Michael Lacy

The appellants challenged a criminal appeal judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral ruling the same day.

The Court held that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the majority below.

The intervener participated, but the dispositive issue was resolved by adopting the appellate majority's reasoning.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment after shooting an intruder outside his home.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in leaving manslaughter with the jury, and challenged the jury instructions on self-defence and out-of-court statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding an air of reality to manslaughter based on the appellant's testimony and upholding the jury instructions.

On the sentence appeal, fresh evidence revealed the trial judge misspoke and intended to impose a six-year sentence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in failing to correct his mistake immediately, and sentenced the appellant afresh to six years' imprisonment.

The accused, a police officer charged with breach of trust and fabricating evidence, brought a motion to compel the Crown to call a fellow officer as a witness.

The Crown refused to call the officer, citing concerns about his reliability due to inconsistencies in his statements.

The court declined to order the Crown to call the witness, affirming the Crown's discretion.

However, given the witness's materiality and allegations that his statement was improperly influenced by an investigating detective, the court exercised its exceptional discretion to call the officer as the court's own witness, permitting both parties to cross-examine him with certain restrictions.

The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder and manslaughter at trial by judge alone after applying a chokehold to the deceased, who lost consciousness and died.

The trial judge found the Crown had not established the requisite subjective mens rea for murder, and that self-defence applied to the lesser included offence of manslaughter.

The Nunavut Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding errors of law in the trial judge's analysis of mens rea for murder and application of self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the further appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Crown's right to appeal an acquittal under s. 676(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is limited to questions of law alone, that the Court of Appeal failed to precisely identify any such error, and that there is no legal rule that a chokehold is always an inherently dangerous act requiring specific findings on mens rea.

The trial judge's self-defence analysis correctly applied an objective standard under each element of s. 34 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with multiple counts including impaired operation and refusing to provide a breath sample causing death and bodily harm, brought a pre-trial application seeking to quash, amend, or sever the refusal counts.

The court dismissed the request to quash the counts based on issue estoppel and rejected the argument that the Crown was limited to a single refusal count under s. 320.15(4) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court granted the application to sever the refusal counts from the impaired and dangerous operation counts, finding that the interests of justice favoured severance to allow the accused to testify on the refusal counts without prejudice to the remaining charges.

The offenders, a police officer and an employee of the Public Guardian and Trustee, were convicted by a jury of defrauding an estate of over $830,000 using a forged will.

The employee was also convicted of breach of trust by a public official.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the complexity and duration of the fraud, the significant impact on the victim, and the offenders' abuse of their positions of public trust.

Both offenders were sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

The court also issued restitution and forfeiture orders for the full amount of the fraud.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing death and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious motor vehicle collision.

He brought pre-trial applications alleging multiple Charter breaches and seeking to exclude evidence of his refusals to provide breath samples and data seized from his vehicle's Airbag Control Module.

The court found breaches of s. 8 (unlawful roadside breath demand), s. 9 (unjustified continued detention), and s. 10(b) (failure to hold off questioning).

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the accused's refusals at the roadside and in the booking area.

However, the court found that a subsequent demand by a breath technician constituted a 'fresh start' and admitted the final refusal.

The application to quash the search warrant for the vehicle data was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to adduce evidence that a third party committed the offence.

The court assessed whether there was a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime to establish an air of reality for the defence.

Assuming the proposed evidence to be true, the court found that the third party's opportunity, admissions of guilt, fingerprint evidence, and other circumstantial factors met the air of reality threshold.

The application was granted, permitting the accused to lead the third-party suspect evidence at trial, with admissibility to be determined when tendered.

The applicant church sought $75,000 in costs after being unsuccessful on an urgent application for an interim injunction to stay COVID-19 restrictions on in-person religious services.

The church argued costs were warranted because the case raised a novel issue of significant public importance.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the injunction application focused on the narrow interests of the church rather than broad public interest, and turned on settled legal principles rather than novel issues.

No costs were awarded to either party for the injunction application.

The applicant church sought an interim injunction to exempt it from O. Reg. 82/20, which restricted religious gatherings to a maximum of ten people in regions designated as Stage 1 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The church argued the regulation infringed its freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the church established a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm.

However, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, as the public interest in protecting health and preventing the spread of COVID-19 outweighed the temporary restriction on the church's religious freedom.

The application for an interim injunction was dismissed.

The offender, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of assault for striking a young Black man in the face with a metal pipe while the victim was injured and seeking help.

The court emphasized the need for denunciation and general deterrence, noting the breach of public trust and the racialized context of the offence.

The offender was sentenced to 9 months in jail, followed by 12 months of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

Prior to the offender's sentencing, the Crown sought to file a community impact statement from the Black Action Defence Committee.

The defence objected to portions of the statement, arguing they exceeded the permissible scope under section 722.2 of the Criminal Code, and sought redactions.

The court held that while much of the statement provided necessary context regarding the impact of the offence on the Black community, two specific portions were irrelevant or inflammatory and required redaction.

The court otherwise declined to redact the statement, noting it would disregard any impermissible content.

The applicant, having been acquitted of aggravated assault but convicted of the lesser included offence of simple assault, applied to re-open the trial before sentencing.

The applicant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to find him guilty of simple assault, asserting that aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code does not contain a lesser included offence of assault.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to re-open the trial, emphasizing the principle of finality and noting the argument should have been raised during closing submissions.

The court also rejected the substantive argument, affirming that simple assault is a lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The applicants, charged jointly with a co-accused on one count of trafficking cocaine and one count of possession of proceeds of crime, applied for severance from the co-accused who faced numerous additional charges.

The applicants argued that the volume of evidence against the co-accused on the other counts would cause overwhelming prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, no real risk of moral or reasoning prejudice that could not be cured by jury instructions, and that severance would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

The applicant, charged with drug offences in two separate cases, applied for the release of seized funds to pay for his legal defence under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded he was denied legal aid, had no other means, and owned the seized funds, but argued the cases were not complex enough to warrant two lawyers at private rates.

The court found the second case, involving multiple confidential informants, was sufficiently complex to justify two lawyers (a senior and a junior) and approved the requested hourly rates of $400 and $200.

The court ordered the release of $250,000 from the seized funds to cover legal expenses for both cases.

The accused brought an application for disclosure of Source Debriefing Reports and Handler's notes relating to a confidential informant.

During a pre-trial Charter application, it became apparent that the Crown had not disclosed certain relevant information about the informant's credibility and reliability.

The Crown argued that providing a summary of the undisclosed information was sufficient and that it would not rely on the undisclosed information.

The court rejected this argument, holding that relevance is not determined by what the Crown chooses to rely on.

Applying the principles from Stinchcombe and McKenzie, the court ordered the Crown to disclose the requested reports and notes, redacted to protect informant privilege, to ensure the accused's right to make full answer and defence.