Court File No. CR-22-00008192-00BR
Date: 09/09/2025
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SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
10 HIS MAJESTY THE KING
v.
15 BYRON CARR
BY ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 517 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE THE EVIDENCE TAKEN, INFORMATION GIVEN OR REPRESENTATIONS MADE AT THE HEARING AND THESE REASONS SHALL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN ANY DOCUMENT, OR BROADCASTED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY WAY BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL OF THIS MATTER, OR IF DISCHARGED AFTER A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY.
R E A S O N S F O R R U L I N G
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BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE A. LONDON-WEINSTEIN
on July 31, 2023, at OTTAWA, Ontario
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APPEARANCES:
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J. Wright Counsel for the Crown
D. Freedom Agent for Byron Carr
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
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Reasons for Ruling 1
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MONDAY, JULY 31, 2023
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Wright. MR. WRIGHT: Good morning, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Freedom and Mr.
Carr. These are my reasons on the application of
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bail review.
R E A S O N S F O R R U L I N G
LONDON-WEINSTEIN, J. (Orally):
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Mr. Carr brings an application to vary his bail by removal of the social media condition. In the alternative, he asked that the condition be changed to read, “Do not use social media or any
other modes of communication to counsel others to
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break the law.” The Crown opposes the application
and takes the view that the secondary ground concerns in this case justify the social media ban.
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Mr. Carr was involved in a protest which took place in February of 2022 as part of the Freedom Convoy in Ottawa. The area of the city near Parliament Hill was gridlocked with trucks, and
25 the that neighbourhood community was disturbed by
the presence of the trucks and protestors. Mr. Carr is charged with obstruct police and mischief. Two of his other charges have been dropped.
30 He was initially detained at his bail hearing, but was released on a bail review before my brother, Maranger, J. At the time of his bail review, he
agreed to a term restricting the content of his speech while using social media. Mr. Carr now argues that the current restriction of his social media access is one which unduly restricts his
right to freedom of expression and communication.
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The Crown points to the disruption and damage caused to the City of Ottawa by the Freedom Convoy and the role of social media in generating support
and interest in these events as justification for
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the restriction on freedom of speech through a social media ban. Given his charges have been dropped, and the vast passage of time, and considering the related circumstances in relation
to the protest, I am of the view that a material
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change in circumstances has transpired such that
the immediate risk to public safety, which was relied on to justify the imposition of the social media ban, the communication ban really through
social media, at the time, is no longer at play.
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I dealt with a similar issue in the unreported case of R. v. Blanchfield where I followed the decision of R. v. Skelly, 2021 ONSC 555 where
25 Justice Goldstein was faced with a somewhat
related issue. The applicant in that case requested a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code. He was banned from posting or communicating on many internet social media
30 platforms, including, but not limited to Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram and TikTok. Mr. Skelly defied the government lockdown order prohibiting indoor
and outdoor dining at restaurants. Mr. Skelly announced on social media that as a protest against lockdown measures, he would be opening for business, including indoor dining.
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As a result, a large crowd attended at Adamson Barbeque. Police and by-law enforcement officers also attended. The inside diners did not maintain social distancing, and Adamson Barbeque was
serving food in violation of the Reopening Ontario
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Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 17. Toronto Public Health officers laid charges against him and took possession of the Queen Elizabeth Boulevard location, padlocking the premises. They gave Mr.
Skelly a notice under the Trespass to Property
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Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21. The Crown alleged that
Mr. Skelly entered an adjacent unit and then broke a hole through the drywall in order to enter the restaurant. Mr. Skelly was observed serving food
in the restaurant, as well as kicking the padlock.
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He was charged with obstructing a police officer and mischief under $5,000 for kicking off the padlock. He faced a number of provincial
25 violations. He was released on consent and agreed
to a number of conditions, including the social media ban. Justice Goldstein concluded that an absolute ban on Mr. Skelly’s ability to use social media was simply too broad. He noted at paragraph
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A ban on all forms of expression, however,
was incompatible with the principle of restraint. It was also incompatible for perfectly legitimate forms of expression on social media, such as expressing a
political view of the lockdown measures, or
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advertising a lawful takeout business, or even streaming a demonstration of barbequing techniques as a form of business prometon - not to mention merely showing
family photos on Instagram. Freedom of
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expression is enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As Justice Cory noted in Edmonton Journal v. Attorney General of Alberta, 1989 20 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at
para. 78:
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It is difficult to image a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society than freedom of expression.
Indeed, a democracy cannot exist without
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that freedom to express new ideas and put forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. The concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all
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institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be over-emphasized.
Justice Goldstein found that it was an error in
30 law for the justice of the peace to have agreed to such a broad condition.
As I noted in Blanchfield, the ability to exchange ideas and to express opinions, even highly unpopular ones, are protected by our Charter.
Section 2(b),(c), and (d) of the Charter guarantee
the fundamental freedom of thought, belief,
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opinion, expression, including freedom of the press and other forms of communication, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association.
Technology has in the past and will always present
challenges to societal life, as with other forms
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of communication technology. The law will have to continue to develop in a Charter-compliant way to address the challenges to public safety posed by the misuse of social media.
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However, as in Blanchfield, a restriction of forms
of speech and the use of social media restricting the ability to criticize the government or to express views contrary to the majority is too
broad a prohibition on the critical right of
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individuals to publicly dissent, a right which is at the core of our democratic system of government. Democracy is an active, not static balancing act. In this case, the needs of public
25 safety must be balanced with the need to preserve
the right to freedom of expression, protest, and the right to hold and express opinions which are critical of government.
30 In my view, courts must be especially careful to not stifle opinions which may be unpopular, or even wildly unpopular, so important is the
protection of the freedom to express and communicate ideas. Social media has revolutionized the way ordinary people can communicate ideas and is highly popular. The
danger of a precedent authorizing the suppression
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of free speech poses a threat to democracy, and should be weighed along with the need to preserve public safety when determining whether a restriction of speech content through social media
by the Applicant is warranted.
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I also agree with the reasoning of Justice Goldstein in Skelly. He noted the Supreme Court pointed out in R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para.
101:
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It is not uncommon for counsel to agree to a condition that may seem somewhat onerous, but does not warrant turning the matter
into a contested hearing, which could
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result in the accused having to stay in custody for a few more days. In such cases, counsel can also seek a review of the condition after a reasonable length of
25 time and ask that it be altered.
I also would have reviewed the bail condition on the grounds that the imposition of such a broad span on speech in the format of social media was
30 an error in law. Counsel may agree on conditions,
but ultimately it is a judicial officer who is responsible to ensure that bail conditions are
appropriate: R. v. Zora at para. 102, R. v. Antic
at para. 56.
As Justice Hill noted, a justice of the peace at a
bail hearing is not a rubber stamp: R. v. Singh,
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2018 ONSC 5336, [2018] OJ No 4757 ONSC at para. 24-25.
The Crown argues that the secondary ground concerns in this case distinguish it from Skelly
and Blanchfield and justify a restriction on
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content of Mr. Carr’s speech through social media, including banning him from discussing certain topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Justice Maranger, in his decision on the bail review of
March 2022, noted that Mr. Carr is seen on his own
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self-created video taunting the police and
disobeying lawful commands. Justice Maranger noted that the police are shown to have demonstrated remarkable restraint in their conduct
and interactions with Mr. Carr. He noted that
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what took place was serious and should be taken seriously.
Justice Maranger found Mr. Carr not to be an
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that the current circumstances make a repeat of this type of offence recurring to be extremely unlikely. Justice Maranger took note of Mr.
Carr’s Métis heritage, and the Gladue principles
30 relating to bail, and the fact that Mr. Carr had no criminal record.
A ban on Mr. Carr’s ability to criticize or protest COVID-19 mandates and vaccinations or similar activities through social media is too broad and [indiscernible] to the Charter-protected
right to freedom of speech to be justified in a
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free and democratic society. I also find that the facts in Skelly are not materially different such that they would justify violating the rule of horizontal stare decisis. And for that, I rely
upon the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v.
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Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19. None of the exceptions in Hansard Spruce Mills, 1954 253 (BC SC), [1954] 4 D.L.R. 590 (B.C.S.C.) apply. Therefore, relying on Skelly, the variation is granted. The condition is
deleted and replaced with a condition which reads:
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“Do not use social media or any other modes of
communication to counsel others to break the law.”
Thank you.
...WHEREUPON THIS MATTER WAS CONCLUDED
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FORM 3
Electronic Certificate of Transcript
Evidence Act, subsection 5(2)
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I, Terri-Jo Thompson, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of Rex v. Byron Carr in the Superior Court of Justice, held at Ottawa, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 0411_CR34_20230731_085840 10_LONDONA.dcr, dated
July 31, 2023, which has been certified in Form 1 by S. Chadha.
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