10 total
The court vacated the applicant's unpaid victim fine surcharges but declined to grant a class-wide remedy.
The applicants sought an order for restitution and vacating of victim fine surcharges imposed between 2013 and 2018, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boudreault which found the surcharge unconstitutional.
The court granted the order vacating the unpaid surcharges for the applicant, Serge Parent, finding it just and appropriate under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and that the limitation period had not expired.
However, the court dismissed the request for restitution of already paid surcharges and the broader class remedy, noting that s. 24(1) is for personal remedies and that government measures had ameliorated some harms.
The court ordered partial disclosure of a homicide investigative file to allow the accused to challenge a wiretap authorization.
The applicants sought disclosure of the complete investigative file relating to a homicide investigation that formed the basis for wiretap authorizations under Part VI of the Criminal Code.
The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing that materials not explicitly relied upon in the Information to Obtain were irrelevant and protected by public interest privilege.
The court held that the accused's right to make full answer and defence applies to pre-trial evidentiary hearings, including Garofoli applications.
The court established that materials in the "investigative file" are presumptively relevant and should be disclosed, defined as all materials accumulated by the investigating agency as a consequence of its investigative efforts in the investigation giving rise to the authorization itself.
The court ordered disclosure of specified materials from the homicide investigation file, subject to redactions protecting informer privilege, while declining to order disclosure of the entire investigative file to prevent needless complexity.
The court dismissed the section 11(b) Charter application, finding the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.
The accused, charged as a youth with four counts of indecent assault alleged to have occurred in 1980, brought a Charter s. 11(b) application seeking to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay.
The charges were laid on July 30, 2015, with trial scheduled for June 14-17, 2017, approximately 22.5 months later.
The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, determining that while the case exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling on its face, the delay attributable to a severance decision constituted an exceptional circumstance.
After deducting the delay caused by the severance and defence unavailability, the court calculated the net delay at approximately 14.75 months, below the threshold.
The application was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial.
Application for production of complainant’s counselling records denied at stage one.
The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code seeking production of counselling records from a woman’s abuse counsellor relating to the complainant’s allegations of sexual assault.
The defence argued the records were relevant to credibility and reliability and necessary to challenge alleged fabrication.
The court applied the two‑stage framework governing third‑party records under ss. 278.1–278.7 and considered whether the accused met the threshold of likely relevance.
The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate that the counselling records were likely to contain new or contradictory information beyond material already disclosed, including medical notes and police statements.
Given the high privacy interests attached to therapeutic counselling records and the absence of a demonstrated impairment to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence, the application was dismissed at the first stage.
Prior consensual sexual activity evidence admitted under s. 276 for limited cross‑examination.
The accused applied under s. 276.2 of the Criminal Code for permission to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.
The defence sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding previous consensual sexual activity involving physical force, including grabbing and slapping, and whether bruising observed on the complainant on the alleged offence date could have been caused by earlier consensual activity.
The Crown did not oppose the application if limited to the specified topics.
The court held the evidence was relevant and significantly probative to the defence theory that no sexual activity occurred on the charged date and that the bruising may have originated earlier.
The court granted the application, allowing cross‑examination limited to the three identified points to protect the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.
Repeat sexual offender declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate penitentiary term.
The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his conviction for sexual assault of a minor.
The offender had a lengthy history of sexual and violent offences and was diagnosed with paraphilia and intellectual disability.
The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender and concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure, such as a determinate sentence with long-term supervision, would adequately protect the public.
The offender was sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention in a penitentiary.
Public officer found guilty of fraud and breach of trust for expediting immigration files for money.
The accused, an acting operations supervisor at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was charged with multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust by a public officer.
She participated in a joint enterprise with an immigration consultant to expedite and favorably process immigration applications in exchange for money and benefits.
The court found that the accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of her office by disclosing confidential information, providing preferential treatment, and accepting benefits.
The accused was found guilty on all counts except one count of bribery.
Crown's KGB application granted to admit a hostile witness's prior guilty pleas and Agreed Statement of Facts.
During a trial for immigration fraud, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the prior inconsistent statements of a hostile witness, specifically his guilty pleas and an Agreed Statement of Facts from his own related trial.
The witness had been uncooperative and claimed memory loss regarding the respondent's involvement.
The court found that the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability were met on a balance of probabilities.
The application was granted, and the statements were admitted to prove the truth of their contents, although the court ultimately assigned them virtually no weight.
Crown witness declared adverse and hostile due to evasiveness and prior inconsistent statements, permitting cross-examination.
During a criminal trial for immigration-related offences, the Crown brought an application under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act to declare its own witness adverse and hostile.
The witness, a former co-accused who had previously pled guilty, was evasive, repeatedly claimed memory loss, and refused to refresh his memory from his prior Agreed Statement of Facts and preliminary inquiry testimony.
The court found the witness to be both adverse under the Act and hostile at common law, noting his clear motive to protect the accused and his refusal to provide helpful evidence.
The Crown was granted leave to cross-examine the witness at large.
Preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by improperly weighing causation and identification evidence.
The deceased died from a brain injury after being assaulted twice in quick succession by two different individuals.
At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the first assailant on a murder charge, finding insufficient evidence that his assault caused the death.
The judge also discharged the second assailant on manslaughter and assault charges, finding insufficient identification evidence.
The Crown sought judicial review.
The reviewing judge quashed the first assailant's discharge but upheld the second assailant's discharge.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error in both instances by exceeding his limited weighing function under the Criminal Code and failing to consider the entirety of the evidence.
The first assailant's committal for murder was upheld, and the second assailant's matter was remitted for committal on assault and reconsideration of manslaughter.