Carol Cahill

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson in relation to the death of his wife.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the hearsay utterances of a co-accused, obtained during a Mr. Big operation, who confessed to the murder and claimed the appellant hired him.

The co-accused refused to testify at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence and in his instructions to the jury regarding the hearsay evidence, bad character evidence, and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's threshold reliability analysis or jury instructions.

The appellant, Mark Staples, appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of his father and sister.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged errors by the trial judge regarding demeanour evidence, post-offence conduct instructions, discreditable conduct, circumstantial evidence, Crown's closing arguments, impermissible opinion evidence, and refusal to admit evidence of another unsolved homicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or instructions, and concluded that the jury's verdict was reasonable given the substantial circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, and post-offence cleanup.

The appellant, Chad Noureddine, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder following a jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: the limited use of a witness's criminal record, the sufficiency of the Vetrovec instruction, the failure to adequately present the defence's position on intent and motive, and the inclusion of an alternate path to conviction not explicitly raised in the Crown's closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge, when considered holistically, was comprehensive and balanced, adequately addressing the issues of witness credibility and all routes to liability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial involved conflicting testimony between the appellant and the sole prosecution witness regarding a motor vehicle collision at an intersection.

The appellant was convicted on August 12, 2016, following a trial heard on April 8, 2016.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the reasons for judgment were insufficient in law because they failed to meaningfully explain why his testimony was disbelieved.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's credibility analysis consisted of conclusions alone without meaningful reasoning, constituting an error of law.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old victim.

The main ground of appeal concerned the admissibility of a partial recording of a telephone call between the appellant and the victim's mother, in which the appellant apologized and appeared to be crying.

The appellant also challenged the admission of incomplete text messages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, finding that the victim's mother's testimony provided sufficient context for the recorded statement and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding the incomplete text messages.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and other firearms offences arising from a home invasion.

He was sentenced to 8 years, less 1:1 credit for pre-disposition custody.

On appeal, the appellant sought enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-disposition custody.

The Crown conceded that under the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the appellant was entitled to the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to reflect the enhanced credit.

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking to adduce third‑party suspect evidence implicating other individuals in the killings.

The proposed evidence relied primarily on a witness’s recorded police statement alleging that one individual had confessed to committing the murders.

The court conducted a detailed hearsay analysis and held that the statement lacked threshold reliability due to the witness’s motive to fabricate, serious drug abuse, extensive criminal record, inconsistencies in her accounts, and the absence of meaningful cross‑examination.

The alleged confession was also inadmissible both as a declaration against penal interest and under the principled hearsay exception.

The court further declined to relax evidentiary rules for defence evidence because the statements were inherently unreliable.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, the court heard three evidentiary applications.

The accused sought to exclude text messages based on authorship and hearsay.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased under the principled approach to hearsay, and evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct to establish motive.

The court admitted the text messages, finding sufficient evidence of authorship.

The court admitted the ante-mortem statements, finding they met the threshold reliability test.

The court admitted some discreditable conduct evidence (prior gun possession, code of silence) as highly probative of motive, but excluded evidence of gang affiliation and drug trafficking as overly prejudicial.

The respondent pleaded guilty to trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and faced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum but illegally granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed the illegal sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, correcting the pre-sentence custody credit to the maximum permitted 1.5:1 ratio.

However, considering the Crown's failure to raise the error at sentencing, the delay in the appeal, and the fact that the respondent had already served the imposed sentence, the Court permanently stayed the execution of the remaining balance.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to review a preliminary inquiry decision that committed two accused to trial for second‑degree murder rather than first‑degree murder and discharged another accused.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence and improperly rejected inferences supporting constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code based on unlawful confinement.

The reviewing court held that the justice committed a jurisdictional error by failing to address evidence of unlawful confinement of a second victim, which could support first‑degree murder within the same transaction.

Mandamus issued requiring committal of two respondents to trial for first‑degree murder.

The application regarding the third respondent was dismissed because the justice properly applied the limited weighing permitted for circumstantial evidence and committed no jurisdictional error.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on charges of attempted murder and overcoming resistance to the commission of an offence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, particularly regarding the specific intent to kill, such as the nature of the weapon, the vital area of the stab wound, and the respondent's actions after the stabbing.

The application was granted, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to commit the respondent for trial on those charges.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal beating death of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement to police, failing to correct Crown closing arguments, and failing to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct and mens rea.

He also appealed the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence due to the severe aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's instructions on unlawful confinement, attempted sexual assault, drunkenness, the adequacy of a Vetrovec warning, the use of prior consistent statements, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the evidence of identity overwhelming and the trial judge's instructions sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder of his wife.

At trial, the Crown introduced hearsay evidence consisting of a letter written by the deceased to her cousin and statements made by the deceased to her family physician, both alleging prior assaults by the appellant.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statements, as he improperly relied on the truth of the contents to establish threshold reliability and erroneously concluded there was no motive to fabricate.

The Court also found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code by using the word 'danger' instead of 'likelihood' of death.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge made erroneous evidentiary rulings and errors in the jury charge.

The evidentiary issues included the refusal of a courtroom voice demonstration and the admission of post-offence conduct evidence.

The jury charge issues involved instructions on post-offence conduct, eyewitness identification, bad character evidence, the application of the W.(D.) framework, the presentation of the defence theory, and the trial judge's expression of opinion.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the conviction appeal and dismissed it.

However, the court found the original sentence to be demonstrably unfit given the appellant's age, antecedents, and lack of a criminal record, and varied the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder.

He argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and the taking of bodily samples, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were inadequate, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant made an informed choice to cooperate with police, the jury instructions substantially complied with the required standards, and trial counsel's tactical decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that the trial judge properly dismissed the application to adduce evidence of other sexual conduct under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, particularly where the application was not renewed after the complainant's subsequent testimony and the proposed evidence was irrelevant to the issues raised.

The court also found the jury charge fair and balanced.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because there was no error in principle in refusing a conditional sentence for serious offences involving grave breach of trust and a vulnerable victim.

The police received a disconnected 911 call from the appellant's apartment.

Upon arrival, the appellant answered the door, stated there was no problem, and attempted to close the door.

The police forced entry to investigate the call and found the appellant's wife crying with a swollen eye, stating the appellant had hit her.

The appellant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to resist arrest after a struggle ensued.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a common law duty to protect life and safety, which justifies a forced entry into a dwelling to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller when the call is disconnected.

The appeal was dismissed.