Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-22-G-11401655
Date: September 2, 2025
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

His Majesty The King (Crown)

and

Brayden Sangster (Accused)

and

Morgan Thompson (Accused)

Counsel:

• Colleen Liggett and Liliia Vorontsova, for the Crown
• Mark Ertel, for Brayden Sangster
• James Coulter, for Morgan Thompson

Heard: February 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7; March 10 and 11; May 5; and June 24, 2025 (Ottawa)

Decision on The Charter Application

DOYLE J.

Overview

[1] Brayden Sangster and Morgan Thompson are jointly charged that on July 13, 2022, they did unlawfully, for the purpose of trafficking, possess cocaine contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 ("CDSA").

[2] Mr. Sangster is further charged that on July 13, 2022, he possessed proceeds of property (i.e. money of over $5,000) contrary to s. 355 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 ("Code").

[3] The affiant, Det. Matthew Cox, relied on information from a confidential informer ("CI") in the Information to Obtain ("ITO") he submitted to obtain two General Warrants dated May 27, 2022 (individually, the "General Warrant"; together, the "General Warrants"). It allowed access to common areas at two separate locations for covert surveillance that were connected to Mr. Sangster. These locations were 220 Lebreton Street ("220 Lebreton") and 340 McLeod Street ("340 McLeod") (also referred to as the "two locations").

[4] Neither accused challenges the grounds for the issuance of the General Warrants permitting the covert surveillance of Mr. Sangster at two locations.

[5] The General Warrants failed to include the notice provisions required pursuant to s. 487.01(5.1) of the Code that requires notice of covert operations to the target after a prescribed period of time. The Crown acknowledges the breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter") but argues that the breach is inconsequential.

[6] Surveillance of Mr. Sangster occurred over the months of May, June, and July 2022 by various members of the Ottawa Police Service ("OPS") Drug Unit.

[7] Pursuant to the General Warrants, members of the OPS Drug Unit entered the common areas and hallways of the two locations to identify the unit numbers associated with Mr. Sangster.

[8] Pursuant to a tracking warrant dated May 27, 2022, the OPS Drug Unit was able to conduct surveillance of Mr. Sangster's vehicle and tracked his vehicle on various trips he made from the two locations, including trips out of Ottawa to Mattawa and Toronto.

[9] On July 6, 2022, two Search Warrants pursuant to s. 11 of the CDSA (individually, the "Search Warrant"; together, the "Search Warrants") were issued to search for and seize any controlled substances or anything involving the drug trade from the specified units in the two locations.

[10] On July 13, 2022, the Search Warrant was executed at 220 Lebreton, Unit 8 ("8-220 Lebreton"), which had been discerned to be Mr. Sangster's residence, and the OPS seized, among other things, cash, which the OPS identified as proceeds from crime.

[11] On the same day, in the execution of the Search Warrant at 340 McLeod, Unit 750 ("750-340 McLeod"), the OPS arrested Ms. Thompson and seized, among other things, over two kilograms of cocaine.

[12] The defence have brought an application under the Charter for exclusion of the evidence, which includes drugs and proceeds from crime, pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, on the basis that s. 8 Charter rights were breached. Ms. Thompson also alleges that her s. 9 and s. 10 Charter rights were breached.

[13] The trial proceeded in a hybrid trial/voir dire format. The defence did not call evidence at the voir dire.

Defence Position

[14] Both accused allege that there were breaches of s. 8 Charter rights. Specifically:

• There was a facial deficiency in the General Warrants as they failed to include the notice provision required under s. 487.01(5.1) of the Code and the General Warrants involved covert techniques requiring this notice;

• The facially invalid General Warrants permitted officers to access the common areas of their properties, take still images, and park their vehicles on the properties;

• If the evidence gathered regarding the specific units from the General Warrants is excised from the ITO for the Search Warrants, then the Search Warrants could not have issued; and

• There were no reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be found at the one of the locations (340 McLeod) identified in the warrants.

[15] In addition, Ms. Thompson alleges that her ss. 9 and 10 Charter rights were breached as:

• She was arbitrarily detained when she was arrested immediately upon the police entering her apartment at 750-340 McLeod Street, and that mere occupation does not create a presumption that she was involved in trafficking. The police had no reasonable and probable grounds to arrest her, therefore she was arbitrarily detained; and

• There was a delay in the police providing both the informational and implementational components of her right to counsel, and consequently, there was a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter rights.

[16] The defence requests that the evidence seized be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter as the court should not associate itself with conduct that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[17] The defence vehemently opposes the Crown's request to amplify the ITO to include the tracking data that the affiant neglected to include the ITO. This is not a technical or minor error made in good faith and the Crown cannot use this opportunity to expand the grounds set out in the ITO in the reviewing stage. The court should not permit the Crown to retroactively add information that could have been included and that the affiant failed to do so.

Position of the Crown

[18] The Crown submits that the accused bear the onus of establishing the unreasonableness of any search performed under a presumptively valid court order. R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, at pp. 277-8.

[19] The Crown conceded that reference to 750-340 McLeod and 8-220 Lebreton units must be excised from the ITO for the Search Warrants because of the facial invalidity of the General Warrants for covert surveillance: R. v. Zacharias, 2023 SCC 30, at paras. 30-35 and 40-45. The facial invalidity of the General Warrants arises from the failure to include a notice of the covert entry and search.

[20] The Crown further concedes that the excision of the unit numbers from the ITO to obtain the Search Warrants would mean that there was no place for the police to execute the warrant. However, the Crown submits that the warrant was otherwise valid as there were grounds for the issuing justice to execute the Search Warrants and search the 340 McLeod location.

[21] The Crown seeks to amplify the ITO for the Search Warrant with the tracking information set out in Exhibit 3.

[22] The affiant, Det. Cox, was aware of and had knowledge of the tracking data but had omitted to include all of the data. Some of the tracking information is alluded to in the ITO. The amplification to include the other tracking information would correct the minor drafting error made by the affiant.

[23] The tracking evidence provides information of Mr. Sangster's vehicle attending frequently at the McLeod location.

[24] The accused, Ms. Thompson, must establish that her arrest was arbitrary and that her right to counsel was breached. The Crown argues that Ms. Thompson's s. 9 Charter right were not infringed as the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest her.

[25] Additionally, the Crown argues Ms. Thompson's s. 10(b) rights were provided in a timely fashion and no information was elicited from her before her s. 10(b) rights were extended.

[26] Finally, the Crown submits that the defence has failed to establish that the admission of evidence under the s. 24(2) analysis would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Evidence

Undisputed Facts

[27] Counsel have agreed, among other things, on the following facts set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts.

[28] Mr. Sangster was under surveillance pursuant to the General Warrants on May 11 and 19 and June 6, 8 and 14, 2022, by members of the OPS Drug Unit.

[29] The Search Warrant for 8-220 Lebreton was executed on July 13, 2022, which the Crown maintains was Mr. Sangster's address at the time. The OPS Drug Unit and Tactical Unit then proceeded to 750-340 McLeod and arrested Ms. Thompson at that residence.

[30] The parties also agree that, among other things, the OPS seized:

• Over two kilograms of cocaine;

• $22,900 CAD and $340 USD; and

• A white Honda with an Ontario license plate, CLWL 554, registered under Mr. Sangster.

[31] I will now set out the evidence gathered from the various members of the OPS who were involved in the matter.

Evidence from the OPS Drug Unit

Detective Aristidis Tasoulis

[32] Det. Tasoulis has been with the OPS for 20 years and with the Drug Unit since January 2020.

[33] He was assigned to the surveillance of Mr. Sangster pursuant to the General Warrants.

[34] There were eight members of his Drug Unit. They developed investigative plans as a group, had ongoing discussions during the investigation, and planned how to execute the Search Warrants and effect the take down. The lead investigator was Det. Lehman.

[35] On May 18, 2022, he observed Mr. Sangster looking out of a window of the third floor of the Lebreton Street apartment building.

[36] Det. Tasoulis later observed Mr. Sangster leaving the building, placing his satchel in the rear driver side of his vehicle, entering the vehicle, and leaving the parking lot.

[37] On June 5, 2022, he received information from the tracking device that Mr. Sangster's vehicle was returning to Ottawa. Mr. Sangster stopped at a private parking lot, removed a black bag from the vehicle's trunk and went into the west side door entrance of 220 Lebreton. This was captured on a 20-second video.

[38] On June 8, 2022, the surveillance of the tracker on Mr. Sangster's vehicle disclosed that Mr. Sangster was heading westbound on Highway 7 and was exiting at Deep River Road.

[39] Mr. Sangster later arrived at a parking lot at St. Laurent Mall, parked his car and went into the mall at 17:15. At 17:31, Mr. Sangster's vehicle arrived and parked at 220 Lebreton. Mr. Sangster was observed having a satchel over his shoulder entering 220 Lebreton.

[40] On July 13, 2022, Det. Tasoulis was involved in the surveillance of Mr. Sangster's vehicle. At 11:01, Mr. Sangster was spotted on Bronson Avenue at a gas station. Det. Tasoulis then followed Mr. Sangster to 220 Lebreton, where he stopped at 12:20.

[41] Det. Tasoulis and other officers surrounded Mr. Sangster's vehicle and took his left arm. They asked him to exit the vehicle and told him that he was under arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

[42] The search incident to arrest netted an iPhone and keys. Mr. Sangster was then handed over to Neighbourhood Officer Nichols.

[43] At 12:42, Det. Tasoulis went to 8-220 Lebreton, which had been secured by the OPS Tactical Unit.

[44] At 12:52, he entered the 8-220 Lebreton and took a video of what it looked like when he arrived.

[45] In conducting a search of the bedroom, he found a safe with identification and money.

[46] Det. Renwick had the keys that had been turned over to him to open the safe.

[47] At 13:53, Det. Tasoulis made a post search video. He catalogued what was found which included $22,990 CAD and $340 USD.

[48] For the execution of the Search Warrant at 8-220 Lebreton, he was the exhibit officer who was responsible in collecting and processing all the evidence.

Detective Timothy Renwick

[49] Det. Renwick has been with the OPS Drug Unit since 2020. Prior to that, he was a patrol constable.

[50] The OPS Drug Unit conducted a surveillance on Mr. Sangster from May 11, 2022, to July 4, 2022. This was pursuant to the General Warrants, which relied on the information from a CI who gave information to a source handler indicating Mr. Sangster was involved in drug activities.

[51] Det. Renwick was involved in the surveillance of Mr. Sangster. He observed Mr. Sangster involved in what he perceived as drug deals.

[52] The surveillance reports contained at Appendix A of the ITO for the Search Warrants include surveillance of Mr. Sangster on May 11, 16, 18, 19 and June 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 22, 2022. Det. Renwick was involved on the following dates: May 16, 17, 18, 19 and June 5, 6, 8, 10, 22, 2022.

[53] On July 4, 2022, pursuant to the General Warrant, Det. Renwick entered the 220 Lebreton location, which he understood was Mr. Sangster's residence, to determine his unit number. Det. Renwick discovered this was unit #8.

[54] The OPS also obtained a tracking warrant that tracked Mr. Sangster's vehicle.

[55] Det. Renwick testified that the drug transactions he observed were short and involved meeting in or around a vehicle with the exchange of a bag.

[56] In one surveillance, Det. Renwick witnessed an individual meeting with Mr. Sangster and obtaining something from Mr. Sangster. After the meeting, the individual entered a white sedan and he was observed snorting cocaine.

[57] Det. Renwick was also involved in the takedown of Mr. Sangster in his vehicle on July 13, 2022. In the takedown, the OPS boxed in Mr. Sangster's vehicle so he could not flee.

[58] Mr. Sangster's girlfriend, Avery McNevin, was a passenger in the vehicle when Mr. Sangster was arrested. Det. Renwick was not involved in the arrest of Mr. Sangster or the detention of Ms. McNevin.

[59] Regarding training on the Charter, he does not recall receiving instruction to include any notice provision in the General Warrants similar to those needed for wiretap authorizations.

[60] Det. Renwick understood that the notice was required for wiretap authorizations but was not aware that it was required for a general warrant.

Acting Sergeant Liban Farah

[61] Sgt. Farah has been with the OPS Drug Unit since February 2022. He has been with the OPS since August 2013. He was a member of the surveillance team observing Mr. Sangster.

[62] On June 1, 2022, he was briefed by Det. Lehman about the surveillance of Mr. Sangster and that the objective was to gather intelligence of cocaine trafficking. There was a tracker on Mr. Sangster's vehicle, and they observed Mr. Sangster at the intersection of Gladstone Avenue and O'Connor Street in Ottawa.

[63] He observed Mr. Sangster arriving at the garage door at 340 McLeod and getting out of the car. Mr. Sangster approached, touched the keypad to the garage and the garage door opened. Mr. Sangster then returned inside his vehicle and drove into the underground garage.

[64] On June 5, 2022, at 00:32, the OPS Drug Unit noted that Mr. Sangster was returning to Ottawa. He had exited Highway 416 and parked in the parking area of Veterans' Commemorative Park. Mr. Sangster removed an item from his trunk and returned to his vehicle.

[65] At 01:02, Mr. Sangster parked in front of 110 Sherbrooke Avenue. Another vehicle, an Acura, who Sgt. Farah understood was owned by Evan Gillespie, arrived and parked directly behind Mr. Sangster's vehicle. Both drivers exited their respective vehicles and talked for about 20-30 seconds between the vehicles. At 01:04, both vehicles drove southbound on Sherbrooke Avenue.

[66] On June 6, 2022, at 12:01, Sgt. Farah observed Mr. Sangster leaving 220 Lebreton carrying a green reusable grocery bag that appeared weighted; that is, Sgt. Farah believed that the bag contained something.

[67] Mr. Sangster placed the bag in the trunk of his car and drove. At 13:36, Mr. Sangster arrived at the Korean Community Church at 384 Arlington Avenue and parked his car. A black Ford Focus pulled in behind his car.

[68] The driver of the Ford Focus entered Mr. Sangster's vehicle's passenger side and then returned to his car. Sgt. Farah observed what he believed to be a drug transaction.

[69] On June 10, 2022, at 16:57, he observed Mr. Sangster park at Railway Street. At 17:11, a grey Acura arrived and parked 20 feet from Mr. Sangster's vehicle. The driver of the Acura entered Mr. Sangster's vehicle's front passenger side and was there for six minutes. The individual then exited Mr. Sangster's vehicle, opened the trunk of the vehicle, and removed a green bag. The individual then entered the driver's side of the Acura.

[70] On July 13, 2022, Sgt. Farah was involved in the arrest of Mr. Sangster after Mr. Sangster's vehicle was spotted at 220 Lebreton at 10:40. Mr. Sangster was arrested at 12:20 in the Dow's Lake area.

[71] Sgt. Farah had no contact with Mr. Sangster's girlfriend who was a passenger in Mr. Sangster's vehicle.

[72] He was assigned to assist with the search of 750-340 McLeod on July 13, 2022, pursuant to the Search Warrant. After the arrest of Mr. Sangster, he attended there, arriving at 12:41.

[73] Upon his arrival at 750-340 McLeod, Ms. Thompson was already in custody and being escorted outside of the unit.

[74] He started searching the unit and took photos of identification documents.

Officer Paul Laforest

[75] Officer Laforest has been with the OPS since 2009 and is part of the OPS Tactical Unit. Before working with the OPS, he worked four years with the military police.

[76] He participated as a member of the OPS Tactical Unit for the execution of the Search Warrants at the Lebreton and McLeod Street locations after he was briefed by Det. Cox. He did not carry a firearm as he was not notified that guns were on site.

[77] He breached the door to allow access to the apartment. Once inside the hallway of the apartment at 340 McLeod, at 12:28, he told Ms. Thompson that she was under arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and brought her to the neighbourhood resources officer down the hallway within 30 seconds.

[78] At 12:30, he secured the apartment to make sure that it was safe for the officers.

[79] He then attended 220 Lebreton and arrived at 12:39. Again, Officer Laforest was in the breach position, but Det. Renwick gave him the keys to the unit, so he used them instead of breaching the door. There was no one in the unit.

Constable Virginia Witt

[80] Cst. Witt has been an officer for 11 years and with the Intimate Partner Violence Unit for the last one and a half years. In July 2022, she was the neighbourhood resources officer and was assigned to be at 340 McLeod during the execution of the Search Warrant.

[81] At 12:28, she took custody of Ms. Thompson from Officer Laforest and brought her out in the hallway. She immediately placed handcuffs on Ms. Thompson in the behind-the-back position. Ms. Thompson was extremely upset and crying.

[82] Cst. Witt tried to calm Ms. Thompson down and told her to lean up against the wall in the hallway to support herself as Ms. Thompson said she was feeling faint.

[83] Cst. Witt then returned to the apartment with Ms. Thompson for Ms. Thompson to obtain some warmer clothing as she told Ms. Thompson that the cell block can be cold, and for Ms. Thompson to make arrangements for her dog in the apartment.

[84] After Ms. Thompson gathered warm clothes and took care of her dog, Cst. Witt escorted Ms. Thompson to her cruiser and ran Ms. Thompson's name to confirm her identity.

[85] At 12:50 in the cruiser, Cst. Witt gave Ms. Thompson her right to counsel, secondary caution, and s. 524 warning.

[86] Cst. Witt testified that based on Ms. Thompson's demeanour, she did not think Ms. Thompson would have understood her rights before that time.

[87] When they arrived at the OPS headquarters at 474 Elgin Street at 12:59, there were two cruisers and a van transporting prisoners from the courthouse ahead of her at the sally port.

[88] After Ms. Thompson was processed by the staff sergeant and searched by special constables, Ms. Thompson was able to talk to her lawyer at 13:37.

[89] At 14:00, Ms. Thompson was placed in a cell.

Detective Matthew Cox

[90] Det. Cox was with the OPS Drug Unit from 2009 to 2022. He is currently the elected President of the Ottawa Police Association.

[91] He was the affiant of all the warrants obtained in this case and led many of the briefing sessions prior to the surveillance of Mr. Sangster.

[92] He provided the briefing before the Search Warrants were executed on July 13, 2022. Reference was made to Det. Lehman's SMEAC report, which helped streamline decision-making and ensured a shared understanding of the plan. He assigned individual officers their respective roles.

[93] He was present at the search of 750-340 McLeod as an extra officer for security.

[94] There were no instructions to make arrests at the McLeod Street residence as they assumed that there would be no one there because they had waited until Mr. Sangster left that location.

[95] He took over custody of Ms. Thompson from the Tactical Unit at 12:30. He advised Ms. Thompson they were executing a search warrant, that she was under arrest for trafficking drugs, and she could call a lawyer at the station. A s. 524 warning was given to Ms. Thompson.

[96] Det. Cox testified that he used a "soft caution" as he did not have his notebook with him and asked Cst. Witt to read Ms. Thompson her right to counsel and cautions from Cst. Witt's notebook. Det. Cox also asked Cst. Witt to arrange for Ms. Thompson to get dressed, escort her to the cruiser, and tell Ms. Thompson her rights.

[97] His grounds to arrest Ms. Thompson were that the investigation showed that 750-340 McLeod was a stash house. If someone was there, they were assumed to have knowledge of the cocaine, and they were a "stash keeper". Det. Cox believed that Ms. Thompson was at least arrestable, but not necessarily chargeable. Given Ms. Thompson's presence at the stash house, Det. Cox assumed that Ms. Thompson had knowledge of what was going on in the apartment.

[98] Det. Cox explained that a stash house is a place where drugs are kept so that (1) they are in a different location; and (2) to avoid arrest. Mr. Sangster was observed attending the stash house before completing drug transactions.

[99] Also, the tracking device had Mr. Sangster frequently attending the McLeod Street residence and completing drug transactions after his attendance.

[100] The CI had disclosed to his handler that Mr. Sangster was in a higher level of trafficking; i.e. in multi-ounces. As such, Det. Cox believed that there would be a stash house. The last time Det. Cox saw Mr. Sangster at the stash house was on July 6, 2022. He knew Mr. Sangster had his own key to the unit.

[101] Det. Cox testified that the information of where Mr. Sangster lived was provided by the CI.

[102] Det. Cox explained that as it was not possible to obtain a warrant for the whole building, it was important that they located the unit numbers for both locations.

[103] He testified that he took a search warrant course and has applied for general warrants in the "double digit" number of times. However, while he was aware of the notice requirement for "sneak and peak" warrants (i.e., go into a unit to look), he was not aware that he needed to include a notice in general warrants.

[104] Det. Cox also agreed that the police have an ongoing duty to assess if reasonable and probable grounds continue to exist for an arrest.

Detective Danick Payment

[105] Det. Payment has been with the OPS Drug Unit since 2017. Prior to that, he was involved in policing street crime for seven years.

[106] He was involved in the surveillance and takedown of Mr. Sangster, in his vehicle, a Honda Accord, on July 13, 2022, at 12:20 near the intersection of Preston Street and Queen Elizabeth Driveway. Mr. Sangster was in the driver's seat and his girlfriend, Ms. McNevin, was in the front passenger seat.

[107] On June 14, 2022, he made a covert entry in plain clothing to 340 McLeod under the authority of the General Warrant.

[108] On that day, during his surveillance of Mr. Sangster in the hallway at 340 McLeod, Det. Payment saw Mr. Sangster enter 750-340 McLeod using a key.

[109] The search incident to arrest netted a phone, a key to the safe in the bedroom closet at the Lebreton Street location, and a key to the McLeod Street location. In the vehicle, the police located $982 CAD and a knife.

[110] The police executed the Search Warrant at 8-220 Lebreton Street, where they located, among other things, $22,990 CAD, $340 USD, and documents and identification. No one was present at that location.

[111] Det. Payment was also present during the search of 750-340 McLeod and testified that he smelled the chemically strong odour of cocaine in the apartment, especially as he got closer to the blue luggage in the closet area.

[112] He found white plastic bags, which contained various types of packaging and a white plastic garbage bag with lots of wrappers with two kilograms of cocaine. He also found a hydraulic press, which is a tool used to press kilograms of cocaine with a buffing agent. The opening of the suitcase and discovery of its contents was captured on a video taken by Det. Cox.

Analysis

[113] I will begin by addressing the removal of information obtained from the facially invalid General Warrants from the ITO submitted in support of the Search Warrants. Next, I will consider the Crown's request to amplify the ITO with tracking data—lawfully obtained pursuant to judicial authorization—linking Mr. Sangster to 340 McLeod Street. Subsequently, I will assess whether the Search Warrants could have otherwise been issued based on the ITO, with or without amplification, by specifically examining whether it disclosed grounds to believe that evidence of the offences would be found at the 340 McLeod location. Finally, I will address the Charter implications of the police failing to include a notice provision in the General Warrants.

Excision of Information Due to Facially Invalid General Warrant

[114] The accused do not challenge the grounds for the General Warrants for covert surveillance of inside 220 Lebreton and 340 McLeod. There is no allegation that the affiant provided misleading or false information, was dishonest or made mistakes in the ITO, and the cross-examination of the affiant was not conducted as this is not a sub-facial attack of the ITO.

[115] Rather, the General Warrant failed to include notice pursuant to s. 487.01(5) of the Code which requires notice of covert entry and search be given within any time after the execution of the General Warrant that the Judge considers reasonable in the circumstances. Failure to include the term is a breach of s. 8.

[116] In R. v. Coderre, 2016 ONCA 276, 348 O.A.C. 238, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated that failure to abide by a statutorily mandated requirement to provide notice infringes the Charter.

[117] Due to this facial invalidity of the General Warrants for covert surveillance, reference to the units that were determined pursuant to the General Warrant, must be excised from the ITO dated July 6, 2022, that is:

• Paragraph 29 of the ITO for the Search Warrant for the 220 Lebreton location, identifying Unit 8; and

• Paragraph 27(d) of the ITO for the Search Warrant for the 340 McLeod location, identifying Unit 750.

[118] After excision, the ITO did not disclose adequate grounds to believe that evidence respecting the offences would be found at those specific units at those two locations. Therefore, there was another s. 8 breach.

Request to Amplify the ITO with Tracking Data

[119] The Crown has requested an amplification of the ITO to include the tracking information found at the agreed statement of facts in Exhibit 3 which ties Mr. Sangster's vehicle to the 340 McLeod location. This data was obtained pursuant to a tracking warrant issued May 27, 2022.

[120] I note that the tracking information ends on July 12, 2022, and the ITO for the Search Warrant dated July 6, 2022, so only information before that date will be considered.

[121] For the reasons set out below, I grant the Crown's request to amplify the ITO to include the tracking data found in Exhibit 3 up to and including July 3, 2022.

Legal Framework

[122] Amplification is permitted if there has been a "minor, technical error" that was known to the affiant but not included as a result of want of drafting skill and made in good faith: R. v. Duncan, 2021 ONCA 673, at paras. 14-16; R. v. Nguyen, 2023 ONCA 291, at para. 32.

[123] If material information was not included and affects the finding of reasonable and probable grounds, the court can consider amplification of the ITO.

[124] As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 42, amplification is not an opportunity for the Crown to add information that it could have included in support of the warrant but failed to do so, to retroactively authorize a search that was not initially supported by reasonable and probable grounds; that is, to bolster an ITO. To permit this would turn the authorization process into a sham: R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 59. Therefore, there cannot be "after-the-fact enhancement": see R. v. Booth, 2019 ONCA 970, 386 C.C.C (3d) 281, at para. 93.

[125] In Booth, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated: "amplification relating to information that could advance the warrant application is permissible only if the error in not making full and frank disclosure is: (1) a 'minor, technical error'; and (2) made in 'good faith'": at para. 59; see also Araujo, at para. 59; Morelli, at para. 41.

[126] In Booth, at para. 61, Paciocco J.A. listed examples of minor or technical errors including mistakenly attributing observations to the wrong observer, mistaken dates and typographical errors, and erroneous but unimportant errors in the description of the source of the information.

[127] In contrast, at para. 62, Paciocco J.A. provided examples of errors that were not minor, technical errors, such as the failure to identify the target unit, the failure to identify the expertise of the officer, and the failure to provide evidence to support the authenticity of a document.

[128] In Booth, the Court of Appeal for Ontario did not permit amplification because the failure to disclose the qualifying information relating to the licence plate did not arise from "minor, technical errors." The omission of this material went to the heart of the circumstantial case the affiant was relying upon. Therefore, the omission could not be considered minor. Further, the affiant did not give full and frank disclosure of the fact that she was not certain of the complete licence number.

[129] The court, however, allowed the amplification of the ITO to include the colour of the rental vehicle; the witness observation of a red shirt, and the witness' uncertainty of the model of the getaway vehicle.

[130] Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal and substituted an acquittal on the basis that there was material non-disclosure by the affiant in obtaining both digital video recorder search and residence search authorizations. The searches were conducted without reasonable and probable grounds and evidence gathered should have been excluded. The affiant had failed to make full and frank disclosure in the ITO, including the significance of a watch worn by one of the accused in connection to the robbery. In addition, the significance of the plate number and its link to the accused was exaggerated.

[131] In Duncan, the accused challenged the judicial authorization for wiretap evidence on the basis that the ITO was misleading, fraudulent, and incapable of remedy by excision or amplification. At the pre-trial Garofoli hearing, the motion judge found the officer's errors were "innocent mistakes" when he obtained the initial production order. He corrected the inaccuracies by using amplification, including an inaccuracy of what the affiant observed on a surveillance video taken inside the warehouse at Pearson Airport where the cargo containing cocaine was found. The affiant's observations of the video drew inferences including identification of individuals, even though the identities of the figures on the video were "indiscernible". As such, these were inferences that could not be "unambiguously drawn from those observations": Duncan, at para. 11.

[132] The motion judge permitted the amplification to "explain how the affiant came to believe that the video depicted the appellant in the warehouse trying to take possession of the container": Duncan, at para. 12. It was the other party depicted in the video who told the affiant that it was the appellant, and told the affiant that the appellant had asked him to put the container outside for the appellant to take. The affiant had learned this information after he first viewed the video, but before swearing his affidavit. His affidavit included the source of this information, the date on which he received it from the other party depicted in the video, and the date on which he first viewed the video: Duncan, at para. 12.

[133] On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario was satisfied that the motion judge did not err in the manner in which he exercised his discretion with respect to the amplification and held that "[i]n short, the inaccuracy was the result of the affiant conflating information received from different sources into a statement suggesting the information came from the single source identified in that statement. The correct sources of the information could, however, be found in the affidavit": Duncan, at paras. 13-14.

[134] The court continued, explaining that "[a]mplification in an affidavit is a flexible remedy. A motion judge has a broad discretion. In exercising that discretion, the nature of the defect in the affidavit is important. If the affiant acted honestly and in good faith in preparing and presenting the affidavit, amplification or excision of parts of the affidavit must be considered by the motion judge": Duncan, at para. 14.

[135] Further, at paras. 15-16, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated:

Even if the affiant acted honestly and in good faith, amplification of the affidavit cannot go so far as to undermine the requirement of prior judicial authorization for the warrant or the order. Nor, however, is amplification limited to errors or omissions in the affidavit which are so minor as to have little, if any, relevance to the ultimate legality of the authorization.

Most of the inadequacies in the affidavit were failures of draftsmanship and, in particular, failures to properly source the facts asserted in the affidavit. In other words, the affiant did not adequately set out the chain of reasoning that led him to come to certain conclusions upon which he based the application. Although it is important that the affidavit be properly sourced, the failure to do so is not inherently misleading, especially in light of the motion judge's finding that the affiant acted honestly and in good faith.

[136] In R. v. Feizi, 2022 ONCA 517, Paciocco J.A. clarified that "minor" or "technical" refers to the nature of the error in an ITO, not the importance of the topic to which it relates. Therefore, a minor or technical error can relate to an essential component: para. 9.

[137] In Feizi, in his affidavit for an ITO, the affiant provided inaccurate information as to the delivery address on a package (i.e., address label) containing drugs, despite the package's label setting out otherwise. After finding that the affiant made this error in good faith by stating his conclusion as to the intended delivery address instead of explaining why he believed that the inaccurate address was the intended delivery address, the trial judge permitted the Crown to amplify the ITO. The amplification then provided reasonable and probable grounds for a general warrant.

[138] On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario was not satisfied that the trial judge erred and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the trial judge applied the correct test and was not persuaded that the errors were not minor nor technical by any reasonable standard.

[139] In Nguyen, the application judge excised all references to the fact that the appellant had been arrested for drug trafficking and that drugs had been found on his person from the ITO at Step 5 of Garofoli. This left the ITO without sufficient grounds to support a warrant to search the appellant's residence. However, at Step 6 of Garofoli, the application judge permitted the Crown to amplify the ITO to include information, from a CI given to one of the officers and passed on to another officer, that the appellant was dealing drugs out of the apartment. The application judge concluded that with the excised and amplified ITO, the warrant could have issued.

[140] The Court of Appeal for Ontario agreed with the application judge's conclusions that the excised, redacted ITO provided sufficient information to support the assertion of where the appellant lived, but did not provide sufficient evidence that the appellant was using the apartment to store drugs or that drugs would be located at the apartment. Moreover, the court agreed that amplification was permissible to correct the ITO to state that one officer had told another officer that the appellant was dealing from the apartment.

[141] At para. 32, the court explained that the focus of amplification is "whether the police had the information at the time of the application for the search warrant but failed to communicate it due to a failure in drafting". Referring to Duncan, the court further explained: "[a]mplification is not restricted to correcting mechanical or typographical errors but extends to failures to communicate what was known by the affiant as a result of want of drafting skill."

[142] In the recent Court of Appeal for Ontario case of R. v. Griffith, 2025 ONCA 322, the reviewing judge dismissed the Charter application. Based on an expanded record supplemented by an examination of the ITO's affiant, the reviewing judge found that the warrant could issue. On appeal, the court found there was a breach of s. 8 of the Charter, but that the evidence should not be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. At para. 19, the court reiterated the following principles:

The focus on amplification in this appeal is on whether the police had information at the time they applied for the search warrant but failed to communicate it due to a failure in drafting. While amplification is not restricted to correcting mechanical or typographical errors but extends to failures to communicate what was known by the affiant as a result of want of drafting skill. [Citations omitted].

Findings

[143] The court will permit the ITO to be amplified to include the tracking data in Exhibit 3 which connects Mr. Sangster's car to the area of 340 McLeod, for the following reasons:

• The affiant was aware that the tracking date showed Mr. Sangster's vehicle was attending the area of 340 McLeod frequently and he refers to some of these attendances in his ITO; and

• He failed, in good faith, to communicate it in the ITO as a result of want of drafting skill.

[144] In his introduction when discussing the detailed history of the investigation/grounds for belief, the affiant indicated that he has detailed observations and investigative findings that he believes to be either of material value to the investigation or that could be consider exculpatory. Later in the ITO, he states he is "creating a clear and concise document that is less burdensome for the issue judicial officer to review. All these things, however, are framed within the context of full, fair and frank disclosure." Therefore, the court finds that the affiant's objective in preparing his ITO to provide the issuing justice with clear, concise, material and accurate information.

[145] Unlike Booth, I do not find that Det. Cox intended to mislead or acted in bad faith when he failed to include the tracking data. Rather, this case is similar to Nguyen, where the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the amplification because the additional information was within the knowledge of the affiant, but the affiant failed to include it due to a drafting error.

[146] In my view, this case is also similar to Duncan, where the affiant did not adequately set out the chain of reasoning that led him to come to certain conclusions upon which he based the application. The affiant in Duncan failed to properly source facts asserted in his affidavit. Here, Det. Cox, in good faith and in attempt to be clear and concise, failed to include all the tracking information that could have bolstered his grounds to believe that evidence respecting the offences would be found at the 340 McLeod location.

[147] As in Duncan, Det. Cox was aware of the tracking data which he failed to include in his ITO. In the ITO with excision, Det. Cox actually refers to some tracking data to connect Mr. Sangster to 340 McLeod.

[148] In testimony, in response to a question from the Crown as to "in forming your grounds to believe that McLeod Unit 750-at 340 McLeod was being used as a stash by Mr. Sangster, what, if anything, from your ITO do you rely on in the formation of that belief?", Det. Cox stated:

So, as I said earlier, I rely on the fact that he attended there prior to going out and doing what was believe to be other drug transactions. He was observed with a bag leaving that location and doing other drug transactions. Some of the times, he would leave the City of Ottawa, and we'd be doing surveillance and see him go do drug transactions after leaving that location. The tracker put him going usually from his residence to that location prior to going – then he'd be going out and meeting with – in areas where had seen him in other surveillance. So, there's reason to believe, based on that, that was a stash location.

[149] The court concludes that Det. Cox had reviewed the tracking data before completing his ITO for the Search Warrants. In the ITO, he mentions the tracking device and the OPS unit intercepting Mr. Sangster's vehicle from the tracking device on at least eight occasions.

[150] Specifically, the nature of the added information is the tracking of Mr. Sangster's vehicle to 340 McLeod before and after they observed him on surveillance.

[151] Therefore, the error was minor and technical, and made in good faith. The nature of the information had already been referred to in the ITO, was within the knowledge of the affiant, but he had not included all the details found in the tracking data due to a drafting error which may have been motivated by efforts to be concise.

[152] Accordingly, the court permits the amplification to include the tracking data in the ITO up to and including July 6, 2022.

Could the Issuing Justice Have Issued the Search Warrants?

Defence Position

[153] The defence submit that Detective Cox did not have reasonable and probable grounds that drugs were stored at 340 McLeod. Put another way, the defence maintains that the ITO does not adequately disclose grounds to believe that evidence respecting the offences would be found at 340 McLeod.

[154] Generally, the defence argues that sufficient reasonable and probable grounds did not exist because the bald assertions and inferences in the ITO were not supported by the information provided. That is:

• The CI information was not credible, compelling and trustworthy;

• The affiant was drawing a nefarious connection between Mr. Sangster and Mr. Gillespie, whose previous drug trafficking charges were stayed;

• Most of the observations of Mr. Sangster during the surveillance are not consistent with drug trafficking and do not explain why the police believed that 340 McLeod was a stash house (e.g., leaving a location with a shopping bag is not nefarious); and

• Mr. Sangster was not at the McLeod Street apartment at the times proximate to the alleged drug transactions set out in the ITO. Further, this is not indicative that Mr. Sangster is dealing in the "multi-ounce" level.

[155] In conclusion, the defence submits that the ITO lacks the necessary information to support the inference that the McLeod Street residence was a stash house, and that Mr. Sangster was trafficking drugs from there.

Position of the Crown

[156] The Crown submits that there is extensive evidence linking Mr. Sangster to 750-340 McLeod, as observed by the multiple officers involved in the surveillance, the information obtained from the CI, and what appeared to be Mr. Sangster being involved in drug transactions before and after attending at 340 McLeod.

[157] The Crown submits that the court must review the "totality of the circumstances" in assessing whether there was some reliable evidence if believed, that the issuing justice could issue a warrant.

Findings

[158] The court has a vital role in guarding against potentially unjustified invasions of privacy authorized by warrants. Warrants and authorizations are presumptively valid, and I must not conduct a de novo hearing of the ex parte application: R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at paras. 83–84.

[159] The test for the issuance of a search warrant under s. 11 of the CDSA is whether there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a controlled substance; anything in which the controlled substance or precursor is contained or concealed; offence-related property; or anything that will afford evidence of an offence, in whole or in part, under the CDSA or ss. 354 or 462.31 of the Code will be found in the location targeted by the warrant.

[160] I find that the Search Warrants could not have issued for those units due to the excision, but the court find that Search Warrants were otherwise valid as the police had reasonable and probable grounds.

[161] As set out in Araujo at para. 45, the Supreme Court stated the reviewing judge must decide whether there were reasonable grounds not perfect grounds.

ITO Without Amplification

[162] Although I have permitted amplification of the ITO, I will first consider whether the Search Warrants would have issued even though there was excision.

[163] I have reviewed the excised ITO, without amplifications, and I have considered "the totality of the circumstances", including its degree of detail, the informer's source of knowledge, and indicia such as the informer's past reliability and confirmation from other sources: R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at p. 1457; Araujo, at para. 54. This review must be conducted on a common sense, practical, non-technical basis. Sadikov para. 82.

[164] The court is not to reweigh the evidence that was in the ITO or reject available inferences.

[165] I note that the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Sadikov, at para. 81, opined:

The statutory standard – "reasonable grounds to believe" – does not require proof on the balance of probabilities, much less proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The statutory and constitutional standard is one of credibly-based probability. The ITO must establish reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the proposed search. If the inferences of criminal conduct and recovery of evidence are reasonable on the facts disclosed in the ITO, the warrant could be issued. [Citations omitted].

[166] The court's only mandate is to determine whether those inferences drawn by the issuing judge were reasonable.

[167] For the reasons elaborated on below, I find that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the issuing justice, absent the excision of the unit numbers, to otherwise issue the Search Warrants because of:

1. The credible, compelling, and corroborative information provided by the CI;

2. The extensive experience of the affiant;

3. The affiant made reasonable inferences set out in the ITO relying on the extensive surveillance of Mr. Sangster's involvement of around 12 drug transactions over approximately two months; and

4. Mr. Sangster's connection to 340 McLeod included five attendances, where after two of those attendances, he subsequently conducted what the police believed to be drug transactions. Further, before an attendance there, the police believe he conducted a drug transaction.

1. Confidential Informer

[168] As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 SCR 1140, the court must concern itself with whether the CI's information was credible, compelling, and corroborated. Each factor does not form a separate test. Rather, it is the "totality of the circumstances" that must meet the standard of reasonableness. Weaknesses in one area may, to some extent, be compensated by strengths in the other two.

[169] In January 2022, the CI told the handler that Mr. Sangster was between 22 and 25 years of age and was a multi-ounce dealer of cocaine driving a light coloured four-door Honda Accord with an Ontario Licence plate CLWL 554. In May 2022, the CI indicated that Mr. Sangster was still trafficking in cocaine, that he was a drug runner, that he resided at 220 Lebreton in Ottawa, and named the same vehicle. The information the CI provided was accurate in that they knew what Mr. Sangster drove, where he lived, that he had no criminal record, his approximate age, and that he had a connection with Mr. Gillespie (although charges of trafficking had been stayed as against him). Specifically, the CI stated that Mr. Sangster was a supplier for Mr. Gillespie of cocaine.

[170] The information from the CI was credible in that the information regarding the CI was disclosed, namely:

• The length of the relationship they had with the police (since 2014, which is eight years);

• The number of occasions that they were involved in CDSA investigations of which CDSA search warrants were executed and drugs were seized and charged were laid with ten leading to convictions and two still before the courts; and

• They were financially motivated to provide information which had to be truthful.

[171] The CI has never provided false or misleading information, and that information has been provided on 25 occasions which assisted in corroborating other intelligence.

[172] In addition, the CI is familiar with the packaging and selling of substances listed in the CDSA and the paraphernalia associated with them. The CI also was familiar with ingestion, packaging, concealment, and the price range of these substances.

[173] I find that based on the information provided about the CI, his information was credible.

[174] Was the CI information compelling? R. v. Debot, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 at p. 219, aff'd , [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, directs this court to consider whether information supplied by a CI constitutes reasonable grounds, noting that "[h]ighly relevant to whether information supplied by an informer constitutes reasonable grounds" are considerations such as whether "the informer's 'tip' contains sufficient detail to ensure it is based on more than mere rumour or gossip" and "whether the informer discloses his or her source or means of knowledge". Bald conclusory statements cannot support the veracity of CI information: Debot, at p. 1168-9; R. v. Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707, 112 O.R. (3d) 742, at paras. 18 and 26.

[175] The issue is whether the CI information was based on bald conclusory statements or based on hearsay, rumour, or gossip.

[176] The following is the information provided by the CI that supported the reasonable grounds that Mr. Sangster was trafficking drugs:

• At paragraph 8 of the ITO, information was obtained from a source debrief (a separate document that was not produced); and CI information comes from their own observations and/or conversations with one or more persons being investigated and that the information was received first hand.

[177] I find that not enough details are provided concerning where the CI received his information, and whether the CI was an observer of some, or any, of Mr. Sangster's activities. There may be reasons why more information was not provided in the ITO to identify the source of the CI's information, e.g. not disclose information that might identify the CI. Nevertheless, there is not enough information provided for the court to determine that the CI's information was compelling.

[178] I find that the information was corroborated by the police investigation; including his association with Mr. Gillespie, the vehicle he drove, the residence, and that he was involved in drug transactions. The fact that he travelled several times to Toronto could support the allegation that Mr. Sangster was a "runner", that is, one who obtained the drugs for distributions. As the Debot criteria is to determine the overall reliability of what the CI said that the police were able to confirm, through the surveillance of Mr. Sangster, that Mr. Sangster was involved in drug transactions, with roughly 12 drug transactions set out in the ITO.

[179] As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Garofoli, at p. 1456: "[h]earsay statements of an informant can provide reasonable and probable grounds to justify a search. However, evidence of a tip from an informer, by itself, is insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds." The reliability of the tip is to be assessed by recourse to "the totality of the circumstances". There is no formulaic test as to what this entails.

[180] I note the informer's reliability is enhanced by his past performance as a CI, and the confirmation of his information from other investigative sources in this case.

[181] Considering the above findings, I find the CI's credibility was high as he was credible and his information was corroborated. This compensates for the fact that some of the details of how he obtained their information is deficient.

2. Experience of Affiant

[182] Det. Cox has extensive training and experience in drug investigations, having completed numerous training courses and numerous undercover operations. He is familiar with the means used by drug traffickers and has conducted many drug investigations in the 12 years preceding his ITO in this case.

[183] The ITO for the Search Warrants indicates his work as an investigator in the Drug Unit as well as previously in the Street Crime Unit, where his duties included conducting street-level undercover drug investigations. He was involved in undercover operations throughout the province. As an undercover officer, he has purchased solvent property, various drugs, and was involved in 186 of these types of transactions. He is familiar with how controlled substances are packaged, concealed and sold.

[184] He has authored, and been granted, over 125 judicial authorizations and has participated in more than 200 warrants to search. He has also participated in the execution of judicial authorizations where covert installations were carried out to intercept private communications.

[185] He is familiar with drug lingo, drug culture, drug user and trafficker behaviour, and how drug transactions are conducted ranging from hand-to hand exchanges to kilogram-level deals.

3. The Affiant Made Reasonable Inferences Set Out in the ITO

[186] As stated in R. v. Anang, 2016 ONCA 825, at paras. 14 and 22, the court must look at the nature of the information from the surveillance, taken in the context of the totality of the circumstances and weighed through the perspective of the experience of the officer.

[187] I find that Det. Cox had established an objective basis for the grounds "as seen from the perspective of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of a police officer with comparable experience to that of an arresting officer": Anang, at para. 14.

[188] The ITO sets out the details of why, based on his observations and experience, Det. Cox believed that Mr. Sangster was using 340 McLeod as a stash house. Det. Cox in entitled to draw inferences that are available based on his experience.

[189] The ITO is not perfect. For example, one bald speculation is from the surveillance which occurred on June 10, 2022 (at page 20 of the ITO), where the affiant infers from the video of what he says was a drug transaction that "it appears to be 2 kilograms of cocaine in the green bag that Gillespie retrieved from the trunk of Sangster's vehicle". The affiant refers to a video. Certainly, it was a reasonable inference that a drug transaction was taking place, but there are not sufficient facts outlined to say that there was actually 2 kg. of cocaine in the bag and the basis for that inference.

[190] Nevertheless, the inferences were, for the most part, not based on bald speculations or inferences.

[191] As set out below, there were allegations of 12 drug transactions, and the surveillance of Mr. Sangster included connections to the 340 McLeod Street on at least five occasions. On three of those occasions, Mr. Sangster attended a drug exchange, as inferred by the affiant.

[192] Det. Cox also referred to some of the tracking data detecting Mr. Sangster's vehicle returning from Toronto – on two occasions – and other localities.

4. 12 Drug Transactions Set Out in the ITO

[193] The ITO sets out reasonable and probable grounds that Mr. Sangster is trafficking drugs. My reasons are explained below.

[194] As further detailed below, from the surveillance by the OPS Drug Unit, the affiant was able to infer that there was:

• One drug transaction on May 11, 2022;

• One drug transaction on May 18, 2022;

• Three drug transactions on May 19, 2022;

• One drug transaction on June 5, 2022;

• One drug transaction on June 6, 2022;

• One drug transaction on June 8, 2022;

• One drug transaction on June 10, 2022, after Mr. Sangster again left the Toronto area and meets up with Mr. Gillespie, who retrieves a green bag from the Honda truck;

• On June 22, 2022, there were observations of three drug transactions. The affiant infers that there is a drug transaction with an individual with a Toyota at the Carlingwood Shopping Centre, another transaction at College Square with an individual who was on foot, and a final drug transaction at an RBC in Manotick with an individual in a pick-up truck.

[195] Therefore, the affiant observed 12 interactions during surveillance and inferred that they were drug transactions. I will now briefly summarize them.

[196] On May 11, 2022, the driver of a black pickup truck got into the rear seat of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for one minute. The front seat was vacant. Based on the nature of this "quick meet", the affiant inferred this was a drug transaction.

[197] On May 18, 2022, Mr. Gillespie entered the front passenger seat of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for 12 minutes, then walks back to his own car with his hand in his hoodie pocket. The affiant noted, at paragraph 16 of the ITO, that he believes this corroborates Mr. Sangster's involvement in cocaine trafficking.

[198] On May 19, 2022, at 13:40, a male entered the front passenger seat of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for one minute.

[199] On May 19, 2022, at 14:16, a male exited a white pickup truck and was observed leaning into the front window of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for one minute.

[200] On May 19, 2022, at 14:46, a male entered the front passenger seat of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for two minutes. The male exited, entered his own vehicle, and snorted what appeared to be a line of cocaine.

[201] The affiant believed the three interactions on May 19, 2022 were drug transactions.

[202] On June 5, 2022, after returning from Toronto and removing an item from his trunk, Mr. Sangster met with Mr. Gillespie for 20 to 30 seconds between their two vehicles. The affiant believed the nature of this meeting was consistent with a drug transaction.

[203] On June 6, 2022, the driver of a Ford Focus got into the passenger seat of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for one minute. The affiant believed the "quick meet" for less than one minute after leaving the suspected stash location assisted with his belief that Mr. Sangster is a drug trafficker.

[204] On June 8, 2022, in Mattawa, Ontario, the driver of a white sedan entered Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for 30 seconds, then the driver exits and places something in the trunk of the sedan. Det. Cox believed the brief nature of the meeting in Mattawa and then Mr. Sangster's immediate return to Ottawa was consistent with what he viewed as a drug transaction.

[205] On June 10, 2022, after returning from Toronto, Mr. Sangster met with Mr. Gillespie for six minutes in Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord. Mr. Gillespie then exited and retrieves a green bag from the trunk of the Honda Accord, which he placed in his own. The affiant believed this was a drug transaction.

[206] On June 22, 2022, at 15:27, a male entered the passenger side of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for three minutes before exiting.

[207] On June 22, 2022, at 15:39, after Mr. Sangster drove to a different location, a man entered the passenger side of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for one minute.

[208] On June 22, 2022, at 16:34, again at a different location, a man from a white pickup truck entered the passenger side of Mr. Sangster's Honda Accord for two minutes.

[209] The affiant believed the three interactions on June 22, 2022, to be drug transactions conducted from Mr. Sangster's vehicle.

5. Connection to 340 McLeod as a Stash House

[210] The court notes that the ITO describes the surveillance and some of the tracking information obtained over 54 days.

[211] Det. Cox outlines that Mr. Sangster is seen attending 340 McLeod on five occasions.

[212] At a minimum, three of the alleged drug transactions appear to have a connection to 340 McLeod. (on May 18, 2022, June 6, 2022, and June 8, 2022).

[213] There was one alleged drug transaction, on May 18, 2022, which occurred before Mr. Sangster attended the underground garage at 340 McLeod. There are two alleged drug transactions which occur after Mr. Sangster leaves 340 McLeod on June 6 and 8, 2022.

[214] On May 18, 2022, Mr. Sangster was observed entering the underground garage at 340-360 McLeod, using a key fob to enter the garage, after returning from an alleged drug transaction with Mr. Gillespie.

[215] On June 6, 2022, after having returned from Toronto the day before, Mr. Sangster left his home at 220 Lebreton with a "green weighted reusable grocery bag". Mr. Sangster placed it in his Honda and then drove to 340 McLeod.

[216] Mr. Sangster walked into 340 McLeod carrying the aforementioned green weighted grocery bag, exited 340 McLeod 35 minutes later carrying a smaller weighted green bag, and entered his vehicle. Eleven minutes later, Mr. Sangster met with someone in a Ford Focus for one minute at the Korean Church. Based on the observations of the "quick meet", the affiant believed this was a drug transaction.

[217] On June 8, 2022, the tracking device has Mr. Sangster's vehicle in the area of 340 McLeod at 10:45 before going to Mattawa where the affiant believed Mr. Sangster completed a drug transaction with an individual in a white sedan. The individual entered Mr. Sangster's vehicle for 30 seconds, exited, and then placed an item in the trunk of his sedan.

[218] The defence submits:

• The only evidence is that Mr. Sangster and Mr. Gillespie were seen together were on May 18, 2022, and on June 6 and 10, 2022 (after trips to Toronto). On one occasion, Mr. Gillespie appeared to retrieve items from Mr. Sangster's vehicle. However, based on the surveillance and the inferences drawn from it, the interactions between Mr. Sangster and Mr. Gillespie appear to contain evidence of drug transactions. For instance, on May 18, 2022, the evidence indicates Mr. Sangster completed a drug transaction with Mr. Gillespie at Domino's Pizza;

• I agree that on June 1, 2022, the evidence shows Mr. Sangster attending and carrying a bag, which is not in itself a criminal activity (paragraph 21 of the ITO);

• Mr. Sangster travelling from the Greater Toronto Area on June 5 and 10, 2022, does not in itself connect Mr. Sangster to any geographic location in obtaining cocaine. The police are connecting the fact that when Mr. Sangster returns from Toronto, he then engages in drug trafficking on June 6 and June 8, 2022, after leaving the 340 McLeod location; and

• The last reference to Mr. Sangster being at the 340 McLeod residence in the ITO is on June 14, 2022 which is a few weeks before the ITO. Given the totality of the circumstances, this does not diminish the grounds for the issuance of the Search Warrants.

[219] As confirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Hafizi, 2016 ONCA 933, 343 C.C.C (3d) 380, at para. 4, the court must conduct a contextual analysis of the evidence in the ITO and not take a piecemeal approach to individual items of evidence shorn of their context as is suggested by the defence. I must not substitute my view of the evidence for that of the issuing justice.

[220] As directed by Hafizi, I must not assign value to each event without regard to its context. Instead, I have considered each event in light of the other events, and I determine that, cumulatively, the grounds provided a basis upon which the issuing justice could have otherwise, absent the excision of the unit numbers, granted the authorization.

[221] I do agree with the defence that some of Mr. Sangster's attendances at 340 McLeod in and of themselves are not inculpatory attendances, but when viewed with the totality of the information in the ITO, they do show a connection between Mr. Sangster and 340 McLeod. Considering all the information in the ITO, there were reasonable and probable grounds that 340 McLeod was being used as a stash house.

ITO with Amplification

[222] Now turning to the issue of amplification permitted by the court.

[223] Consequently, the amplification of the tracking information strengthens the grounds for issuance of the Search Warrants. It includes other tracking data which provides confirmation that from May 27, 2022, to July 3, 2022, (38 days) Mr. Sangster is attending 340 McLeod on 36 occasions, that is, on average once each day in that span of time.

[224] The sheer number of attendances to this location when Mr. Sangster is under surveillance provides compelling evidence linking Mr. Sangster to the 340 McLeod as a site where he stores drugs.

[225] The tracker showed Mr. Sangster's vehicle travelling back toward Ottawa on May 29, 2022. On June 1, 2022, the tracker shows the vehicle in the area of Gladstone and O'Connor, and in the area of 340 McLeod Street on June 8, 2022.

[226] In conclusion, the court finds that, with the excision of the unit numbers, the Search Warrants would otherwise have issued for both locations. With the amplification, further details are provided of Mr. Sangster frequent attendances at 340 McLeod which strengthen the grounds for the issuance of the Search Warrants.

Charter Implications for Failure to Provide Notice

[227] I will now deal with the impact of the facially invalid Search Warrants on the accused.

[228] The accused bear the onus to establish Charter breaches and the unreasonableness of the searches on a balance of probabilities.

Section 8 Breaches Alleged by Mr. Sangster and Ms. Thompson

Legal Framework

[229] Section 8 of the Charter guarantees everyone the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. This means that individuals are protected from unwarranted intrusions by the government into their personal lives and property. The key aspect of s. 8 is the concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy".

[230] The failure to comply with the notice provision constitutes a breach of s. 8: see Coderre, at para. 13; R. v. Pipping, 2020 BCCA 104, 386 C.C.C. (3d) 431, at para. 54, leave to appeal refused, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 179.

[231] As explained by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Singh, 2024 ONCA 66, 432 C.C.C. (3d) 527, at para. 43:

Counsel are correct to focus on the specific circumstances in which the alleged s. 8 violation occurred. Section 8 protects against state intrusions upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the subject matter of the alleged search. A determination of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists is a fact-specific and contextual inquiry directed at the subject matter of the search or seizure. [Citations omitted].

[232] Further, in R. v. Saciragic, 2017 ONCA 91, at para. 32, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 106, the Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's municipal address as a physical address does not reveal intimate details about an individual's personal choices and way of life. In addition, an address is readily available to the public. Moreover, the court found that there was no evidence that the accused's comings and goings would not be observed by others or recorded digitally: Saciragic, at para. 33.

[233] In R. v. Yu, 2019 ONCA 942, 151 O.R. (3d) 244, at para. 59, the court found that condominium hallways attracted a reasonable, but low expectation of privacy.

[234] At para. 60, the court noted, however, on the occasion where the police entered the common hallways without the consent of property management, this entry violated s. 8 as it was not authorized by law. Nevertheless, the court found that the violation had a minor impact on Charter-protected interests and was not the result of bad faith by the police.

[235] The court explored reasons for the search and what specifically the police were seeking. As the case at bar, the police in Yu were confirming the appellants' residence and unit number in the building. The court noted that this information would have been available to the police and in public view if, for example, the police followed someone home to a detached house: Yu, at para. 76.

[236] Again, at para. 81, the court reiterated that the appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways of their respective buildings, but it was at the low end of the spectrum. The court stated that a contextual approach is required when applying the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, and there is no categorical bar to a reasonable expectation of privacy in shared common areas.

[237] Additionally, a search executed under the authority of a properly issued warrant is prima facie reasonable as it was obtained with prior judicial authority: Collins, at pp. 277-8; R. v. Abdullahi, 2020 BCSC 1822, 399 C.C.C. (3d) 93, at para. 91.

Section 8 Breaches

[238] In summary, there are two section 8 breaches: 1) no notice provision in the General Warrant; and 2) section 8 breach emanating from the excision of the unit numbers from the ITO for the Search Warrants.

[239] The General Warrant dated May 27, 2022 (which was valid for 60 days) permitted the OPS to enter 220 Lebreton and the parking lot next to the building to conduct surveillance operations in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the appendix. Access was limited to common areas, such as the parking lot, lobby, hallways and stairways, and allowed for photos to be taken. It also ordered the condominium's management groups to assist in access and privacy.

[240] A second duplicate General Warrant was issued for 340 McLeod with the same terms and scope of surveillance.

[241] The court finds that Mr. Sangster has standing to challenge the General Warrant and Search Warrant at 8-220 Lebreton, as this was his residence.

[242] The court also finds that Ms. Thompson has standing to challenge the General Warrant and Search Warrant of 750-340 McLeod as this was her residence. Ms. Thompson does not challenge the warrants for the Lebreton Street residence.

[243] Moreover, Mr. Sangster enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy at 750-340 McLeod as he had a key to that unit and attended there regularly: see R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128.

[244] From the evidence, Mr. Sangster is seen going there on multiple occasions (36 times according to the tracker data) and is seen using the garage and entering the building common area and it is inferred he went up to the unit.

[245] For both Mr. Sangster and Ms. Thompson, the expectation of privacy of the underground garage and areas outside the buildings is lower.

[246] Mr. Sangster had a lower expectation of privacy at 750-340 McLeod than Ms. Thompson, as this was her residence.

[247] Therefore, I find as set out in Yu, that there was a breach of s. 8 when the police entered the common areas of the two locations where there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit one on the low end of the spectrum, on the basis of the two facially invalid warrants.

[248] Furthermore, I find that a second violation of s. 8 of the Charter occurred. The police contravened section 8 by entering the private residences of Ms. Thompson and Mr. Sangster pursuant to facially invalid Search Warrants. As previously noted, the Search Warrants were obtained after the execution of the General Warrants, which had been used to identify the unit numbers.

[249] As stated above, the failure to provide notice resulted in the excision of those unit numbers from the ITO, thereby rendering the General Warrants invalid. Consequently, the Search Warrants were executed without reference to specific unit numbers. Given the heightened expectation of privacy associated with private residences, the police entry was unauthorized and constituted a distinct breach of s. 8.

Section 9 Breach Alleged by Ms. Thompson

Position of Ms. Thompson

[250] Ms. Thompson argues that there were no grounds justifying her handcuffing, and that this constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

[251] Ms. Thompson was a "found in" (as described by her counsel) in the apartment on McLeod Street, which was under surveillance and where Mr. Sangster would attend.

[252] The defence submits that the police cannot just arrest everyone in a house and assume they have knowledge and control over the activities in the house. There were other options.

[253] She relies on a number of cases (discussed below) that deal with the unlawful arrests of individuals in vehicles where drugs are found.

Legal Framework

[254] In R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, the Supreme Court of Canada held that an arresting officer must subjectively have objectively reasonable and probable grounds to support a lawful arrest.

[255] As explained by Himel J. in R. v. Hassan, 2020 ONSC 6354, at para. 50, "there must be something in the conduct observed by police along with the rest of the circumstances that leads the officer to form the belief that there are reasonable grounds to arrest."

[256] In order for an arrest to be lawful, police must have reasonable grounds to believe that an offence is being or has been committed. The reasonable grounds inquiry has both a subjective and objective component. The officer must hold an honest belief that the person committed an offence. In addition, the belief must be objectively reasonable in the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest: R. v. Canary, 2018 ONCA 304, 361 C.C.C. (3d) 63, at para. 21.

[257] In order for a belief to be "reasonable", a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the police officer must be able to see the grounds for arrest: R. v. Brown, 2012 ONCA 225, 286 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 14. The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Brown further stated: "[t]he individual's constitutional right to be left alone by the state cannot depend exclusively on the officer's subjective perception of events regardless of how accurate that perception might be. The issue is not the correctness of the officer's belief, but the need to impose discernable objectively measurable limits on police powers": at para. 14.

[258] In Tim, at para. 24, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the objective component as follows:

The objective assessment is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest, including the dynamics of the situation, as seen from the perspective of a reasonable person with comparable knowledge, training, and experience as the arresting officer.

[259] Therefore, when considering whether an officer's subjective belief is objectively reasonable, the court looks at the objectively discernible facts through the eyes of a reasonable person with the same knowledge, training and experience as the officer: R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220, at paras. 45-47. The standard is met at the point where credibly based probability replaces suspicion. Of course, the totality of the circumstances is to be considered: R. v. Dhillon, 2016 ONCA 308, 335 C.C.C. (3d) 144, at para. 25.

[260] However, as stated in R. v. Mackenzie, 2013 SCC 50, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250, at para. 62, the court can take into account an officer's experience, but it cannot be accepted uncritically.

[261] The defence relies on the following three cases.

[262] In R. v. Bissonnette, [2024] O.J. No. 294, an officer arrested everyone in a suspect vehicle. The officer understood that anyone in the vehicle was to be arrested and that "[a]s in any drug investigation that [they did], if there are drugs in the vehicle, typically everyone in the vehicle is considered involved until proven otherwise": Bissonnette, at para. 92.

[263] The court held that the police must have objective evidence on which to base reasonable and probable grounds to arrest someone. Mere presence at the scene of the crime (e.g., in a vehicle), is not enough. The court criticized the polices' "arrest first, ask questions later" approach, stating that such practice was improper and inappropriate.

[264] Ultimately, the court, taking into consideration the factors set out in the Grant test, concluded that the Charter-infringing conduct in arresting a passenger without reasonable and probable grounds, unlawfully searching her purse, and detaining her overnight, was serious and militated towards the exclusion of evidence.

[265] In R. v. Mohammed, 2015 ONSC 905, like in Bissonnette, everyone in the suspect vehicle was arrested. The court concluded that the arresting officer drew unsupportable inferences to get to reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant. The court found that mere presence in a vehicle with friends carrying drugs could not attract a possession arrest. Therefore, the applicant's arrest was arbitrary and constituted a breach of the applicant's Charter rights.

[266] Likewise, the court found that the applicant's ensuing detention was arbitrary and a continuing breach of the applicant's Charter rights. Aside from the arbitrary arrest, the court further found that the delay in processing the applicant was unreasonable; the search of the applicant's personal belongings at the station was not properly incident to arrest; and the seizure of the applicant's wallet was a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

[267] In R. v. Mohamed, 2021 ONSC 2336, the court found the arrest was not lawful because the officers did not have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence was being committed; specifically, that they did not have reason to believe that the accused was carrying a firearm. The court was not satisfied that the accused knew that the van was a police van and that he was staring into the van or that he sought to evade the officers. The court also found that officers' certainty that the accused's fanny pack, based on its appearance, contained a firearm was not justified.

[268] Rather, the court found that the officers acted precipitously as they quickly concluded that the accused had a firearm in his fanny pack – a conclusion that was to a large extent influenced by a stale, uncorroborated tip. The court concluded the tip was devoid of compelling details or information and there was nothing to support its veracity. However, despite the weakness of the tip, the officers took no steps to verify or determine if the information was credible or reliable: Mohamed, at para. 100.

[269] Moreover, the court found that the officers did not turn their minds to further investigatory steps. As noted by the court, and referring to Hassan, at para. 117, citing R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, although the officers initially set out to conduct surveillance to corroborate the tip, once they came across the accused, they failed to consider less intrusive means of investigating and raced to arrest. The officers rushed to arrest after observing the accused for an exceedingly short period of time, and when the accused's actions were ambiguous. The limited time frame and information available to assess the situation were the result of the officers' actions and decisions: Mohamed, at para. 101.

[270] As such, the court found that the officers were not reasonable to conclude, based on their limited interaction and observations of the accused, that the accused was in possession of a firearm: Mohamed, at para. 102.

[271] D. E. Harris J. considered this issue in R. v. Bailey et al., 2023 ONSC 6789, where one of the accused was not a target, but was in the stash house when the police arrested the other two targets present and fentanyl and firearms were found. At paras. 9 and 11, D.E. Harris J. stated:

There can be no dispute that police officers executing a search warrant may need to control the scene both for safety reasons and for the purpose of preserving evidence. This general power is not properly characterized as an investigative detention although there will be circumstances in which additional grounds may lead to such a detention. Rather, as the jurisprudence makes clear, the power to control the scene is better viewed as an ancillary power which stems from general police duties while in the execution of a search warrant.

… There was no hint in the evidence or argument that there was any necessity or justification for the handcuffing. Officer Proulx's handcuffing as a routine everyday procedure during residential searches constitutes an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter. A deprivation of liberty by the handcuffing of all occupants in every instance in which a search warrant is executed is clearly not authorized by law. [Citations omitted].

Findings

[272] This issue revolves around the police treatment of a non-targeted resident of a home during the execution of a search warrant.

[273] The onus is on Ms. Thompson to establish that her arrest was arbitrary. Therefore, the issue here is whether the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest her?

[274] The following are the circumstances leading to the arrest.

[275] Based on information aided by the installation of a tracking device on Mr. Sangster's car, the police conducted surveillance of Mr. Sangster over a two-month period from May 2022 to July 2022.

[276] During that surveillance, Mr. Sangster was observed attending at both 220 Lebreton and 340 Macleod, having access to the garage, and entering the buildings at both locations. Accordingly, he had the means to control his entry into both buildings and there was direct evidence linking him to both buildings.

[277] In this case, the officers executing the Search Warrant at 750-340 McLeod were not aware that Ms. Thompson resided at 750-340 McLeod. She was not a target.

[278] As an experienced officer, with the information of the surveillance of the property and his belief that 340 McLeod location was being used as a stash house, he testified that as Ms. Thompson was in a stash location, she was arrestable at that point of time.

[279] The officers attended that location believing that there was going to be cocaine "that was going to be found inside that residence. And believing that – like I said, didn't believe anybody was gonna to be there. With her being present there, we believed that she has knowledge of what was going on inside that apartment".

[280] Turning to the Mohammed and Bissonnette cases where "arrest everyone in the vehicle" was a common theme amongst the police who testified.

[281] This case is distinguishable from Mohammed and Bissonnette because those cases involved individuals in a vehicle who were passengers and may not have necessarily known what was in the trunk of the vehicles they were passengers in. This is because a passenger of a vehicle is typically not the owner of the vehicle of which they are seated, and as such, may not necessarily have knowledge of the contents within the vehicle.

[282] The leading principles is set out in Anang, at paras. 14 and 22: arresting officers must subjectively believe they have reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and those grounds must be justified on an objective basis, as seen from the perspective of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of a police officer with comparable experience to that of the arresting officer.

[283] I note that in R. v. Okezie, 2025 ONCA 77, at para 7, the accused was seen on video with a handgun so the police got a warrant to search his home and car. The accused argued that though there were grounds to believe he had committed an offence, there was nothing connecting the firearm to his home or car. The court stated that as a "a matter of common sense" people store their possessions in their homes/property and it is not unreasonable to believe they do. Nothing more than that reasonable inference was required to support the issuance of the warrant.

[284] For reasons elaborated below, even though there may have been other options, I find that Det. Cox had subjective and objective grounds, based on his experience, to arrest Ms. Thompson. As an experienced officer involved in multiple drug investigations. He believed the 340 McLeod apartment to be a stash house. Det. Cox had the subjective grounds to arrest Ms. Thompson as she was in a location which he believed to be a stash house. He subjectively and objectively believed that she would have knowledge of what was taking place in the residence; and he believed she could be a "stash holder" or "stash keeper". He believed that she was arrestable.

[285] Det. Cox's experience cannot be accepted uncritically: Mackenzie, at para. 62.

[286] Here, the court heard diverse evidence from Det. Cox who admitted Ms. Thompson could have been detained for investigative purposes and not charged right away, and from another officer, Officer Payment, who testified that they do not always arrest anyone who is found in a stash house.

[287] Det. Cox indicated that throughout the investigation, there was no intel that would suggest that anybody would be present at the McLeod Street residence.

[288] Yet, Ms. Thompson was in her apartment and presumably had control of her apartment. As "a matter of common sense", she would have been aware of Mr. Sangster's frequent comings and goings to her apartment over the past few months.

[289] As stated, the officers had observed that Mr. Sangster would go from his Lebreton Street address and attend the McLeod Street address, leave with a bag, continue to do a drug deal, and then return to this location. The tracker on his vehicle also showed him going from his residence on Lebreton Street to the McLeod Street location, from which he would then go to areas where he would conduct a drug deal while under surveillance.

[290] Specifically, Det. Cox believed that she would have had knowledge of Mr. Sangster attending there and leaving and taking a bag or leaving a bag.

[291] The 750-340 McLeod apartment was Ms. Thompson's residence. Surveillance shows Mr. Sangster, a drug dealer, frequenting her place before and after what the police believed to be drug trafficking. As the person who lived at the residence, it is not unreasonable to believe that Ms. Thompson had knowledge of what was occurring in her residence. The apartment is small, and the cocaine was found in the bedroom closet.

[292] In conclusion, regardless of whether there were other options, the question is whether there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe she had committed an offence.

[293] In conclusion, I find that the police did have those grounds, and the court concludes that Ms. Thompson's arrest was not an arbitrary detention. Therefore, there was no breach of her s. 9 Charter rights.

Section 10(b) Breach of Ms. Thompson

[294] Det. Cox gave Ms. Thompson a soft caution at 12:30 when he arrested her. Cst. Witt gave Ms. Thompson her full rights to counsel 22 minutes later when she was in the cruiser and being transported to the OPS headquarters.

[295] Ms. Thompson was able to speak to her lawyer at 13:37, which was 69 minutes after she was taken into custody at 12:28.

Legal Framework

[296] Ms. Thompson bears the onus to establish that her right to be advised of her right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was breached.

[297] Section 10(b) of the Charter provides for certain rights that are triggered as soon as an individual is "detained" or "arrested" within the meaning of the section. Section 10(b) "ensures that people have a chance to challenge the lawfulness of an arrest or detention", by requiring that individuals be informed promptly of the reasons for their arrest or detention (s. 10(a)), and then having a meaningful opportunity to retain and instruct counsel without delay (s. 10(b)): R. v. Bielli, 2021 ONCA 222, 155 O.R. (3d) 568, at para. 85.

[298] The purpose of s. 10(b) is to provide detainees the opportunity to understand their right to remain silent, so they can make an informed decision about whether to waive that right: R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, at paras. 24-25, citing R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, at pp. 176-77. These rights combine to ensure that a suspect is able to make the choice to speak to the police investigators that is both free and informed: Sinclair, at para. 25.

[299] Section 10(b) places three duties on state authorities: 1) the duty to inform detainees of the right to counsel; 2) the duty to provide them with a reasonable opportunity to exercise this right; and 3) the duty to curtail questioning until that reasonable opportunity has been exercised. The first duty is an informational one. The second and third are implementation duties that are triggered only if a detainee expresses the wish to exercise the right to counsel.

[300] Police must advise of the right to counsel without delay and provide reasonable opportunity to exercise that right to counsel. R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, at paras. 37-42.

[301] In Suberu, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that police must advise the right to counsel without delay and provide reasonable opportunity to exercise that right. While "without delay" has been interpreted to mean immediately, this immediacy obligation is subject to concerns for officer or public safety or to reasonable limits justified by law and justified by s. 1 of the Charter: Suberu, at para. 2.

[302] Similarly, in R. v. Griffith, 2021 ONCA 302, 408 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at para. 38, the court described other reasons that could delay the right to counsel, including officer or public safety, safety concerns for the accused, preservation of evidence, medical reasons, and privacy.

[303] Therefore, in determining whether there is a delay in giving rights to a detainee, the court should look at all of the circumstances.

Findings

[304] As stated in Griffith, at para. 38, if there are concerns such as police or public safety, safety concerns for the accused, medical concerns, preservation of evidence, medical reasons or privacy, the right to counsel, both informational and implementation must be done without delay.

[305] At 12:30, Det. Cox told Ms. Thompson that she was under arrest for possession for purpose of trafficking, that she would have an opportunity to call a lawyer when she was at the police station, and that she was given a s. 524 warning.

[306] The court notes, however, that when Det. Cox handed Ms. Thompson over to Cst Witt, Ms. Thompson was very upset and crying and stated that she felt like she was going to faint. Cst. Witt advised Ms. Thompson to lean against the wall in the hallway to help support herself. About 20 minutes passed from the moment she felt faint until she retrieved some clothing (as she was wearing lounge clothes). This is because Cst. Witt told Ms. Thompson to bring some warm clothes as it could be cold in the cell block and provided Ms. Thompson the opportunity to leave some food and water for her dog, before they then went to Cst. Witt's cruiser.

[307] Cst. Witt indicated that Ms. Thompson was still upset when they were in the cruiser, and Ms. Thompson eventually calmed down. While in the cruiser, Cst. Witt provided Ms. Thompson her rights to counsel at 12:50. At 12:51, Cst. Witt gave Ms. Thompson a secondary caution and then the s. 524 arrest warning.

[308] Cst. Witt states she delayed in providing the formal right to counsel out of concern for Ms. Thompson's safety, her state of feeling faint, concern for her dignity as a result of her being in loungewear, and concern for her pet.

[309] Cst. Witt explained that the delay in giving Ms. Thompson her rights was because Ms. Thompson's demeanour and anxiety were heightened. Cst. Witt wanted Ms. Thompson to calm down and "get some air" so she could understand her rights because it was important that she understood her rights.

[310] While the police were waiting for Ms. Thompson to get over the shock of what was happening, they did not interrogate in her in any way and she did not provide any information.

[311] Cst. Witt further explained there was a delay of about 20 to 25 minutes at the sally port at the police station as there were two cruisers and a van in front of her.

[312] With respect to the informational right to counsel, there was a delay in providing Ms. Thompson her right to counsel, but this delay was because Cst. Witt was concerned with Ms. Thompson's mental state and obvious physical discomfort, including Ms. Thompson feeling faint.

[313] With respect to the implementation aspect, Ms. Thompson was given an opportunity to speak to a lawyer at 13:37, which was 69 minutes after she was taken into custody at 12:28.

[314] Once at the police cell block, Cst. Witt provided Ms. Thompson an opportunity to exercise her right to counsel.

[315] In the context of this case, a period of 69 minutes is not an insignificant delay and I find that there was a breach of Ms. Thompson's s. 10(b) rights.

Section 24(2) Analysis

Introduction

[316] The accused must establish that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Collins, at pp. 274-275; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 71.

[317] The threshold requirement — asks whether the evidence was "obtained in a manner" that infringed or denied a Charter right or freedom. The threshold requirement insists that there be a nexus between the Charter breach and the evidence, absent which s. 24(2) has no application.

[318] The court finds that the nexus exists here as the evidence was obtained with infringements of Charter rights: R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54.

[319] When evidence is obtained in breach of the Charter, the s. 24(2) inquiry then examines the impact of admitting this evidence on public confidence in the justice system over the long term, based on three lines of inquiry.

[320] The Grant test regarding the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) requires the court to consider and balance: 1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; 2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused; and 3) society's interest in adjudicating the case on the merits: para. 71.

[321] In R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 692, at para. 139, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the question to be decided under the s. 24(2) analysis is whether the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by the admission of the evidence: see also R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, at para. 42. This is because the Charter directs that such evidence must be excluded, not to punish police or compensate for a rights infringement, but because it is necessary to do so to maintain the "integrity of, and the public confidence in, the justice system": Le, at para. 139, citing Grant, at paras. 68-70.

[322] Further, at paras. 140-41, the Supreme Court of Canada in Le noted that while the first two lines of inquiry under the Grant test "typically work in tandem in the sense that both pull towards exclusion of the evidence, they need not pull with identical degrees of force in order to compel exclusion."

[323] It is also worth noting that, while Charter-infringing conduct may not be reckless, it does not mean that police acted in "good faith" or did not act in "bad faith" or that the absence of recklessness is a mitigating factor: R. v. Lafrance, 2022 SCC 32, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 393, at para. 95.

[324] Police conduct can be on a continuum of seriousness. As stated by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Kitaitchik, 161 O.A.C. 169, at para. 41, the s. 24(2) assessment should not "fixate on the legal label the trial judge attached to the police conduct."

Section 8 Breach – Lack of Notice

1. Seriousness of the Charter-Infringing State Conduct

[325] I find that the failure to include the notice provision in the General Warrants is a minor breach of s. 8.

[326] It was inadvertent, not deliberate, and reflected an honest mistake. It was not capricious.

[327] In R. v. Prince, 2019 ONSC 5567, Copeland J. (as she was then), at para. 82, did not find "that breach to be significant in terms of the s. 24(2) balancing." She found this to be a technical breach and then at para. 87 stated:

However, in my view, this breach is entitled to very little weight in the s. 24(2) analysis. First, on the case law, this type of breach or analogous breaches, such as failure to report to a justice, have not been considered to be a significant factor favouring exclusion of evidence for s. 24(2) purposes. [Citations omitted].

[328] This is not to say that the disclosure process should be a replacement for the requirement that notice be provided for covert operations. Nevertheless, the disclosure of the covert surveillance would attenuate the breach: see Pipping, at para. 68.

[329] Additionally, Det. Cox was not aware of the notice requirements. He and the OPS Drug Unit proceeded on the basis that they were acting on a legal warrant.

[330] It is important that they first obtained judicial authorization respecting the expectation of privacy. It reflects a competent and largely constitutionally sound investigation on the whole where the involved officers, though not perfect, were cognizant and respectful of Charter rights including:

• Tracking Mr. Sangster's vehicle;

• Entering into common areas of the apartments for surveillance of Mr. Sangster; and

• Search Warrants after receiving information from a CI that had been proven trustworthy in the past.

[331] The defence submits that the officers' conduct was negligent and their failure to follow the law is a dereliction of their duty as officers because they are entrusted with extensive powers in our society to investigate crime.

[332] I do not find that Det. Cox's failure to include the notice in the General Warrants demonstrates a blatant disregard of Charter rights or that he was negligent. He was just not aware of the requirement of the notice. It was a mistake that was also not caught by the issuing Justice who signed the General Warrants.

[333] Therefore, while there was no intent to violate Charter rights, this breach does reflect a misapprehension in the law of warrants, even though Det. Cox had been involved in approximately 12 other CDSA warrants. I note that Det. Renwick was aware that notice was required for a wiretap authorization and for a "sneak and peak" warrant but not for a General Warrant.

[334] I find this breach was a technical one and falls on the less serious end of the culpability scale as it was inadvertent, and Det. Cox held an honest belief that he was acting lawfully.

[335] In my view, it could equate to a breach for failure to report to a justice. See R. v. Garcia-Machado, 2015 ONCA 569, 126 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 67.

[336] The omission was done in the context of an investigation that was conducted by experienced officers who obtained numerous judicial authorizations each step of the way in their investigation.

[337] Certainly, the officers honestly believed that the General Warrant was valid.

[338] In this case, this mistake was closer to a good faith error made in the context of an investigation that was conducted in a highly professional manner.

[339] That is not to say that ignorance standards should be condoned. This is because as stated in Grant, at para. 75, "ignorance of Charter standards must not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith." Moreover, "the reputation of the administration of justice requires that courts should dissociate themselves from evidence obtained as a result of police negligence in meeting Charter standards": Le, at para. 143.

[340] I further note that Rosenberg J.A. stated in Rocha, at para. 28, that "[u]nless the applicant for exclusion of evidence can show that the warrant was obtained through use of false or deliberately misleading information, or the drafting of the ITO in some way subverted the warrant process, the obtaining of the warrant generally … tells in favour of admitting the evidence."

[341] Contrast this with R. v. Szilagyi, 2018 ONCA 695, 142 O.R. (3d) 700, another Court of Appeal for Ontario decision involving a CI. In Szilagyi, the ITO was prepared with serious and significant deficiencies with insufficient indicia of the credibility and reliability of the main CI and failed to seek any meaningful corroboration of the informant's tip: para. 52.

[342] In conclusion, the court finds that this factor weighs in favour of admission of the evidence.

2. The Impact of the Breaches on the Accused's Charter-Protected Rights

[343] The defence agrees that the failure to provide notice was a technical breach but since the police entered into the common areas of the buildings, this had an impact on the interests of the accused because there is an expectation of privacy in the common areas.

[344] The police did access the common hallways of the two apartments at 220 Lebreton and 340 McLeod. However, this privacy interest is on the low end of the spectrum.

[345] As to this line of inquiry, the court must situate the accused's Charter-protected interests on a spectrum measuring the impact ranging from impacts that are fleeting, technical, transient, or trivial to those that are profoundly intrusive or that seriously compromise the interests underlying their rights. The greater the impact on the Charter interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Tim, at para. 90.

[346] The police had grounds for the search despite the lack of notice.

[347] The evidence could have been obtained without the breach and this lessens, but does not extinguish the impact on the accused.

[348] However, the expectation of privacy for Mr. Sangster at the McLeod Street residence is lower than Ms. Thompson, as it was not his home.

[349] Ultimately, the defence obtained the information regarding the surveillance as part of the disclosure process as follows:

• On November 2, 2022, Det. Payment's surveillance report dated June 14, 2022, where he observed Mr. Sangster enter Unit 750 while he was inside 340 McLeod;

• On November 7, 2022, Det. Renwick's activity report dated July 4, 2022, where he was inside 220 Lebreton and observed that Unit 8 was the unit that Mr. Sangster was observed entering;

• The defence were told about the existence of the General Warrants for both locations in the disclosure package dated August 15, 2022; and

• On October 12, 2022, the ITO for the General Warrants were disclosed.

[350] The notice provision is statutorily mandated and cannot be reduced to simply a "technicality" such that associated breaches are not taken the least bit seriously. But the reality here is that the police were acting in a manner respectful of Charter rights; but did not appreciate that the notice provision applied to non-wiretap warrants so did not include it. The issuing judge did not know this either.

[351] In my view, the breach had little to no impact on the accused.

[352] Accordingly, this factor weighs in favour of admission of the evidence.

3. Society's Interest in the Adjudication of the Case on Its Merits

[353] I am mindful that the court should distance itself from serious and impactful Charter-infringing conduct in order to maintain the integrity and public confidence in the justice system.

[354] The public has an interest to see the determination of a case on the merits where the offence charged is serious, and also has an interest in having a justice system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for the accused are high: Grant, at para. 84.

[355] The charges before the court are serious charges of dealing multi-ounce cocaine, over two kilograms. The impugned evidence is reliable and is important to the Crown's case.

[356] Specifically, the cocaine seized at the McLeod Street residence and the cash seized at the Lebreton Street residence are highly reliable evidence, which is critical to the prosecution. The exclusion would impact negatively on the repute of the administration of justice.

[357] Society desires that drug cases be adjudicated based on evidence seized from lawful conduct. This factor weighs in favour of admission of the evidence.

Section 8 Breaches – Search Warrants for Both Locations

1. Seriousness of the Charter-Infringing State Conduct

[358] There was no attempt by the affiant to mislead the issuing justice, nor was there wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights.

[359] The court found that the issuing justice could have otherwise issued the Search Warrant, except for the excision.

[360] The police had engaged in previous judicial authorizations (General Warrant and tracking warrant). There was no attempt to circumvent Charter rights.

[361] This factor weighs in favour of admission of the evidence.

2. The Impact of the Breach on the Charter-Protected Interests of the Accused

[362] The search involved residences and this is a significant intrusion into privacy interests: see Pipping, at paras. 77-78.

[363] This factor weighs in favour of exclusion of the evidence.

3. Society's Interest in the Adjudication of the Case on Its Merits

[364] The police seized cocaine with a value of approximately $218,000 (2158.2 grams of cocaine) at 750-340 McLeod. This highly reliable evidence is critical to the prosecution's case.

[365] The police seized cash (which they allege are proceeds from crime) at 8-220 Lebreton which is again highly reliable evidence critical to the Crown's case.

[366] The exclusion of the above evidence would negatively impact the prosecution of a serious drug trafficking case.

[367] This factor weighs in favour of the admission of the evidence.

Section 10 Rights of Ms. Thompson

1. Seriousness of the Charter-Infringing State Conduct

[368] There was a delay in the informational component of her s. 10(b) rights and there was also a delay in the implementation of her s. 10 rights.

[369] The importance of the right to counsel was addressed by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745, 143 O.R. (3d) 135, at para. 45 when he described it as: "a lifeline for detained persons" and that with legal advice and guidance they do not have "the sense that they are entirely at the mercy of the police while detained. The psychological value of access to counsel without delay should not be underestimated."

[370] The defence concedes that the informational component of the s.10 breach of Ms. Thompson's rights was not as strong as set out in their materials. Nevertheless, the defence submits there was still a delay and Ms. Thompson's right to counsel was not given immediately as required by the Charter.

[371] Det. Cox provided Ms. Thompson a "soft warning" of her right to counsel, but when Ms. Thompson was handed over to Cst. Witt, Ms. Thompson was frantic and required some consoling. At that time, Ms. Thompson stated she felt faint, had to be told to lean up against the wall to support herself, had to obtain proper clothing for the cell block, and took some time to ensure that her dog had food and water before she left her apartment.

[372] Although the right to counsel is critical and must be done immediately, I accept Cst. Witt's testimony that, given Ms. Thompson's demeanour and mental state in the presence of the police, she would not have been able to fully understand and comprehend her right to counsel at the moment of their first interaction. Cst. Witt was sensitive to Ms. Thompson's emotional state and physical wellbeing, as demonstrated by her concern for Ms. Thompson's state of dress and when she opened the window to allow for air flow in the cruiser.

[373] I find it was understandable to delay giving Ms. Thompson her rights until she had calmed down and could understand and appreciate them.

[374] Additionally, the implementation of Ms. Thompson's right to counsel took place at 13:37, after Ms. Thompson was arrested by Det. Cox at 12:30. I also consider the fact that there was a short delay at the sally port.

[375] As such, I find that any s. 10(b) delay was due solely because of Ms. Thompson's physical and mental state and the delay at the police station for her to contact a lawyer was not overly delayed.

[376] This factor favours inclusion of the evidence.

2. The Impact of the Breaches on the Accused's Charter-Protected Rights

[377] With respect to s. 10 rights, although Ms. Thompson was handcuffed, she was comforted by Cst. Witt.

[378] As discussed, Cst. Witt instructed Ms. Thompson to lean up against the wall when she was feeling faint, provided Ms. Thompson the opportunity get appropriate clothing for the cell block (as she was wearing loungewear), and make arrangements for her dog.

[379] Once in the back of the cruiser, Ms. Thompson remained very upset. She cried, stating it was hot. As a result, Cst. Witt opened the windows in her cruiser and turned on the air conditioning.

[380] Also of note, the police did not attempt to elicit any information from Ms. Thompson and ask her any questions until her formal right to counsel was provided.

[381] Ms. Thompson was not questioned nor prompted to speak during this period of time.

[382] Thus, the impact of the s. 10 breach on Ms. Thompson was minimal.

[383] This factor favours inclusion of the evidence.

3. Society's Interest in Adjudicating the Case on the Merits

[384] Again, the evidence is reliable and credible evidence.

[385] This factor favours inclusion of the evidence.

Balancing

[386] Ultimately, once the court has completed its assessment under the above three lines of inquiry, the court must balance those assessments "to determine whether, considering all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute": Grant, at para. 71.

[387] In Beaver, at para. 133-134 the Supreme Court:

[133] The final step in the s. 24(2) analysis involves weighing each line of inquiry to determine whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This balancing has a prospective function: it aims to ensure that evidence obtained through a Charter breach does not cause further damage to the justice system. It is also societal in scope: its goal is not to punish the police but to address systemic concerns involving the broad impact of admitting the evidence on the long‑term repute of the justice system (see Grant, at paras. 69-70 and 85-86; Le, at para. 139; Tim, at para. 98).

[388] The defence argues that the evidence was obtained through multiple, serious Charter violations and its admission would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system.

[389] The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that: "the more serious the state-infringing conduct and the greater the impact on the Charter-protected interests, the stronger the pull for exclusion": R. v. McGuffie, 2016 ONCA 365, 131 O.R. (3d) 643, at para. 62.

[390] As stated in R. v. Truong, 2025 ONCA 69, 445 C.C.C. (3d) 141, at paras. 42-43, all breaches must be considered as well as the cumulative effect of the breaches.

[391] First, I find that there was no "pattern of abuse" or systemic Charter breaches in this case. R. v. Harflett, 2016 ONCA 248, 336 C.C.C. (3d) 102.

[392] With respect to the s. 8 breach of lack of notice, all lines of inquiry weighed in favour of inclusion of the evidence.

[393] Further, there was no malicious intent by the police, who were not aware of the notice requirement. It was not a significant breach which led to the s. 8 breaches. The impact on the accused was not significant as the General Warrant was issued and the Search Warrant, but for the excision, was otherwise valid.

[394] With respect to the s.8 breach of the search warrants, only the second line of inquiry weighed in favour of exclusion of the evidence.

[395] The affiant made a mistake relating to the notice provision in the general warrants and had no impact on the accused as the search warrant was otherwise valid and the accused received notice of the surveillance in a timely way through disclosure.

[396] The application of the three inquiries into the delay of Ms. Thompson's rights under s. 10(b) did not weigh in favour of exclusion of the evidence.

[397] This is not a case where the first and second inquiries of the Charter breaches made a strong case for exclusion and therefore, the third inquiry could tip the balance in favour of admissibility.

[398] Therefore, the balancing of all of the Grant factors weighs in favour of admitting the evidence.

[399] I find that despite the breaches, the admission of the evidence seized would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Conclusion

[400] Accordingly, the court dismisses the defence Charter applications.

Date: September 2, 2025

Justice A. Doyle