Tony Vanden Ende

The accused, Anibal Silva, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging that the almost 25-month delay in his criminal proceedings for impaired operation, 80+, and failing to stop for police breached his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown argued that after deducting defence and COVID-related delays, the net delay was below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling, attributing it to multiple failures including police non-disclosure, and a "culture of complacency" by all parties and the court in actively managing the case.

The court determined that COVID-19 did not cause any additional delay in this specific case as the outstanding disclosure could have been remedied during that period.

The application was granted, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving and appealed on the basis that his section 9 Charter rights were violated due to arbitrary detention.

He was held in custody for six hours after completing his breath test.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, finding the police conducted an ongoing assessment and reasonably detained him due to his high level of intoxication and risk of repeating the offence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the law and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit, with offences dating to September 1, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application to stay the charges for violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled for November 23-24, 2020.

The court found that the net delay of 567 days (18 months and 17 days) exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court rejected the Crown's "but-for" analysis in favor of a "common sense" approach to scheduling delays and found no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The charges were stayed.

The applicant, charged with possessing a loaded restricted firearm and failing to comply with a recognizance, sought a bail review under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a new release plan involving electronic monitoring, a formal Charter application regarding the search of his vehicle, and the Covid-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances.

The court found that the pandemic was not a material change warranting release, but the strength of the s. 8 Charter argument and the addition of electronic monitoring to the release plan sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on strict conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a traffic stop for speeding on Highway 7 in Markham.

The defence challenged whether the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test was administered "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the investigating officer's delay in making the demand while conferring with a colleague breached the accused's Charter rights.

The court found that the approximately three-minute-and-thirty-seven-second delay was not a breach of the "forthwith" requirement, or alternatively, if it was a breach, it was trivial and should not result in exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was convicted of Sexual Assault, Forcible Confinement, Assault, and Assault Resisting Arrest.

The offences involved forced anal intercourse with the accused's former girlfriend while she was bound and confined, followed by choking and violent resistance to police arrest.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of two years less one day with three years' probation to follow, along with mandatory ancillary orders including firearms prohibition, DNA orders, and SOIRA registration.

The defendant, Daniel Costa, was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath to homicide detectives.

The Crown conceded that Costa could not be convicted of perjury due to the application of s. 131(3) of the Criminal Code, as he was not legally required, permitted, or authorized to make the statement.

The Crown then sought to continue the prosecution on the basis that attempt to obstruct justice was an included offence of perjury as described in the indictment.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that attempt to obstruct justice was not necessarily included in the perjury charge as worded, and that the accused did not have fair notice of this potential charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved that a sergeant observed the accused driving erratically, smelled alcohol on the accused's breath, and obtained an admission of drinking.

An Approved Screening Device test was administered at the roadside, which the accused failed.

The accused was arrested and transported to a police station where approved instrument testing resulted in readings of 170 and 180 milligrams.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the stop, the ASD demand, the arrest, and the delay in providing access to counsel.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol on June 18, 2014.

The accused did not deny the essential elements of the offence but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was fleeing from an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.

After being assaulted at a social gathering by another guest, the accused ran to his vehicle and drove a short distance before losing control of his keys.

The court found that all three elements of the necessity defence were established: there was clear and imminent peril from the assault, no reasonable legal alternative existed given the circumstances and the speed of events, and the harm inflicted by the brief impaired driving was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery for acting as the getaway driver in the armed robbery of a retail store.

The perpetrator stole $65,000 worth of cell phones and $7,600 in cash.

The accused was aware of the robbery but did not know a weapon would be used.

Accepting a joint submission, the court sentenced the accused to two years in the penitentiary followed by three years of probation, noting his role, the planning involved, and his status as a first-time offender.

The accused was charged with Over 80 Operation of a Motor Vehicle following a motor vehicle collision on October 15, 2014.

The Crown proved that the accused was involved in a rear-end collision, had a faint odour of alcohol on his breath, failed a roadside screening device test, and provided three breath samples to an Approved Instrument with results of 240, 218, and 206 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 10(b), and contended that one of the breath samples was deemed unsuitable by the breath technician and therefore should not be used.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty based on the expert toxicology evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts arising from an armed bank robbery committed on October 8, 2008: robbery while armed with an imitation firearm, disguise with intent, auto theft, and auto possession.

The Crown pursued a dangerous offender designation under section 753 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused met the criteria for dangerous offender status based on a pattern of repetitive armed robberies spanning from 1988 to 2008, demonstrating a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of inflicting severe psychological damage on others.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 13 years imprisonment (with credit for approximately six years of pre-trial detention resulting in two years remaining) followed by a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order, rather than an indeterminate sentence, based on positive developments in the accused's behaviour and mental health stabilization while in custody.

The applicant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and over 80 on April 23, 2011.

She brought a motion to stay the charges pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging that she was not tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled to commence on January 25, 2012, but did not conclude until July 13, 2012, resulting in a delay of approximately 14.5 months from arrest to the second trial date.

The court found that the Crown's inattention to disclosure obligations, including the failure to timely provide police officer notes and a 911 recording, contributed significantly to the delay.

The court concluded that the applicant's s. 11(b) rights were violated and granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with excess alcohol.

A police officer observed a light-coloured van being driven at excessive speed in Stouffville, Ontario.

After losing sight of the vehicle, the officer discovered a damaged Toyota Sienna van parked on Catherine Crescent with a blown tire.

The defendant was found nearby underneath a Jeep.

The Crown's case rested on establishing that the defendant was the operator of the van.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts based on circumstantial evidence including the defendant's proximity to the vehicle, his appearance matching the driver's description, his statements suggesting consciousness of guilt, and evidence that keys in his possession operated the van's key fob.

The charge of driving with excess alcohol was stayed pursuant to the rule in R. v. Kienapple.

The accused was charged with assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats following a domestic altercation with his spouse.

Both parties sustained injuries, including a broken finger for the spouse and extensive scratching on the accused.

The court found the spouse's evidence regarding the threat was contradicted by the 911 recording and that she minimized her physical aggression towards the accused.

Applying the W.D. framework and the law of self-defence, the court concluded the Crown failed to disprove that the accused acted in self-defence when he pushed the spouse and twisted her hand to stop her from scratching him.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.