Delinda Hayton

The Crown applied for forfeiture of cash found on Mr. Breton's property, alleging it was proceeds of crime under sections 462.43 and 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony regarding drug trafficking patterns and currency bundling.

The court found that the large sums of cash found buried in the garage, along with cocaine and digital scales, were proceeds of crime, dismissing alternative explanations like a repair business or lottery winnings.

However, cash found in the house vents was not forfeited due to reasonable doubt regarding its origin.

The court rendered a sentencing decision for Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, who were found guilty of eight firearms, drug, and proceeds of crime offences.

The judge accepted the joint sentencing submission from counsel, imposing a nine-year penitentiary sentence for Puentes-Reed and an eight-year penitentiary sentence for Yousuf, less time served.

The decision emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, acknowledging the severe societal harms caused by drug trafficking and the associated violence, while also considering the offenders' prospects for rehabilitation.

The Crown sought forfeiture of over $1.2 million in cash seized from the accused under sections 462.43 and 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence (cash, opinion evidence, and agreed statement of facts) under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his section 8 Charter rights, as previously found by the court in his criminal trial where the evidence was excluded, leading to his acquittal.

The court, applying the R. v. Grant test, determined that while the Charter breaches were serious, the context of a forfeiture application, where liberty is not at stake, is sufficiently different from a criminal trial.

The court found that excluding the evidence in this forfeiture proceeding would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the nature and large sum of the cash.

Therefore, the defence's application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, allowing the forfeiture application to proceed.

The accused, Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, were jointly charged with multiple offences including possession of proceeds of crime, possession of cocaine and marijuana for trafficking, and various firearm offences.

They were found asleep in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay containing large amounts of cash, drugs, and firearms.

The defence argued lack of possession and knowledge, with Puentes-Reed claiming he was intoxicated and inadvertently brought to the residence.

The court rejected the defence's explanations, finding them incredible and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the nature of the "safe house" operation.

Both accused were found guilty on all remaining charges, as the Crown proved constructive possession and knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicants brought a motion challenging the validity of three general warrants (dated June 30, August 13, and October 8, 2015) authorizing video surveillance and covert entries at 691 Bank Street in Ottawa as part of Project Step, a drug trafficking investigation.

The central issue was whether an Ontario Court of Justice judge had jurisdiction to authorize video surveillance under section 487.01(4) of the Criminal Code, or whether such authorization required a Superior Court of Justice judge.

The court found that the applicants had standing to challenge the warrants based on a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway, albeit attenuated.

The court determined that video surveillance warrants must be signed by a Superior Court judge, not an Ontario Court of Justice judge, rendering the June 30 warrant invalid.

However, the court severed the covert entry portion of the June 30 warrant, which remained valid.

The court also quashed the portions of the August 13 and October 8 warrants authorizing entries into unit C, as the information supporting those entries was derived from the unlawful hallway surveillance.

Despite these findings, the court admitted all evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the good faith conduct of police and the attenuated privacy interests involved.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine and codeine, careless storage of a loaded prohibited .32 calibre handgun, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of recognizance.

The Crown sought five years less twelve months credit for time at a treatment facility.

The defence sought a conditional jail sentence for weapons offences and a suspended sentence for drug charges.

The court found exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from typical sentencing ranges, given the accused's extraordinary rehabilitation efforts including completion of a residential treatment program, return to education with a business diploma, community service exceeding 2,100 hours including speaking at schools about addiction, and genuine employment prospects.

The court imposed a two-year-less-a-day conditional sentence for firearms offences followed by two years' probation, a suspended sentence for drug charges with two years' probation, and a suspended sentence for the breach with two years' probation.

The applicants sought disclosure of the complete investigative file relating to a homicide investigation that formed the basis for wiretap authorizations under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing that materials not explicitly relied upon in the Information to Obtain were irrelevant and protected by public interest privilege.

The court held that the accused's right to make full answer and defence applies to pre-trial evidentiary hearings, including Garofoli applications.

The court established that materials in the "investigative file" are presumptively relevant and should be disclosed, defined as all materials accumulated by the investigating agency as a consequence of its investigative efforts in the investigation giving rise to the authorization itself.

The court ordered disclosure of specified materials from the homicide investigation file, subject to redactions protecting informer privilege, while declining to order disclosure of the entire investigative file to prevent needless complexity.

The accused was charged with firearm offences, possession for the purposes of trafficking in crack cocaine, and breach of a recognizance.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing the accused presented a substantial likelihood of re-offending and that public confidence in the administration of justice required detention.

The accused proposed release on a recognizance with a live-in surety (his mother), house arrest, and electronic monitoring.

The court found the accused met the reverse onus by demonstrating the proposed conditions would adequately reduce the risk of re-offending on the secondary ground and would maintain public confidence on the tertiary ground, despite the serious nature of the allegations and the accused's extensive criminal record.

The accused pleaded guilty to producing 957 marijuana plants in violation of section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The mandatory minimum sentence triggered by the aggravating factors was three years imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum provision under section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found the mandatory minimum sentence to be grossly disproportionate both as applied to the accused and as it would reasonably foreseeably apply to other offenders, particularly those with minimal involvement in large-scale operations on third-party property.

The Crown applied under Criminal Code forfeiture provisions seeking an order that $39,680 seized from a residence be forfeited as proceeds of crime following the respondent’s conviction for offences connected to a drug trafficking organization.

The respondent argued the funds belonged to his parents, who were innocent third parties, and sought the return of the money to them.

The court held that although circumstantial evidence could support an inference that the funds were proceeds of crime, credible testimony from the respondent’s parents provided an equally plausible explanation that the money represented long-term household savings.

The Crown therefore failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the funds were proceeds of crime.

The court found the parents were lawful owners and innocent of complicity and ordered the funds returned to them under s. 462.41(3) of the Criminal Code.

Three offenders were convicted following a lengthy trial of firearms trafficking offences arising from Project Lancaster, a two-year investigation into illegal firearms and drug trafficking.

All three were convicted of various firearms offences involving restricted or prohibited handguns.

Two offenders were also convicted of drug trafficking offences.

The court imposed sentences of 5 years for the firearms offences, with an additional 7 months consecutive for drug offences where applicable.

The court rejected constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum sentence under section 99 of the Criminal Code, finding that the appropriate sentences exceeded the three-year minimum.

Enhanced credit for pre-trial custody was granted, resulting in net sentences ranging from approximately 4.7 years to 5 years and 7 months.

Three accused were tried on 42 counts involving firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, and related offences arising from Project Lancaster, a two-year investigation spanning January 2009 to March 2011.

The Crown relied heavily on wiretap evidence, text messages, surveillance, undercover operations, and expert testimony regarding firearms and drug terminology.

The court convicted the accused on various counts including offering to transfer firearms, conspiracy to traffic marijuana, possession of marijuana for trafficking purposes, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Key issues included the interpretation of coded language in communications, the definition of "firearm" without physical recovery, and the elements of conspiracy in buy-sell drug transactions.

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a police officer and two counts of failing to comply with an undertaking.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in determining when the appellant was detained by police, thereby triggering Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The appellant argued detention occurred from the outset of the police interaction in a park during proactive policing.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held the initial interaction constituted general questioning and did not amount to detention until the appellant provided false identifying information confirmed by another officer.

The court concluded there was no Charter breach and no error of law by the trial judge.

At a preliminary inquiry, two accused were jointly charged with weapons offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of cannabis for trafficking purposes.

The Crown withdrew charges for trafficking and proceeds of crime.

The accused Lacroix conceded sufficient evidence for committal on remaining charges.

The accused Adatia challenged committal on all charges except possession of 26.3 grams of marijuana found in plain view.

The court found that circumstantial evidence regarding a firearm and brass knuckles found in a bedroom drawer and closet was insufficient to establish knowledge and control by Adatia.

The court held that mere proximity of her passport to the firearm did not reasonably support an inference of knowledge or control.

Adatia was committed only on the plain view marijuana possession charge.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in marijuana between November 15, 2010 and March 7, 2011.

The Crown's case relied primarily on wiretap intercepts of the accused's phone conversations with an alleged drug trafficker, combined with surveillance evidence.

The central issues were whether the accused was the party to the intercepted conversations and whether the evidence established a conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

The court found that the accused was indeed a party to the conversations and that the evidence established a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the proposition that mere knowledge by a seller that a buyer intends to resell is sufficient for conspiracy; rather, the Crown must prove an agreement to pursue a mutual criminal objective.

The court found that the accused agreed to supply marijuana on an ongoing basis as part of the alleged trafficker's distribution scheme.

The applicants brought applications pursuant to Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenging the validity of a production order directed to Telus, two Part VI wiretap authorizations, and search warrants executed in connection with Project Lancaster, an investigation into firearms trafficking and drug offences in Ottawa.

The applicants challenged the type of order used to obtain text messages, the sufficiency of grounds for the authorizations and warrants, and sought exclusion of evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court dismissed all applications, finding that a production order was the appropriate mechanism for obtaining stored text messages, that the authorizing judges had sufficient grounds based on reliable and corroborated confidential informant information, and that the search warrants were properly issued.