Amanda M. Ross

The appellant, convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault against his nieces and great-nieces, appealed his convictions.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred by admitting similar fact evidence without properly considering collusion among complainants and by applying a different standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of collusion, credibility, or the application of similar fact principles.

This decision concerns an application by the accused, Kavit Shah, a registered physiotherapist charged with sexual assault, to admit the complainant's physiotherapy records at trial under sections 278.92-278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and Complainant opposed the application, primarily arguing a lack of proper evidentiary foundation for authenticity.

The court found that a hearsay affidavit from defence counsel's associate, along with the records obtained through police disclosure, provided a sufficient basis for the pre-trial admissibility assessment.

The court determined the records were relevant to the complainant's credibility and reliability, and that their significant probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the administration of justice, given the limited privacy interest in the records and the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The application was granted, allowing the defence to use the records for cross-examination and to establish prior inconsistent statements, with authentication to be addressed at trial if the defence seeks to prove their contents for truth.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and contradictions with other evidence, including her mother's testimony and forensic findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that it was for the jury to assess credibility and weigh evidence, especially considering the complainant's age.

The court found that the trial judge's post-verdict factual findings for sentencing (limiting the proven facts to a single incident of touching) did not render the jury's initial verdict unreasonable, as there was no demonstrable deliberate lie by the complainant.

The appellant, Marcy McMahon, appealed her eight-month custodial sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine, which was imposed after a guilty plea and joint submission.

Fresh evidence was admitted, demonstrating that the appellant was unaware of the legal availability of a conditional sentence at the time of her sentencing due to a recent change in law (R. v. Sharma).

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituting the custodial sentence with a 23-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, finding the proposed sentence fit given the circumstances and the appellant's rehabilitation.

This is an appeal from convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant, Joseph Bradley, was convicted after an accident where unbuckled passengers in his vehicle were severely injured.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge conflated the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, erred by considering the unbuckled status of passengers relevant to the actus reus, and failed to address factual causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read holistically, demonstrated proper findings on all elements.

The court affirmed that "all the circumstances" under s. 249(1) of the Criminal Code can include factors like unbuckled passengers, as they enhance the dangerousness of the driving, and that implicit findings on causation are acceptable if apparent from the decision.

The appellant brought an appeal in the Court of Appeal for Ontario against a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent of the Crown, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The appellant appealed a conviction.

On consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was directed to appear on December 10, 2018 to set a trial date.

The accused, Austen Garrido, was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an incident at a birthday party where a knife caused severe injury to Devan Dhindsa.

Garrido claimed self-defense and accident.

The court found Garrido's testimony largely incredible but also identified weaknesses in the Crown's case, particularly regarding the intent behind the knife injury and the alleged threatening actions.

Ultimately, the court found reasonable doubt on the essential elements of both charges and the accident theory, leading to acquittals.

The court declined to convict on the lesser charge of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose due to insufficient evidence of criminal intent or recklessness.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault following a jury trial.

The offences involved two separate incidents with the appellant's stepdaughter when she was 13 years old and approximately 18 months later.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that evidence concerning one incident could not be used to support a finding of guilt on charges relating to the other incident.

The jury charge was deficient and confusing, creating a risk of propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered, and an acquittal was entered on the sexual exploitation count as the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offence charges on the basis that the trial judge erred in denying two s. 11(b) Charter applications regarding unreasonable delay.

The first application was decided under the Morin test, and the second under the Jordan test.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in calculating the delay period and in assessing the relevant factors.

The trial judge incorrectly attributed delay to the defence when much of it was attributable to Crown disclosure practices and procedural issues.

The properly calculated delay of over 17 months substantially exceeded the Morin guideline of 8-10 months for provincial trials.

The case was not complex, and the prejudice to the accused was not modest as the trial judge had found.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and the proceedings were stayed.

The defendants brought a Charter application under section 11(b) alleging that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached.

The delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 20.5 months.

The Crown acknowledged the delay was presumptively unreasonable and sought to justify it based on case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The court found neither complexity nor transitional circumstances applied.

The case involved straightforward factual issues regarding consent and age verification, with only three principal Crown witnesses and a five-day trial schedule.

The court granted the application and stayed all charges against the defendants.

The appellant, a pediatrician, was convicted at trial of sexual assault following a genital examination of a 15-year-old patient during an initial consultation for attention deficit disorder.

The trial judge found that the appellant did not forewarn the patient of the genital examination and did not palpate the patient's testicles, and concluded the touching was gratuitous and for a sexual purpose.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the reliability of the complainant's testimony, the significance of the appellant's contemporaneous medical notes, and the expert evidence regarding the medical necessity and appropriateness of the examination.

The court concluded that on a correct apprehension of the evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, a small family-run grocery store, was convicted of operating food premises in a manner permitting a public health hazard contrary to Ontario Food Premises Regulation 562.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $6,255.

The appeal concerned sentence only.

The Crown conceded that the sentence was based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration of the violation.

The parties jointly requested a reduction to $1,500 payable over two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had misapprehended the evidence, ignored the fact that the store had been sold, failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay, and lacked information about previous convictions.

The defendant, Daniel Costa, was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath to homicide detectives.

The Crown conceded that Costa could not be convicted of perjury due to the application of s. 131(3) of the Criminal Code, as he was not legally required, permitted, or authorized to make the statement.

The Crown then sought to continue the prosecution on the basis that attempt to obstruct justice was an included offence of perjury as described in the indictment.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that attempt to obstruct justice was not necessarily included in the perjury charge as worded, and that the accused did not have fair notice of this potential charge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of controlled substances and possession for the purpose of trafficking based on evidence seized from his residence and vehicle pursuant to search warrants.

The central fact in the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrants was false: the police believed the appellant had sent a text message setting up a drug transaction, but it was actually sent by an employee.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter s. 8 application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the search warrants invalid, as the false information was the central basis for the residence search, and the remaining evidence was insufficient.

The court also found the warrant overbroad and the execution improper.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence and set aside the convictions.