Marie Dufort

The applicant, accused of fatally stabbing his son, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from being adduced at trial.

He argued the dated record would cause undue prejudice and lead to improper propensity reasoning by the jury.

The Crown opposed, noting the applicant's credibility was central and he had already introduced parts of his record and attacked the victim's character.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's credibility was crucial and a properly instructed jury could use the criminal record for its limited purpose.

The applicant, charged with the second degree murder of his son, brought a mid-trial Scopelliti application to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The applicant sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased, including incidents unknown to the applicant, to support a claim of self-defence.

The court held that evidence of the deceased's disposition for violence unknown to the accused is only admissible if there is some other appreciable evidence that the deceased was the aggressor on the occasion in question.

Finding no such appreciable evidence at the time of the stabbing, the court limited the admissible evidence to incidents known to the applicant and observations of their relationship by specific witnesses, while excluding the deceased's entire criminal record and incidents unknown to the applicant.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence to support a claim of self-defence analogous to battered spouse syndrome.

The proposed expert opined that the accused's actions fit the idea of a pre-emptive homicide as self-defence.

The court excluded this portion of the expert's opinion, finding it unnecessary, beyond the expert's qualifications, and liable to usurp the jury's function in assessing the accused's state of mind and the reasonableness of his actions under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.

The accused pleaded guilty to two bank robberies committed in Montreal and Ottawa and to using an imitation firearm during the Montreal robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors including planning, threats of violence, and the accused’s extensive criminal record for similar offences, as well as mitigating factors such as guilty pleas and delay in transferring charges between jurisdictions.

Sentencing principles of proportionality, totality, denunciation, and deterrence were applied alongside the mandatory consecutive minimum sentence under s. 85 of the Criminal Code.

The court determined a global sentence of eight years was just and appropriate.

Enhanced credit of 1.5:1 was granted for presentence custody pursuant to s. 719(3.1) and the principles in Summers.

Following a jury conviction for sexual interference involving a 12‑year‑old complainant, the court proceeded to sentence after staying a sexual assault conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The offence involved a brief incident in which the accused sexually touched and kissed a child while alone in a residence.

The court considered denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for sexual offences against children, while also weighing rehabilitation due to the offender’s youth, impulsivity issues, and low assessed risk of recidivism.

Aggravating factors included the complainant’s age, the power imbalance between the adult offender and the child, and the psychological impact on the complainant.

The accused was sentenced to six months’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation with multiple conditions, along with ancillary orders including a s. 161 prohibition, DNA order, SOIRA registration, and weapons prohibition.

The accused faced 22 charges involving seven different female complainants, including sexual assault, unlawful confinement, theft, mischief, and criminal harassment.

The accused targeted intoxicated women in the Ottawa market area, offering them rides in his vehicle, taking them to his apartment, and stealing their cell phones.

He subsequently used the stolen phones to harass the victims and others.

The court applied the W.(D.) test to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's testimony as unreliable and contradictory.

The accused was found guilty on 20 of the 22 counts, with the court finding that he unlawfully confined and sexually assaulted multiple victims, stole their property, and engaged in persistent criminal harassment.

The Crown sought admission of cross-count similar fact evidence in a multi-count indictment involving allegations of sexual assault, forcible confinement, theft, and criminal harassment involving several complainants.

Identity was admitted by the accused, leaving actus reus, modus operandi, and complainant credibility as live issues.

Applying the governing test from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court found striking contextual similarities across several complainants, including circumstances involving intoxicated victims, use of a vehicle, loss of personal property, and subsequent communications from the accused.

Most of the requested similar fact evidence was admitted, subject to limited exceptions where the nexus between incidents was insufficient.

In a criminal trial, the Crown brought a motion seeking admission of a witness’s prior e-mail statement as past recollection recorded.

The witness had no present memory of certain events but confirmed she had authored the statement and believed it to be truthful when made.

The court applied the four-part test for past recollection recorded evidence set out in R. v. Fliss and affirmed in appellate authority.

Despite a three‑week delay between the incident and the creation of the statement, and defence arguments regarding possible tainting through discussions with others, the court found the record reliable, made within a reasonable time, and vouched for by the witness.

The statement was therefore admitted as evidence.

On a voir dire, the court considered whether a lengthy videotaped police interview of the accused was voluntary and admissible under the common law confessions rule.

The defence argued that the interview involved oppressive circumstances and inducements and that the statement should alternatively be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter for breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court applied the framework in R. v. Oickle and examined the entire context of the interrogation, including duration, questioning techniques, and the accused’s conduct during the interview.

The court found the interview was not oppressive and that the accused generally retained control over what information he shared.

However, certain comments by police suggesting that speaking could affect which charges were pursued created a quid pro quo inducement raising a reasonable doubt about voluntariness for statements made thereafter.

The court admitted the portion of the interview up to a specified point in the transcript and excluded the remainder.