Elise Nakelsky

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the victim 30 times.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge and Crown misstated forensic evidence, that the jury instructions on self-defence, provocation, and mens rea were inadequate, and that the trial judge erred in finding him the aggressor for sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, properly equipped the jury and that any misstatements of evidence did not vitiate the verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the aggressor was supported by the physical evidence and post-offence conduct.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for the appointment of a special commissioner to inquire into allegations of juror misconduct.

A juror alleged undue pressure, verbal abuse, and exposure to extrinsic information during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the alleged conduct was intrinsic to the deliberation process and protected by the jury secrecy rule.

The court held there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to establish extrinsic influence or obstruction of justice.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in 1971 for the death of his common-law wife and served over three years in prison.

Decades later, fresh medical evidence from multiple pathologists concluded the deceased died of natural causes following a fall, contradicting the trial evidence of blunt force trauma.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the case to the Court of Appeal.

On a joint submission with the Crown, the Court admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the appellant was wrongly convicted.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the accused to lead her lengthy, exculpatory police video statement as part of her defence under the Edgar exception for prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct principles and reasonably exercised his discretion in finding the statement was spontaneous and made when the accused was first confronted with an accusation of a crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of discreditable conduct, misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, and misdirected the jury on the elements of first degree murder, specifically regarding unlawful confinement and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The applicant, convicted of historical sexual assault against his daughters and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

He argued his appeal had merit based on his hearing impairment preventing a fair trial and alleged collusion between the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the grounds of appeal arguable but weak, and concluding that the public interest favoured the continued enforcement of the sentence.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to exercise discretion against the designation and in finding he did not qualify as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly assessed the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, his extensive criminal history, and the lack of a reasonable possibility that his risk could eventually be controlled in the community.