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The court imposed a three-year global sentence for sexual interference, factoring in harsh pre-trial conditions.
The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference with a person under 16 years of age and breach of a release order.
The victim was 14 years old at the time of the offence.
The Crown sought 3.5 to 4 years imprisonment; the defence sought time served plus probation.
The court imposed a global sentence of three years imprisonment, considering aggravating factors including forced penetrative sexual assault and the victim's age, mitigating factors including guilty plea and no adult criminal record, collateral consequences of incarceration, and Duncan credit for harsh prison conditions.
The court also imposed ancillary orders including SOIRA registration for 20 years, DNA sample, weapons prohibition, non-contact order, and section 161 prohibitions with limited exception for supervised contact with cousin.
The court admitted Crown-led evidence of the complainant's prior online sexual activity to explain the genesis of the alleged abuse.
This ruling addresses the admissibility of Crown-led sexual history evidence in a sexual assault prosecution.
The court applies the two-stage procedure set out in sections 278.93 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, as clarified by the Supreme Court in R. v. Kinamore, to determine whether evidence of the complainant’s online sexual activity is admissible.
The court finds the evidence relevant to the Crown’s theory of mens rea and the genesis of the alleged abuse, and concludes that its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect, subject to limitations on the degree of detail permitted at trial.
Prior discreditable conduct evidence was excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
The court considered the Crown’s application to admit evidence of the accused’s alleged prior discreditable conduct—specifically, statements about sexual interest in the complainant’s cousin—in a sexual assault prosecution.
The court found that while the evidence was probative of the accused’s state of mind and could explain gaps in the alleged abuse, its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly in a judge-alone trial.
The evidence was excluded.
The Court of Appeal upheld the drug trafficking convictions but reduced the sentence by granting additional credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.
The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.
The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.
The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.
The accused was convicted of multiple counts of domestic assault, choking, uttering threats, and breaching a release order.
This criminal trial concerned 17 counts of domestic abuse allegations against the accused, Leon Giardino, involving his former spouse, Santina Giardino, between 2013 and 2021.
Charges included assault, assault with a weapon, choking, mischief, uttering threats, and failing to comply with release orders.
The court applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing conflicting testimony.
The judge found the accused guilty of 10 counts, including multiple assaults, assault by choking, uttering threats, and one count of failing to comply with a release order, while acquitting on other charges due to insufficient evidence or reasonable doubt.
The court denied the Crown's application to admit prejudicial evidence of prior discreditable conduct.
The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit evidence of similar acts and prior discreditable conduct of the accused in a domestic violence case involving multiple assault charges.
The defence opposed the admission, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and presumptively inadmissible.
The court, applying the principles from *R. v. Z.W.C.*, denied the Crown's application.
It found that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect, as it largely constituted hearsay or vague observations not directly describing Criminal Code offences, and would risk impermissible bad character reasoning.