Mash Frouhar

The Crown brought a bail review application under s. 521 of the Criminal Code, seeking to vacate a release order and have a bail hearing de novo for the respondent, Brandon Van Allen.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to address submissions regarding the surety's contradictory evidence and gaps in the supervision plan (secondary grounds), and by unduly focusing on triable issues and the respondent's non-participation in an altercation when assessing public confidence (tertiary grounds).

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the Justice of the Peace properly applied the test for release, assessed the surety's credibility, and was entitled to deference in her determinations, concluding that no error in law occurred.

The accused, Hussein Assaad and Jason Ishraki, brought an application under Section 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay for Assaad was over 26 months and for Ishraki over 30 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued complexity and the COVID-19 pandemic as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that while the case had some hallmarks of complexity, the primary cause of delay was the Crown and police's chosen method of disclosure triage, not inherent complexity.

The court also found the pandemic did not justify the extent of the delay.

The proceedings against both accused were stayed.

The accused, a professional truck driver, was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The accused's tractor trailer collided with stopped or slowed traffic at 104 km/h without braking until a fraction of a second before impact.

The court found that the accused failed to respond to visual cues, including flashing lights and brake lights, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person, particularly a professional driver.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The court issued a trial management endorsement to address the resumption of a criminal trial that was adjourned due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused is charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

The court ordered that the balance of the Crown's non-expert witnesses will testify via Zoom, while expert witnesses will testify in person at a later date.

The endorsement sets out detailed procedures for document sharing, witness management, and virtual courtroom etiquette.

Three defendants were charged with twelve offences arising from a shooting incident at a strip mall parking lot in Ottawa on September 1, 2018.

The Crown alleged that Haji Ragab was the shooter, Paraparan was the driver of the getaway vehicle, and Hope was a passenger.

All three were charged with various firearm-related offences.

The trial judge found that while the Crown proved the three defendants were in the vehicle at the scene, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Haji Ragab was the shooter or that Paraparan was the driver.

Critically, the Crown also failed to prove that any defendant possessed the firearm, as the weapon was never recovered and the Crown could not establish that the item used was a firearm as defined by the Criminal Code.

All charges were dismissed against all defendants.

John McRae was found guilty of second-degree murder of his son, Michael McRae.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, considering the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury's recommendation.

Aggravating factors included the abuse of a position of trust and the brutal nature of the murder.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age and health.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 12 years, balancing deterrence, denunciation, and the specific circumstances.

The applicant, accused of fatally stabbing his son, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from being adduced at trial.

He argued the dated record would cause undue prejudice and lead to improper propensity reasoning by the jury.

The Crown opposed, noting the applicant's credibility was central and he had already introduced parts of his record and attacked the victim's character.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's credibility was crucial and a properly instructed jury could use the criminal record for its limited purpose.

The applicant, charged with the second degree murder of his son, brought a mid-trial Scopelliti application to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The applicant sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased, including incidents unknown to the applicant, to support a claim of self-defence.

The court held that evidence of the deceased's disposition for violence unknown to the accused is only admissible if there is some other appreciable evidence that the deceased was the aggressor on the occasion in question.

Finding no such appreciable evidence at the time of the stabbing, the court limited the admissible evidence to incidents known to the applicant and observations of their relationship by specific witnesses, while excluding the deceased's entire criminal record and incidents unknown to the applicant.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence to support a claim of self-defence analogous to battered spouse syndrome.

The proposed expert opined that the accused's actions fit the idea of a pre-emptive homicide as self-defence.

The court excluded this portion of the expert's opinion, finding it unnecessary, beyond the expert's qualifications, and liable to usurp the jury's function in assessing the accused's state of mind and the reasonableness of his actions under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.

During a jury trial, the Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness claimed to have no memory of conversations and events that he had previously detailed in a police statement.

The court found the witness's claim of memory loss was not credible, noting he could recall other significant details from the same day.

The court granted the application, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the witness on the prior statement.

The accused, Jose Herrera, was charged with possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault with a weapon, and aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

The court found Herrera not guilty of possession of a knife for a dangerous purpose due to insufficient evidence that a knife specifically was used.

However, he was found guilty of assault with a weapon (a sharp-edged object) and aggravated assault.

The defense of self-defense was rejected as lacking an "air of reality," given that Herrera initiated both altercations and there was no evidence of force or threat from the complainant prior to the stabbing.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases following a preliminary inquiry as per R. v. Jordan.

The court identified 13 months of defence-caused delay, including unavailability of counsel, re-election for a preliminary inquiry, conflict of interest by original counsel, and rejection of earlier trial dates.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that they took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement of a 14-year-old complainant.

The complainant accompanied the accused on an overnight trip to Ottawa, where they shared a hotel room.

The complainant alleged the accused insisted she sleep in his bed and subsequently touched her breast and belly for a sexual purpose.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's testimony as unreliable and contradictory.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated by circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault, while the unlawful confinement charge was withdrawn.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision determining whether there is sufficient evidence to commit seven accused persons to stand trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and unlawful entry arising from a brutal attack on the victim in the early morning hours of November 17, 2013.

The Crown's theory is that the attack was undertaken in retaliation for an assault on the brother of one of the accused the previous day.

The court applies the prima facie case standard, examining whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of each charge.

The decision addresses complex issues regarding the mens rea of attempted murder, the admissibility of hearsay statements, the evaluation of circumstantial identification evidence, and the requirements for party liability.

The Crown brought a section 540(7) application seeking to admit witness statements as evidence at a preliminary inquiry without requiring the witnesses to testify.

The application involved four key witnesses: Jessica Walker, Samantha Daoust, Mark Sudiacal, and Jason Klein.

The Crown sought to admit their statements under the Criminal Code provision that permits justices to receive evidence that would not otherwise be admissible if the justice considers it credible or trustworthy.

The court admitted the statements of Daoust, Sudiacal, and Klein, as well as the videotaped statements of Walker, but excluded Walker's off-camera statement recorded in police notes.

The decision provides comprehensive guidance on the interpretation and application of section 540(7).

The Crown sought reconsideration of a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling denying a section 540(7) application to file transcripts of witness statements.

The initial judge had rejected the application as inadequately presented and lacking sufficient grounding.

The Crown subsequently renewed the application with a fuller record.

The presiding judge ruled that reconsideration was permissible, finding that the initial ruling was not a final determination on the merits of section 540(7) admissibility but rather a rejection of the application as presented.

The judge held that interlocutory evidentiary rulings can be reconsidered where there is no prejudice to the defence and where the interests of justice support reconsideration, particularly in preliminary inquiries where evidentiary errors cannot be appealed.