forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches.

The Court admitted fresh evidence on the sentence appeal but dismissed it on the merits, except for setting aside the forfeiture order for the funds seized.

The appellant appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed following convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The offences arose from the appellant's actions at the American consulate in Toronto, where she forced her way into the building and slashed a security guard with a box cutter.

The appellant argued the sentence was disproportionate given that she had never caused more than minor bodily harm and her violent offences were few and far between.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied section 753.01(5) of the Criminal Code and that there was no reasonable expectation a determinate sentence would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Norma Walton’s appeal from her convictions for theft over $5,000, finding that the trial judge’s repeated and intrusive questioning of the accused during her testimony, both in chief and in cross-examination, undermined the fairness of the trial.

The court held that the trial judge’s interventions usurped the role of counsel, created the impression of alignment with the Crown, and prevented the defence from presenting its case in an orderly fashion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance, as well as his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the 20-month net delay was justified by the exceptional circumstance of case complexity, given the 10 complainants, multiple charges, and extensive pre-trial applications.

The Court also dismissed the conviction appeals based on alleged misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The sentence appeal, challenging a four-month term for breach of recognizance and a 20-year SOIRA registration order, was also dismissed.

The applicant, Liam Stinson, convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself from sentencing.

The application was based on an email sent by the investigating officer to the judge's judicial assistant, which the applicant argued created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge noted that the email contained no sentencing submissions or requests for a particular outcome, and that the judge had acted ethically by consulting the Judicial Ethics Committee and disclosing the email to counsel.

The court emphasized the trial judge's unique advantage in sentencing due to having presided over the trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.

Liam Stinson, charged with three counts of first-degree murder and one count of arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charges at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown argued Stinson was a principal perpetrator through the use of innocent agents (Jared Herrick and Phillippe Jeannotte) in the firebombing that resulted in three deaths.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude Stinson intended to commit murder and used the agents to achieve this, having misled them into believing the residence was unoccupied.

The jury subsequently found Stinson guilty of first-degree murder.

On extensive pre-trial motions in a first degree murder prosecution, the court addressed Charter challenges arising from a related arrest investigation, lost evidence, and multiple Garofoli applications to successive warrants and production orders.

The court found numerous serious breaches, including unlawful phone pinging, failures under ss. 10(a) and 10(b), unlawful seizure and reporting failures concerning cell phones, and unacceptable negligence in the loss of both bullpen video and a physically seized phone, leading to exclusion of all post-arrest statements, utterances, the seized phones, and extraction reports.

The court also found unacceptable negligence in the loss of the deceased's Corvette, but held that the proportionate remedy was a jury instruction rather than exclusion of the Van Dam evidence.

The Garofoli challenges largely failed because, after excision and amplification, the issuing justice could still have granted the contested authorizations, save for the phone-content search tied to the unlawfully obtained phones.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct in a trial concerning a fatal fire.

The proposed evidence included the accused's history of drug dealing, controlling behaviour, and threats towards the deceased and others.

The court applied the test for prior discreditable conduct, weighing the probative value of each piece of evidence against its prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that some evidence, including certain text messages and interactions demonstrating animus and motive, was admissible, while other evidence, such as the accused's prior desire to use Molotov cocktails, was excluded as overly prejudicial.

The accused is charged with first degree murder and attempted murder following a firebombing that killed three people.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's after-the-fact conduct, specifically an incident where the accused allegedly assaulted a witness in jail after calling him a 'rat'.

The court ruled the evidence admissible as circumstantial evidence relevant to identity and consciousness of guilt, but limited the Crown from introducing detailed evidence of the witness's injuries to avoid undue prejudice.

The accused, Liam Stinson, is charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased victim, Jamie Lynn Rose.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the *res gestae* exception or the principled approach to hearsay, arguing their relevance to the deceased's state of mind, the accused's animus, motive, and identity.

The court applied the tests of necessity, reliability (procedural and substantive), and the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

Many statements were excluded due to lack of contemporaneousness, suspicious circumstances, contradictory evidence, or the declarant's motive to lie.

Other statements, particularly those made closer to the time of death and without reliability concerns, were admitted.

The court emphasized avoiding "trials within a trial" and undue prejudice from cumulative evidence.

The appellants, Shawn Cargioli, Kendell Kamal, and Famien Morrisson, appealed their murder convictions stemming from the stabbing death of Shadi Taleb during a planned robbery.

Cargioli was convicted of first-degree murder, while Kamal and Morrisson were convicted of second-degree murder.

The appeals raised various grounds, including the admissibility of expert evidence, trial judge's rulings on witness testimony, admissibility of police statements, jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, misapprehension of evidence, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, and jury instructions on liability for manslaughter, murder, and first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Morrisson and Kamal, affirming their convictions and sentences.

For Cargioli, the court found a reversible error in the first-degree murder instruction regarding the contemporaneity of mens rea and actus reus for active participation.

Given the Crown's concession, the court substituted a conviction for second-degree murder for Cargioli and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The applicant, Mohamad El-Zahawi, sought to re-open a Garofoli application to exclude intercepted communications, an order for additional disclosure, and a stay of proceedings.

The original Garofoli application, heard in the Ontario Court of Justice, was dismissed.

However, new information (Exhibit F) came to light in a related case (Askari Group) that led to a stay of charges for other accused due to the Crown's inability to disclose relevant material without compromising informant privilege.

The court found that Exhibit F was relevant fresh evidence, constituting a material change in circumstances, and that the Superior Court of Justice had inherent jurisdiction to re-open the Garofoli application despite the applicant's prior undertakings.

The court ruled that the undertakings were not intended to bind the applicant in perpetuity against new evidence.

Consequently, the application to re-open was allowed.

Following this decision, the Crown conceded a violation of the applicant's s. 7 Charter rights due to the inability to disclose Exhibit F and requested a stay of charges, which was granted.

The accused was arrested for drug trafficking after police observed a hand-to-hand transaction.

During the arrest and subsequent booking, the accused was subjected to multiple searches, including a frisk search and an authorized strip search.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing unlawful arrest, improper strip searches in the field and at the station, and a delay in implementing his right to counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding the arrest lawful, the field and booking searches to be valid frisk searches rather than strip searches, the authorized strip search justified, and no deliberate delay in providing access to counsel.

The accused was found guilty of trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and breaching a release order.

The appellant, Nigel Jordan, appealed a three-year sentence for three breaches of a long-term supervision order.

He argued the sentence was too long, given the non-violent nature of the offences, and that the sentencing judge erred by considering a four-year sentence without allowing submissions and by overemphasizing the need for an exemplary sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the sentencing judge's decision, noting that the imposed sentence was within the Crown's proposed range and that the judge properly considered all circumstances, including aggravating factors related to the purpose of the supervision order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude intercepted communications obtained under a Part VI wiretap authorization issued during a large‑scale police investigation into alleged fraud and violence within the Greater Toronto Area tow‑truck industry.

They argued the authorization was facially invalid, that the Information to Obtain failed to establish reasonable grounds, that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations, and that confidential informant summaries were inadequate.

The court conducted both facial and sub‑facial review of the ITO, including amplification based on cross‑examination of the affiant.

It held that any drafting defects could be addressed through severance and that the ITO, viewed holistically, established a credibly‑based probability that a criminal organization associated with the Paramount Group engaged in fraud and violence.

The court also found no deliberate misconduct by the affiant and ruled the judicial summaries provided a meaningful basis to challenge informant evidence.

The appellant police officer appealed a Hearing Officer's decision finding him guilty of Discreditable Conduct and Deceit, and the subsequent penalty of termination.

The misconduct involved submitting numerous false health benefit claims for services allegedly provided by a non-existent massage therapist.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer's credibility assessments of the defence witnesses were reasonable and that she did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

The Commission also upheld the penalty of termination, concluding that the Hearing Officer properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the serious impact on the police service's reputation and the deliberate, repeated nature of the deceit.

The Crown sought to introduce a videotaped police statement of a deceased witness at the accused's trial for first degree murder under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the statement met the necessity requirement but failed to establish threshold reliability, as it lacked procedural safeguards and substantive reliability due to inconsistencies and the witness's intoxication.

The statement was ruled inadmissible under the principled exception, though specific portions were admitted as pure narrative to provide context to the jury.

This decision addresses the admissibility of antemortem statements made by the deceased, C.C., in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce these statements under various hearsay exceptions, including present intention, physical condition, narrative, and the principled exception.

The court ruled on the admissibility of specific statements made to different witnesses, admitting those that demonstrated present intention, physical condition, or narrative, as well as those admissible under the principled exception or as circumstantial evidence.

Statements tendered to prove a fact contrary to their content were deemed inadmissible.