Rudi Covre

Kurlan Cadet pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm, contrary to section 320.14(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, after operating a vehicle with a blood-drug concentration exceeding the legal limit, resulting in serious injuries to his son and another passenger.

The Crown sought two years' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court, balancing general deterrence and denunciation with the offender's significant mitigating factors and collateral consequences (including his own severe injuries and the impact on his son), imposed a two-year conditional sentence with strict house arrest, GPS monitoring, and a five-year driving prohibition, followed by one year of probation.

The court emphasized that this was an exceptional case justifying a sentence outside the normal range to achieve restorative justice.

The defendant, Raby Shahin, was charged with three counts of sexual assault, one count of forcible confinement, and one count of criminal harassment.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant (P.B.) and the defendant.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding her relationship with the defendant, her voluntary contact with him, and the details of the alleged assaults, particularly concerning where she was sleeping during two alleged incidents.

The court also noted the complainant's evasiveness and argumentative demeanor during cross-examination.

While acknowledging that post-assault conduct should not lead to adverse inferences based on stereotypes, the court found the complainant's attempts to distance herself from the defendant not credible.

Conversely, the defendant's testimony was found to be generally forthright, despite some confusion regarding evidence extraction.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a traffic stop for speeding on Highway 7 in Markham.

The defence challenged whether the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test was administered "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the investigating officer's delay in making the demand while conferring with a colleague breached the accused's Charter rights.

The court found that the approximately three-minute-and-thirty-seven-second delay was not a breach of the "forthwith" requirement, or alternatively, if it was a breach, it was trivial and should not result in exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operation with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg following a traffic stop on August 28, 2015.

The trial focused on two issues: whether the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) were violated regarding access to counsel of choice, and whether the evidence was sufficient to establish impaired driving.

The court found that while the police failed to take intermediate steps to facilitate contact with the accused's counsel of choice after an initial message went unreturned, the Charter breach was minimally serious and the breath evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving due to insufficient evidence of impairment but convicted of the over 80 charge based on breath analysis results.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a breath sample into a roadside screening device (ASD) following a RIDE stop.

After seven attempts to provide a suitable sample, the defendant was arrested.

The Crown proved that the officer made a valid demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, that the ASD was functioning properly, and that the defendant deliberately chose not to blow with sufficient force despite being capable of doing so and receiving clear instructions.

The defendant's credibility was undermined by his initial lie to the officer and inconsistencies in his testimony.

The court found the defendant guilty, rejecting his assertion that he believed he was blowing sufficiently.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault against a highly intoxicated woman.

The court found the accused was wilfully blind to the victim's inability to consent due to extreme intoxication.

Although the victim had initially consented to sexual activity and suggested going to a hotel, once at the scene the accused proceeded with intercourse despite the victim's obvious irrational and intoxicated state.

The victim passed out during the act and was unconscious when police arrived.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment plus three years probation, considering aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability and humiliating circumstances, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's remorse, rehabilitation potential, and stable employment.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident on May 29, 2011, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with a highly intoxicated woman who had also consumed cocaine, ketamine, and GHB.

The complainant had no memory of meeting the accused or consenting to sexual activity.

The accused claimed the complainant consented and appeared normal to him.

The court found that the complainant lacked capacity to consent due to her extreme intoxication and drug use, and that the accused was either knowingly engaging in sexual activity with an incapacitated person or was wilfully blind to her incapacity.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats against an intimate partner, and pleaded guilty to attempting to obstruct justice by instructing the complainant to recant her evidence.

The trial focused primarily on whether sexual intercourse in the complainant’s bedroom occurred without consent following a relationship breakdown triggered by the accused’s infidelity.

The court applied the governing principles on consent and honest but mistaken belief in consent under the Criminal Code and leading authorities including Ewanchuk and J.A. The complainant’s evidence that she verbally and physically resisted sexual advances was accepted as credible, while the accused’s claim of consensual intercourse based on prior relationship dynamics and non-verbal cues was rejected.

The court found the Crown proved sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt but held that the assault and uttering threats allegations were not established to the required standard.