Anne E. London-Weinstein

Following the granting of the defendant's motion to strike, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The self-represented plaintiff had appealed the order alleging judicial bias.

In the circumstances, the court determined that costs should be in the cause to maintain the appearance of fairness, rather than awarding costs to the successful moving party.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of uttering threats to burn down property.

The trial judge found that while the respondent made statements about burning down the house during an argument with his spouse, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would interpret these words as a threat, nor that the respondent intended to intimidate or have the words taken seriously.

The trial judge considered the context of the parties' relationship, including their history of heated arguments where both parties said things they did not mean.

The appellate court upheld the acquittal, finding the trial judge's reasoning was sound and that he properly applied the legal test for uttering threats.

The court also rejected the Crown's allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the trial judge's questions to the complainant and his suggestion of potential resolution options.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest.

The respondent, who has schizophrenia, became agitated during execution of a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act and punched an officer.

The Crown argued the trial judge demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias through excessive interventions during witness examination, erred in analyzing an alleged Charter section 10(b) breach, and wrongfully took judicial notice.

The appellate court found the trial judge's numerous interjections and cross-examinations from the bench, combined with certain comments suggesting a predetermined position, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

A new trial was ordered.

Two African-Canadian federal inmates serving life sentences for second-degree murder challenged the cancellation of their Escorted Temporary Absences (ETAs) granted by the Parole Board of Canada.

The ETAs were cancelled following an internal misconduct hearing where the same correctional officer who investigated the alleged contraband incident also adjudicated the hearing.

The Crown brought a motion for summary dismissal, arguing that the cancellation of ETAs does not constitute a deprivation of liberty and therefore habeas corpus is unavailable.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents raised legitimate grounds for questioning the legality of their detention based on procedural fairness concerns and that the matter should proceed to a full hearing.

The plaintiff was successful in obtaining a default judgment against the defendant who failed to file any material in response to the motion.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $43,821.00.

The defendant was found entirely at fault and was obstructionist in avoiding service of materials.

The plaintiff recovered general damages, aggravated damages, special damages, and punitive damages.

The accused pleaded guilty to arson endangering life, arson by negligence, and arson causing damage to property, with multiple rolled-up charges.

Between September and October 2024, she set several fires in Ottawa in occupied buildings and commercial properties, creating significant risk to human life and causing substantial property damage.

The court imposed a sentence of 16 months custody (time served) plus 24 months probation with conditions addressing her mental health and addiction issues.

The sentencing considered the accused's Borderline Personality Disorder, substance abuse, and difficult personal circumstances, while balancing the serious danger posed by the offences.

The applicant brought a motion to determine the timing of an application to declare section 172.1 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant sought relief under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The court dismissed the motion and determined that the constitutional challenge should be heard after the conclusion of the trial, if necessary.

The court applied the two-policy framework from R. v. DeSousa, which discourages fragmentation of criminal proceedings and requires a factual foundation for constitutional challenges.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant Keith Topping following a motor vehicle accident on October 20, 2015.

The plaintiff had settled her claim with Allstate Insurance Canada for $250,000 and assigned her right to pursue default judgment against the defendants to Allstate.

The defendant Keith Topping failed to defend the action and was noted in default.

The court granted default judgment in the amount of $250,000 payable to Allstate Insurance Canada.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis for the motion in the amount of $2,896.83, but declined to award Allstate its costs of the action.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death contrary to section 320(14)(3) of the Criminal Code.

On February 24, 2023, the accused drove his vehicle while impaired with his six-year-old daughter as a passenger for approximately 3.5 hours, ultimately colliding with another vehicle and killing the driver.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of six years less 99 days imprisonment, considering aggravating factors including the extended period of impaired driving, extremely high blood alcohol levels, and the presence of the accused's young daughter in the vehicle, balanced against mitigating factors including the guilty plea, genuine remorse, and significant rehabilitative efforts undertaken while on bail.

The plaintiffs, Mitel Networks Corporation and Mitel Networks, Inc., sought a declaration that the defendant, Division Integral de Telefonia S.A. de C.V. (“Divitel”), breached a distribution agreement and requested judgment for outstanding payments, as well as the preservation and return of all products.

The court details the extensive efforts required to serve Divitel in Mexico under the Hague Service Convention, including multiple Letters Rogatory and publication in Mexican newspapers.

Divitel was noted in default, and the court granted default judgment in favour of Mitel for $1,607,707.32 CAD ($1,174,966.98 USD), as well as costs and disbursements.

The court found the costs reasonable given the complexity and international service requirements.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of Crown-led sexual history evidence in a sexual assault prosecution.

The court applies the two-stage procedure set out in sections 278.93 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, as clarified by the Supreme Court in R. v. Kinamore, to determine whether evidence of the complainant’s online sexual activity is admissible.

The court finds the evidence relevant to the Crown’s theory of mens rea and the genesis of the alleged abuse, and concludes that its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect, subject to limitations on the degree of detail permitted at trial.

The court considered the Crown’s application to admit evidence of the accused’s alleged prior discreditable conduct—specifically, statements about sexual interest in the complainant’s cousin—in a sexual assault prosecution.

The court found that while the evidence was probative of the accused’s state of mind and could explain gaps in the alleged abuse, its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly in a judge-alone trial.

The evidence was excluded.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Makita Canada Inc., dismissing Mark Hennebury’s personal injury action as statute-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the alleged negligence related to the manufacture and distribution of a power router occurred more than 15 years before the action was commenced, and that there was no continuing cause of action to toll the limitation period.

The court also held that the matter was suitable for summary judgment and did not require a trial to resolve credibility issues.

This costs endorsement addresses the Applicant's request for full indemnity costs following a successful urgent motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The court reviews the relevant Family Law Rules regarding offers to settle and the factors for awarding costs, including the impact of the Respondent's mental health on her ability to respond to settlement offers.

Ultimately, the court awards partial indemnity costs, deferring payment to be set off against equalization or paid from the Respondent’s share of the matrimonial home.

This costs endorsement addresses a motion regarding parenting time and the appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court found that success on the motion was divided: parenting time was reinstated, but the OCL was not appointed.

The court also addressed outstanding child support and ordered immediate payment to the Applicant.

Given the divided success and the circumstances, no costs were awarded.

The court sentenced Chawn Lemieux for second-degree murder following a public shooting in Ottawa.

The decision reviews the statutory and case law considerations for setting the period of parole ineligibility, including the nature and circumstances of the offence, the character of the offender, jury recommendations, and victim impact statements.

After reviewing comparable case law, the court imposed a life sentence with 16 years of parole ineligibility, emphasizing the aggravating factors of public danger, prior record, and use of a firearm, while also considering Lemieux’s youth, difficult upbringing, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The Bank of Nova Scotia sought leave to issue a notice of garnishment to enforce a 2014 judgment against Ronald William Arnold, after more than six years had passed.

The court reviewed the requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure for seeking such leave, including the need to show no waiver or acquiescence by the plaintiff and the absence of detrimental reliance by the defendant.

The court found that the Bank had made continuous efforts to enforce the judgment and contact the defendant, who acknowledged but refused to pay the debt.

The court granted leave to issue the notice of garnishment.

The appellant, Prosper Chenjelani, appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg in 100 ml of blood, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on alleged errors by the trial judge, including the rejection of evidence of racial profiling, the sufficiency of reasons, and the application of the law regarding racial profiling.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge’s findings and the applicable legal standards, ultimately dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction.

The court considered whether to exercise its discretion to grant pre-charge Charter relief in the form of a declaration that the seizure of items by police during a criminal investigation was in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The Applicants, Eastway Tank Pump and Meter Ltd. and Neil Greene, had not been charged with a criminal offence but were under investigation following a fatal explosion.

The court reviewed the factual background, the parties' positions, and relevant case law on the availability of certiorari and declaratory relief prior to the laying of charges.

Ultimately, the court declined to exercise its discretion to grant the relief at this stage, finding the Charter issues best left to the trial judge, but left open the possibility of renewal if charges are not laid within a reasonable time and further evidence of reputational harm is provided.

The applicants, owners of 156 First Avenue in Ottawa, sought a declaration of prescriptive easement over a laneway (the “Disputed Lands”) running between their property and the respondents’ property at 152 First Avenue.

The applicants claimed the right to use the laneway to access the rear of their property and for parking, and sought an order for the removal of a fence erected by the respondents.

The court reviewed extensive affidavit evidence from the parties, former tenants, and neighbours regarding the historical use of the laneway.

The court found that while there was some evidence of past use for parking, the applicants failed to establish 20 years of open, uninterrupted, and acquiesced use necessary for a prescriptive easement, nor that such use was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property.

The application was dismissed.