Dr. Mayers

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a youth charged with impaired driving causing death.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of the youth's statements to a paramedic, breath samples, and blood samples, finding multiple breaches of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the youth had a reasonable expectation of privacy during a medical assessment in an ambulance, and that the police officer's breath demand lacked subjective grounds.

The Court also agreed that the subsequent breath demand by a technician was tainted by the initial breach, and that the search warrant for hospital records was invalid.

The exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) was upheld due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while impaired by drug, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, continuity issues with a urine sample, and improper use of compelled statements.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by treating the COVID-19 pandemic as an automatic deduction for delay without analyzing the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure.

The net delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on statements made to a Drug Recognition Evaluator without first holding a voir dire to prove voluntariness.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The young person was charged with impaired operation causing death and criminal negligence causing death following a fatal single-vehicle accident.

The court found multiple serious breaches of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights, including an officer surreptitiously listening to a medical assessment, making a breath demand without reasonable grounds, and providing misleading information to obtain a search warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath and blood sample evidence under s. 24(2).

Without this evidence, the Crown could not prove the elements of the offences, resulting in acquittals on all charges.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving, failing to comply with a breath demand, and dangerous driving.

At trial, she argued that her drink had been spiked, leading to involuntary intoxication.

The trial judge rejected this defence and convicted her.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof, erroneously requiring the defence to establish a 'likelihood' of involuntary intoxication rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting three complainants and administering a stupefying drug to one of them.

The complainants alleged they felt ill after drinking wine provided by the appellant.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence that GHB was found in one of the wine bottles.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence showing that GHB occurs naturally in all red wine, including the specific brand and vintage seized.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably be expected to have affected the jury's assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, following a motor vehicle collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly inferred guilt from his post-offence departure from Canada, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in using the departure evidence to infer guilt, but applied the curative proviso given the overwhelming evidence of erratic driving and impairment.

The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, reducing the sentence by one year to account for two-for-one pre-trial custody credit, which the trial judge had improperly denied based on the erroneous flight finding.

The appellant appealed jury convictions arising from a multiple shooting in a drug-trafficking setting, advancing Charter, evidentiary, jury-instruction, inconsistent-verdict, and sentence grounds.

The court held that the police did not deny reasonable access for obtaining blood or urine samples from the accused in custody, and rejected the argument that the state forced the accused to surrender privacy or self-incrimination protections as a condition of obtaining samples.

Although the court concluded that evidence of a prior violent stabbing by the deceased should have been admitted on the self-defence issue, it found the error harmless because the excluded evidence would not have affected the jury’s rejection of self-defence.

The court further found substantial compliance with the Lifchus principles, no misdirection on self-defence, no true inconsistency in the verdicts, and no basis to interfere with the life sentence for attempted murder.