Don Doney

The accused, R.H., was found guilty of sexual interference with his four-year-old step-granddaughter.

The Crown sought a two-year jail sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

Despite initially denying guilt, R.H. accepted responsibility at the sentencing hearing.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasizing the need for increased sentences for child sexual offences, the profound psychological and emotional harm caused, and the aggravating factors of a position of trust and the victim's young age.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, employment, and family support, though the belated acknowledgment of guilt was attenuated.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, imposing a sentence of two years less a day in jail, followed by three years probation, and various ancillary orders, finding the case slightly more aggravating than R. v. J.T. due to the family relationship.

The accused, R.H., was charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-granddaughter, M.C. The core allegation was that R.H. made M.C. touch his penis over his clothes.

The Crown presented evidence including M.C.'s spontaneous utterances, a 715 statement, and R.H.'s out-of-court admissions via text message.

R.H. testified, denying the allegations and explaining his admissions as panic-induced.

The court rejected R.H.'s in-court testimony, finding it inconsistent with the evidence, particularly M.C.'s unprompted utterances and R.H.'s own inculpatory text.

The court accepted M.C.'s statements and R.H.'s admissions as reliable.

Consequently, the court found R.H. guilty on all three charges.

This decision addresses a Crown application to admit hearsay statements of a child complainant (M.C.) in a criminal trial where the accused, R.H., is charged with sexual interference, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, aged 6 at the time of the application and 4 at the time of the alleged incidents, had no recollection of the events and would not testify.

The court applied the twin criteria of necessity and reliability for hearsay admissibility.

It found necessity met due to the complainant's young age and inability to recall.

For reliability, the court assessed both procedural and substantive aspects, including corroborative evidence from the accused's admissions.

The court admitted two spontaneous utterances and a video-recorded statement, finding them sufficiently reliable and distinct, but dismissed a third utterance as redundant.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's evidence was uncontested.

The sole issue was whether the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter was breached.

The accused argued that his waiver of the right to counsel was equivocal and that police should have taken further steps to explain his rights.

The court found that the accused's initial response of "I guess so" constituted a positive assertion of the right to counsel, placing the burden on the Crown to prove an informed and unequivocal waiver.

The court determined that the Crown satisfied this burden, as the accused was adequately informed of his rights on multiple occasions, including information about free duty counsel, and his waiver was clear and unequivocal despite his expressed uncertainty and emotional state.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and while possessing a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence based on alleged violations of Sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, arguing that the officer failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel before administering a roadside screening device test.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the "forthwith window" remained open and no realistic opportunity to consult counsel existed at the roadside.

At trial, the court found the accused not guilty of impaired operation but guilty of the over-80 charge, as the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt but successfully proved the blood-alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The defendants brought a Charter application under section 11(b) alleging that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached.

The delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 20.5 months.

The Crown acknowledged the delay was presumptively unreasonable and sought to justify it based on case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The court found neither complexity nor transitional circumstances applied.

The case involved straightforward factual issues regarding consent and age verification, with only three principal Crown witnesses and a five-day trial schedule.

The court granted the application and stayed all charges against the defendants.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on a blended voir dire basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on the investigating officer's failure to have an approved screening device readily available when making the demand for a breath sample, resulting in an 8-minute delay.

The court found that a realistic opportunity existed for the accused to consult counsel before the test was administered and that the officer failed to take reasonable steps to facilitate the accused's right to counsel.

The court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.