Brian Bencze

The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the accused's application alleging institutional bias in relation to cannabis-related charges.

The accused alleged that the history of the Jesuits' involvement with Indigenous peoples created a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, and that a question posed by Crown counsel during cross-examination regarding the Pope crystallized this bias.

The accused sought a traditional Indigenous circle for resolution of the matters.

The court granted the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding the underlying application manifestly frivolous and that the accused failed to meet the high threshold for establishing institutional bias.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of five constitutional questions (NCQs) raised by Indigenous respondents charged with various cannabis offences.

The respondents claimed their lands were not part of Canada, that cannabis laws infringed their traditional rights and economic well-being, and that the laws were part of genocide/apartheid, and that the Crown failed in its duty to consult.

The court summarily dismissed four of the five NCQs, finding them non-justiciable or without reasonable prospect of success (sovereignty, genocide/apartheid, economic well-being).

The fifth NCQ, regarding traditional use and trade of cannabis/hemp under s. 35 of the Charter, was not summarily dismissed, but the court ordered further case management due to delays in expert reports.

Miykael Goodridge was found guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and firearm offences.

The court delivered reasons for sentence, considering aggravating factors (loaded firearm, probation, weapons prohibition, limited criminal record, substance nature) and mitigating factors (youth, pre-sentence custody, house arrest, strong parental support, rehabilitative potential, and moral blameworthiness mitigated by systemic anti-Black racism).

Applying the principles from R. v. Morris, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, emphasizing rehabilitation and addressing systemic over-incarceration of Black offenders.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant by banging his head against a wall twice and tearing his lip, requiring eight stitches.

The complainant and accused were in a polygamous marriage under Sharia law.

The accused denied the assault, claiming the injury was self-inflicted or caused by someone else.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and corroborated by her daughter's testimony.

The complainant's evidence was found to be internally inconsistent, inconsistent with his prior affidavit, and motivated by financial and community concerns.

The court concluded the complainant intentionally injured himself after leaving the home and fabricated the assault allegation to gain leverage in family law proceedings and minimize his financial obligations.

The offender, an aboriginal man with a lengthy criminal record, was convicted of aggravated assault, weapons offences, and breach of recognizance after stabbing a store owner during a dispute over a cell phone data plan.

The court considered Gladue factors, including the offender's history of abuse, bullying, and substance abuse, alongside the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 33 months' imprisonment (credited as time served plus 6 additional months) followed by three years of probation.

The offender was convicted after trial of sexual assault contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code for forcing his cellmate to perform fellatio on him without consent on three occasions while incarcerated at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre on November 5, 2015.

The Crown sought a sentence of three and a half to four years penitentiary, while the defence sought 12 to 18 months jail.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment, finding that denunciation and specific and general deterrence were paramount.

The court rejected the defence argument for enhanced credit beyond the statutory 1.5 to 1 ratio under Section 719(3.1), finding that the offender's segregation was a result of his own criminal conduct and that he had refused alternatives offered by the institution.

The accused, Andrea Alexis Long, was charged with defrauding Ontario Works of over $5,000 by deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The allegations stemmed from her failure to report income from Rogers Communications Inc. while receiving OW benefits in 2007 and 2009.

The court found that Ms. Long deliberately concealed her income, understanding her obligation to disclose it, and that her testimony was contradictory and lacked credibility.

The Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to a conviction for fraud over $5,000.

The accused, charged as a youth with four counts of indecent assault alleged to have occurred in 1980, brought a Charter s. 11(b) application seeking to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The charges were laid on July 30, 2015, with trial scheduled for June 14-17, 2017, approximately 22.5 months later.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, determining that while the case exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling on its face, the delay attributable to a severance decision constituted an exceptional circumstance.

After deducting the delay caused by the severance and defence unavailability, the court calculated the net delay at approximately 14.75 months, below the threshold.

The application was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit after breath sample evidence had been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a breach of the respondent’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) because police failed to give a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice, defaulted quickly to duty counsel, and failed to facilitate contact beyond leaving a single voicemail.

The appellate court held that the informational and implementational components of s. 10(b) were breached where the accused reasonably believed he had no option but to speak with duty counsel rather than wait for his chosen lawyer.

Despite the reliability and minimally intrusive nature of breath evidence, the seriousness of the Charter breach justified exclusion to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The Crown’s appeal from the acquittal was dismissed.

The accused applied for release following a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code after remaining in custody following a denied bail hearing.

The Crown argued that the court could only conduct a detention review under s. 515(10) where unreasonable delay in the proceedings had first been established.

The court rejected that interpretation and held that s. 525 allows the reviewing judge to consider whether continued detention is justified even absent proven delay.

The accused presented a new release plan involving supervision by her parents and participation in treatment for substance abuse.

The court concluded that continued detention was not justified and ordered release on strict conditions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving arising from a collision with a parked vehicle while operating a golf cart at a private campground.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly inferred that the alleged post‑accident alcohol consumption could not explain the level of intoxication observed by police without expert evidence, applied a stricter credibility standard to defence witnesses, failed to provide adequate reasons for accepting civilian witness testimony, and misapplied the W.D. credibility framework.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to rely on judicial notice and supporting expert evidence regarding the relationship between rising blood alcohol concentration and increasing impairment.

The court further held that the credibility findings and evaluation of witness testimony were reasonable and entitled to deference, and that the trial judge properly applied the W.D. analysis when rejecting the defence evidence and relying on accepted Crown evidence.

The conviction for impaired driving was upheld.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charges, including attempted murder, were laid in 2002 but the accused was not arrested until 2009 while residing in South Korea, resulting in approximately 11 years of delay before trial.

The court held that the Crown failed to take reasonable steps to bring the accused to trial despite knowing his whereabouts and having extradition options available.

Most of the delay was attributable to Crown inaction rather than inherent requirements or actions of the accused.

Given the exceptional delay and resulting prejudice to liberty, security, and fair trial interests, the court concluded that the accused’s s. 11(b) rights were violated.