CITATION: R. v. Ismail, 2026 ONSC 1774

COURT FILE NO.:: 23-11403240

DATE: 2026/03/24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

His Majesty The King

– and –

Ahmed Ismail

Accused

Marie Dufort for the Crown

Richard Addelman for Mr. Ahmed Ismail

Meaghan McMahon Amicus

HEARD: November 27, 2025

ANNE London-weinstein j.

1Ahmed Mohammed Ismail admitted to killing William Bryant. The only issue for the court to determine is whether he was suffering from a mental disorder at the time, so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of the operation of s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

2This matter has a history which bears a brief outline to provide context to these reasons. The court initially heard this matter on: April 7 and 8, 2025.

3The Crown and Defence were, at the time, and remain in agreement that Mr. Ismail should be found Not Criminally Responsible (“NCR”) for the death of Mr. Bryant. It will serve little purpose to review the facts extensively here. For a complete review of the facts, please see my original decision: R. v. Ismail, 2025 ONSC 4345.

4 Section 16(1) of the Criminal Code reads as follows: “No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.”

5The evidentiary record at the time was insufficient for the court to conclude that Mr. Ismail was NCR for murdering Mr. Bryant. As a result, the parties were provided leave to augment the record. They have since done so and I heard further evidence and submissions on this matter on November 27 and 28, 2025. After receiving the additional evidence, I was satisfied that Mr. Ismail was NCR for taking Mr. Bryant’s life unlawfully as he did not know that it was wrong to do so. At the time I made my ruling, I indicated I would provide reasons for my conclusion. These are my reasons.

Evidence

6At the initial hearing, Dr. Joel Watts was qualified as an expert in forensic psychiatry. I found his proposed evidence met the threshold level to warrant admissibility as set out in R. v. Mohan, 1994 80 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9. An Agreed Statement of Facts was filed. After Dr. Watts testified, the Crown filed an Amended Statement of Facts. I also found that Dr. Watts understood his responsibilities as an expert witness and his duty of impartiality as set out in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182.

7Dr. Watts’ opinion was that Mr. Ismail was NCR for the death of Mr. Bryant because he was incapable of knowing it was wrong.

8The court was satisfied upon hearing the evidence of Dr. Watts that Mr. Ismail suffers from severe mental illness, schizophrenia, and that he has experienced psychosis and paranoid delusions. I remain satisfied of this fact. I need only be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Ismail did not understand the wrongfulness of his actions in stabbing Mr. Bryant to death to find him NCR under s. 16 of the Criminal Code. There was a significant body of evidence to suggest that Mr. Ismail was NCR at the time that he killed Mr. Bryant.

9However, I was initially unable to conclude that Mr. Ismail was NCR. There were several reasons for my inability to reach that conclusion.

10The matter had proceeded on a consent basis as both the Crown and the Defence agreed that Mr. Ismail should be found NCR. There are good reasons for proceeding on a consent basis on a matter such as this one. Matters are streamlined for the court. Focus can be sharpened to only the remaining issues which are truly contentious.

11However, in this case, the court was dissatisfied with the state of the record. There were many questions which were left unresolved regarding whether Mr. Ismail understood that killing Mr. Bryant was wrong. The parties had proceeded on a consent basis, which meant that there was no cross-examination of Dr. Watts.

12As a result, the parties were provided with opportunity to lead further evidence. Ms. McMahon was appointed by the court as amicus to conduct cross-examination of Dr. Watts addressing the court’s concerns.

13One of the court’s primary concerns in this case was that Dr. Watts had not reviewed Mr. Ismail’s video statement to Det. McEwen in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Mr. Bryant. Dr. Watts had only reviewed a summary of that interview after interviewing Mr. Ismail.¹

14Mr. Ismail made several utterances in the interview which were relevant to the court’s assessment of whether he knew that it was wrong to kill Mr. Bryant. Some of the relevant parts of the interview were exempted from both the summary and from Dr. Watt’s initial report. They included evidence of motive which is relevant to the court’s determination of whether Mr. Ismail was aware that it was morally wrong to kill Mr. Bryant.

15Mr. Ismail was asked by Det. McEwen about Mr. Bryant, and he said he was “done” and did not want to talk anymore. He said he was not going to admit to anything. He said that the evidence from his apartment might have come from his youngest brother and friends entering his apartment.

16He said that he would speak to his lawyer, and not the police, about his memories. He became so upset that he appeared near to vomiting at one point in the interview. He indicated recognition of the fact that he and the police officer were not friends and recognized that the officer was being ingratiating toward him in his professional capacity to put him behind bars. The apparent belief that the officer wanted to put him behind bars could potentially suggest that he was aware it was wrong to kill Mr. Bryant. He denied knowing Mr. Bryant. The issue of how this evidence related to knowledge of wrongfulness needed to be further clarified for the court. The exact nature of the relationship between Mr. Bryant and Mr. Ismail also needed to be clarified for the court with respect to potential motive. The existence of motive was highly relevant to the issue of knowledge of wrongfulness.

17In his evidence on November 27, 2025, Dr. Watts, having reviewed the video of the interview, indicated that he remained satisfied that Mr. Ismail was NCR and was also in active psychosis at the time of the interview.

18He explained that it was not clear to him why Mr. Ismail denied knowing Mr. Bryant at all, but it was possible that he did so due to a combination of genuine amnesia regarding his involvement in the murder, paranoid beliefs about police persecution, and simple abidance to instruction from counsel to avail himself of his right to remain silent. Dr. Watts was not of the view that a denial of knowledge of Mr. Bryant supported the inference that Mr. Ismail was aware of the moral wrongfulness of killing him at the material time.

19Dr Watts addressed the court’s concerns regarding the true nature of the relationship between Mr. Ismail and Mr. Bryant.

20The court was also provided with evidence from Det. McEwen, including a review of Cellebrite extractions from Mr. Ismail’s phone. The platonic nature of the relationship between Mr. Ismail and Mr. Bryant was made clear to the court in a way that was not established by the evidence initially led by the parties.

21In addition, the parties amended their Agreed Statement of Facts in this case. They included the fact that the victim, 74, had befriended Mr. Ismail, who lived at 2750 Carousel Crescent in Ottawa. Friends of Mr. Bryant, with whom he volunteered at Amnesty International and Capital Rainbow Refuge, stated that Mr. Bryant had indicated befriending Mr. Ismail about a year prior. Thomas Ndayiragije, who had volunteered with Mr. Bryant for several years at Amnesty International, indicated that Mr. Bryant had told him he had befriended Mr. Ismail, who he indicated had mental health issues. Sophia Lowe, from Capital Rainbow Refuge, where Mr. Bryant was serving as a volunteer on several committees, including resettlement and support of newly arrived individuals and refugees, indicated that Mr. Bryant had talked to her about Mr. Ismail, a friend who he described as mentally unstable.

Mental Health Interventions and Police Investigation

22The Mobile Crisis Team of the Ottawa Hospital had previously attended Mr. Ismail’s apartment on September 9, 2022, following two complaints by Mr. Ismail that he had been sexually assaulted. The doctor attending indicated that Mr. Ismail said that he met Mr. Bryant in 2019 at a function but later stated that his adoptive family gave him to Mr. Bryant in the 1990s. He stated that Mr. Bryant helped him by bringing groceries. His thought process was disorganized and hard to follow. He spoke about being “manipulated, abused, sedated and controlled” by his adoptive family since he was a child. He said his family brought him food and drinks periodically which sedated him. Further clarifying questions were met with resistance and he started expressing paranoia about the Mobile Crisis Team. He did not wish to go to the hospital and requested Dr. Ku and the Mobile Crisis Team leave. The evidence was that Mr. Ismail and Mr. Bryant were not acquainted in the 1990s, which I accepted.

23Mr. Ismail’s brother Sayid obtained a Form under the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, after a Mobile Crisis Team member called him on September 12, 2022, regarding concerns about Mr. Ismail’s worsening mental health. Sayid reported that he visited Mr. Ismail once a week but Mr. Ismail had not returned his call for the preceding four days and did not respond to him knocking on the door.

24According to Sayid, Mr. Ismail had a similar presentation four years prior when he reported concerns about a couple living on the unit above him. He believed that this couple spoke to him through a microphone on their ground about sexual themes. He had complained to the building manager about this issue. Around that time, Sayid observed Mr. Ismail talk to himself in front of a mirror or into a cell phone.

25Investigators discovered that Mr. Ismail had called 911 on May 9, 2023, at 4:36, and indicated to the operator that he was “recovering” and possibly had been attacked again. He also called 911 at 19:48 on the same day and indicated to the operator that there were police at his door, that he had a mistrust of police and was afraid for his life, and that police had abused him in 2008. He provided his location at 2750 Carousel Crescent. He indicated that he had immunity from any questions, that he was recovering and that he had been attacked. He asked for a few provisions and some eggs and indicated that Canada had been unfair to him.

26Ottawa Police conducted a search of Mr. Ismail’s apartment on May 10, 2023. Photographs of the search were taken and some of those photos depict the glove that Mr. Ismail is seen wearing on the elevator in his building around the time of the murder of Mr. Bryant. The gloves were on top of the back of a chair in his living room. The backpack that Mr. Ismail is seen carrying during the same elevator ride and shortly before entering the elevator was also found in his apartment and depicts visible red staining on the top of the backpack, the straps and inside the backpack. The Center for Forensic Science concluded that this was Mr. Bryant’s blood. The backpack also contained a black plastic knife guard.

The Interview of Mr. Ismail by Det. McEwen

27The parties also submitted a summary of some of the prevalent themes from the interview between Mr. Ismail and Det. McEwen, which paralleled his call to 911 on the night of May 9, 2023.

28Mr. Ismail was interviewed by Det. McEwen on May 10, 2023. During the police interview, Mr. Ismail indicated, as he did when he called 911 the previous evening, that he is wary of the police and has very little faith in them, stating that horrible things happened to him and that he suffered many misfortunes publicly at Parliament. He indicated that he felt like his chest might collapse and he had not yet recovered from his previous misfortunes. He indicated that he was scared of the police and, while being transported, was having flashbacks to past misfortunes that he thought he had moved past. He discussed his family and the manner in which they mistreated him, claiming he had been treated “like Cinderella”, and said of his “disloyal” family that “they are my enemies”. He also said that the police had been following him for the last 30 years and that there were many calls that came in and “spilled onto the street”.

29Mr. Ismail indicated that there is a lot he did not recall about the previous day, May 9, from between the time he had his breakfast and up to the time police came to his door and he called his brother for food. He generally expressed confusion. He recalled talking to police that night, that he indicated he did not have to answer their questions, that he had immunity and perceived them as a threat, and that he asked them for eggs and milk, which they never delivered. This lack of memory persisted throughout the interview. Mr. Ismail spoke about how he had been wronged by his family over the last 30 years, his lack of memory of what happened over those years, and that he would not be totally honest with Det. McEwen because Canada is a failed nation he was his “best salvation”. He acknowledged that some police officers are honest but they are “shoulder to shoulder” with those who are not, referencing the past abuse he suffered. He expressed a mistrust and a lack of faith in the police. Mr. Ismail indicated that he suffered a misfortune and was sexually assaulted in 2008, and that there were many people involved who were wrong for sexually assaulting him.

30Mr. Ismail continued to discuss his mistrust of his family. The interview is very disjointed. He alleged that he was sexually assaulted not just by Mr. Bryant but by his disloyal family. Mr. Ismail reiterated repeatedly his mistrust of his family, his fear and wariness of the police and the abuse he suffered years ago. He indicated that he had not murdered anyone and that he had no memory.

Legal Analysis

31The issue for the court to decide is whether Mr. Ismail has established on a balance of probabilities that he was suffering from a mental disorder that either rendered him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his act or of knowing that what he did on May 9, 2023, was wrong.

32The term “mental disorder” is defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code as a “disease of the mind”. The term mental disorder is to be given a broad and liberal construction, embracing any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning, excluding, however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion. In order to support a defence of insanity, the disease must be sufficiently intense to render the accused person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the violent act, or of knowing it was wrong: Cooper v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 1149, at pp. 1156, 1159.

33Dr. Watts diagnosed Mr. Ismail with schizophrenia, alcohol and cannabis use disorder, and unspecified trauma and stressor-related disorder.

34Schizophrenia is a disease of the mind as defined by s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

35Having found that Mr. Ismail’s diagnosis of schizophrenia constitutes a mental disorder, I turn to the question of whether Mr. Ismail’s diagnosis of schizophrenia rendered him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the offence in question. This branch of the section 16 test deals with whether the accused was able to appreciate the physical nature, character and consequences of his actions at the time of the offence: R. v. Minassian, 2021 ONSC 1258, 401 C.C.C. (3d) 123, at para. 26.

36If, by virtue of the mental disorder, the accused did not appreciate what he was doing, he cannot be convicted of the offence as it “really was not his act”: Schwartz v. The Queen, 1976 165 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 673, at p. 700.

37Dr. Watts concluded that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Mr. Ismail could not appreciate the nature, character and consequences of his actions.

38The next question deals with whether Mr. Ismail’s mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his acts were wrong at the time of the offence.

39The wrongfulness analysis must consider whether the accused lacked the capacity to apply the knowledge of wrongfulness in a rational way. The Supreme Court in R. v. Oommen, 1994 101 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507, at p. 518, described the analysis as follows:

The crux of the inquiry is whether the accused lacks the capacity to rationally decide whether the act is right or wrong and hence to make a rational choice about whether to do it or not. The inability to make a rational choice may result from a variety of mental dysfunctions; as the following passages indicate these include at a minimum the states to which the psychiatrists testified in this case—delusions which make the accused perceive an act which is wrong as right or justifiable, and a disordered condition of the mind which deprives the accused of the ability to rationally evaluate what he is doing.

40Criminal responsibility will only follow where it can be said that the accused committed the act voluntarily, and in order to have acted voluntarily, his act must be a product of his own free will. Criminal responsibility for the act can only occur where the accused can distinguish right from wrong and display the requisite level of autonomy and rationality to attract criminal liability: R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 575, at para. 49.

41The concept of “moral wrongfulness” was established in R v. Chaulk, 1990 34 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303. The focus is not on whether the accused lacked the general capacity to know right from wrong, but rather on whether he or she is deprived—by reason of a mental disorder (including, in some cases, delusions)—of the capacity to know the particular act is right or wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people: Oommen, at pp. 516-20.

42As Doherty J.A., noted in R. v. Dobson, 2018 ONCA 589, at para. 24:

Oomen, as interpreted in the judgments of this court, holds that an accused who has the capacity to know that society regards his actions as morally wrong and proceeds to commit those acts cannot be said to lack the capacity to know right from wrong. As a result, he is not NCR, even if he believed that he had no choice but to act, or that his acts were justified. However, an accused who, through the distorted lens of his mental illness, sees his conduct as justified, not only according to his own view, but also according to the norms of society, lacks the capacity to know that his act is wrong. That accused has an NCR defence. Similarly, an accused who, on account of mental disorder, lacks the capacity to assess the wrongness of his conduct against societal norms lacks the capacity to know his act is wrong and is entitled to an NCR defence.

43This approach to the analysis of knowledge of wrongfulness was recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Worrie, 2022 ONCA 471, 415 C.C.C. (3d) 45, and R. v. Bharwani, 2023 ONCA 203, 166 O.R. (3d) 1, at para 230, aff’d 2025 SCC 26, 450 C.C.C. (3d) 143.

44As a result, and in light of the new and better evidence lead in this matter, the court is now in position to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Ismail did not, owing to a disease of the mind, in this case schizophrenia, appreciate the moral wrongfulness of killing Mr. Bryant.

45The court appreciates that calling this additional evidence required time and delayed the adjudication of this matter. However, given the gravity of the offence in this case, the court must be in a position to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Ismail was not legally culpable for taking Mr. Bryant’s life on a proper record, even where the parties proceeded on consent.

46In summary, the issue of the relationship between these two men was central to the issue the court had to decide. There was evidence that Mr. Bryant and Mr. Ismail were friends. There was also circumstantial evidence that the relationship may not have been strictly platonic. This may or may not have been evidence of a possible motive. The presence or absence of motive is relevant to the issue of NCR, as the presence of motive militates against a finding of NCR. However, the record of the available evidence on this issue needed to be fully and fairly aired through cross-examination, which it was upon the appointment of amicus.

47I found that it was critical to my assessment of the expert’s opinion that certain contradictory evidence needed to be explained to the trier of fact. The court also required a more complete examination of evidence from Mr. Ismail’s statement to Det. McEwen—specifically with regard to his knowledge of wrongfulness—even if Mr. Ismail was experiencing psychosis at the time of the incident. See R v. Campione, 2015 ONCA 67, 321 C.C.C. (3d) 63; Bharwani (ONCA), at paras. 64, 230-232; and Oommen, at p. 518, all cases which discuss the fact that an individual may be in a state of psychosis and not be found to be NCR.

48Further, the evidence of the video statement was the best evidence of Mr. Ismail’s state of mind in the immediate aftermath of killing Mr. Bryant. It should have been reviewed by Dr. Watts prior to interviewing Mr. Ismail, since it contained evidence relevant to the issue of motive. The summary was incomplete and inadequate and was not reviewed by Dr. Watts prior to interviewing Mr. Ismail.

49While it was patently obvious to Dr. Watts that Mr. Ismail was NCR without a review of that video, it is the court that must be satisfied. The fact that Dr. Watts found it obvious that Mr. Ismail was NCR does not relieve the court of the necessity of assessing the evidence upon which that expert opinion is based.

50The court cannot abdicate its role as fact finder and simply attorn to the opinion of an expert: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275.

51As Tulloch C.J.O. pointed out recently, all justice system participants have a responsibility to guard against the risks of miscarriages of justice even in cases involving highly experienced expert witnesses. Judges are the last line of defence: R v. Hason, 2024 ONCA 369, 171 O.R. (3d) 225, at para. 1.

52However, at this point, all of the issues which were troubling at first instance have now been satisfactorily addressed.

53I am satisfied that Mr. Ismail is NCR and disposition of this matter is deferred to the Ontario Review Board.

Anne London-Weinstein J.

Released: March 24, 2026