Sheila Joan Cressman

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving over 80 on January 26, 2014, with trial scheduled for February 4, 2015, resulting in approximately 12 months and 6 days of delay.

The court applied the analytical framework from R. v. Morin and found that while the delay was approximately 9.5 months of institutional delay (within the 8-10 month guideline for Ontario Court of Justice), the applicant had not established sufficient prejudice to warrant a stay.

The court found that much of the alleged prejudice related to the charge itself rather than the delay, and balanced the minimal prejudice against the serious nature of the drinking and driving allegations and the strong public interest in a trial on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

Sentencing decision following convictions for multiple firearms offences involving possession of two loaded handguns, possession of firearms without a licence, possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, concealing a weapon, possession of an overcapacity magazine, and firearm transfer offences under the Criminal Code.

The accused argued he possessed the firearms under duress while temporarily holding them for another individual, but the defence had been rejected at trial.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in firearms offences and considered aggravating factors including possession of two loaded firearms in a public parking lot and failure to comply with police commands.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of criminal record and strong employment history.

Applying the Kienapple principle and the totality principle, the court imposed a global custodial sentence of 4.5 years with credit for pre-sentence restrictions.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault against a highly intoxicated woman.

The court found the accused was wilfully blind to the victim's inability to consent due to extreme intoxication.

Although the victim had initially consented to sexual activity and suggested going to a hotel, once at the scene the accused proceeded with intercourse despite the victim's obvious irrational and intoxicated state.

The victim passed out during the act and was unconscious when police arrived.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment plus three years probation, considering aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability and humiliating circumstances, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's remorse, rehabilitation potential, and stable employment.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms offences including possession of prohibited and restricted firearms, possession of an overcapacity magazine, and possession for the purpose of transferring firearms.

The accused admitted possessing the firearms but asserted the common law defence of duress, claiming he held the guns under threats from an associate with a reputation for violence.

The court held that the accused had voluntarily associated with the individual and had reasonable avenues of escape during the week he possessed the firearms.

The court further found that handing the firearms to another individual constituted a transfer within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The defence of duress lacked an air of reality and, in any event, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence failed.

The accused applied for disclosure of unvetted information used to obtain a search warrant, arguing that confidential informant communications could raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt and support a defence of duress.

The Crown opposed disclosure on the basis of confidential informant privilege and argued the innocence-at-stake exception was not met.

Applying the two-stage test from Supreme Court authority, the court held the accused failed to establish that the information sought was unavailable from other sources or that it could likely raise a reasonable doubt.

Potential witnesses connected to the alleged duress, including individuals involved in the transfer of the firearms, were available to testify.

The application to disclose confidential informant information was therefore denied.

The accused, charged with multiple firearms offences, brought a motion seeking disclosure of police records relating to a third party whom he alleged had coerced him to possess the firearms.

The defence argued the records were relevant to a defence of duress because they would demonstrate the third party’s reputation for violence, firearms, and drug activity.

Applying the two‑stage test for third‑party record disclosure from R. v. McNeil and R. v. O’Connor, the court first found the requested materials were likely relevant.

After reviewing the records, the court held that police occurrence reports involving allegations of violence, firearms, drugs, and confirmation of the third party’s nickname were necessary to permit full answer and defence.

Disclosure of those records was ordered, with identifying information of complainants redacted to protect privacy.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident on May 29, 2011, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with a highly intoxicated woman who had also consumed cocaine, ketamine, and GHB.

The complainant had no memory of meeting the accused or consenting to sexual activity.

The accused claimed the complainant consented and appeared normal to him.

The court found that the complainant lacked capacity to consent due to her extreme intoxication and drug use, and that the accused was either knowingly engaging in sexual activity with an incapacitated person or was wilfully blind to her incapacity.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case on several firearms trafficking-related counts.

The motion argued that the Crown had failed to adduce evidence establishing the essential elements of transferring or offering to transfer a firearm and possession for the purpose of trafficking under ss. 99 and 100 of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed the legal test for directed verdicts, including the requirement that the Crown present some evidence of culpability on each essential element and the limited weighing permitted when relying on circumstantial evidence.

Considering police observations of the accused displaying an object later identified as a prohibited firearm to two individuals, along with the seizure of firearms and money at the scene, the court held that a reasonable jury properly instructed could infer an offer to transfer.

The application for a directed verdict on the impugned counts was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that a 30‑month delay from arrest to trial infringed their right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the length of delay, reasons for delay, prejudice to the accused, and the societal interest in adjudicating the charges.

The court attributed portions of the delay to inherent requirements, defence delay, Crown delay related to a certiorari application, and institutional delay.

The combined Crown and institutional delay totaled approximately 17½ months, within the Morin guideline range for cases proceeding through both the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice.

Balancing the modest prejudice experienced by the accused against the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearms and drug charges, the court concluded the delay did not exceed what is constitutionally tolerable.

The offender was convicted by a jury of armed robbery and forcible confinement arising from a planned robbery of a workplace where he was employed and held a position of trust.

During the offence the victim supervisor was threatened with a firearm, blindfolded, and restrained while copper pipe valued at over $344,000 was stolen.

The court determined that a fit global sentence was six and one-half years’ imprisonment, considering aggravating factors including the breach of trust, planning, and the psychological harm to the victim, balanced against the offender’s lack of prior criminal record and prospects for rehabilitation.

Evidence established that police assaulted the offender during post-arrest interrogation; although the misconduct did not affect trial fairness, the court reduced the sentence by one year to reflect the abuse of state authority.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and limited credit for strict bail conditions, and ancillary orders including a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA order were imposed.

The applicant sought a stay of his convictions for armed robbery with a firearm and forcible confinement, arguing that police assaulted him during post‑arrest questioning in violation of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded that excessive force had been used by police officers during the interviews.

The court accepted that the assaults occurred but found the injuries were not serious, did not produce lasting harm, and had no impact on the fairness of the trial or the reliability of the verdict.

Applying the principles governing abuse of process and stays of proceedings, the court held that the stringent threshold for a stay was not met.

The appropriate remedy was instead a reduction in the sentence otherwise fit.