Mark Edward Ertel

The prosecution alleged a police sergeant unlawfully entered and searched a private apartment, directed arrests and detention, and later altered an official occurrence report to fabricate grounds for entry.

The court found no lawful grounds, no exigent circumstances, and no fresh-pursuit basis, and accepted evidence that the impugned narrative was inserted after the fact.

Applying the breach-of-trust framework, the court held the conduct was a marked departure from expected standards and was undertaken for personal, non-public purposes.

The court also found the report-editing and related falsehoods proved obstruct justice beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The accused brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of General Warrants and Search Warrants executed in a drug trafficking investigation.

The General Warrants, issued for covert surveillance of two residential locations, failed to include the statutorily required notice provision under section 487.01(5.1) of the Criminal Code, constituting a facial invalidity and breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Search Warrants were subsequently obtained using information derived from the facially invalid General Warrants.

The court found that while the General Warrants were facially invalid due to the missing notice provision, the Search Warrants could otherwise have been issued based on the totality of the evidence, including amplified tracking data.

The court also addressed allegations of arbitrary detention and breach of the right to counsel.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the Charter applications, finding that despite the breaches, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under the section 24(2) analysis.

This decision addresses the application to exclude evidence seized during a warrantless search conducted under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act (CCA).

The police officer stopped the accused for a traffic violation and observed a cannabis vape pen in the vehicle, which he believed constituted reasonable grounds to conduct a search.

The Court found that the vape pen is paraphernalia and not cannabis itself, and that the officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds to conduct the search without further investigation.

The Court also found a breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter right due to delay in informing him of his right to counsel.

Balancing the factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Court excluded the evidence due to serious Charter breaches despite the good faith of the officer.

The court considered an application by the Attorney General of Canada on behalf of France for the extradition of Prasanna Nallalingam to stand trial in France for murder and attempted murder.

The court found that a properly instructed jury could conclude that Nallalingam possessed the requisite mens rea for manslaughter and assault causing bodily harm, based on circumstantial evidence of his planning, provision of weapons, and command of the attack.

The committal order was granted under the Extradition Act.

The court considered whether to exercise its discretion to grant pre-charge Charter relief in the form of a declaration that the seizure of items by police during a criminal investigation was in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The Applicants, Eastway Tank Pump and Meter Ltd. and Neil Greene, had not been charged with a criminal offence but were under investigation following a fatal explosion.

The court reviewed the factual background, the parties' positions, and relevant case law on the availability of certiorari and declaratory relief prior to the laying of charges.

Ultimately, the court declined to exercise its discretion to grant the relief at this stage, finding the Charter issues best left to the trial judge, but left open the possibility of renewal if charges are not laid within a reasonable time and further evidence of reputational harm is provided.

The court considered whether an ante mortem statement by Emma Roy, made to Christopher Prieur two days before her death in a car accident, was admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown sought to admit the statement to show prior discreditable conduct by the accused, Kyle Trepanier.

The court found that the statement did not meet the threshold reliability requirement, as the circumstances did not negate the possibility of untruthfulness or mistake.

The application was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned the defendant, Cory Leclair, who was charged with illegal possession of a firearm and being an accessory after the fact to discharging a firearm.

The charges stemmed from an altercation where Jamie Labelle, a companion of the defendant, brandished a handgun.

The Crown alleged Leclair took the bag containing the firearm from Labelle and hid it.

The court found the defendant guilty of illegal possession of a prohibited firearm (counts 4 and 8), concluding that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial video evidence was that the defendant knew the gun was in the bag when he took possession of it.

However, the court found the defendant not guilty of being an accessory after the fact to discharging a firearm (count 9), as there was reasonable doubt whether Labelle had actually fired the weapon, despite some witness testimony.

Randall Hillier, charged with multiple offences related to the "Freedom Convoy," sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was approximately 34 months and 28 days.

The court deducted 65 days for defence-caused delay (counsel's refusal to attend a pretrial conference) and 40 days for exceptional circumstances (Supreme Court's Haevischer decision requiring re-hearing of a motion).

The net delay of 31 months and 13 days still exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling, leading the court to grant the application and stay the charges.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, willfully altering computer data, and making available intimate images without consent, stemming from a "revenge porn" incident.

He appealed his convictions on three grounds: that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in concluding guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principles of burden of proof, did not misapprehend the evidence given the strong circumstantial case, and was entitled to find the appellant's text messages constituted implied admissions.

The Crown sought an adjournment of a criminal trial continuation due to the unavailability of a key witness.

The defendant opposed the application, arguing the Crown failed to meet the "laches or neglect" prong of the R. v. Darville test.

The court found that the Crown's office was negligent in failing to notify the police of the continuation date until six days prior, attributing this to a systemic resourcing issue where one person was responsible for all subpoenas.

Despite acknowledging resource constraints, the court held that such deficiencies cannot imperil a defendant's rights.

The application for adjournment was dismissed.

The appellant, Abigail Morris, appealed her conviction for sexual interference (sexual assault conviction stayed under Kienapple principle) involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The appeal challenged whether voluntariness requires subjective consent of the accused, the admissibility of prior sexual communications (Seaboyer application), reliance on myths and stereotypes, and the use of context evidence to infer voluntariness.

The court dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's premise that voluntariness equates to subjective consent of the accused.

It found no error in admitting the prior sexual communications, nor in the trial judge's determination of voluntariness, which was based on the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statements, not on myths or stereotypes.

The appellant, Kensky Dautruche, appealed two convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the validity of a vehicle search incident to arrest for flight from police under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the trial judge's inference regarding the appellant's possession of cocaine found outside the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the search was a valid search incident to arrest, as the officer had a reasonable subjective belief that the search might uncover evidence explaining the flight.

The court also determined that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial judge's inference of possession of the second bag of cocaine, finding it to be the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant, J.Y.L., appealed his conviction for historical sexual offenses involving a complainant, D.H., arguing that the trial judge erred by not determining the physical possibility of the assault as described and by focusing solely on credibility over reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence despite minor inconsistencies, especially given the significant passage of time since the incident.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to section 14 of the Security of Information Act, which criminalizes the unauthorized communication of special operational information by persons permanently bound to secrecy.

The challenge argued that the term "without authority" was unconstitutionally vague, violating section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the term was not vague when interpreted in its statutory context, particularly for the specific class of individuals to whom it applies.

It clarified that "without authority" pertains to the actus reus of the offence, meaning the power or right to act, derived from one's official position or a superior's grant of authority.

The accused, Akram Elmuradi, was charged with sexual assault.

The defence conceded sexual activity but argued consent, explicitly not relying on mistaken belief in consent.

The case hinged on the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The court found the accused engaged in deceitful conduct to create an opportunity for sexual activity, exploiting the complainant's trust and vulnerability as a client seeking therapeutic massage.

The complainant's testimony regarding lack of consent was accepted, and the accused's account was deemed implausible and incredible.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent and that the accused knew the sexual contact was unwanted.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused, Cameron Ortis, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act, arguing that non-disclosure of highly classified information by the Crown compromised his right to a fair trial and full answer and defence.

The court dismissed counts 5 to 8 of the indictment, finding that the prohibited classified information was of immense importance to Ortis's defence regarding the mens rea element of those charges, making the national security interests and fair trial rights irreconcilable.

However, the court denied the stay for counts 1 to 4, 9, and 10, determining that the non-disclosure did not sufficiently impact Ortis's ability to present his defence for those charges.

This is an appeal from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned an acquittal in a sexual assault case and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant, finding reasonable doubt regarding consent and the alleged initial assault, partly due to an inconsistency in the complainant's evidence and the public nature of the alleged act.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) allowed the Crown's appeal, concluding the trial judge engaged in "myth-based reasoning" and erred in finding consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appellant's appeal, restoring the acquittal.

The Court found the SCAJ erred by substituting its own factual conclusions, mischaracterizing the trial judge's reasoning as "myth-based," and failing to distinguish between a finding of lack of consent and a finding of reasonable doubt about consent.

The Court also noted the SCAJ's failure to apply the material error test required for Crown appeals from acquittal.

The court addressed whether it lost jurisdiction over a trial when the accused was disconnected from a virtual hearing for 15 minutes during evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

The court considered the right to be present at trial, the less formal nature of summary conviction proceedings, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on court operations.

The judge ruled against declaring a mistrial, finding that alternative remedies, such as providing the accused with a transcript and recording of the missed evidence and resuming the trial in person, could cure any prejudice and ensure a fair trial.

The appellant, H.K., appealed convictions for various sexual assault offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting evidence on consent and that the global sentence of three years was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal at the outset.

Regarding the conviction appeal, the appellant contended the trial judge's credibility assessment was piecemeal and failed to resolve inconsistencies.

The Court, applying principles from R. v. G.F., affirmed the heightened deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings.

It found that the trial judge conducted a thorough and nuanced analysis, explaining which parts of the complainant's evidence were accepted or found unreliable, and considering corroborating evidence.

The Court concluded there was no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal from convictions.