ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025-04-01
COURT FILE No.: Windsor 22-81103420
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
CORY LECLAIR
Before Justice S. G. Pratt
Sentencing submissions heard on 12 February 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on 1 April 2025
Counsel:
S. Odom — Counsel for the Crown
M. Ertel — Counsel for the Defendant
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
1On 3 December 2024, I found the Offender Cory Leclair guilty of two offences: the unlicensed possession of a prohibited firearm, and the possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. My complete reasons for conviction can be found at 2024 ONCJ 624. I heard sentencing submissions on 12 February 2025. These are my reasons for sentence.
Facts
2My detailed factual findings are set out in the reasons for conviction cited above. Briefly, the Offender was with two people in downtown Windsor the night of the offences. An altercation broke out with another group as the Offender and Jamie Labelle crossed Riverside Drive. That altercation led to Mr. Labelle producing a handgun from a satchel he was carrying. After the other group fled, the Offender took the gun and satchel and left the area. Shortly afterward, he put the satchel under the vehicle belonging to the third person in their group, Christina Roberts. It is this possession, from the end of the altercation to his deposit of the firearm under the car, that led to his convictions.
Positions of the Parties
3Crown counsel seeks a three-year penitentiary term. This sentence, it is argued, is in keeping with the seriousness of the offence and the danger the Offender created by his actions that night.
4Defence counsel seeks a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by two years of probation. He points to the Offender’s antecedents and low risk of re-offending in support of this position. He also recommends the Offender be ordered to perform a significant amount of community service as part of his sentence.
5There are several ancillary orders that must accompany the sentence imposed. These were not opposed by the Offender’s counsel.
The Pre-Sentence Report
6I have had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) provided by Probation Officer Rebecca Rowsell. Ms. Rowsell is from the Ottawa probation office and completed the report because that is where the Offender resides.
7The PSR described a very difficult upbringing for the Offender. He was raised by his mother. He had no relationship with his father until his teenage years. Before that, he was told repeatedly by his mother what a bad person his father was. He was also the regular target of verbal abuse by both his mother and grandmother. His cousin, Richard Guertin, recalled them telling the Offender things like “you’re useless, you’re just like your father” and “you’re a waste of space” on a regular basis. The home was an unstable one where meeting everyday needs was a struggle.
8The Offender told Ms. Rowsell he felt he’d been raised by the streets. Despite this lack of support in the home, and despite those streets being in the economically-challenged area of Vanier, the Offender managed to complete high school. He left school for a period after the birth of his first child, but returned and earned his diploma. He has since obtained a certification as a security guard, and now owns his own construction business. At the age of 18, the Offender taught himself to read.
9While the Offender does not hold Indigenous status, his family does have Indigenous heritage. His grandmother experienced firsthand the damage caused by residential schools. Mr. Guertin noted that alcoholism runs in the family. I suspect those points are not unrelated.
10The Offender has seven children, ranging in age from 3 to 20. He currently resides with his 20-year-old son and 14-year-old daughter. He is involved in family court proceedings where he is trying to obtain custody of his other children. According to the PSR, the Offender takes great pride in being a father and wants to set a good example for his children.
11Regarding alcohol and substance use, the Offender says his drinking is not problematic. While he drank heavily in his time as a security guard working in the night club industry, that is no longer the case. The more concerning issue is his heavy use of marijuana. He told Ms. Rowsell that he uses approximately one ounce of marijuana every 2-3 days. This is a significant amount being consumed on a daily basis. He said he uses it in part to address ongoing back pain, but even Mr. Guertin observed that the Offender could “significantly reduce his use of the substance.”
12When asked about the offences, the Offender maintained his innocence. That is his right, and I take nothing from it. He went on to express his concern for bystanders, noting that someone could have been hurt. It’s not clear if he’s referring to Mr. Labelle’s use of the firearm or his own hiding of it afterward, but it’s positive that he at least acknowledges the danger the situation presented.
13Overall, the PSR is positive. Despite an abusive childhood growing up in a difficult part of the city, the Offender finished high school and obtained steady employment. He now owns his own business. He is a father with a clear desire to be in his children’s lives. His cousin Mr. Guertin says he is a good person who wants to help others. The PSR mentioned his involvement in charitable activities. He has no prior criminal record.
14I am a bit concerned, however, that some of the Offender’s social contacts may be less than positive influences on him. Most obvious on this point is Mr. Labelle. On the night of the offences, he was walking around downtown Windsor, extremely intoxicated, with a loaded handgun concealed in a bag. His judgment was so poor that he immediately produced the gun when an argument started with a group of strangers. That decision led to the Offender’s decision to hide the gun, which led to his conviction. The Offender described Mr. Labelle as his brother. If the Offender is serious in his desire to live a positive life and to be a good father, he can’t associate with armed criminals. It’s really that simple.
Principles of Sentencing
15Offences involving firearms are treated very seriously by Parliament. The toll taken on Canadian society by gun crime is as clear as it is heartbreaking. Those who choose to engage in criminal activity using firearms will be treated harshly by the courts. Society demands nothing less.
16Denunciation and deterrence must be given paramount consideration by a sentencing court. Sentencing objectives like rehabilitation and reintegration cannot be ignored, but they must be subordinate. The protection of society must be a sentencing court’s guiding motivation.
17Not all firearm offences, however, are created equal. For example, the use of a firearm in the commission of an offence is likely to be seen as more serious than simply possessing that firearm without using it. Even possession offences can vary widely in their commission. This was the Supreme Court of Canada’s observation in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, where the three-year mandatory minimum sentence for offences under s. 95 was ruled unconstitutional. Possession can take many different forms and occur under many different contexts. The impact on public safety will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
18The Criminal Code also directs sentencing judges to impose sentences that are proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the level of responsibility of the offender. Further, s. 718.2(d) and (e) state as follows:
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.
19Counsel for the Offender seeks a conditional sentence of imprisonment. These sentences are governed by s. 742 and onward. Section 742.1 sets out when conditional sentences can be imposed:
742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3, if
(a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2;
(b) the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;
(c) the offence is not an offence under any of the following provisions:
(i) section 239, for which a sentence is imposed under paragraph 239(1)(b) (attempt to commit murder),
(ii) section 269.1 (torture), or
(iii) section 318 (advocating genocide); and
(d) the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more.
20The imposition of a conditional sentence is not precluded by paragraphs b, c, or d. Crown counsel concedes the sentence is legally available. I will consider s. 742.1(a) later in these reasons.
Caselaw
21The Crown provided several cases in support of its position. Like most sentencing authorities, none are entirely similar factually but all provide some guidance to me.
22The case of R. v. Serrano and Samaniego, 2018 ONSC 6785 bears some factual similarity to the case at bar. Samaniego was denied entry into a bar by security. He showed the guard he had a gun. He passed that gun to Serrano, who entered the club. When he later exited the club, he dropped the gun. He picked it up and the two left the area. Police were called when the dropped gun was seen, and the pair were quickly apprehended. When police caught up to them, Serrano was seen to throw the gun on the ground. Like the Offender, it is not alleged Serrano did anything with the gun other than hold it (ostensibly for Samaniego). Both were convicted following trial.
23Serrano was 36 years old with a limited criminal record. He had family support and had been employed until he was involved in a motor vehicle collision.
24The evidence showed Serrano was in possession of the gun for less than four minutes. He was in the club with the gun for 30-40 seconds. The 911 call was made at 1:01 am, and police had the gun located and secured by 1:04 am.
25In the end, Serrano was sentenced to 31 months and 3 weeks of imprisonment. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal at 2020 ONCA 439.
[26] There are several similarities between Serrano and the Offender:
(1) Both cases involve sentencing post-trial;
(2) Both involve brief possession of a firearm primarily held by another party;
(3) Both involve discarding of the firearm;
(4) Both are otherwise prosocial individuals with family and community support;
(5) Both support their children; and
(6) Both served long periods on judicial interim release without incident.
27The case of R. v. Blagrove-Robinson, an unreported 2022 decision of Justice Himel of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, is factually quite different and objectively more serious. That offender was on bail awaiting sentencing for drug offences when he was apprehended with a loaded handgun, a large amount of money, and approximately 800g of a “white, crystalline substance”, though I note the substance was not identified and no plea was entered with regard to it.
28That offender was sentenced to 3 ½ years on the s. 95(1) offence, in addition to other sentences for other counts. Here, the Crown relies on it for support in their argument for a three-year sentence.
29There are important differences between Blagrove-Robinson and the Offender. Blagrove-Robinson’s conduct was objectively more serious when he brought a loaded firearm into a shopping mall. He had pleaded guilty to very serious drug charges and was violating the terms of his bail at the time of the firearm offence. While I agree the case provides a useful review of sentencing principles in firearms cases, the sentence ultimately imposed on Blagrove-Robinson arose from factors not present in the case at bar.
30R. v. Francis, 2022 ONCA 729 was a sentence appeal where the Court of Appeal reduced the offender’s sentence for possessing a loaded firearm and possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking from seven years to five years. The appeal reminded sentencing courts of the need to emphasize denunciation and deterrence while not ignoring other sentencing principles. It also focused on the concept of restraint when imposing a first sentence of incarceration. While the decision discussed restraint in the context of a “youthful” first offender (Francis was 23 years old at the time of the offences), the principle applies to all offenders facing their first prison sentence.
31Even giving restraint its proper application, and despite his positive rehabilitative prospects, he was still sentenced to five years custody.
32The case of R. v. Raybe, 2024 ONSC 7077 involved an offender who pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing a loaded firearm contrary to s. 95(1). Each count arose from a separate incident. Most importantly, each arose from encounters where Raybe fired the gun. In the first, no one fired at Raybe. In the second, he was in his vehicle returning fire that had come from another vehicle. In that exchange, he was shot in the shoulder. Justice Goldstein reviewed the offender’s circumstances and imposed two 3 ½ year sentences, to be served consecutively.
33Finally, in R. v. Walters, 2023 ONCA 4, the Court of Appeal upheld a total sentence of 38 months for a combination of drug and gun offences related to a loaded handgun, two overcapacity magazines, additional ammunition, and two baggies with approximately 7g of cocaine. These items were found in a bedroom closet and night table. The facts surrounding the possession of that firearm are clearly quite different from those surrounding the Offender’s possession.
34The notion that a conditional sentence can be imposed for s. 95(1) offences is not entirely novel. In the case of R. v. Moye, 2024 O.J. No. 4076 (C.J.), the offender got into an argument with a bar employee. Police were called. On searching Moye, they found a loaded .22 calibre handgun in his satchel, together with 40 additional rounds. He pleaded guilty to an offence under s. 95(1). The Crown sought a three-year prison sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence of two years less a day.
35Moye came before the Court with a challenging history. His family had arrived in Canada as Sudanese refugees, fleeing civil war. He had difficulties in school and serious problems with drugs and alcohol. He said the offence was committed due to financial pressures and debts. Since the offence, his family noted a drastic improvement in his behaviour. Justice West was satisfied Moye had strong rehabilitative prospects, and that therefore he had to balance denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation and restraint.
36His Honour quoted with approval the words of Justice Wagner (as he then was) in the case of R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R.1089, at paragraphs 57 and 58:
57 Sentencing ranges are nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives. However, they should not be considered "averages", let alone straitjackets, but should instead be seen as historical portraits for the use of sentencing judges, who must still exercise their discretion in each case:
Even when an appellate court has established a range, it may be that a fact pattern will arise, which is sufficiently dissimilar to past decisions that the "range", as it were, must be expanded. The fundamental point is that a "range" is not a straitjacket to the exercise of discretion of a sentencing judge. (R. v. Keepness, 2010 SKCA 69, 359 Sask. R. 34, at para. 24)
58 There will always be situations that call for a sentence outside a particular range: although ensuring parity in sentencing is in itself a desirable objective, the fact that each crime is committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile cannot be disregarded. The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation. It involves a variety of factors that are difficult to define with precision. This is why it may happen that a sentence that, on its face, falls outside a particular range, and that may never have been imposed in the past for a similar crime, is not demonstrably unfit. Once again, everything depends on the gravity of the offence, the offender's degree of responsibility and the specific circumstances of each case. LeBel J. commented as follows on this subject:
A judge can order a sentence outside that range as long as it is in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing. Thus, a sentence falling outside the regular range of appropriate sentences is not necessarily unfit. Regard must be had to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, and to the needs of the community in which the offence occurred. (Nasogaluak, at para. 44)
37His Honour also cited Justice Copeland, then of the Superior Court of Justice, who noted at paragraph 76 of R. v. Stewart, 2022 O.J. No. 4656 (S.C.J.) that:
The Court of Appeal has also recognized that in some cases, particularly those involving young adults with no criminal record and good prospects for rehabilitation, a conditional sentence of imprisonment may be an appropriate sentence even for serious firearm possession offences: Morris at paras. 124-28, 180-81; Desmond-Robinson.
38While I might not call the Offender a “young adult” at the time of the offences – he was 35 years old – I would still find these principles to be available for application. There should be no age cutoff beyond which sentencing options cease to be applicable. Keeping all options open underscores the individualized nature of the sentencing process. Courts should be open to impose sentences they deem fit, so long as they reflect consideration of appropriate principles and the overarching purpose of sentencing.
39In the end, Justice West imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day. The Court took into account the rehabilitative efforts made by Moye together with his difficult upbringing and prospects for a productive future.
40Certainly, one important factor in that offender’s favour that is missing from the case at bar is the mitigation of a guilty plea.
41In the case of R. v. Papilota, 2024 O.J. No. 3567 (S.C.J.), Justice Himel (the trial judge in Blagrove-Robinson, supra) sentenced an offender to a conditional sentence of two years less a day following a guilty plea to the illegal possession of an unloaded shotgun and a loaded handgun, together with additional ammunition for both, inside a residence. Papilota was 32 years old and had no prior record. He owned a business that managed a staff of six. He had been compliant with his bail conditions and had good rehabilitative prospects.
42At paragraph 48 of the decision, Justice Himel stated:
I have considered the need for denunciation and deterrence in this case. However, I am mindful that Mr. Papilota is relatively young, has no criminal record and has stable family and friends who support him. He has a business which has proven to be successful and in which he employs five people; he wishes to continue this business with his partner. Permitting Mr. Papilota to serve his sentence in the community will allow him to continue his rehabilitation and be a productive member of society. In reaching this sentence I am mindful that Mr. Papilota has been on a release to reside with his sureties with strict house arrest for a portion of it and a less strict release permitting him to work and be subject to a curfew. These terms that have been in place since his release on February 17, 2022, following his arrest and are a factor I consider in fashioning the appropriate sentence as is discussed in R. v. Downes, (2006), 2006 ONCA 3957, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (Ont. C.A.).
43A lot of what Papilota had going for him applies to the Offender as well: he is relatively young, has no prior record, owns his own business, and is otherwise a productive member of society. He has also been on bail for nearly 18 months without incident.
44Again, what is missing is the mitigation of a guilty plea. As well, the context of the possession is different. Papilota had the firearms in his residence, while the Offender personally possessed the firearm before discarding it under the Roberts vehicle.
45In summary, while a conditional sentence of imprisonment may be an unusual outcome in a case of firearm possession, it is not unheard of.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
46Any illegal possession of a loaded firearm is a serious criminal offence. There are features in this case that make it even more so.
47First, the location of the possession is significant. Unlike, for example, the offender in Papilota, supra, this firearm was not possessed in the confines of a residence. It was on a public street in downtown Windsor. This presented a grave danger to the public, even at that late hour. The prior consumption of alcohol and the angry altercation with the other group further add to the seriousness and danger of the situation.
48The manner in which the firearm was dealt with by the Offender is also aggravating. He did not return it to Mr. Labelle or surrender it to police. Instead, he hid it under the Roberts vehicle and left it unattended. This increased the potential danger the firearm represented.
49That said, it is not as though he left it in plain view on a street corner in the middle of the day. It was in a bag and hidden under his friend’s vehicle late at night. The Offender presumably expected Ms. Roberts to show up shortly afterward. Had Amer Kadri not happened to be sitting in the vehicle next to it, it would likely never have been found before Ms. Roberts returned to the car and collected it. The way in which the Offender discarded the gun is aggravating, but it is not on par with the actions in Serrano, supra, where the defendant threw the gun away when confronted by police.
50The Crown argues that the Offender not being licensed to possess firearms is an aggravating factor. I must respectfully disagree as not holding a valid license is an element of each offence. I cannot use an element of an offence as an aggravating factor (see: Lacasse, supra).
51The primary mitigating factor is the lack of a prior record. The Crown argued that this is not a mitigating factor but rather the lack of an aggravating factor. Again, I disagree. The caselaw is replete with references to the lack of a prior record being a mitigating factor, including the Supreme Court of Canada accepting that reasoning by the trial judge in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2019] S.C.J. No. 100. A person’s status as a first-time offender is almost always an important mitigating circumstance.
52That the Offender has managed to stay out of trouble for the first 3 ½ decades of his life, despite an abusive upbringing and negative peers, speaks well of his rehabilitative prospects and strengthens the idea that this was out of character for him. He has held stable employment and now owns a business. He is active in his community. These are all good things.
53It is also in his favour that he has been on bail for the last 17 ½ months without incident. This speaks to his ability to follow the rules and informs my decision on the type of sentence I should impose.
54The one mitigating factor glaring in its omission is the lack of a guilty plea. I do not say that to suggest he should not have maintained the presumption of innocence through this trial, or put the Crown to the proof of its case. Rather, I mention it as a potentially important distinguishing factor that sets his case apart from those cited above where conditional sentences were imposed.
55Counsel also pointed to the brief period of possession in this case. While I agree the specific circumstances of this case show possession for only a short period of time, there is no minimum time requirement set out in the sections. To put it another way, any illegal firearm possession is bad; it can be made even worse by aggravating circumstances, but brevity of possession is not mitigating.
Analysis
56Is a conditional sentence appropriate in this case? The answer turns on my application of s. 742.1(a). Again, that portion of the Criminal Code states the following:
742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3, if
(a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2;
57First, I must consider if a sentence of less than two years is appropriate. Only if that answer is yes do I then go on to consider if a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the community or be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
58I recognize the significant caselaw that suggests three years is the starting point for illegal firearm possession that does not fall into the quasi-regulatory category of offences. Three years was the mandatory minimum sentence set by Parliament until it was struck down in Nur, supra. Even after the Supreme Court’s decision, three years was widely accepted as the starting point for illegal firearm possession undertaken in a criminal context.
59The law, however, has not remained static. Several of the cases I’ve noted above allow for greater discretion on the part of a sentencing judge. Sentences of less than three years have been imposed in circumstances similar to (or arguably worse than) the present case. Given the lack of a mandatory minimum sentence, and the disparity in various courts’ treatment of the offence, I find a sentence of less than two years for this Offender would be within the range of fit sentences available to me. Even lacking the strong mitigation of a guilty plea, I find the Offender’s circumstances, together with the unique genesis of his possession, allow for a reformatory sentence in this case.
60I turn now to paragraph (a) of s. 742.1. Before I do, I pause to make a few observations of what a conditional sentence actually is.
61From R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 onward, courts have been clear that a conditional sentence is a jail sentence. It is not probation. Chief Justice Lamer compared the two regimes in detail, beginning at paragraph 23. A conditional sentence is a sentence of custody an offender is given the opportunity to begin serving in the community. Whether they complete the sentence in the community is entirely up to them. The consequences of breaching a conditional sentence are much harsher than breaching a probation order: the presumption is that whatever remains of the conditional sentence at the time of the breach will be served in a jail cell. A breach of a probation order may lead to a charge under s. 733.1. This charge would carry with it all the Charter protections to which criminal defendants are entitled. They would be presumed innocent. If the Crown wanted them to stay in custody pending trial, they would have to convince a court that detention is necessary (assuming s. 515(6) does not apply). At trial, the Crown would have to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The procedure on a breach of a conditional sentence is very different. The Crown need only show a breach on a balance of probabilities. Once that is done, there is no burden on the Crown to explain why custody is a necessary result. The burden is on the offender to explain why it isn’t.
62Further, it is entirely possible to craft a conditional sentence that would achieve the goals of denunciation and deterrence in an appropriate case. Conditional sentences can be punitive while simultaneously encouraging rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
63Would a conditional sentence in this case endanger the safety of the community? After careful consideration of the circumstances of this offence and this Offender, I find the answer is no. Conditions could be structured to manage whatever risk the Offender may pose. In making that determination, I consider the way in which these offences were committed. The Offender was with two people, one of whom was armed with a gun. There is no evidence the Offender knew that. When a group of strangers and Mr. Labelle took issue with each other, Ms. Roberts immediately inserted herself into the situation. Rather than escalate the altercation, the Offender stayed back and was himself assaulted. Even after that, he remained a distance away from the developing melee. Only after it was done and the strangers had departed did he take the satchel and firearm from Mr. Labelle. To that point, the Offender had been chiefly focused on helping Mr. Labelle walk upright and cross the street safely.
64Once he took possession of the gun, he walked a short distance and hid it under Ms. Roberts’ car. He did not keep it or brandish it himself. He did not remove it from the bag. His goal, it would seem, was to remove the gun from the scene and protect the person he referred to in the PSR as being like his brother.
65The Offender was not a participant in the violent encounter between the strangers and his friends. He was not looking for trouble. His actions following that encounter were reckless, hazardous, and illegal, but his conduct is not that of a dangerous criminal. Adding to these circumstances the fact that he has no prior criminal record leads me to the conclusion that a conditional sentence with sufficiently restrictive terms would not endanger the safety of the community.
66On that point, I also note the Offender is no stranger to following conditions. For the last 17 ½ months he has obeyed the conditions of his release without incident. This supports the notion that he would similarly follow the terms of a conditional sentence.
67Finally, would a conditional sentence be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing? Those principles include protecting society and fostering respect for the law. Sentences achieve those goals through the use of sanctions that denounce and deter illegal conduct, and that help to rehabilitate offenders. Any sentence, whether custodial or not, must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
68I must prioritize denunciation and deterrence. Without question, the Offender’s crimes are serious. But I cannot ignore the prospects of rehabilitation for a stable 35-year-old first offender with a job and family responsibilities. But for this one incident, he has stayed out of trouble and been a productive citizen despite growing up in a difficult area with several personal challenges. He is clearly a person who can succeed when he sets his mind to it. Denunciation and deterrence must be the paramount considerations. They cannot be the exclusive considerations.
69Taking the guiding caselaw into account, together with the will of Parliament as enacted in the Criminal Code, and most importantly the specific facts of this case and of this Offender, I find a lengthy and punitive conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. Such a sentence would send the message that firearm possession, regardless of the circumstances, will attract a custodial sentence. Even momentary possession only motivated by a desire to help a friend will result in a long jail sentence. Giving the Offender the chance to begin that sentence in the community will honour the principles of restraint and proportionality. If the Offender squanders this chance, he should understand what is likely waiting for him.
Sentence
70The Offender will be sentenced as follows:
(1) A sentence of two years less one day, to be served as a conditional sentence. Terms of the conditional sentence, in addition to the statutory terms, will be:
- (a) Report in person to a supervisor within two working days of today’s date and after that, at all times and places as directed by the supervisor or any person authorized by a supervisor to assist in your supervision.
- (b) Co-operate with your supervisor. You must sign any releases necessary to permit the supervisor to monitor your compliance and you must provide proof of compliance with any condition of this Order to your supervisor on request.
- (c) Live at a place approved of by the supervisor and not change that address without obtaining the consent of the supervisor in advance.
- (d) The home confinement condition will be in effect for the full duration of the sentence. You are to remain in your residence or on the property of your residence at all times except:
(i) Between the hours of 12pm – 4pm each Saturday in order to acquire the necessities of life;
(ii) For any medical emergency involving you or any member of your immediate family;
(iii) For going directly to and from or being at school, employment, court attendances, religious services and legal or medical or dental appointments;
(iv) For going directly to or from and being at assessment, treatment or counselling sessions;
(v) For going directly to or from and performing community service hours; and
(vi) For carrying out any legal obligations regarding compliance with this Conditional Sentence Order. - (e) Do not associate or communicate in any way, by any physical, electronic or other means, or be in the company of Jamie Labelle or Christina Roberts.
- (f) Do not be within 100m of any place where you know any of the above named persons to live, work, go to school, or any place you know the persons to be except for required court attendances.
- (g) Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
- (h) Do not buy, possess or consume alcohol or other intoxicating substances.
- (i) Do not possess or consume any unlawful drugs or substances except with a valid prescription in your name or those available over the counter.
- (j) Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the supervisor and complete them to the satisfaction of the supervisor for substance abuse.
- (k) Perform 150 hours of community service work on a rate and schedule to be directed by the supervisor.
(2) Following his conditional sentence, the Offender will be placed on probation for a period of two years. Probationary terms, in addition to the statutory terms, will be:
- (a) Do not associate or communicate in any way, by any physical, electronic or other means, or be in the company of Jamie Labelle or Christina Roberts.
- (b) Do not be within 100m of any place where you know any of the above named persons to live, work, go to school, or any place you know the persons to be except for required court attendances.
- (c) Do not possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
(3) The Offender will provide a sample of his DNA to the Windsor Police Service for inclusion in the national DNA databank on or before 30 April 2025. This order will apply to both counts as both are secondary DNA offences.
(4) There will be a weapons prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code for ten years.
(5) There will be an order under s. 491 of the Criminal Code for the forfeiture of the firearm in question to His Majesty the King.
(6) Finally, there will be a $200 Victim Surcharge on each offence, payable within six months.
71Supervision of the conditional sentence and of probation can be transferred to the city of Ottawa if the Offender desires.
72The Offender needs to understand this is an unusual sentence for these offences. He should not take the chance he’s being given lightly.
Released: 1 April 2025
Signed: Justice S. G. Pratt